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Elizabeth Hinton 
 
The first historical account of federal crime control policy, “From Social Welfare 
to Social Control” contextualizes the mass incarceration of marginalized Americans by 
illuminating the process that gave rise to the modern carceral state in the decades after the 
Civil Rights Movement. The dissertation examines the development of the national law 
enforcement program during its initial two decades, from the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which established the block grant system and a massive 
federal investment into penal and juridical agencies, to the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988, which set sentencing guidelines that ensured historic incarceration rates. 
During this critical period, Presidential Administrations, State Departments, and 
Congress refocused the domestic agenda from social programs to crime and punishment. 
To challenge our understanding of the liberal welfare state and the rise of modern 
conservatism, “From Social Welfare to Social Control” emphasizes the bipartisan 
dimensions of punitive policy and situates crime control as the dominant federal response 
to the social and demographic transformations brought about by mass protest and the 
decline of domestic manufacturing. The federal government’s decision to manage the 
material consequences of rising unemployment, subpar school systems, and poverty in 
American cities as they manifested through crime reinforced violence within the 
communities national law enforcement legislation targeted with billions of dollars in 
grant funds from 1968 onwards.  
By highlighting the role of race-neutral language in federal policy following civil 
rights legislation, the study also exposes the way structural racism endured after racism in 
the public sphere was no longer acceptable. Tracking the discretionary portion of the law 
enforcement budget that Congress permitted the White House to spend autonomously 
illustrates the way racism grounded color-blind crime control programs over time. With 
novel use of discretionary aid, White House Officials enlarged the federal government’s 
influence over local authorities while still operating through the new states’ rights 
paradigm the Safe Streets Act created via block grants. On the ground, federal law 
enforcement assistance heightened patrol forces in black urban neighborhoods and social 
institutions, causing disproportionate arrest rates and the unprecedented entrance of 
young Americans from areas of segregated poverty into state and federal penitentiaries.  
At the close of the first twenty years of the national law enforcement program, the 
number of inmates in American prisons had more than tripled. 
Ultimately, the dissertation questions the way the federal government helped to 
facilitate the process through which the state apparatus of punishment—including law 
enforcement, criminal justice, border management, and prison systems—quickly 
developed into its own viable industry in the context of urban deindustrialization and 
disinvestment. In contributing to debates about the persistence of poverty in the United 
States and drawing our attention to the federal government’s role in sustaining punitive 
policy that first emerged in the 1960s, “From Social Welfare to Social Control” provides 
critical insight to one of the most important questions facing our society: why, in the land 
of the free, are more than one in a hundred American citizens in prison or jail?
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From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime 
It is striking that the mass incarceration of young black and Latino Americans in 
the late twentieth century occurred once overt racism no longer enjoyed public 
legitimacy.1  The origins of this phenomenon can be traced to the height of the liberal 
welfare state, when President Lyndon Johnson created the Office of Law Enforcement 
Assistance in the spring of 1965 and set the federal government’s punitive intervention in 
motion. The blueprint Johnson developed for a national crime control program remained 
entirely race-neutral, as did all of punitive measures designed by his predecessors. Yet as 
they unfolded on the ground federal law enforcement programs produced vast racial 
discrepancies.2 Policymakers earmarked low-income urban areas for increased patrol and 
surveillance, and young Americans living in these communities entered the criminal 
justice system at historic rates. The fact that today black men are more likely than their 
counterparts to serve prison or jail time, and that half of all young urban African-
American men are under criminal supervision, is rooted in the ways the first twenty years 
                                                   
1  
2 There are countless statistics reinforcing the inherent racism in the American criminal justice 
system. More than half of young black men in major urban centers are currently in prison or jail, and across 
the nation black men are 6.5 times more likely than white men and 2.5 times more likely than Latino men 
to encounter the carceral state. See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age 
of Colorblindness (New York: New Press, 2011), 16; Heather C. West, William J. Sabol, and Sarah J. 
Greenman, “Prisoners in 2009,” Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Revised 10-27-11, Department of 
Justice; Adam Gopnik, “The Caging of America,” The New Yorker, January 30, 2012.  
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of race-blind federal punitive policy criminalized Americans living in areas of segregated 
poverty. 3  
The advent of mass imprisonment in the late twentieth century is the latest 
development in the evolution of the civil status of black Americans. State governments 
turned to punitive policy in the decades after emancipation and compromised the promise 
of Reconstruction by supporting the nation’s first prison boom and disproportionately 
sentencing young black men to long terms. 4 Roughly a century later, a new system of 
social control and exclusion quickly formed in the ashes of Jim Crow. The federal 
government turned to punitive policy in the decades after the “Second Reconstruction,” 
and compromised the promise of full civic participation.5 With respect to the franchise, 
employment, healthcare, and fundamental social rights, the rise of the modern American 
carceral complex has reditected the social and economic progression that characterized 
postwar liberal reform and the racial inclusion championed by the civil rights movement.  
This dissertation examines the way prisons, jails, and law enforcement institutions 
have functioned as the engine of social inequality since the mid-1960s. It treats crime 
control measures enacted by the federal government in the late 1960s and 1970s as a set 
of pre-emptive policies that criminalized entire communities and created a law 
enforcement infrastructure capable of incarcerating hundreds of thousands of new 
                                                   
 3 Heather Ann Thompson calls this dynamic the “criminalization of urban space.” See Thompson, 
“Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American 
History,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 97, No.3 December 2010 (pp. 703-58), 705; Alexander 
16. 
4 See David M. Oshinsky: “Worse Than Slavery”: Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow 
Justice (New York: 1997).  
5 The term “Second Reconstruction” is Manning Marable’s. See Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The 
Second Reconstruction and Beyond in Black America (Oxford: University of Mississippi Press, Third 
Edition, 2007).  
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offenders. The unprecedented scope of urban civil disorder, beginning with Watts in 
1965, compelled Lyndon Johnson to design a major national law enforcement program 
that enhanced the government’s ability to monitor and detain low-income urban 
Americans. This punitive turn birthed what sociologist Bruce Western calls the “mass 
imprisonment generation,” or poorly educated black men born after 1965.6 Extending our 
gaze beyond the Electoral College, white backlash, and Ronald Reagan’s ascent in the 
1980s, this examination understands mass imprisonment as a process that developed over 
time. It is the product of reactionary federal policy that preserved historical inequality 
when the post-Reconstruction racial order lost its legal grounding. 
Major incidents of urban civil disorder (or what policymakers, journalists, and 
most of the public at large called “riots”) underscored the consequences of two decades 
of structural exclusion in the age of prosperity and abundance.  Coming into the 1960s, 
more than half of all nonwhite Americans lived in poverty. By mid-decade, it became 
clear that while postwar policy had enabled many white Americans and European ethnics 
to achieve middle-class status through housing subsidies and the GI Bill, these and other 
federal programs had increased segregation in the United States and maintained 
inequality in the liberal welfare state. Riots and the reported crime rate called for the 
federal government to launch an intervention in vulnerable neighborhoods. In 
dismantling Jim Crow the federal government fully embraced the principle of 
antidiscrimination, but to truly realize the goal of equal opportunity it needed to combat 
the structural forces from which racial inequality flows. 
                                                   
6 Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
2006) 31, 195.   
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Instead the federal government created an entirely new set of policies and 
institutions and transformed the activist state in the process. 7 The development of the 
criminal justice system in the first half of the twentieth century shaped the punitive 
practices of the postwar period, but the federal government’s choice to invest in law 
enforcement institutions in the immediate context of urban civil disorder and black 
demands for full socio-economic inclusion represented an entirely new approach to crime 
control and the purpose of state authority.8 Regulating the economy or enacting 
egalitarian policy no longer fell within the purview of the state, which moved towards 
regulating individual behavior and privileging the right to safety. Along these lines, the 
federal government transitioned criminal justice from a system focused on punishing 
offenders and preventing crime to a system of management, social control, and 
surveillance.  
Although conservative principles of limited government, unregulated capitalism, 
and individual autonomy stimulated the transition of government functions to the private 
sector and discontinued social programs, the rise of federal punitive policy is a 
thoroughly bipartisan story. Indeed, crime control may be the domestic policy issue in the 
late twentieth century where conservative and liberal interests were heavily intertwined. 
Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress from the Johnson Administration 
                                                   
7 Alan Brinkley, Liberalism and its Discontents (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); 
Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989). 
8 Orlando Patterson’s view that of black criminality emerged forcefully in the post-emancipation 
period but did not become a “national problem” until the 1970s reinforces my own view. See The Ordeal of 
Integration: Progress and Resentment in America’s “Racial’ Crisis (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 
1998).  A few scholars have considered the ways in which riots in the 1960s shaped subsequent urban 
living conditions and policy at the federal, state, and local levels. See Robert M. Fogelson, Violence as 
Protest: A Study of Riots and Ghettos, (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1971); Gerald Horne: Fire 
This Time: The Watts Uprising and the 1960s (New York: De Capo Press, 1997). 
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through the final years of the Reagan Administration and worked with Republicans to 
devise a new approach to federalism, one that restored states’ rights via block grants and 
replaced public social programs with privatized and punitive ones. Together, Democrats 
and Republicans increased urban patrol forces, enacted harsh and racially biased 
sentencing laws, and endorsed new penal institutions that made mass incarceration 
possible.  
On the surface, policies of decentralization and disinvestment dissolved Great 
Society programs and with it the relationship between the federal government and 
municipalities established by the New Deal. But the bipartisan coalition retained these 
partnerships in the form of law enforcement programs. By reallocating public resources 
from a domestic social war based on welfare principles to a domestic social war based on 
control principles, the federal government remained in cities as a repressive, rather than a 
progressive, agent.  
Given the gross exaggeration of rising crime rates by policymakers at all levels of 
government and the increasing coverage of urban disorder by the national media, the 
emergence of federal crime control policy in the mid 1960s should be understood both as 
a response to civil rights advances and the threat riots posed to American law and 
institutions. In fact violent crime steadily declined beginning in the 1930s and crime 
levels in the 1960s remained stable despite rising law and order rhetoric. Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark insisted in 1967, “there is no crime wave in this country,” pointing 
out that the murder rate in 1965 was the same as in 1910.9 Even though law enforcement 
                                                   
9 The murder rate in 1965 was at 5.5. for every 100,000 Americans, the same rate as in 1910. 
Sidney E. Zion “Clark Says Rise in Crime is Small,” New York Times, 19 May 1967; Thompson, “Why 
Mass Incarceration Matters.” 
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officials and policymakers questioned the accuracy of FBI Uniform Crime Reports, in the 
context of urban uprisings the data reinforced the sense that crime was on the rise among 
specific sectors of the citizenry.  
The development of crime statistics technology alongside early federal law 
enforcement measures meant that rising crime rates correlated directly to rising crime 
reporting, a fact that skewed perceptions of violence.10 During the progressive era, 
reformers and social scientists crafted what historian Khalil Gibran Muhammad calls a 
“statistical discourse” that associated black Americans with criminality, a notion that 
shaped the popular and political imagination in subsequent decades. When the federal 
government chose to invest in law enforcement and crime control in the mid-1960s, it 
similarly relied on a statistical discourse to reinforce and justify new social control 
programs. 11 Rates of reported crime among young black men justified their 
disproportionate numbers in the criminal justice system. However, arrest rates do not 
provide a sound indicator of actual crime but reflect the extent of police force in a given 
community.12 By targeting low-income urban areas for law enforcement programs, the 
federal government unleashed conditions that heightened the chance of arrest for young 
black men and created a portrait of criminality in those areas. The resulting figures 
influenced and reinforced policy decisions and built a strategy for domestic social war 
based largely on anticipated crime. Accordingly, the explosion in prison populations 
                                                   
10 Vesla Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in 
American Political Development, 21 (Fall 2007), 258, 260-261. 
11 Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of 
Modern Urban America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).  
 
12 See Michael Tonry, Punishing Race: A Continuing American Dilemma (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
  
7 
during the 1990s did not reflect actual crime rates, but expressed changes in law, 
budgetary allocations for crime control, and punitive practices at all levels of 
government.13  
With overt racism no longer enjoying public legitimacy, legislators coded the 
racial dimension of law enforcement initiatives in race-neutral, social-psychological 
terms. As civil rights advocate Michelle Alexander reminds us, “It is the genius of the 
new system of control that it can always be defended on nonracial grounds.”14 Although 
federal policymakers often used the language of crime to discuss race, the extent of racial 
bias in the criminal justice system can be gauged through the discretionary portion of the 
crime control budget. Operating in the confines of the block grant system, discretionary 
funds offered the White House an opportunity to fund special law enforcement initiatives 
of its own choosing. Because of this degree of power and influence, the use of 
discretionary funds profoundly reflects presidential intent with respect to the national law 
enforcement program. Tracking the discretionary budget exposes the racial motivations 
behind anti-crime policy, motivations so pervasive that the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan 
Administrations contradicted their own avowed commitments to the principles of “New 
Federalism,” or devolution, to exert greater punitive authority in American cities with 
high rates of reported crime. Even if states did not allocate crime control resources to 
urban police departments as policymakers had intended, the White House targeted 
discretionary funds in areas of segregated poverty. In this sense, understanding the 
                                                   
13 See Western, Punishment and Inequality, Chapter 7.  
14 Alexander 103.  
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president’s use of the discretionary budget illustrates the way racism structured crime 
control programs over time.  
The expansion of federal criminal justice programs in the 1970s built an enduring 
punitive environment in areas of segregated poverty by making law enforcement the 
primary mode of contact between the state and black Americans with limited education.15 
When the reported crime rate doubled nearly ten years into the national crime control 
program as a result of the enlargement of the law enforcement apparatus, the federal 
government enacted pre-emptive legislation and funded special discretionary programs 
that targeted black youth and their families as a means to contain the problem. Ironically, 
this tactic worsened the issues policymakers had originally hoped to reduce. 
As War on Crime programs reshaped War on Poverty programs, the integration of 
law enforcement in urban social institutions dramatically increased the chances of arrest 
and incarceration in targeted areas. After a decade of federal crime control measures, 
contact with law enforcement officials emerged as a condition of everyday life for low-
income urban Americans. By the time the prison population sharply rose in the mid-
1980s, patrol and surveillance had become a normative condition for a generation of 
young Americans. The placement of law enforcement officials and institutions in urban 
social programs serving racially marginalized populations shaped not only the individuals 
absorbed by the criminal justice system—who are denied access to the franchise, 
                                                   
15 In Imprisoning Communities: How Mass Incarceration Makes Disadvantaged Neighborhoods 
Worse (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), Todd R. Clear discusses how high rates of 
incarceration in concentrated communities further contributes to the criminalization of those very 
communities, my work demonstrates the ways in which this process began in the decade before and 
alongside the rapid accelearation of prison populations.   
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employment opportunities, and welfare and housing benefits after release—but also their 
families and communities.16 
By operating the national law enforcement program through warfare metaphors 
and defining the enemy under coded racial terms, the federal government fostered the 
militarization of urban police departments and introduced a host of new weapons on the 
streets of America’s cities suffering from extreme rates of unemployment. This included 
helicopters, bulletproof vests, army tanks and guns, walkie-talkies, and computer 
management programs. Excluded from formal employment opportunities in the era of 
industrial decline and failing urban school systems, youth groups began to arm 
themselves for self-protection and to access the underground economy. Street crime 
quickly turned deadly. The term “post-industrial violence” captures this dynamic, which 
emerged following the initial hardware and patrol phase of the law enforcement program. 
Punitive policy removed the casualties of the War on Crime and the War on Drugs from 
the streets and sentenced them to correctional institutions, but other narcotics traffickers, 
thieves, vandals, and murderers rose in their absence. The phenomenon of post-industrial 
violence reached full force in the landscape of continued plant closures, the crack 
epidemic, and gang warfare in the mid-1980s. 
At the height of the civil rights movement and direct action protest, when the 
nation seemed ready to embrace the egalitarian values and redistributive principles that 
guided the black political sphere throughout the history of the United States, the federal 
                                                   
16 Loic Wacquant, “The New ‘Peculiar Institution:’ On the Prison as Surrogate Ghetto,” 
Theoretical Criminology 4, 200: 377-89; Alexander 14.  
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government’s punitive turn prevented this realization.17 In subsequent years, the 
relocation of domestic manufacturing jobs overseas, the assault on union benefits and 
working conditions, and the privatization of public programs disproportionately touched 
racially marginalized Americans. Yet the expansion of the black middle class and the 
visibility of nonwhite Americans in positions of power reinforced the notion that the 
United States moved beyond race-based systems of exploitation. Although black 
Americans grew more affluent after 1965, they are primarily concentrated in the public 
sphere and social services, where mobility is tied to the extent of state spending on 
domestic programs. In deciding to manage the material consequences of institutional 
racism with crime control programs, the federal government’s set a process in motion that 
made mass incarceration possible and spawned new levels of intra-stratification among 
black Americans. Problems of crime, violence, and drug abuse demanded structural 
solutions, but the federal government has yet to move beyond law enforcement and 
incarceration as means of retaining social control.  
 
Overview 
This story begins at the peak of progressive social policy in the United States, 
when Lyndon B. Johnson led other liberals in a bipartisan, bi-regional effort that halted 
the trajectory of postwar reform. Chapter 1 stresses that, as the architect of modern crime 
control, Johnson’s most enduring legacy with respect to domestic policy lies not in his 
Great Society programs but in the punitive turn his administration spearheaded. The 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 contained the legislative origins of 
                                                   
17 Using the concept of “Frontlash” to describe this dynamic, Vesla Weaver demonstrates the way 
policymakers created a national crime control program that is best understood as a pre-emptive reaction to 
civil rights policy. See Weaver, “Frontlash.” 
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the “New Federalism” favored by conservatives, and when Johnson signed the bill into 
law with block grants he led the federal government in returning funding power to states 
in the ashes of Jim Crow.  
Chapter 2 traces the impact of the Safe Streets Act to show how the Nixon 
administration established crime prevention bureaucracies at the state and federal level to 
funnel law enforcement grants to local and private entities. Through the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) established by the 1968 Act, 
municipalities that confronted urban civil disorder in the second half of the 1960s 
received federal grants to train police officers and equip them with advanced weapons 
and communications technology. Corruption and mismanagement within the LEAA, 
however, exposed the limitations of the block grant system and the hardware focused 
approach to crime control. Despite the fact that the Nixon’s “New Federalism” and 
Revenue Sharing Programs had failed to reduce the crime rate or engender a cohesive 
national crime control program, and policymakers awareness of this failure, Congress 
continued to increase its annual allocation to law enforcement and prison construction.  
With discretionary use of law enforcement aid, Nixon empowered police officers 
to disproportionately patrol low-income black neighborhoods and schools. Chapter 3 
explores the way radical new patrol and urban policy programs unfolded in areas of 
segregated poverty and examines community responses to these practices. The 
development of the national juvenile justice program is the focus of Chapter 4, when the 
federal government drafted pre-emptive crime control policy. The federal government’s 
decision to raise penalties for drugs and juvenile infractions produced a significant 
population of new offenders, many of them young people, who entered state and federal 
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penitentiaries at unprecedented rates beginning in the mid-1970s. Building from the 
Nixon model, Gerald Ford used discretionary funds to support the burgeoning juvenile 
justice system by forming special programs addressing firearm use and gang membership 
among black urban youth.  
When Jimmy Carter inherited the enlarged law enforcement complex sanctioned 
by these prior administrations, he attempted to relieve an increasingly overburdened 
justice system by conjoining punitive and general urban policies. Rather than resorting to 
fighting crime solely by increasing arrest rates, Carter unsuccessfully attempted to 
decriminalize marijuana and lower recidivism through a “community-based” approach to 
corrections. Yet Carter’s Presidency represented a key moment of transition in the 
construction of the American carceral state. Chapter 5 exposes the way his administration 
laid the groundwork for an increased reliance on private contractors and elite councils to 
direct federal law enforcement programs. As Carter’s Attorney General labored to replace 
the LEAA with cabinet-level policy boards and research centers, other officials 
consolidated the efforts of a range of federal agencies involved in crime control. Like 
Johnson, Carter believed only social justice and economic opportunity could have a long-
range impact on crime. However, by increasing the power of local law enforcement to 
actively shape city planning, patrol urban public schools, and monitor housing projects, 
the Carter Administration strengthened the punitive authority of police departments in the 
everyday lives of marginalized Americans at the close of the 1970s.  
By the time that Ronald Reagan instituted mandatory minimum sentences for 
minor offenses, thereby culminating more than two decades of federal crime control 
efforts, the number of inmates in American prisons had risen over five hundred percent. 
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This history concludes with Reagan’s Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which defined drug users 
as criminals and institutionalized a coordinated effort among law enforcement, the 
military, and intelligence. Now the Attorney General, the National Security Affairs 
Advisor, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Housing and Urban Development, and the 
Directors of the FBI and the CIA collaborated on domestic and international law 
enforcement at National Drug Control Policy Board meetings. Not only did the law  
target black and Latino Americans by the end of the Reagan Administration under 
explicit terms, but it had reorganized and strengthened the carceral capabilities of the 
federal government.  
 
Historiography 
In his 2008 presidential address to the Urban History Association, Michael Katz 
characterized the retreat from direct action protest and civil violence of the 1960s and 
early 1970s as an “inward turn” towards criminal or “opportunistic” violence.18 Katz 
noted that while black Americans no longer found themselves legally marginalized from 
participation in the political system and consumer marketplace, the persistence of race-
based economic inequality in the aftermath of the civil rights movement resulted in “de-
politicization among African American youth.” Eschewing interpretations of the “inward 
turn” as the product of inherent cultural or behavioral deviance, Katz went on to 
speculate: “That a share of the responsibility for the turn toward criminal violence… rests 
with public authorities remains a hypothesis—intriguing, explosive in its implications, 
and in need of much research. Indeed, the lack of research on this question… remains 
                                                   
18“Opportunistic violence” is sociologist Charles Tilly’s term. See The Politics of Collective 
Violence. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
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stunning and surprising.”19 While there is a significant body of literature on the decline of 
collective action in the context of deindustrialization and divestment, the development of 
the national law enforcement program has yet to be considered as critical explanatory 
element in that story.  
Recognizing this void, and calling for historians to “think critically about mass 
incarceration and begin to consider the reverberations of this never-before-seen 
phenomenon,” Heather Ann Thompson’s groundbreaking article in the Journal of 
American History in 2010 made a profound a case for why the rapid expansion of the 
American carceral complex needs to be at the center of work that considers the rise of 
conservatism, the decline of the labor movement, and urban inequality in the postwar 
period. 20  In this vein, the history of the first twenty years of federal crime control policy 
enhances our view of the political, economic, and social transformations in the United 
States over the last fifty years that are embedded in the expansion of American penal and 
juridical institutions. Understanding the development of the national crime control 
program over time illuminates the ways the punitive turn shaped the contours of the 
                                                   
19Michael Katz “Why Don’t American Cities Burn Very Often?” Journal of Urban History, Vol. 
34, No. 2, 185-208: January 2008.  
20 Thompson 705. 
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“inward turn” identified by Katz.21 It is a history that helps us make sense of the fact that 
today many states spend more money on penitentiaries than public schools.22     
From the mid-1960s onwards, sociologists and political scientists supplied the 
theoretical and statistical base for federal punitive policy.23 These interpretations 
explained why Americans living in segregated poverty came to be disproportionately 
represented in carceral institutions through a social-pathological framework. By treating 
structurally disadvantaged African-Americans as monolithic, cultural deterministic 
arguments espoused by Daniel Patrick Moynihan and others relied on long-held racial 
stereotypes that naturalized criminal behavior. The idea of an urban “underclass” itself 
suggested that black Americans possessed transhistorical cultural traits that fostered 
dependence and deviance. Taken together, the sociologist Nathan Glazer and 
psychologist Kenneth Clark offered a new socio-historical interpretation of black 
American life to explain inequality and the development of the civil rights movement in 
                                                   
21 Within United States historiography, we have a much firmer grasp of the relationship between 
the criminalization of black Americans, imprisonment, and the development of the carceral state in the 
decades after emancipation.21 In addition to Muhammad’s work on perceptions of black criminality 
following Reconstruction, Rebecca McLennan’s The Crisis of Imprisonment: Protest, Politics, and the 
Making of the American Penal State, 1776-1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) links the 
steady growth of incarceration with the development of what she calls a “mass carceral bureaucracy” that 
evolved throughout American history. McLennan’s research opened up new questions about the 
relationship between the expansion of state power and the growth of crime and penal institutions.  
22 Reports from the Department of Justice and the National Education Association in 2011 
indicated that California, New York, Georgia, and Michigan spent more money incarcerating citizens than 
on educating them. California spent approximately $47,000 annually on a single inmate while only $9,000 
on a student. See Heather C. West, William J. Sabol, and Sarah J. Greenman, “Prisoners in 2009,” Bureau 
of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Revised 10-27-11, Department of Justice; National Education Association, 
Rankings of the States 2010 and Estimates of School Statistics 2011. The Pew Center on the States and the 
Public Safety Performance Project’s report, “One in 100: Behind Bars in America in 2008” reported that 
California, Michigan, Vermont, and Minnesota spent more on prisons than public universities and 
community colleges; Pew Center on the States and the Public Safety Performance Project, 2008. 
23 Scholars who have examined the rise of the prison system in the postwar period include Robert 
Perkinson, Texas Tough: The Rise of America’s Prison Empire, (New York: Picador, 2010); Volker 
Janssen, “When the ‘Jungle’ Met the Forest: Public Work, Civil Defense, and Prison Camps in Postwar 
California, Journal of American History, 96 (Dec. 2009), 702-26; Christian Parenti, Lockdown America: 
Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (New York, 2000). 
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both structural and pathological terms. During Reagan’s War on Crime, the parameters of 
the debate that began amidst the War on Poverty resumed, but lost the economic 
groundings the earlier literature provided.   
In the 1980s, scholarly and professional research into the urban “underclass” 
encouraged the federal government to disinvest from social programs. Reagan’s comment 
to the International Association of Chiefs of Police: “Only our deep moral values and 
strong institutions can hold back that jungle and restrain the darker impulses of human 
nature;” echoed George Gilder’s conclusion in the 1981 bestseller Wealth and Poverty: 
“The problem is… familial anarchy among the concentrated poor of the inner city, in 
which flamboyant and impulsive youths rather than responsible men provide the themes 
of aspiration”24 According to Gilder and other prominent new-right scholars—including 
Edward Banfield, Milton Friedman, and Oscar Lewis—the “underclass” originated when 
changes in social policy under the Great Society attempted to govern the behavior of 
welfare recipients.25  As Charles Murray argued in Losing Ground: American Social 
                                                   
24 Ken Auletta expressed the same sentiment in explicitly racist terms in The Underclass (New 
York: Random House, 1982). While Auletta admitted that, “ all races behave the same,” he went on to state 
that, “in the rural South (where many of the white poor reside) defiant anti-social behavior is less prevalent; 
the underclass is less visible. In urban America, the members of the underclass are as omnipresent as 
potholes, and can be considerably more dangerous.” Auletta 200; Reagan quoted in Brent S. Steel and 
Mary and E. Steger, “Death Penalty: Just Punishment or Legalized Homicide?” in Raymond Tatalovich, 
Theodore J. Lowi, and Bryon W. Daynes, eds. Moral Controversies in American Politics, 2nd ed. (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe), 115; George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Bookthrift Company, 1981), 
153.  
25 See Edward Banfield, Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1967) and 
The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis (New York: Little, Brown, 1970); 
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2002); Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez: Autobiography of a Mexican Family (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1979). Nicholas Lemann’s The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How it 
Changed America (New York: Vintage, 1992) intervened on the underclass scholarship by stressing social 
functions, but retained pathological conclusions by arguing that “underclass culture in the ghettos” is 
traceable to the culture of sharecropping in the South. See also Douglas Glasgow, The Black Underclass: 
Unemployment and Entrapment of Ghetto Youth  (New York: Random House, 1980); Lawrence Mead, 
Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship  (New York: Free Press, 1986). 
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Policy, 1950-1980, Johnson’s activist state contributed to the breakdown of familial, 
educational, and religious institutions. The “underclass” imagined by Murray and others 
resulted in part from “liberal language” that prevented conversations that identified social 
welfare as poverty’s source and the free market as poverty’s solvent. To combat cultural 
deterministic arguments, structuralists similarly concerned themselves with issues of 
unemployment, welfare, and teen pregnancy.26 Despite critical adjustments to the cultural 
deterministic view of perceived welfare dependency and violence as constitutive of 
poverty, lack of context obscured the relationship between a long history of structural 
racism and mobility and could not fully account for the ways in which crime is rooted in 
the specific historical conditions of its origin.27 Even Katz’s choice of the phrase “inward 
turn” implicitly retains the imprint of the consensus that rooted urban crisis in behavioral 
characteristics.  
                                                   
26 Some of this literature includes Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood, Welfare Realities. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).; Herbert J. Gans, The War Against the Poor: The 
Underclass and Antipoverty Policy. (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Tom Joe and Cheryl Rogers, By the 
Few for the Few: The Reagan Welfare Legacy (1985); Michael Katz, ed. The “Underclass Debate:” Views 
from History. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) and Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the 
War on Poverty to the War on Welfare. (New York: Pantheon, 1990); Melvin L., Oliver, Jr., and Thomas 
M. Shapiro. Black Wealth/White Wealth. (New York: Routledge, 1995); Douglas Massey, and Nancy 
Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1993); and Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on 
Poverty. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).  
27 Placing race at the center of the rise of punitive policy, Michelle Alexander, Vesla Weaver and 
Bruce Western offer the best examinations of contemporary mass incarceration. While they do stress the 
emergence of federal crime control in the post-civil rights, post-riot political and social landscape, the Ford 
and Carter administrations are almost entirely absent from their analysis. Other notable works on crime and 
prisons include Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997);  Lawrence Bobo, Melvin D. Oliver, James Johnson Jr., and 
Abel Valenzuela Jr., eds., Prismatic Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2000); David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary 
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Clarence Lusane, Pipe Dream Blues: Racism and 
the War on Drugs (Boston: South End Press, 1991); Mark Mauer, Race to Incarcerate (New York: New 
Press, 1999); Jerome Miller, Search and Destroy: African-American Males in the Criminal Justice System 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect; Race, Crime, and 
Punishment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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 Given the proximity of the post-civil rights period to our own, historians have 
only begun to investigate the impact of deindustrialization, poverty, and the decline of 
postwar liberalism on black urban Americans.28 In particular, African-American Studies 
and Urban Studies offers a middle ground between exclusively cultural or structural 
interpretations.29 Thomas Sugrue’s The Origins of Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in 
Postwar Detroit avoided the tendency to portray black Americans as victims of an 
inescapable cultural cycle. Sugrue examined the way structural forces played out through 
homeownership, arguing that the intersection of deindustrialization and stratification 
intersected with racism and fostered unequal conditions that restricted black agency.  
With a similar set of questions about white flight, the decline of liberalism, the 
rise of Reagan democrats, and the political dimensions of racism, Robert O. Self used 
Sugrue’s interpretive framework in American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for 
Postwar Oakland to argue that residential segregation and urban decline resulted from 
                                                   
28 Within sociology, Loic Wacquant has made important connections between the penal and 
welfare states. See especially Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity 
(Raleigh: Duke University Press, 2009); “Racial Stigma in the Making of the Punitive State,” in Race, 
Incarceration, and American Values, ed. Loury, 57-70.  
29The historical method employed by several key works in Black Studies offers compelling links 
between segregated poverty, mass imprisonment, and sites of possible resistance. This includes Manning 
Marable, How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America. (Boston: South End Press, 1982), and Race, 
Reform, and Rebellion; Robin D.G. Kelley, Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class. 
(New York: Free Press, 1994), and Yo’ Mama’s Disfunktional! Fighting the Culture Wars in Urban 
America. (Boston: Beacon Press,1997); Earl Lewis, In Their Own Interests: Race, Class and Power in 20th 
Century Norfolk, Virginia. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); and J. Phillip Thompson, 
Double Trouble: Black Mayors, Black Communities, and the Call for a Deep Democracy (Cambridge: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). In addition, from the late 1980s onwards, ethnography probed how 
residents negotiated and responded to community-specific problems. These micro-level findings can be 
further illuminated by a macro-level approach. See Elijah Anderson, Streetwise: Race, Class, and Change 
in an Urban Community. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Martin Sanchez Jankowski, 
Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1991); Christopher Jencks, Rethinking Social Policy: Race, Poverty, and the Underclass 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); and Sudhir Venkatesh’s work on the underground 
economy and gang leaders in Chicago. 
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racially motivated state and local tax and development policies. 30 While Sugrue, Self, 
and many others offered a useful method to examine the relationship between federal 
policy and local initiatives, scholars have yet to include crime control and police 
militarization in these discussions.31 Donna Murch’s Living for the City: Migration, 
Education and the Rise of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California is the standing 
exception. Murch offers an important consideration of militant protest and politics in the 
postwar period that links the criminalization of black urban populations with the 
modernization of local police forces.32  
                                                   
30 Social Geographers like David Harvey and Mike Davis have also undertaken questions of 
imprisonment and punishment. See Davis, City of Quartz. (New York, Verso: 1990); Harvey, The Urban 
Experience (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) and Justice, Nature, and the Geography of 
Difference (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1997). One of the only academics to focus on prisons 
specifically, Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in 
Globalizing California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007) pointed to the ways in which 
federal interstate systems facilitated suburbanization of white Americans and skilled, high-tech industries. 
The process secured California’s dominance in both the military and prison operations. By considering the 
relationship between economic restructuring in urban and rural communities, Gilmore and I ask similar 
questions about the post-1965 shift from the state’s role as an “urban growth machine” to a “federal 
devolution machine” in order to “produce stability and growth in the general political economy,” when 
“equity is no longer on the agenda,” Gilmore 22. See also Ann R Markusen, Peter Hall, Scott Campbell, 
and Sabina Deitrick. The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991). 
31The most recent works in Urban Studies have shifted the field’s focus from inner-cities to 
explore suburban development. See Kevin Kruse and Thomas Sugrue, eds. The New Suburban History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Daniel M.P. Freund, Colored Property: State Policy and 
White Racial Politics in Suburban America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). See also Arnold 
R Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); Raphael J. Sonenshein, Politics in Black and White: Race and Power in Los 
Angeles. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Scholars are also beginning to note how the War on 
Poverty played out on a local context. See Susan Youngblood Ashmore, Carry it On: The War on Poverty 
and the Civil Rights Movement in Alabama, 1964-1972 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008); 
Robert Bauman, Race and the War on Poverty: From Watts to East LA. (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2008).  
32 In her study of Oakland in the postwar period, Donna Murch shows how the state of California 
and the local police department responded to integration by focusing on delinquency. While Murch 
demonstrates the ways crime control programs on the state and local level used youth-based punitive 
programs to manage white racial fears, roughly thirty years later the federal government implemented this 
practice nationally. See Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise of the Black Panther Party 
in Oakland, California (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
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As historical treatments of the rise of the modern carceral state and mass 
imprisonment are only beginning to make a substantial impact on the literature, the most 
sustained discussion of the political shift towards social control appears in histories of 
late twentieth century conservatism. Like sociologists surveying the “underclass,” these 
scholars emphasize party politics, welfare debates, and tax reform to explain the advent 
of “law and order” discourse.33 For Thomas and Mary Edsall, Jonathan Rieder, and Jim 
Sleeper, by the late 1960s, military Keynesian redistributive principles that began with 
Roosevelt’s New Deal and lasted through Johnson’s Great Society could not endure once 
“pathological dependency” in American inner cities became linked in the popular 
imagination to the inherent failure of government social welfare programs. The threat of 
Black Power, urban riots, and busing mobilized a new conservative grassroots base that 
secured the American Right’s electoral resurgence. Yet the emphasis scholars of 
conservatism placed on the way the national media and politicians depicted black 
Americans in the years after the civil rights movement ignored political and economic 
transformations that left a skilled suburban job market spatially inaccessible and that 
turned towards law enforcement to execute social control objectives.34 
                                                   
33 Michael W. Flamm focuses on this explicitly. See Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, 
and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).  
34Thomas and Mary Edsall’s Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American 
Politics (New York: Norton, 1991) and T Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality. (New York: Norton, 
1988) argue that race, taxes, and rights set up “a chain reaction, a reaction forcing a realignment of the 
presidential electorate,” Edsall and Edsall, 3-4. Lisa McGirr’s Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the new 
American Right (2002) is one of the key works in conservatism studies. See also Matthew D. Lassiter, The 
Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); 
Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007); Jason Sokol, There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil 
Rights, 1945-1975 (New York; Vintage, 2007); Becky M. Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven: Life and Politics in 
the Working Class Suburbs of Los Angeles, 1920-1965 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
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Conservatism Studies relies on party politics to answer the question of why 
policymakers embraced law and order rhetoric to shore up support for carceral measures. 
Electoral concerns certainly help explain the federal government’s commitment to 
juridical and penal reform beginning in the mid-1960s, but Republican Party strategy is 
not a satisfactory answer alone. Barry Goldwater’s 1964 campaign and the “law-and-
order” focus of the 1968 election figures prominently into literature on mass 
incarceration. Without question, the rightward turn of the American political system is 
accountable for the appearance of anticrime legislation.35 And segregationists in 
Congress such as John McClellan, Sam Erwin, and Strum Thurmond emerged as some of 
the most outspoken crime control proponents in the early stages of the federal 
government’s law enforcement program. But research tracking post civil-rights 
realignment often conforms to a given set of social, political, economic categories that 
obstruct moments when liberals and conservatives shared criminal justice objectives. 
This critical historical shift must be extended outside of party politics and demands new 
consideration of party intersections in the domestic political sphere.  
Examining the process through which racial discourse became subverted and 
reframed in the political and economic context of both Moynihan’s The Negro Family 
and Murray’s Losing Ground lends critical context to the advent of post-industrial 
violence in deindustrializing cities. The accessibility of high-tech military weaponry, the 
advent of drive-by shootings and gang violence, and the watershed in hard narcotics 
                                                   
35Most recently, Rick Perlstein’s Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of 
America (New York: Scribner, 2008), and Sean Wilentz’s The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New 
York: Harper, 2008) have framed this realignment through different Presidential “eras.” While I do not find 
this a useful paradigm to examine the social, political, and economic dynamics of the late twentieth century 




trafficking are just a few examples of historical manifestations of violence that are best 
posed as historical questions. While deindustrialization is one element of the story—and 
indeed it may prove to be the critical factor—the revolution in the American law 
enforcement that immediately followed the “Second Reconstruction” is also important to 
explore the question of why more black men are touched by the criminal justice system 
today than were enslaved in 1850.36  In contributing to debates about the persistence of 
poverty in the United States and drawing our attention to the federal government’s role in 
sustaining punitive policy that first emerged in the 1960s, this history contextualizes the 
advent of mass imprisonment and provides critical insight to one of the most important 
questions facing our society: why, in the land of the free, are one in a hundred American 
citizens in prison or jail?37 
 
                                                   
36 Adam Gopnik, “The Caging of America,” The New Yorker, January 30, 2012. 




CHAPTER ONE  
 
“Progress of Justice or Equality:” 
The First Federal Crime Control Legislation and the Transition of Liberalism 
  
President Lyndon Johnson sent three bills to Congress in March 1965 that 
encapsulated the federal government’s legislative response to the civil rights movement. 
The Housing and Urban Development Act subsidized private homes for low-income 
renters; the Law Enforcement Assistance Act established a role for the federal 
government in local police operations; and the Voting Rights Act gave black Americans 
in the South the opportunity to participate in the electoral process as full citizens. It was a 
landmark year for liberal reform, following closely upon the Civil Rights Act’s 
dismantling of Jim Crow the previous July. By summer’s end in 1965, the President and 
Congress had expanded educational and vocational opportunities for black youth through 
Head Start and Neighborhood Youth Corps programs and gave poor families and older 
Americans access to health care benefits with Medicare and Medicaid. Yet Johnson also 
told Congress: “I hope 1965 will be regarded as the year when this country began a 
thorough, intelligent and effective war against crime.”1 Thus, the crest of constitutional 
change and socio-economic reform coincided with the beginning of a punitive turn in 
federal policy, particularly directed at black urban residents.  
Today, the Voting Rights Act is regarded as the apex of the civil rights revolution. 
Few remember the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, yet it too would have a profound 
impact on American society and subsequent national policy. As Great Society legislation 
worked its way through Congress and black residents of Watts engaged in urban civil 
                                                   
1 “President Forms Panel to Study Crime Problems,” New York Times, 27 Jul 1965, 1. 
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disorder, Johnson assembled research teams and supported experimental law enforcement 
practices to enable him to design the nation’s first national crime control program.  
From the outset, the Kennedy Administration had conjoined its social welfare 
objectives with social control objectives.2 The federal government’s earliest venture into 
anti-poverty policy focused on solving the problem of juvenile delinquency through 
social service institutions and social science research. Alongside a host of programs 
targeting youth, including Youth Opportunity Centers and Manpower Development and 
Training Act programs, in 1961 the Kennedy Administration established the Office of 
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development in the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare.3  Like subsequent executive-level crime control initiatives, in its early years 
the Juvenile Delinquency Office worked with public and non-profit local agencies on 
research and demonstration projects. It eventually served as a legislative precedent for 
Johnson’s War on Poverty and, later, his War on Crime.  
Although the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 represented the 
federal government’s earliest effort to respond to the needs of unemployed black 
Americans, urban civil disorder seemed to underscore the shortcomings of Kennedy and 
Johnson’s approach. The emergence of this new type of mass violence meant that the 
federal government could no longer evade social problems resulting from segregation in 
the nation’s cities. Policymakers in Congress, the White House, and Executive 
Departments increasingly chose not to attack the root causes of crime through these 
                                                   
2 See Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American 
Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
3 For a discussion of the Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development and the links 
between law enforcement and early War on Poverty programs, see Michael W. Flamm, Law and Order: 
Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005), Chapter 1.  
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youth-based programs, but to mitigate its effects through new police department 
programs. Barry Goldwater’s 1964 political campaign introduced “law and order” and 
“crime in the streets” into the political discourse and placed them on the domestic policy 
agenda. Following Johnson’s substantial electoral victory, he recast fighting crime as part 
of the Great Society. Liberals themselves would now preside over a revolution in 
American law enforcement. 
As the architect of modern crime control, Johnson’s most enduring legacy with 
respect to domestic policy lies not in his Great Society programs but in the punitive turn 
his administration spearheaded.4 By devising a blueprint for a revolution in the nation’s 
law enforcement and criminal justice systems, the Johnson Administration and key 
liberals in Congress laid the groundwork for a new approach to urban policy.  Johnson 
understood his federal crime plan as an “instrument for social progress,” in line with the 
larger aims of the Great Society, as a means to, “provide necessary resources to spur 
research and the generation of new thoughts, new approaches, and new methods in 
dealing with criminal activity.” 5 Johnson imagined that existing education, health, 
housing, and urban environment programs that contributed to eliminating the root causes 
of crime would operate in tandem with police training, correctional consolidation, and 
                                                   
4 Vesla Weaver’s “Frontlash: Race and the Politics of Punishment,” (PhD diss., Harvard 
University, 2007) stresses the significance of Johnson’s law enforcement initiatives from a political science 
perspective.  See also Glen C. Loury et al. Race, Incarceration, and American Values (Boston: The MIT 
Press, 2008) for a symposium on the punitive turn as it unfolded in subsequent decades. 
5Lyndon Johnson, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” 1967. Public Papers 
of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1970), Volume I, entry 14, 25-33; House Subcommittee No. 3, Committee on the 
Judiciary, Law Enforcement Assistance: Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st 
sess., May 20th 1965 Hearings, 8; In his 1965 crime speech, Johnson falsely claimed that since 1940 the 
crime rate had doubled and that it had increased five times as fast as the national population since 1958. 
See “Crime, its prevalence, and measures of prevention. Message from the President of the United States 
relative to comments on crime, its prevalence, and measures of prevention.” March 8, 1965. Serial Set Vol. 
No. 12677-3, Session Vol. No.1-3 89th Congress, 1st Session H.Doc. 103, 3.  
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research programs that contributed to the suppression of criminal activity.  As President 
during one of the most prosperous decades in the history of the United States, Johnson 
insisted that the federal government would continue to work towards social justice and 
economic opportunity.  
Although from the Great Depression through 1965 the national crime rate had 
declined, FBI data depicted black urban neighborhoods as frequent sites of prospective 
crime and young, black men as representing a high proportion of violent criminals. 6  
Although their accuracy was highly contested, the figures indicated that people under the 
age of twenty-five committed roughly three-fourths of crimes, and that nearly two million 
of the 2.8 million crimes reported to the police occurred in cities. 7 White men had the 
largest number of arrests, but the FBI statistics revealed that black men had a higher rate 
of arrest in every category except “offenses against public order and morals.”8 This led 
policymakers to conclude: “The common serious crimes that worry people most—
murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary—happen most often in 
the slums of large cities… the offenses, the victims, and the offenders are found most 
                                                   
6 Sidney E. Zion “Clark Says Rise in Crime is Small,” New York Times, 19 May 1967.  
7 Only 500,000 crimes were reported in suburbs, and 170,000 in rural areas. Nicholas deB. 
Katzenbach et al. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society: A Report by the President’s Commission on 
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1967), 5. Even though Commission members used federal data to support the use of federal grant 
monies in urban policing efforts, they knew the figures they used to base these claims were highly flawed. 
James Q. Wilson, who consulted federal planners on law enforcement programs, pointed out that the 
violent crime statistics the Katzenbach group relied upon to make its case for federal carceral measures 
could not be based in reality. Though Wilson questioned the reliability of the FBI in accurately reporting 
the crime situation in the United States, he explained the perpetual increase of violent crime as the result of 
an increase in the nation’s youth population, ultimately concluding, “the only sure way we know of fighting 
crime is birth control.” For Wilson, to curtail crime rates “short of locking up everyone under 30 years of 
age,” lay in “making more secure the scene of the prospective crime…” And as black urban neighborhoods, 
statistically speaking, posed the most accurately predictable scene of prospective crime, the federal 
government anchored its new crime control system in these areas. Wilson in The Public Interest, Fall 1966, 
32.  
8 Katzenbach 44.  
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frequently in the poorest, and most deteriorated and socially disorganized areas of 
cities.”9 Though Robert F. Kennedy’s crusade against white collar and organized crime 
brought those issues into the law enforcement policy arena, the FBI data supported the 
Johnson Administration’s perception that, “most crimes, wherever they are committed, 
are committed by boys and young men, and that most crimes, by whomever they are 
committed, are committed in cities.”10 This gave the federal government a specific locale 
(urban centers) and a specific population (young men between the ages of 15 and 24) at 
which to aim its reconstitution of American law enforcement.  
When the Watts section of Los Angeles erupted during the summer of 1965, just 
weeks after Johnson officially established the Crime Commission and the Senate 
Judiciary Committee subcommittee considered the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, the 
new federal crime control program won wide support among the larger American public 
and previously ambivalent liberals. Unlike the wartime race riots sparked by white 
hostility to integration, the form of collective violence that emerged in this later period 
represented an attack on exploitative and exclusionary institutions in black 
neighborhoods. The Johnson Administration increasingly understood the apparent 
increase in urban violence and crime as a consequence of socio-economic conditions that 
fostered criminal behavior. “Plainly, laws are less likely to command the respect of those 
forced to live at the margins of our society,” Johnson told Congress in his 1965 crime 
message, “Stability and order have little meaning and small advantage to those who exist 
in poverty, hopelessness, and despair.” But Johnson went on to explain the rising wave of 
                                                   
9 ibid 35.  
10 ibid 5.  
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crime as the product of “a deep moral decay.”11 Confrontations between looters and white 
business owners and between guerilla snipers and National Guardsmen forced the federal 
government to reorient its diagnosis of the causes of urban ills from historic inequality to 
community behavior.  
Outnumbered and lacking a planned offensive, law enforcement officials 
combated a new type of urban guerrilla warfare during the Watts riot, tactics that recalled 
the violent encounters American troops faced in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. 
Los Angeles Police Chief William Parker believed the riot represented a virtual 
insurgency that was “very much like fighting the Viet Cong.”12 Coinciding with the 
major housing, voting, and crime bills Johnson brought to Congress in March 1965, the 
president sent an additional 20,000 troops to South Vietnam, bringing the total number of 
American soldiers in the region to 100,000. To prevent spread of urban civil disorder into 
white communities such as South Gate and Beverly Hills, black civilians and participants 
alike were subject to the National Guard, the LAPD, and the California Highway Patrol, 
who together comprised Chief Parker’s 16,000 strong self-proclaimed “attacking force.” 
Combined, the officers outweighed the number of soldiers Johnson sent to invade the 
Dominican Republic four months prior.13  Media coverage of the violence in Watts fully 
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justified paramilitary support. “This was not a riot. It was an insurrection against all 
authority,” CBS Radio concluded, “If it had gone much further, it would have become 
civil war.” 14  The actions of the riot’s participants and the two hundred million dollars in 
property damage they caused seemed to call for an overthrow of public institutions or 
inclusion as full economic and social citizens, neither of which the federal government 
was prepared to accept.15 
The Johnson Administration operated on the assumption that crime and violence 
comprised the “foremost condition of life in the ghetto,” and that only federal social 
control programs could restore law and order in cities.16 “There are very few affluent 
Americans that are attracted to crime,” Johnson insisted, “and very few of them have 
criminal records.”17 Based on FBI data, the Crime Commission echoed the President’s 
assumption in its report issued in early 1967: “Instead of turning out men and women 
who conform to the American norm… the slums are producing the highest rates of crime, 
vice, and financial dependence.”18 The continued exodus of industry, factories, and 
businesses from cities to suburban areas required new approaches to the problems 
municipalities faced with tax bases in decline.  
Johnson established two special research teams to investigate urban violence, 
which devised a blueprint for the federally directed revolution in American law 
enforcement. The Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 sanctioned the Crime 
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Commission, whose members closely monitored the first federal crime-fighting 
initiatives to assist the President in drafting a comprehensive crime control bill. The 
second task force Johnson appointed two years later, the National Advisory Commission 
on Violence and Civil Disorders (usually referred to as the Kerner Commission), 
reinforced suggestions advanced by its predecessor. The president formed the Kerner 
Commission during the Detroit riot and on the heels of the devastation in Newark, hoping 
it would provide urban police departments and the National Guard with concrete 
measures to prevent and manage urban unrest.  
The Reports of the Crime and Kerner Commissions identified black urban 
neighborhoods as the War on Crime’s primary battleground. The fact that fifteen and 
sixteen-year olds had the highest arrest rate in the United States, and that statistics 
pointed to black urban teenagers as the nation’s largest criminal group, urged the 
commissions to focus their recommendations on revitalizing the juvenile justice system 
and the youth programs initiated by the New Frontier and the War on Poverty.19 The 
Crime Commission essentially viewed urban young people as juvenile delinquents, “from 
backgrounds of social and economic deprivation,” living in broken homes, with low 
school performance.20 The Kerner Commission identified them as the “hard-core” 
unemployed, locked out of manufacturing jobs as cities deindustrialized and susceptible 
to crime and rioting.  
The War on Poverty effectively “laid the ingredients” for the social institutions 
the Crime and Kerner Commissions proposed, whereby the service agencies in urban 
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areas previously premised on Community Action adopted law enforcement 
components.21 The Commissions believed the perceived inability of autonomous urban 
social institutions to maintain order could be assuaged by recasting power in public 
programs from grassroots activists and social workers to professional planners and law 
enforcement officials.  On the ground, this ceded “maximum feasible participation” by 
local residents and activists to educated policy planners who often lived outside the 
communities they served. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach and other liberal 
policymakers believed that the foot soldiers of the War on Poverty—grassroots activists, 
social workers, and “indigenous leaders”—could not effectively run many promising 
federal programs. It is not surprising that Johnson’s Law Enforcement Assistance Act 
prohibited anyone but professional planners from access to new federal funds. 
After 1965, in the wake of urban uprisings and the Vietnam War, local police 
emerged as the vehicles through which residents, and particularly youth, in urban 
communities received social services. The Kerner Report described a situation where 
“police responsibilities in the ghetto have grown as other institutions of social control 
have lost much of their authority.”  “It is the policeman,” it added, “who must fill this 
institutional vacuum.”22 By embracing an increased police presence to mitigate the 
perceived erosion of urban social institutions, the Crime and Kerner Commissions 
restructured the function of crime control as the primary social service provider for 
racially marginalized Americans and left police officers as the government’s first line of 
representation in segregated black neighborhoods.  
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By instituting neighborhood centers and special programs for juveniles as 
suggested by both commissions, the Johnson Administration expanded the federal 
government’s law enforcement capabilities in local communities. The commissions 
reconfigured the role of urban police departments so as to actively shape the city planning 
process and conceived of new institutions like Youth Services Bureaus and storefront law 
enforcement centers. The ultimate result of the policies devised by both commissions was 
to ease the transition from a domestic war based on social welfare to one based on social 
control. By enacting the commissions’ suggestion to invest fiscal funds into local police 
departments as an immediate solution to urban crisis from 1965 onwards, the Johnson 
administration and liberal policymakers facilitated the process by which Community 
Action Programs in the War on Poverty morphed into Police-Community Relation 
Programs in the War on Crime. 
The federal government’s commitments to fighting crime and poverty beginning 
in the mid-1960s is often considered in terms of a dichotomy that pits liberals against 
conservatives, but the problem of law and order won bipartisan attention from the outset. 
The Law Enforcement Assistance Act and subsequent crime control legislation 
underscores the extent to which, even at the height of the liberal welfare state, these two 
seemingly opposing domestic policy approaches were complementary. With respect to 
the American system of criminal justice, Johnson is best understood as the engineer of a 
cohesive, unified national law enforcement system—a project he saw as “generations 
overdue.”23 Working together, liberals and conservatives in the Johnson administration 
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and Congress brought the Department of Justice to a new level of prominence, expanded 
the power and influence of the attorney general at the local level, and invited the private 
sector to participate in public social programs.24 When Johnson signed the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in early June 1968, the Crime Commission witnessed 
the implementation of its comprehensive legislative plan for what policymakers called a 
revolution in the nation’s penal and juridical institutions.25 
Through its crime control bills, the Johnson Administration set a process in 
motion that changed the nature of liberalism. The choice to bring carceral measures into 
urban policy, to channel funds to states and municipalities through block grants, and to 
contract with the private sector and employ professional planners, helped to lay the 
groundwork for subsequent federal action generally associated with conservatism. Over 
the course of his presidency, Johnson led the federal effort to increase the surveillance of 
hyper-segregated communities and restored states’ rights under a new guise.  
 
 
I. The War on Black Poverty 
Just days after Johnson introduced the Law Enforcement Assistance Act to 
Congress and delivered his first message on crime in March 1965, Daniel Patrick 
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Moynihan submitted an internal report on what he called the “crisis of race relations” to 
Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, who promptly shared the Harvard sociologist’s data 
on black urban families with White House officials. Hoping to take advantage of the 
moment, and eager to work with fellow liberals in Washington on the problems of 
poverty and racial inequality, numerous academics had descended on Washington. Few 
came to exert more long-term influence than Moynihan. Johnson waged the War on 
Poverty largely on the basis of legislative proposals Moynihan and others produced in 
Kennedy’s Task Force on Manpower Conservation in 1963. When Johnson created an 
Office of Policy Planning and Research at the Department of Labor he appointed 
Moynihan as the agency’s first director.26 Positioned in the Department of Labor during 
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations and as Assistant to President Nixon for Urban 
affairs, Moynihan rose to the forefront of the federal attempt to manage the problem of 
racial disparities in income and education during the second half of the 1960s and early 
1970s. Drawing in equal measure on social science data and psychological theory, 
Moynihan devised reforms that he believed would address the problem of socio-
economic inequality. The debates about race, gender, and welfare ignited by his notorious 
The Negro Family: The Case for National Action of 1965 overshadowed the imprint 
Moynihan himself left on national policy, working behind the scenes with White House 
officials, fellow academics, and three presidents.  
Coinciding with the federal transition from the War on Poverty to the War on 
Crime, Moynihan’s ideas helped to create a new strain of liberalism, one that recognized 
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the limitations of civil rights legislation to overcome race-based inequality and 
emphasized the need for structural reform, but that explained the disproportionate reality 
of poverty among black Americans as a consequence of “the pathology of post-industrial 
society.”27 For Moynihan the urban crisis resulted from the substantial migration of black 
Americans from rural areas to cities for newly available wartime production jobs, and the 
subsequent disappearance of those jobs as American corporations increasingly relied on 
suburban, rural, and overseas labor. Moynihan contextualized what he called “black 
ghetto poverty” in the socio-economic legacy of slavery and structural discrimination, but 
redefined the problem of inequality as a problem of the black family, a “fundamental 
source of weakness in the Negro community.”28 Offering the federal government a 
“cornerstone for a new era of social legislation,” Moynihan argued that policies aimed at 
sustaining and creating two-parent households in poverty-stricken urban areas would 
alleviate the consequences of structural discrimination and exclusion for black 
Americans.29  
Writing in the wake of urban civil disorder in Harlem and Philadelphia during the 
summer of 1964, Moynihan believed the extraordinary scope of the riots represented an 
opportune moment to advocate for new federal employment measures. Though Moynihan 
did not intend his notion of “post-industrial pathology” to steer liberal policymakers away 
from fundamental socio-economic reforms, his understanding of the urban crisis provided 
the federal government an academic rationale for directing domestic programs 
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specifically at the plight of black men, while removing itself from accountability for the 
larger social conditions that inspired black Americans to riot. Moynihan argued that 
delinquency, crime, unemployment, poverty, and lack of education resulted from unstable 
black families. His recommendations encouraged a kind of reform that responded to 
decaying urban school systems, high rates of unemployment, and substandard housing 
but looked inward instead of instead of addressing the structural factors that 
institutionalized exclusion for generations of black Americans.30  
Although Moynihan originally intended The Negro Family for a small audience of 
policymakers and state officials, on March 23, 1965, weeks after the initial “Eyes Only” 
copies were printed, Secretary of Labor Wirtz sent Johnson a memo summarizing 
Moynihan’s key findings. The memo, drafted by Moynihan himself, warned Johnson that 
he confronted “a second stage, a new crisis” of reform that demanded that the federal 
government move beyond rights “traditionally associated with Liberty” to meet demands 
for “the democratic ideal of Equality.”31 Johnson assigned his assistant Bill Moyers to 
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read the entire report in order to include Moynihan’s recommendations in the national 
agenda.32 
In his first presidential message on race and black Americans, Johnson used his 
June address to the graduates of Howard’s class of 1965 to commit his administration to 
developing social programs that would ensure greater equality as the principle behind the 
“next and more profound stage” of civil rights policy.33  Whether Johnson read the series 
of memos he received from Moynihan remains unclear, but the president eventually took 
enough notice to ask Moynihan to draft his Howard speech. The night before its delivery, 
Moynihan penned Johnson’s remarks with presidential assistant Richard N. Goodwin, 
transforming his social science data into political rhetoric.  
Johnson’s speech announced that the White House intended to advance beyond 
civil rights legislation by supporting measures to address structural inequalities in 
employment, housing, and education. “We seek not freedom but opportunity,” Johnson 
said, “we seek not just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a 
theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result… to this end equal opportunity is 
essential, but not enough.”34 Johnson cited statistics from the Moynihan Report on 
unemployment, infant mortality, and black single mothers as evidence of the “breakdown 
of the Negro family,” a problem for which he believed, “white America must accept 
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responsibility.” Johnson claimed that without a policy to foster two-parent households, 
“the circle of despair and deprivation” in black urban America would never break.35  
Yet Johnson’s gesture towards a “War on Black Poverty” was short-lived. 
Roughly a month after his remarks at Howard, and shortly after the Voting Rights Act 
became law, Watts residents rioted. The Moynihan Report went public as journalists and 
policymakers looked for academic explanations for the outbreak. Meanwhile, Johnson 
escalated American involvement in Southeast Asia. Vietnam and the violence in Los 
Angeles placed the Great Society and postwar liberalism itself in question. The riots 
highlighted the sense that the United States faced its gravest racial crossroads since the 
civil war, and made clear that the monumental federal actions of the first half of the 
1960s did not resolve entrenched structural inequality and disadvantage. Under growing 
criticism from civil rights leaders and a resurgent left for his decision to escalate the war 
in Vietnam, Johnson fell into retreat. The substantial socio-economic reform the president 
proposed at Howard dwindled on his Administration’s domestic agenda.   
While urban rebellion in Watts may have weakened support for the War on 
Poverty, Moynihan’s policy option of strengthening the black family and the male role 
within it continued to gain ground politically and publically. For Johnson, the Watts riot 
confirmed Moynihan’s suggestion that his most viable political option lay in directing 
domestic social policy towards the restoration of stability and order within the black 
family. For the mainstream press, the report’s conclusions seemed to offer a sound 
explanation for what the Wall Street Journal called the “orgy of Negro rioting” in Watts 
and Chicago’s West Garfield Park. On August 16, 1965, five days into the Watts 
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rebellion, the Journal printed a sensational article on its front page, warning the public: 
“Behind the Riots: Family Life Breakdown in Negro Slums Sows Seeds of Race 
Violence; Husbandless Homes Spawn Young Hoodlums, Impede Reforms, Sociologists 
Say; Racing a Booming Birth Rate.”36 Drawing on Moynihan’s analysis, the article 
pointed to the “spreading disintegration of Negro family life,” as a possible cause of 
violence on the streets of Los Angeles in August 1965.37 This and countless other 
sensationalized depictions of urban violence in Watts reinforced Moynihan’s assumptions 
about community behavior. 
When policymakers and the media applied this pathological view to the Los 
Angeles uprising, they concluded that single black mothers raising illegitimate children 
not only explained poverty in urban neighborhoods, but also caused the riots. The 
Journal warned of the young people it largely perceived to be leading violent outbreaks: 
“A growing army of such youth is being bred in the Negro sections of cities across the 
country by broken homes, illegitimacy and other social ills that have grown steadily 
worse in recent decades.”38 The Journal inferred that growing up in the slums “warped 
the minds” of black youth and that the reversal of this trend would be a “discouragingly 
long-term struggle.”39 The implication was that civil rights laws themselves, “may 
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temporarily—though surely unintentionally—make the situation worse,” by cultivating a 
new, unfounded sense of freedom that encouraged criminality.40  
Images of Watts rioters throwing rocks, beating white civilians, and setting fire to 
property reinforced the new prominence of crime prevention on the domestic policy 
agenda and upheld popular arguments that, as Senator Strom Thurmond put it, “No 
country has every incurred as much crime as America is enduring today.”41 A critical 
mass of policymakers, federal administrators, law enforcement officials, and journalists 
concluded that only intensified enforcement of the law in segregated urban communities 
where contempt for authority seemed widespread would quell the anarchy and chaos on 
the nation’s streets. Urban civil disorder in Los Angeles and elsewhere reinforced long-
held racist fears of innate violent tendencies in black Americans; these fears contributed 
to the federal government’s decision to manage urban crisis through punitive measures.  
The Watts uprising called Johnson’s anti-poverty record into question and 
reinforced conservative arguments about the shortcomings of liberalism. The exceptional 
damage fueled claims from conservatives and even some liberals that federal welfare and 
housing policy helped to cause the crime menace. Like many of his peers, Los Angeles 
District Attorney Evelle Younger criticized the War on Poverty for encouraging 
lawlessness. Younger believed that a “national guilt complex” about historic racism 
paralyzed the liberal state so that “every time a hoodlum throws a Molotov cocktail or 
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shoots a policeman society is somehow at fault.” 42 The idea that “there is an indulgence 
of crime because of sympathy of those who have become criminals,” led directly to the 
conclusion that the civil rights revolution made necessary a renewed focus on public 
security and safety. Johnson’s friend and Crime Commission appointee Leon Jaworski 
implicated civil rights laws in the rising crime rate by asking the National Conference of 
Bar Presidents:  
“If a civil rights leader… disobeys a law or court decree because it offends 
his moral beliefs of what is right… [and is] excused from obeying the law 
on such grounds, why shouldn’t members of the crime syndicate be 
granted similar exemption from obeying the law? … Such reasoning could 
eventually view murder as justifiable homicide and destroy our moral 
concern for what we now consider wrong and evil. A moral callousness of 
the preservation of what we now consider to be right and decent, 
reminiscent of the days of the fall of the Roman empire, may well 
follow.”43 
 
Policymakers and the media did acknowledge unemployment, police brutality, and 
subpar urban school systems as factors contributing to what they labeled a national crime 
problem, but the Watts riots and subsequent urban civil disorder moved liberal 
sympathizers away from structural critiques of poverty.44 By equating violence with a 
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cultural cycle of poverty among black Americans, policymakers configured crime as an 
issue of social pathology.45 
The growing clamor for safety as the “forgotten civil right” compelled 
policymakers to revisit the transformation of American racial law and social policy made 
possible by the reforms of the previous decade. “No right is more elemental to our society 
than the right to personal security and no right needs more urgent protection,” Johnson 
affirmed in his 1965 message to Congress on crime, emphasizing that, “one of the most 
legitimate functions of government is the preservation of law and order.”46 The 
President’s remarks reflected a growing sentiment among Western Republicans and 
Southern Democrats that the foremost public need was the restoration of social order. 
These policymakers drew on Moynihan’s combination of structural criticism and 
pathological indictment to claim that liberal welfare policy demoralized black urban 
constituents and sustained an environment of criminality.47  
By making the issue of law and order the centerpiece of his 1964 campaign, 
Goldwater had demonstrated the extent to which crime control resonated with the public, 
but the election also exposed the fissures within the Democratic Party’s national 
constituency despite Johnson’s overwhelming victory. For Johnson and other liberals, the 
1964 Presidential contest made clear that racial reform left key groups of white voters 
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highly disenchanted. For instance, even while voting for Johnson, in 1964 California 
voters overturned the Rumford Fair Housing Act outlawing restrictive covenants in the 
Proposition 14 referendum. To maintain the support of these critical portions of the 
electorate, Johnson vowed to protect the safety of “ordinary” Americans and moved his 
policy towards a new liberal synthesis that combined welfare and crime control. Now, 
federal grants awarded to states and municipalities to develop autonomous programs 
functioned to mitigate the states rights’ issue, and crime control and law enforcement 
enjoyed a new status as a main tenet of domestic policy. 
 
The Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 
Although Southern conservatives relied upon anticrime rhetoric as a mode of 
opposition to changes in American racial law, it was liberal politicians who introduced 
the first federal legislation to restore law and order, or the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Act of 1965. In the fall of that year, as the reality of Watts and the backlash it spawned 
influenced policy considerations, Johnson scaled back the massive federal socio-
economic program he had described at Howard University.48 Vietnam occupied an 
increasing amount of the president’s attention and an increasing share of the federal 
budget. Johnson found himself on tenuous ground: he needed to placate liberals and 
respond to the riots so that it did not appear that he ignored the problem of urban poverty, 
but sensationalized depictions of urban civil disorder, the new electoral prominence of 
crime control issues, and growing conservative reactions to civil rights gains meant that 
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the president could not seem as if he were conceding to rioters or rewarding their 
actions.49  
To shore up support for the War on Crime during the early stages of the War on 
Poverty, elected officials acted on the assumption that continued social progress 
depended upon the arrest and punishment of lawbreakers. As Younger wrote in 1968: 
“The problems of our great cities were decades in building; they will be decades in their 
solution… But we cannot have patience with urban violence. Immediate and decisive 
force must be the first response.”  Younger urged that law enforcement programs “deal 
with the immediate crisis—the riots” by containing “those engaging in riots and violence, 
those trying hardest to destroy our system based on this rule of law.”50 This outlook left 
the young people living in segregated urban neighborhoods particularly vulnerable to the 
ever-expanding criminal justice system. While the structural diagnosis of urban civil 
disorder promised to curtail crime rates in the long-term through Great Society programs, 
enacting policies to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement presented the federal 
government with an opportunity to make an immediate impact on crime rates.    
To do so, the federal government needed to build institutions that would support 
police departments in reducing urban violence. Johnson’s Act instituted the Office of 
Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA) with a three year, twenty-two million dollar grant 
to fund law enforcement research and experiments in urban areas and to professionalize 
the field through special training programs. 51  By expanding the power of the Department 
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of Justice and redefining the role of the attorney general, Johnson imagined that the new 
agency would support the development of law enforcement techniques. He suggested to 
Congress that “experiments might be undertaken with different kinds and intensity of 
police coverage in high crime districts in order to learn more about the effective 
allocation of manpower.”52 Under the direction of Attorney General Katzenbach, the 
Department of Justice’s newest agency would offer grants and contracts to public and 
private entities. 53 The Act left it up to Katzenbach (and his successor Ramsey Clark) to 
chart the course of the first battles of the War on Crime.54 
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52 “Crime, its prevalence, and measures of prevention.”  
53 The origins of the federal research and the rising importance of the Department of Justice and 
Attorney General in domestic policy lie in the New Frontier. In 1961, Kennedy’s Civil Rights Commission 
gave the Attorney General authority to redistribute federal funds with respect to the function and 
effectiveness of law enforcement. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Law Enforcement Assistance Act 
of 1965: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st sess., July 22, 1965, 12. ; 
H.R. 6508, sec 8 (a) (1), (2)); H.R. 8027, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. Sec. 6 (b).  
54 Where special assistance and training programs had previously been under the exclusive domain 
of the FBI, the Department of Justice and the Attorney General gained new legislative authority in 
American law enforcement under the Act’s premises. J. Edgar Hoover set the precedent for federal 
intervention beginning in 1961, when the FBI’s National Academy in Washington opened its doors to state 
and local officers for equipment, training, and services. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
provided vocational training for police; the Treasury Department’s Bureau of Narcotics Training Schools 
instructed narcotics enforcement officials. Kennedy’s bill proposed a National Academy of Criminal 
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In its earliest incarnation, the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance encouraged 
local police and private firms to accept subsidies that would allow for experimental 
strides in the federal effort to eradicate the newly perceived crime problem.55 In the style 
of grant programs under the War on Poverty, the OLEA channeled federal funds directly 
to local level operations. Katzenbach adamantly refused to grant money to states, both 
because Congress eschewed direct federal participation in writing crime control policy at 
the state level and policymakers did not want the OLEA to evolve into a federal police 
force. Instead, Katzenbach designed his new agency to provide “the means [for the 
States] to protect their own lives and property,” by supplying “the tools and training by 
which they can better exercise their responsibility.”56 The OLEA allowed the federal 
government to invest taxpayer dollars in projects that advanced promising new directions 
for American law enforcement practices, and served as an information clearinghouse to 
instruct major metropolitan areas in modern crime control techniques.  
Indeed, in a rare moment when the federal government encouraged innovative and 
experimental use of its anti-poverty aid, it excluded grassroots activists and social service 
professionals from policy discussions in matters of crime control.57 Katzenbach’s 
direction of the OLEA set a precedent in federal law enforcement policy that relied on 
professional planners to develop crime control and prevention measures. The earliest 
                                                   
55 Johnson intended the Law Enforcement Assistance Act to support radical new criminal justice 
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Professionalization of Reform,” The Public Interest (Fall 1965), 6-16. 
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grants the attorney general awarded closed law enforcement discussions to the 
communities where the implementation of new crime control methods supported by the 
OLEA were underway. Katzenbach told the Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary during 
its hearings on the Act: “I would like really to deal with the professionals on this.”58 As 
director of the new agency, Katzenbach allocated crime control funds through a 
professional channel, one staffed by people with training and expertise.  
The first federal law enforcement grants in 1965, then, went primarily to private, 
nonprofit institutions: to universities to conduct research and law enforcement training 
programs, police organizations like the International Association of the Chiefs of Police, 
think tanks like the Kellogg corporation and the Vera Institute, and local groups of 
community businessmen eager to contribute resources to the larger crime fighting effort. 
Where Congress viewed experimental War on Poverty programs with trepidation, the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Act encouraged the development of radical new approaches 
to criminal justice, and conceived of the OLEA as an agency that would finance research 
to eventually culminate in a permanent institution.  
To complement the work of the OLEA in launching the earliest federal law 
enforcement programs, the Act mandated a research team to develop programs that 
would advise Johnson on how to begin a new era in federal management of the nation’s 
penal and juridical institutions. 59 On July 23, 1965, the day J. Edgar Hoover released a 
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report indicating a sharp increase in national crime levels, Johnson officially appointed 
the National Crime Commission he had mentioned only in passing during his first major 
speech to Congress on crime.60 Johnson subscribed to the belief that the solution to social 
problems lay in knowledge, planning, and bureaucracy. As Johnson’s first decisive action 
towards the maintenance of law and order, establishing the Crime Commission ensured 
that the new direction in law enforcement and crime control Johnson sought to place on 
the Congressional agenda would be well designed.  
One week after the Law Enforcement Assistance Act unanimously passed in both 
chambers, on September 8th, 1965, the staff and members of the Crime Commission held 
their first series of meetings at the Department of Labor and the White House. Congress 
granted Katzenbach and his research team 1.1 million dollars for operation (by the time 
the Commission finished its work the total cost of its research endeavors nearly doubled 
this initial allocation; the law enforcement experts at the nation’s top universities who 
served as consultants proved to be costly).61 The Crime Commission promptly divided 
itself into four major committees: police, general analysis of the crime problem, courts, 
and corrections. Some committees broke into various subcommittees during the course of 
the Commission’s tenure, and to further investigate pressing issues such as juvenile 
delinquency and narcotics abuse.  
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Johnson worked actively with the commission as it collected data and 
summarized its findings, careful to control the political nature of the recommendations 
released in the final report. At times Johnson’s insistence that the Commission comply 
with the official positions of his administration caused severe delays in the group’s 
proceedings. For instance, while the commission upheld the Justice Department’s stance 
on criminal and law enforcement issues, it broke with the Department over wiretapping. 
The law enforcement officials on the commission favored endorsing the controversial 
practice, while the Justice Department opposed it. Eventually the Crime Commission 
revised its stance and placed its recommendations in line with the Justice Department’s 
defense of privacy.62  
This revision reflected the extent to which Katzenbach and his staff at the 
Department of Justice dominated the commission and steered its policy suggestions. 
Katzenbach chose Harvard Law School’s James Vorenburg to serve as staff director. 
Vorenburg worked as part-time director at the Department of Justice’s new Office of 
Criminal Justice, established in August 1964 by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. 
Once Vorenburg accepted the post on the President’s Task Force, he left Harvard to 
begin working full-time for the Department.  While he served in both capacities, as 
Director of the Commission and the Office of Criminal Justice, Vorenburg drafted a code 
of police procedures for the American Law Institute under a grant from the Ford 
Foundation. The code included a highly controversial “stop-and-frisk” law that 
Vorenburg strongly advocated in his post on the Crime Commission, as well as 
provisions that allowed police to question suspects without a lawyer present in certain 
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circumstances and a broader definition of the constitutional requirement of “reasonable 
cause” for arrest. 63 Vorenburg hired his colleague at the Office of Criminal Justice, 
Henry S. Ruth Jr., a former prosecutor of the Department of Justice’s Organized Crime 
and Racketeering Section, to work directly under him.  
To avoid controversy or divisiveness in his crime control project, Johnson 
carefully selected commission members. As Max Freedman of the Los Angeles Times 
wrote: “the committee is characterized less by experience and knowledge than by the 
blandness that makes for acceptability to all interested parties. The typical member is the 
safest of all creatures, a former or retiring official with ambitions.” 64 By bringing 
together representative experts from the law enforcement, academic, civil rights, and 
corporate worlds with moderate political orientations, Johnson could produce a 
comprehensive crime control and prevention plan to place on the agenda for the 
upcoming congressional year amenable to both liberal and conservative policymakers 
involved in the project.  
In September 1965, Johnson met with members of his newest Task Force almost 
immediately upon their arrival in Washington, after Chief Justice Earl Warren swore in 
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John P. Mackenzie “ ‘Frisk’ Plan Snarls Law Institute,” The Washington Post, 18 May 1966, A2. 
64 The Commission included Johnson’s friend Leon Jaworski and Massachusetts District Attorney 
Garret Byrne, judges Charles D. Breitel of the New York Court of Appeals, Luther Youngdahl and James 
Benton Parsons of the United States District Court, and law enforcement officials Thomas C. Lynch, the 
Attorney General of California, and San Francisco’s police chief Thomas J. Cahill. Columbia law professor 
Herbert Wechsler drafted the Model Penal Code for the American Law Institute just two years before he 
served on the Crime Commission, and accepted a post as director of the institute when he joined the 
Presidential Task Force. From outside of the criminal justice and law enforcement community came Los 
Angeles Times publisher Otis Chandler; Julia Davis Stuart, the President of the League of Women Voters; 
and Whitney Young of the National Urban League. Max Freedman, “National Crime Commission’s 
Strategy Has at Least One Flaw,” Los Angeles Times, 5 Aug 1965, A5. 
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each member.65 When Johnson spoke with the Commission over a catered lunch at the 
White House, he promised to support members’ suggestions and make every effort to get 
their comprehensive law enforcement plan enacted in Congress. 66 “When you find the 
answers I will try to see that corrective action is taken. So I ask this committee to be 
daring and creative and revolutionary in your recommendations.”67 Johnson went on to 
make drastic statements about the state of crime in the United States. “Crime is a sore on 
the face of America,” the President told members of the Crime Commission, “It is a 
menace on our streets. It is a drain on our cities. It is a corrupter of youth.” 68 After a chat 
with J. Edgar Hoover about the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions that expanded 
the rights of defendants and revised general arrest and interrogation methods, Chief 
Justice Warren discussed the change in the nature of crime from the days of the 
Wickersham Commission to the “great outburst of crime” that Warren felt the Watts riot 
displayed.69   
Johnson could filter additional funds for to the Commission through the OLEA 
without having to compromise the amount of support experimental demonstration 
projects under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act received. With OLEA director 
Katzenbach chairing the Commission and with top Justice Department officials in other 
leadership positions, the Commission had the power to reward experimental programs for 
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the benefit of its own research and analysis. 70  In this vein, both the OLEA and the Crime 
Commission mutually reinforced each other until Johnson offered the Commission’s 
blueprint for a comprehensive federal law enforcement program to Congress in the Safe 
Streets Act of 1967.  
Over the course of its eighteen-month investigation, the Crime Commission 
actively worked on forty projects with state and local authorities. Almost immediately 
following lunch with the President in September 1965, the Commission held meetings 
with black leaders and police officials before it began its fieldwork. Members 
interviewed and observed more than two hundred police chiefs and consulted with 2,200 
law enforcement agencies to “identify successful police methods developed by local 
initiative and imagination.”71 Commission members gathered “precinct profiles” in key 
American cities as the primary source for understanding the nature of crime and “to learn 
where and when certain kinds of crime are committed, and which people are most likely 
to become victims.”72 The Commission’s ethnographic approach to fieldwork in cities 
like Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, and Boston placed members in 
patrol vehicles with officers on the high crime beat.73 In addition to surveying violent 
trends in a wide variety of middle and low-income neighborhoods, the Crime 
Commission introduced judges, sociologists, and law enforcement specialists to cutting-
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edge law enforcement techniques at a series of conferences.74  One conference brought 
scientists and businessmen together to consider ways to make crime control more 
technologically sound, another looked at legal manpower needs, and the final gathering 
of law enforcement personnel brought together state-level Crime Commissions. The staff 
of the national Commission worked directly with state and local criminal justice officials 
to determine how the recommendations of the Crime Commission could directly shape 
new law enforcement systems. 
While the Crime Commission repeatedly mentioned socio-economic problems at 
the root of crime—leading Life Magazine to declare, “the report can only be called 
liberal, even adventuresome”— its recommendations focused on ways to improve the 
ability of federal, state, and local governments to establish social control in black urban 
communities.75 For Commission members, “assuring all Americans a stake in the benefits 
and responsibilities of American life,” meant “strengthening law enforcement and 
reducing criminal opportunities.”76 Extending the efforts of the OLEA, the Crime 
Commission urged the professionalization of police forces, intergovernmental 
agreements, and city-county pooling proposals that encouraged joint and cooperative 
activities as a means through which new resources in crime control techniques could be 
shared.77  
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To make the case for federal intervention in local law enforcement, the Crime 
Commission condemned black urban families, schools, churches, and other social 
institutions for failing to “give young people the motivation to live moral lives.” And 
while the Commission knew that “young people today are sorely discontented in the 
suburbs and on the campuses as well as in the slums,” in black urban neighborhoods 
“there is no doubt that they more often express this discontent criminally.”78 Echoing 
Moynihan’s analysis, this criminality arose from a generation of young people, “who 
have not received strong and loving parental guidance… [who] tend to be unmotivated 
people, and therefore people with whom the community is most unprepared to cope...”79 
As a preventive measure, the Crime Commission believed that urban social institutions 
needed to be reconstructed, a challenge that could not occur without a long-range federal 
crime control plan that integrated law enforcement into existing government agencies.80 
The Crime Commission concluded: “For the fact of the matter is that, whether or not the 
result in any given case is delinquency, society is failing slum youth. Their families are 
failing… The social institutions generally relied on to guide and control people in their 
individual and mutual existence simply are not operating effectively in the inner city.”81  
New, community-based centers directed by law enforcement officials would operate as 
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an umbrella for Great Society programs and provide a range of services for black urban 
youth. Here, the commission established a precedent that eventually allowed the War on 
Crime to eclipse the War on Poverty. 
                                 
II. A National Strategy 
 In 1966, exactly a year after his first message to Congress on crime, President 
Johnson declared to both chambers: “For the first time in our history, an administration 
has pledged to the American people that the growth of crime—local, State, and 
National—will be checked.”82 The President lauded the progress of the Office of Law 
Enforcement Assistance in its first year of operation, which had begun the process of 
shifting federal funds to the “frontline soldier in the war on crime,” or to local police in 
technological advances like air surveillance and hand-held radios.  Drawing on a model 
of business management, the OLEA encouraged the reorganization of local law 
enforcement institutions and professionalization of the field. State and local law 
enforcement officials strongly supported these new federal measures, and many 
established crime commissions of their own.  The executive director of Philadelphia’s 
Crime Commission, Ephraim Gomberg, lauded Johnson’s initiatives: “The President’s 
message is an inspiration to all who have been waiting patiently for just this kind of 
federal leadership to bring about effective change.”83 By creating regional law 
enforcement institutions, national training, conferences, and other measures, the 
development of a major law enforcement apparatus and bureaucracy was underway.  
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Meanwhile, the presidential crime commission continued working in its various 
subcommittees on specialized projects, surveys, and national conferences. Katzenbach 
frequently reported the commission’s findings to Johnson, statistics that, by March 1966 
when Johnson spoke to Congress on crime for the second time, morphed into fear-
mongering sound bites public figures and policymakers repeated again and again when 
they discussed the nation’s new “number one domestic problem.” Johnson reported to 
Congress a year into his crime control efforts that in the United States a forcible rape 
occurred every 26 minutes; a robbery every five minutes; and an aggravated assault every 
three minutes.84  In the context of increasingly vocal antiwar protest, a shift in black 
grassroots activism towards demands for socio-economic reforms, continued instances of 
urban rebellion, and the persistent escalation of troops in Vietnam, Johnson hoped to 
move legislative attention towards domestic policy that would appeal to the broad public.  
The growing sense that the social conditions of the inner city furnished a breeding 
ground for crime demanded new law enforcement techniques and institutions to manage 
the problem.85  Johnson’s framing of the law and order issue linked social programs 
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already in operation to his demand that Congress “meet the growing menace of crime in 
the streets by building up law enforcement and revitalizing the entire Federal system 
from prevention to probation,” as he declared in his 1966 State of the Union Address.86 
To make the case for a massive federal law enforcement program, the Crime Commission 
argued: “The criminal justice system… was not designed to eliminate the conditions in 
which most crime breeds. It needs help.”87 By conflating social policy with crime control 
policy, Johnson attacked the symptoms of the urban crisis while evading the cause.  
 
Arming the Footsoldiers 
 Johnson and the Crime Commission believed that in order to make an immediate 
impact on crime rates, local law enforcement officers should receive the majority of 
initial congressional allocations for law enforcement measures.88 With federal law 
enforcement aid available to local entities for the first time, the OLEA worked to get its 
ten million dollars in congressional allocation to police departments as quickly and 
wisely as possible. Based on the success of the Crime Commission in evaluating early 
OLEA programs and assessing the crime problem, Johnson asked Congress to double the 
OLEA’s budget for 1967. Meanwhile, the FBI resurrected its COINTELPRO program in 
response to the rise of militant and radical black protest groups such as the Black 
Panthers in Oakland and Los Angeles.  
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 Katzenbach wanted direct federal control over how new crime prevention funds 
would be distributed at the local level, and accordingly, the grant design of the OLEA 
rewarded statewide police and sheriffs groups, such as the California Peace Officers 
Organization and the National Institute for Crime and Delinquency. “It is the policeman 
on the corner who is our traditional symbol of personal security,” Katzenbach argued, 
and he would “provide the leadership, the research, and the experimental assistance 
which can help preserve that symbol.”89 Unlike Johnson, Katzenbach did not make grand 
statements about addressing the causes of crime, but focused his agency on crime 
prevention.90 “Not only must we reinforce the public’s respect for law and order,” 
Katzenbach maintained, “we must restore the public’s confidence that law enforcement 
agencies have the means and equipment to meet crime head on.”91 This meant limiting 
community participation and focusing on building up the weapon arsenal of local (and 
particularly urban) police departments.  
 The federal government’s intention to use law enforcement assistance programs 
for crime prevention meant that Katzenbach dedicated a disproportionate amount of 
OLEA funds to programs that addressed the problem of inadequate manpower to patrol 
black urban neighborhoods. The OLEA warmly received proposals to improve the 
effectiveness of patrol in these communities, often turning to private groups for 
additional support. In St. Louis, for instance, the OLEA funded a program that relied on 
computer technology to determine effective police deployment. Law enforcement 
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personnel fed statistics into a machine to “show where and when particular types of crime 
are likely to occur and help police decide where patrols should be concentrated.”92 Other 
OLEA projects included street lighting initiatives, increasing the technological capacity 
of police departments, and making salary payments for the training of local police 
officers.93 In California, the private think tank RAND teamed with the state government 
to develop ways in which systems analysis techniques could apply to innovations in 
police patrol. 
 The high crime rates reported in black neighborhoods in Washington, DC made 
the nation’s capital a special focus for the President and Congress. Katzenbach and the 
OLEA could easily monitor the accomplishments of its efforts with the local police 
department, which received 1.2 million dollars from Congress to fund experimental 
projects. Police effectiveness was the imperative of this early federal crime control effort, 
and the OLEA helped to bring more officers onto the streets in black neighborhoods and 
equip them with modern weaponry and communication systems. To give the nation’s 
capital, in Johnson’s words, “the best police force in the United States,” a substantial 
federal grant bought the Washington police department sixteen new station wagons, three 
patrol wagons, twenty-five motor scooters, thirty-four scout cars, walkie-talkie radios for 
patrolmen on foot, eighty new detectives, and 271 additional police officers. 94  “We’re 
not going to tolerate hoodlums who kill and rape and mug in this city,” Johnson said of 
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his effort to revitalize law enforcement in the District of Columbia.95 The scooters went 
to a special roving Tactical Squad implemented by the OLEA for neighborhood patrol. 
They enabled police to move to crime scenes at a fast pace while maintaining a closer 
physical relationship to residents than wagon patrol. To provide the kind of special 
training the Law Enforcement Assistance Act stressed, Tactical Squad officers, as well as 
other policemen working in high crime areas in Washington, participated in a course run 
by the International Association of Chiefs of Police with an OLEA grant of 48,000 
dollars on “current social problems and the psychological factors involved in personal 
relations with people in the community.”96 The federal government contracted with the 
International Association to write a six hundred page report that proposed a 
reorganization of the Washington police force, which the Crime Commission used in its 
national plan.  
 In addition to addressing manpower and equipment needs of local police 
departments, the OLEA invested heavily in technological innovation for weapons 
development. Katzenbach awarded the Institute for Defense Analysis a 500,0000 dollar 
grant to study how science and technology could be useful to the War on Crime. The 
Crime Commission used the most promising solutions in its final report to the president 
and Congress. The Institute proposed the development of “net guns,” whereby police 
officers would fire off a net, as one might catch a wild animal, and leave a suspect 
trapped as a way to prevent police from resorting to deadly force. 97 The OLEA also 
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funded a new communications system for the Washington police department that brought 
multiple radio channels to marked cars and in the personal cars of law enforcement 
officials, as well as a computer network to consolidate record keeping. 98  At the end of 
July, 1966, IBM held a three-day class in computer concepts for twenty one senior law 
enforcement officials in the Washington police department.  
 The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department received the most substantial OLEA grant, 
a likely product of the prominence of California policymakers and criminal justice 
officials in spearheading the federal crime control effort, and the fact that the Watts riot 
weighed heavily on national law enforcement discussions. In early 1966, the Sheriff’s 
Department presented a helicopter plan for Los Angeles—called Project Sky Knight—to 
the attorney general’s newest agency for funding.99  For Katzenbach and the OLEA, air 
patrol seemed to be a quick, technologically astute and thrifty solution that would enable 
the Sheriff’s Department to “abate the crime problem by enhancing the patrol unit’s 
opportunities for apprehension and repression, without a significant increase in police 
manpower.” Seen as the most important crime deterrent vehicle available to law 
enforcement and increasingly used by US Troops in Vietnam, the helicopter enabled the 
LAPD to “see more, travel further, and respond with speed and directness heretofore 
impossible,” as the grant proposal boasted. 100  The early success of Project Sky Knight’s 
effort to apprehend suspects and patrol in “high crime” areas reflected both the OLEA’s 
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presence in local communities and the potential function of federal participation in crime 
control.101 With an unmatched allocation of OLEA funds, Los Angeles pioneered the 
application of cutting-edge technology and punitive measures that would later be used in 
other major cities and would come to characterize American policing in the late twentieth 
century.  
 To ensure that state and local law enforcement agencies would follow the federal 
government’s lead in modernizing penal and juridical institutions and increasing the 
patrol power of police officers, the Crime Commission and the OLEA worked actively 
with governors to establish long range crime control and prevention committees at the 
state level. 102 In September 1966, in anticipation of the release of the Crime 
Commission’s report, Johnson met with governors at the White House to plan how to 
carry forth the Commission’s recommendations, urging the state leaders to, “exert every 
means to insure for all our people safety of the home and safety of the streets.”103 Then, 
in mid-October at another conference on State Committees of Criminal Administration, 
Johnson told roughly forty-four chairmen and directors of State Crime Commissions: “If 
we wish to rid this country of crime, if we wish to stop hacking at its branches only, we 
must cut its roots and drain its swampy breeding ground, the slum.”104 Even as he noted 
the root causes of crime, Johnson employed the language of war to rally the new heads of 
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Crime Commissions and planning committees at the state level. Johnson pledged to “use 
every resource of the federal government to banish crime from these shores… nothing 
short of total victory will be acceptable.”105 Johnson rhetorically approached the 
immediate need to fight urban insurgency much like the effort to fight insurgency in 
Vietnam. 
 To jumpstart the war at home, the Crime Commission directors urged the creation 
of an institution to coordinate the effort at all levels of government. The National 
Commission’s work would be completed in January 1967, and states wanted continued 
direction from the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. Though Katzenbach 
moved to the State Department in November 1966, he retained his post as chair of the 
Crime Commission. Ramsey Clark, who served as Katzenbach’s deputy attorney general 
and helped draft the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, took charge of the federal 
government’s assistance programs to state and local police departments during the final 
years of Johnson’s presidency and immediately after the Crime Commission submitted its 
report to the president.106 Clark inherited a booming OLEA: Congress amended the Law 
Enforcement Act of 1965 and extended its grant-making office until 1967, dedicating 
fifteen million dollars to the OLEA for 1967, and doubling the budget to thirty million for 
1968. From the perspective of officials in the Johnson administration, policymakers, and 
academics who advocated for federal investment in law enforcement at the state and local 
levels to complement the War on Poverty, the Crime War was off to a promising start. 
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Although FBI figures did not indicate that two years of federal law enforcement 
programs had reduced crime, policymakers believed that pouring money into police 
departments would eventually solve the problem of lawlessness. In any event, the War on 
Poverty and federal social programs had seemingly failed to change the course of 
violence and crime in the nation’s urban cities.  
 
III. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 
While it focused on Vietnam and tax increases, Johnson’s message of January 
19th, 1967 marked the first time an American president discussed crime and law 
enforcement at length in a state of the union address. Four days later, Katzenbach 
submitted the Crime Commission’s final report, entitled “The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society.” The Administration had already begun drawing from the Commission’s 
recommendations to craft the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1967. In doing so, 
Johnson assured that two separate yet related domestic social wars would comprise his 
legacy: the War on Poverty combated crime by responding to the root causes liberal 
policymakers still intended to remedy, and the War on Crime battled the immediate 
manifestation of crime.107 “Effective law enforcement and social justice must be pursued 
together, as the foundation of our efforts against crime,” Johnson believed.108 The report 
Katzenbach and his team produced for a federal crime prevention program that would 
modernize and consolidate American law enforcement—what the President called “a 
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major work of scholarship”—became the basis of the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1967. 109 As the last significant piece of domestic legislation of Johnson’s presidency, 
the Safe Streets Act created the institutions that functioned to revolutionize American law 
enforcement in subsequent decades and sought to take possession of the law and order 
issue from conservatives.  
Liberal proponents of federal involvement in crime control at the state and local 
levels imagined that new law enforcement initiatives would complement existing social 
programs under the War on Poverty. Positioning the federal government’s crime 
prevention program and anti-poverty programs as mutually reinforcing, Johnson urged 
Congress to grant unprecedented funding to attack employment, education, and housing 
issues.110 For Johnson and other liberals, a long-range solution involved, “an attack not 
only against crime directly, but against the roots from which it springs.”111 The Crime 
Commission also defended the Great Society’s effort to address the structural factors that 
contributed to the nation’s crime problem in its report. “Warring on poverty, inadequate 
housing, and unemployment is warring on crime,” members wrote, “A civil rights law is 
a law against crime… More broadly and more important every effort to improve life in 
America’s ‘inner cities’ is an effort against crime.”112 Welfare payments, Model Cities, 
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special manpower training programs, Community Action Programs, and incentives for 
black suburban movement promised to improve conditions in urban centers. 
Early drafts of “The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society” circulated among 
mainstream civil rights leaders, intellectuals, and policymakers, and seemed to satisfy all 
interested parties. Some civil rights leaders appreciated the Crime Commission’s focus on 
black Americans; others hoped to recast the racist undertones of crime control. Local 
Urban League directors like Edwin Berry believed that the Crime Commission’s “very 
important recommendations… are very long overdue,” while Whitney Young offered a 
different perspective on the report he helped to write.113 “I think the real criminals in our 
society are…. the employer who refuses to hire, the real estate agent who refuses to rent 
or the builder who refuses to sell to people because of their color,” Young commented. 
“The Negro community has learned to respect law because it has been through law that 
we got the Supreme Court decision, we got restaurants, hotels, and other places open.”114 
Young’s comments countered familiar arguments about lawlessness by emphasizing that 
the outcome of civil rights gains increased respect for the American political process and 
legal codes among black Americans. Representing an entirely different political outlook, 
William F. Buckley wrote in the Los Angeles Times; “on the concrete questions… said to 
be distinctively liberal, the commission strikes me as having done excellent work by no 
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means uncongenial to conservatives.”115 House Republican leader Gerald Ford also 
praised the report, but took issue with the way in which the Commission and, by 
extension, the Administration, proposed to allocate federal law enforcement funds to state 
and local governments. Ford and other leading Republicans in Congress supported a 
federal role in the national crime control only if it awarded block grants that permitted 
states themselves to control autonomously law enforcement practices.  
In contrast to the states’ rights rationale of the block grant system, the allocation 
structure of Johnson’s crime control program mirrored his general approach to federal 
urban policy. With the Crime Commission’s blueprint in hand and the OLEA set to 
expire, Johnson requested that Congress establish an Office of Law Enforcement and 
Criminal Justice Assistance with fifty million dollars at its disposal to fund grants, 
research, and pilot projects at the state and local level. This new federal agency would 
supersede the efforts of the OLEA with broader, more advanced research and 
experimental programs. More than half of the funds would be used to encourage state and 
local law enforcement agencies to improve and modernize police, court, and corrections 
operations. The remaining nineteen million would finance research projects to develop 
methods to improve crime control, mostly through contracts with public and private 
agencies. In Johnson’s initial version of the Safe Streets Act, the federal government 
would assume ninety percent of the cost in helping state and local governments develop 
long range master plans to combat crime, sixty percent of the cost of training tactical 
units and helping with cutting-edge weapons and communications technology, and fifty 
percent of the cost of the construction of training centers. In all, Johnson asked for 350 
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million dollars to fund the War on Crime for the following two fiscal years. Given that 
the national budget for law enforcement and corrections totaled four billion, this 
represented a significant influx of federal funds into building crime control institutions.116 
Coinciding with the release of the Crime Commission’s report, Johnson brought 
seven hundred law enforcement officials from across the United States to Washington for 
a crime control conference in late March 1967. Both the Department of Justice and the 
Crime Commission encouraged all fifty governors to establish crime-planning 
committees. Not surprisingly, given the prominence of California in the earliest federal 
crime control programs, Governor Ronald Reagan’s anticrime program was the first one 
to be approved by a state legislature. While opponents of the new California Council on 
Criminal Justice as well as a Technological Research Foundation feared that the agencies 
would create a privately funded police force, the public-private partnership established in 
California and elsewhere hoped to solve the crime problem in earnest.  
 
Newark, Detroit and the National Commission on Violence and Civil Disorders 
The Harlem uprising in July 1964 began a period of rioting during the summers of 
Johnson’s presidency, but the unprecedented destruction and federal paramilitary 
response involved in Newark and Detroit’s disturbances during the last two weeks of July 
1967 raised new questions about the achievements of the Great Society and exposed its 
limitations. Urban civil disorder symbolized the failure of liberal social legislation and 
domestic programs to create sufficient opportunity for black Americans. The sense that 
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violent uprisings would only increase in scope and continue for the foreseeable future 
placed additional pressure on the federal government to enact policies that would move 
the nation closer to its egalitarian ideals. Johnson cautiously adopted both an offensive 
and defensive stance by rhetorically combining the War on Poverty with the War on 
Crime.  
The duration and proximity of the Newark and Detroit eruptions coupled with a 
mounting student protest movement reinforced the sense that the United States was under 
attack, and the black urban rioter emerged as the new public enemy. In televised remarks 
five days into the Detroit rebellion and roughly a week after the outbreak in Newark 
subsided, Johnson declared: “The apostles of violence, with their ugly drumbeat of 
hatred, must know that they are now heading for disaster. And every man who wants 
progress of justice or equality must stand against them and their miserable virus of 
hate.”117 By conflating the language of crime control with the language of civil rights, 
Johnson brought law enforcement programs into the Great Society’s effort to improve 
socio-economic conditions in black urban areas. “There is no American right to loot 
stores, or to burn buildings, or to fire rifles from the rooftops,” Johnson said: “That is 
crime.”118 Johnson went on to remind the nation: “preserving civil peace is the first 
responsibility of government.”119 Urban civil disorder in Newark and Detroit helped to 
push Johnson to privilege the right to personal safety—the “Forgotten Civil Right” 
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championed by conservatives immediately after the Brown decision—as a value more 
important than economic opportunity and social welfare.  
Despite the efforts of the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance and the pending 
Safe Streets Act of 1967, frequent incidents of urban civil disorder in major cities and 
smaller deindustrializing towns confirmed to a large segment of the American public that 
the urban crisis was escalating. In his speech to the nation as Detroit’s Paradise Valley 
burned, Johnson announced the creation of the Kerner Commission to evaluate the causes 
and suggest policy to prevent and suppress future urban unrest. “No society can tolerate 
massive violence, any more than a body can tolerate massive disease,” Johnson remarked 
when he issued the executive order establishing the Kerner Commission. The president 
emphasized, “This matter… goes to the heart of our society in a time of swift change and 
great stress.”120 While the Crime Commission functioned to develop concrete policy to 
reconstitute American law enforcement, the Kerner Commission functioned as a symbol 
of direct, executive-level action against the violent outbreaks.121  
On July 29th 1967, only two days after Johnson announced his intention to form 
the task force, the Kerner Commission met for the first time and Johnson hosted its 
members for a White House luncheon.122 Much like his choices for the Crime 
Commission, Johnson stacked the Kerner Commission with public figures known for 
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relatively moderate political orientations.123 In order that their recommendations, “affect 
this year the dangerous climate of tension and apprehension that pervades our cities,” 
Johnson placed the group on a strict schedule, giving members until March 1, 1968 to 
complete the task. 124 
The Kerner Commission sought to understand the chronology of events during the 
riots, but also to explore the social, psychological, and political dimension of urban 
unrest. To do so effectively and meet Johnson’s six-month deadline, members opted to 
divide their work into two phases. During the first phase in the late summer and fall of 
1967, the Commission brought mayors, police chiefs, state and local crime commissions, 
municipal officials, governors, federal officials, and other relevant experts to Washington 
to testify in closed hearings. Unlike the Crime Commission’s reliance on experts and 
professionals during the hearing stage, however, the Kerner Commission heard testimony 
from residents, civil rights leaders, public figures, reporters, and academics.125 
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Commission and staff members visited Detroit, Newark, East St. Louis, and Milwaukee 
and interviewed residents, activists, and city officials. During the Kerner Commission’s 
second phase, members labored frantically to submit a report of their findings to the 
president by the deadline, meeting a total of forty-four times in Washington and often 
working until midnight.126  By the end of the process, the group supposedly reached 
consensus on every issue and recommendation: “I know there have been reports of 
disagreement among commission members. These were minor arguments about words, 
nothing basic,” Kerner maintained. “The main thrust of the document, without question, 
was adopted by all the members.”127  In stark contrast to the Crime Commission, which 
split up the task of writing chapters according to committee and subcommittee, the 
Kerner Commission took a more active approach to understanding the urban social 
problem at hand.  
Even though the Kerner Commission received more public attention than any 
other presidential commission in the 1960s, the group and its well-known report proved 
to be largely symbolic, lacking the long-term impact or direct legislative relevance as its 
predecessor in the Crime Commission.  This was, in part, because the Crime Commission 
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essentially operated as the research apparatus of the Office of Law Enforcement 
Assistance and Johnson created the commission as a means of producing a federal crime 
control program. Working closely with Katzenbach during the Crime Commission’s 
tenure, the President relied upon its assessments of American law enforcement and 
criminal justice in order to begin a new era of juridical and penal reform.  
 
The Hard-Core Unemployed and the New Liberal Reform 
Like the Crime Commission, the Kerner Commission used population predictions 
to ground its suggestions to Johnson and Congress. Using current census population 
trends, Kerner Commission members predicted that the black population in cities would 
increase seventy-two percent by 1985, reaching roughly twenty-one million.128 In 
particular, the Kerner Commission noted that the black population aged fifteen to twenty-
four years old “will grow much faster than either the Negro population as a whole, or the 
white population in the same age group.”129 Based on these figures, the black youth 
population—perceived as responsible for urban disorder and living in Moynihan’s broken 
homes—appeared to be the fastest growing group in the United States. Although the 
Kerner Commission argued, “in a phrase… the problem is white racism compounded by 
poverty,” its policy suggestions offered a revised, punitive version of Moynihan’s 
“unequal treatment for the Negro.”130  Both the FBI and the census data sets reinforced 
the urgency of a new direction for the War on Poverty that targeted black Americans and 
                                                   
128 Kerner 21.  
129 ibid 392.  
130 Yuenger  “Commission Sought and Got Facts.” 
  
74 
responded to the growing number of young people living in segregated poverty who 
could not be absorbed into private sector manufacturing jobs.  
The Kerner Commission believed the key to preventing future rioting lay in 
designing federal policy that would fully integrate American society by stimulating 
upward mobility for racially marginalized Americans. But the task of creating a black 
urban middle class through federal initiatives proved especially difficult given the grim 
economic reality city governments encountered by the mid-1960s. Existing grant-in-aid 
programs, which amounted to more than ten billion dollars in fiscal year 1968, 
insufficiently compensated for the shrinking tax base in riot-torn cities.131 As white 
homeowners accelerated the decades-long process of suburban flight, economic pressures 
amplified by the exodus of manufacturing jobs left municipal governments in a position 
where they could not adequately cope with socio-economic racial discrepancies or solve 
the urban crisis without federal financial assistance and substantial amounts of private 
capital.  
New collaborations between public and private entities addressing issues of black 
unemployment, such as the Urban Coalition, the National Alliance of Businessmen, and 
the “hard-core” employment programs advocated by the Kerner Commission, did not 
receive the same amount of support as law enforcement initiatives, but the 
acknowledgement of the relationship between deindustrialization, job discrimination, and 
crime continued to typify the new public-private partnership that managed urban crisis. 
By mixing social programs with crime control programs, both the Crime and Kerner 
Commissions established a path for the federal government to work with the private 
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sector in black urban areas. This early combination of urban and punitive policy also 
abetted the eventual dissolution of the Great Society.  
Johnson popularized the term “hard-core unemployed” in his 1967 State of the 
Union Message to classify roughly half a million black men between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-five locked out of employment prospects. This grouping comprised the crux 
of the Kerner Report’s recommendations for future urban policy.132  Members of the 
Kerner Commission characterized the hard-core group by “the sense that they lack eighth 
grade literacy and mathematical skills, have only intermittent work histories at most, and 
often lack motivation to hold and perform a job.”133 The Kerner Commission formed the 
Advisory Panel on Private Enterprise, chaired by Charles Thornton, to devise policy 
strategies to increase employment opportunities for this population.134  Before he secured 
his position as CEO of Litton Industries, Thornton had trained thousands of officers at the 
War Department and used his technological expertise to improve the efficiency of 
fighting and the production of war materials. Thornton’s vocal support of Johnson’s 
antipoverty program and his active role in helping to create Job Corps camps and 
invigorate private sector involvement in the problem of black unemployment made him 
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Johnson’s appropriate choice to devise public-private strategies for the Kerner 
Commission.  
Ultimately, federal crime control efforts disproportionately targeted unemployed 
black urban youth. The link the Kerner Commission and liberal policymakers drew 
between the “hard core” and riot participation invigorated a federal commitment to job 
training programs for young black men; it took the devastation in Newark and Watts for 
Moynihan’s insistence on the need for national policy to address the structural obstacles 
black men confronted to receive attention from policymakers.135 Johnson brought 
together leaders from the public and private sectors in the Urban Coalition and the 
National Alliance of Businessmen immediately after the riots in the summer of 1967 to 
concentrate job-training efforts on what the Kerner Report called the “hard core 
disadvantaged.” While the private sector started to bring members of the hard-core into 
its ranks in the late 1960s—the Ford Motor Company even instituted new industrial 
training and recruitment centers near the epicenter of the Detroit riot—the Commission 
wanted the federal government to develop a comprehensive urban policy that would 
mandate job creation and training opportunities.136 
The Kerner Commission’s commitment to building a black middle class 
compelled members to suggest that major corporations conduct special training programs 
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for the “hard core” unemployed, as “the disadvantaged need help in obtaining managerial 
experience and in creating for themselves a stake in the economic community.”137 As an 
incentive to encourage private business to undertake this new responsibility, corporations 
received income tax credits for each hard-core employee hired. And in order to allow 
businesses themselves to avoid venturing into potentially dangerous areas of black urban 
poverty to recruit workers, a government agency or local community action agency 
identified candidates for private training programs.138 To meet the immediate needs of 
business owners, the commission promoted incentives for special riot insurance. To build 
a long-range solution to urban poverty, the Kerner Commission proposed the use of 
federal tax benefits to promote industrial and commercial development and social 
assistance in areas of highly concentrated poverty. 
The training schemes designed by the Kerner Commission exemplified the extent 
to which Moynihan’s notion of “post-industrial pathology” gained widespread acceptance 
in policy and corporate circles. Like Moynihan, the Kerner Commission believed only 
federal intervention could inspire, “as many disadvantaged Americans as possible… to 
enter the mainstream of American prosperity, to progress toward what is often called 
middle-class status.”139  This goal reflected the ways liberals retained their commitment 
to federal activism and social inclusion—at least for those willing to embrace a 
prescribed set of values—despite incidents of collective urban violence and the Great 
Society’s limitations as identified by Moynihan and other policymakers.  
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Programs that enabled private industry to absorb the hard core into its ranks, such 
as an “Intense National Program to Improve Verbal Skills of Ghetto Residents” revealed 
the deeply embedded fear of politicians, corporate executives, and academics that the 
culture of poverty Moynihan described left residents ill equipped to meet basic work 
requirements.140 The National Advisory Panel on Private Enterprise concluded: “It is 
difficult to motivate hard core youths to remain on the job for more than a few weeks.”141  
Fearing a “loss of productivity,” business owners hesitated to hire the hard-core as 
“tardiness and absenteeism are major problems for this group, who have previously found 
little social or economic benefit from conformity with the usual standards of commercial 
life.”142 From the perspective of the private sector, hiring the hard core meant that a 
number of “supportive services” would be required. In addition to job training, these 
special life skills classes included counseling in regard to “dress, appearance, social 
relationships, money management, transportation, hygiene, and health.”143 From the 
perspective of the corporations involved in these sorts of ventures, the authority to 
impose behavioral regulations that extended into the private lives of new black 
employees offset the perceived risk of hiring the “hard core.”   
While the Kerner Commission’s strategy recognized the impact of structural 
exclusion on black Americans, the proposal for a major employment program came too 
late to reap long-term benefits. Increasing numbers of domestic corporations preferred to 
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establish new production facilities in the south or overseas, where laborers could be paid 
far less than even black Americans. In Detroit, where the Urban Coalition and the “hard 
core” employment programs received the most support, the Kerner Commission’s model 
lasted only until the final months of the 1960s. Instead, the federal government chose to 
manage the effects of poverty by placing more police officers in black urban 
neighborhoods under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Without 
massive support from the private sector to hire young black Americans, the federal 
government’s effort to fight crime by fighting poverty was doomed. Ultimately it became 
far easier to manage the effects of historical inequality by increasing the carceral capacity 
of urban police departments than to enact fundamental socio-economic changes. 
 
IV. Safe Streets and Crime Control 
“This year America must decisively capture the initiative in the battle against 
crime,” Johnson vowed on February 7th, 1968 when he delivered the final version of the 
Safe Streets and Crime Control Act to Congress a week after North Vietnamese forces 
launched devastating attacks on American and South Vietnamese troops in the Tet 
offensive. While the brutality in Vietnam and opposition to the war reached new heights, 
it was a landmark day for the president’s domestic social war: just before his remarks to 
Congress, Johnson signed an executive order establishing the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration (LEAA) within the Department of Justice as a more powerful 
replacement for the OLEA. The LEAA enabled the attorney general to coordinate the 
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entire criminal justice system, from the criminal law enforcement activities of all federal 
departments to the crime prevention activities of state and local governments.144  
Based on the early efforts of the OLEA and the Crime Commission’s research, 
which pointed out the fragmentation within American criminal justice and law 
enforcement, Johnson proudly presented the LEAA as a model federal crime control 
institution.145  The new agency provided state and local law enforcement a single office 
in Washington to get the most current information on research, technology, and patrol 
programs. “We are already beginning to see the healthy effects of the Commission’s 
research and insights,” Johnson noted in his speech.146 By then, half the states had 
implemented criminal justice planning agencies.147  
  Working with state and local agencies, Johnson insisted that his crime control 
program would manage the effects of socio-economic inequality.148 “For decades the 
conditions that nourish crime have been gathering force,” Johnson said. “As a result, 
every major city harbors an army of the alienated—people who acknowledge no stake in 
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public order and no responsibility to others.”149 With the insights of the Crime 
Commission now available to the public, Johnson presented the Safe Streets Act as “the 
cornerstone of the Federal anti-crime effort to assist local law enforcement. It builds upon 
the fundamental tenets of the Crime Commission’s report: That crime prevention is a 
major national priority.”150  
Even though the Johnson administration initially used FBI statistics to justify 
federal intervention in local law enforcement, the inaccuracy of those very statistics 
served as fodder for additional federal crime control resources. During the House 
Judiciary subcommittee hearings in the first week of March 1968 considering the latest 
version of the Safe Streets Act, one witness asked: “Is crime going up or is crime going 
down? We do not honestly know.” The President’s Commission on Crime in 
Washington, D.C. also noted: “It is currently impossible… to determine the precise 
dispositions of the criminal cases of persons arrested in a particular year for serious crime 
such as robbery, housebreaking or aggravated assault,” a critique in which the National 
Crime Commission concurred: “We have no accurate or comprehensive view of the 
entire criminal process-where it succeeds, how it fails, and what happens to the people in 
it.”151 Elliot H. Lumbard, former chair of the New York State Crime Commission 
testified that the FBI Uniform Crime Report, “is a harmful document in many respects 
because it is highly inflammatory in its presentation… the figures are so gross in nature 
that they defy further analysis as to what you do next.” Lumbard went on to challenge the 
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FBI’s immediate interest in raising the specter of the nation’s crime problem by charging, 
“[The FBI] should not collect or be a statistical tool. It has a stake to a certain degree in 
the system.”152 Nonetheless, faulty statistics that anchored the entire rationale for 
devoting federal resources to urban police departments failed to bring the aims of the new 
national crime control program into question.153 The scope of the riots, the reality of 
black poverty and segregation, and social science research all underscored the fact of 
urban crisis. Crime control and punitive measures directed at black urban Americans 
seemed the most politically astute and economically viable way to solve it.  
It is not surprising, then, that the Kerner Commission’s recommendations 
achieved legislative implementation only when they reinforced the law enforcement 
measures put forth by the Crime Commission. Johnson viewed the Kerner Commission’s 
assessment of urban social realties as too radical, and the controversial nature of some of 
its analysis led policymakers to distance themselves from the implications. But the 
Kerner Commission’s identification of the criminal population (black men aged fifteen to 
twenty-four) and the solution (heightened patrol in black urban neighborhoods and 
community-based law enforcement programs) opened the door for the national law 
enforcement program put forth by the Safe Streets Act to unfold disproportionately in 
racially marginalized communities. 
                                                   
152 Bernstein, “FBI Jealousy.”  
153 When the high-profile members of the Kerner Commission delivered their thorough analysis of 
the riots to Johnson on the March 1, 1968 deadline, the occasion received great media fanfare because of 
the Report’s sensational and widely covered subject matter. CBS and PBS aired special news stories on the 
Commission’s findings. Members Harris, Wilkins, and Kerner appeared on ABC’s “Issues and Answers,” 
and Mayor Lindsay on Face the Nation. Civil Rights leaders from Martin Luther King to Stokely 
Carmichael commented that the Kerner Report only reconfirmed the critique of racism activists had 
articulated for years. CORE’s Floyd McKissick saw the Commission’s conclusions as a turning point in the 




Title I of the Safe Streets Act replicated the Crime Commission’s 
recommendations and Johnson’s crime control agenda. By giving the LEAA legislative 
sanction beyond Johnson’s executive order, Title I established the mechanism through 
which the federal government could dedicate unprecedented resources to police training, 
operations, and technological research. The Act gave the LEAA four hundred million 
dollars to design and implement new programs for law enforcement, corrections, and 
courts and to distribute the funds to states and municipalities. It began the process 
through which the federal government cultivated a permanent presence in local law 
enforcement. As a new agency staffed by experts and planners that utilized federal funds 
at the state and local levels, Johnson wanted the LEAA to function like the War on 
Poverty’s Model Cities and Community Action Agencies. By focusing the majority of 
institutional energy in its earliest years on improving the technological capacity of police 
departments and modernizing patrol operations, the LEAA empowered police units with 
responsibilities previously held by Community Action Agencies.154 
President Johnson, the attorney general, and other liberal policymakers initially 
opposed ending the grant system that enabled Washington to influence directly 
programming designed for black urban neighborhoods, but after 125 cities erupted in the 
immediate aftermath of Martin Luther King's assassination in April 1968, Johnson in 
early June signed the Safe Streets Act into law without further revision in its grant 
structure.155 The sustained reliance on federal troops and National Guardsmen for nearly 
a month after King’s murder pushed Johnson to sign the Act, with block grants, a 
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significant retreat from the liberal welfare state that began with the New Deal and 
expanded via Great Society programs.156 When Johnson brought an earlier version of the 
Act to Congress in 1967, he imagined that the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration would function in the style of War on Poverty funds, which dispersed 
federal monies directly to local agencies. By signing the Safe Streets Act into law with 
Title I’s adherence to states rights, Johnson effectively handed control of the nation’s 
crime prevention program to an emerging coalition of Western Republicans and Southern 
Democrats.  
 
Title I: “Better Pay, Better Training, and Better Equipment”  
The federal government approached its venture into local law enforcement by 
insisting that the restoration of public safety depended upon buttressing the capability of 
the criminal justice system to handle substantial numbers of new offenders from the 
nation’s urban areas. This could be accomplished only by enacting legislation—the 
product of the Crime and Kerner Commission’s research, studies, and suggestions—to 
shift federal resources away from community action programs and towards community 
patrol programs. New federal crime control measures would turn back the decisions of 
the Warren Court by revamping police departments capabilities in the surveillance of 
suspects, arrests of the criminally accused, and conviction of offenders. Once the Safe 
Streets Act paved the way for a major federal intervention in American law enforcement, 
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black Americans living in urban neighborhoods prone to rioting faced disproportionate 
arrest and imprisonment.  
Based largely on the conclusions of the Crime and Kerner Commissions, the 
Johnson Administration and Congress embraced the law enforcement mantra that only 
increasing the patrol power of big city police departments in order to arrest more 
criminals and incarcerate offenders could resolve the urban crisis.157  However, in the 
wake of Supreme Court decisions increasing the rights of defendants by protecting 
against illegal search and seizure, involuntary confessions, and guaranteeing the right to 
counsel, conviction of guilty criminals “is more difficult… than in this or any other 
country throughout recorded history,” Los Angeles District Attorney Evelle Younger 
lamented.158 Policymakers believed judicial decisions of the 1950s and 1960s jeopardized 
the safety of citizens by scrutinizing police methods, resulting in a lack of general respect 
for law enforcement. Nevada’s Democratic Senator Alan Bible told the subcommittee on 
Criminal Laws and Procedures that this resulted in “unbalanced scales of justice,” leaving 
the United States government, “in the unenviable position of losing control of the crime 
and violence that are running rampant in our cities.” 159  
Police programs occupied a substantial portion of the Crime and Kerner 
Commissions recommendations, and so it is not surprising that Title I of the Safe Streets 
Act mandated an increased punitive force in black urban neighborhoods as a short-range 
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solution to the problem of inequality.160 The Crime Commission adopted the theory that 
“the widest patrol coverage is the most deterrent coverage,” and felt “increasing patrol 
force in an area, through use of special tactical patrols, causes a decline in crimes directed 
at citizens walking the streets in the heavily patrolled area.”161 Thus, the majority of 
OLEA grants went to local police department initiatives such as Project Sky Knight, 
which provided federal support for cutting-edge weapons and communications 
technology in order to make patrol more effective. In a rare moment of disagreement 
between the two Commissions on police matters, the Kerner Commission noted that new 
patrol programs funded through OLEA actually caused much of the tension that resulted 
in urban outbreaks. The Kerner Commission criticized the trend towards aggressive 
patrol in segregated neighborhoods and found that law enforcement officers engaged in 
disturbing post-riot patrol practices. Roving task forces instituted by some police 
departments subjected entire communities in high crime districts to “intensive, often 
indiscriminate, stops and searches.”162 Despite the Kerner Commission’s recognition of 
the punitive social climate tactical police squads helped to create, the federal government 
continued to fund these specialized forces, particularly after the Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act passed.  Policymakers were generally unwilling to challenge popular law 
enforcement theory, and believed that only increased patrols could prevent crime, despite 
the highly uncertain effects of these practices. 
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Even though the Kerner Commission frequently mentioned the role of white 
racism in socio-economic inequality and the conditions that seemed to encourage urban 
civil disorder, its claim that citizens and the media exaggerated police brutality and 
misconduct overshadowed its critique of urban patrol practices. Despite widespread 
charges of aggressive patrol, the Kerner Report argued that racism occurred in only eight 
percent of police-citizen interactions, and it rejected widespread, “unfounded” 
misconduct charges.163 The Crime Commission also downplayed the extent of police 
brutality, viewing any tension between community members and police as a result of 
citizen hostility. “Most policemen treat minority-group citizens in a nondiscriminatory 
manner,” the Crime Commission blithely reported. Displacing the blame to black urban 
Americans themselves for tension, the Crime Commission argued: “Ghetto residents will 
not obtain the police protection they badly want and need until policemen feel their 
presence is welcome and that their problems are understood.” Along these lines, the 
Crime Commission charged that the negative attitudes black Americans carried about 
police actually “stimulate crime,” as officers could not effectively perform their function 
in an “angry neighborhood.”164 By developing programs that responded to community 
grievances and establishing policy guidelines for police on the beat in high crime areas 
for the LEAA, both commissions hoped that law enforcement institutions could soften 
the impact of increased patrol on residents.165  
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If improvements in police-community relations rested on changing black 
Americans’ perception of racism within local police departments, the Crime and Kerner 
Commissions proposed special programs funded by LEAA grants to emphasize the 
“humanism” and “friendliness” of officers.166 Kerner Commission members postulated 
that black residents would endorse an increased police presence in their communities if 
aggressive patrol projected a strong commitment to reducing crime levels. The Kerner 
Report warned: “What may arouse hostility is not the fact of aggressive patrol, but its 
indiscriminate use so that it comes to be regarded not as crime control but as a new 
method of racial harassment.”167 Community relations programs would increase “the 
patrolman’s knowledge of the ghetto,” in order to ameliorate hostility and to encourage 
officers to interact with community members.168 Operating on the assumption that, “there 
is more crime in the ghetto than in other areas,” more officers patrolled black 
neighborhoods, but the Kerner Commission hoped special sensitivity training programs 
would indicate a genuine effort on the part of the federal government and local law 
                                                   
166 This language is from a Los Angeles Police Department Community Relations Program 
Report. The Department wanted to emphasize the “humanism” and “friendliness” of police officers, who 
came to interact with some eight thousand students a week. The Report stated that “Police and school 
officials agree that this program, presented in an atmosphere of learning, is invaluable in creating a sense of 
concern for orderly behavior and responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.” The program 
involved the distribution of pamphlets from police officers to primary and secondary schoolchildren. This 
would “provide students with an appreciation of the role of the police and their own responsibilities as good 
citizens. In 1968, more than 210,000 students from 1-12 grade in Head Start centers were exposed to this 
program. “Los Angeles Police Department Community Relations Program,” November 1968, Richard 
Nixon Presidential Library, Egil Krogh Collection, Box 26.  
167 Kerner 307. Moreover, if police departments remained lily-white “a feeling may develop that 
the community is not being policed to maintain civil peace but to maintain the status quo,” Kerner 315. 
Black police officers would not only increase the stability of black families but also make residents more 
comfortable with new levels of law enforcement personnel in their everyday lives. The Katzenbach 
Commission actually held an opposite view, stating: “If there is not a substantial percentage of Negro 
officers among the policemen in a Negro neighborhood, many residents will reach the conclusion that the 
neighborhood is being policed, not for the purpose of maintaining law and order, but for the purpose of 
maintaining the ghetto’s status quo.” Katzenbach 102 
168 Kerner 307.  
  
89 
enforcement agencies to curtail discriminatory patrol practices in order to promote 
positive community relations and prevent violent outbreaks.169 
Increasing the involvement of major urban police departments in city government 
seemed an apt response to violence and social dislocation, and the LEAA used the funds 
provided through Title I to establish special grant programs for this purpose. The Crime 
Commission suggested creating police-community planning boards in order for officers 
to “formally participate in community planning in all cities,” by placing law enforcement 
officials in housing, parks, welfare and health departments.170 To restore law and order at 
a moment of “increasing crime, increasing social unrest, and increasing public sensitivity 
to both,” the Crime Commission defined a role for police in all public programs as a 
remedy to the problem of urban disorder.171 By including law enforcement officials in 
aspects of the municipal infrastructure that touched black communities, the Crime and 
Kerner Commissions carved out a punitive element in federal social programs. 
The LEAA endorsed the Kerner Commission’s alternative model that blended 
anti-poverty programs with law enforcement programs by incorporating police into 
service agencies established by the Great Society. The Kerner Commission lauded the 
work of police neighborhood service centers many municipal governments created in the 
aftermath of civil disorder. Conveniently located in storefronts or public housing projects 
and staffed by city anti-poverty employees and police officers, these centers connected 
residents to local social service agencies in order to “give the police in general the 
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opportunity to provide services, not merely to enforce the law.”172 Bringing police 
officers into War on Poverty programs seemed to satisfy the need both commissions 
identified to strengthen law enforcement in black urban areas and improve police-
community relations.  
The recommendations the Crime and Kerner Commissions offered to the 
president and Congress on how to modernize and make more effective police 
departments responsible for maintaining order in major metropolitan areas foreshadowed 
the ways in which federal social programs took on punitive and carceral forms. In Los 
Angeles, for example, the police force eclipsed all other government organizations in 
providing social services for youth. The Los Angeles Police Department’s presence in 
public schools, housing projects, and on the streets correlated directly to the decline of 
the War on Poverty’s community action programs. After the Watts riot, uniformed police 
officers appeared in an average of fifteen schools daily to “dispel fear and unfamiliarity,” 
according to the LAPD’s Community Relations Program Report. The presence of police 
officers in inner-city schools functioned to “create a sense of concern for orderly 
behavior and a sense of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.” The LAPD 
provided grand outings for some 25,000 “youngsters predominantly from the city’s lower 
socio-economic areas” to sporting, professional, and entertainment venues.173 The 
recommendations of both commissions and the ways their suggestions unfolded in Los 
Angeles and other cities reflected how the War on Poverty’s attempt to offer health, 
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housing, and educational opportunities gave way to providing momentary recreation as a 
means of improving police-community relations in the War on Crime.   
 
The Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention Act 
The nation’s top law enforcement officials hoped to direct the federal investment 
in the American law enforcement and criminal justice systems most forcefully at 
juveniles. Leading the effort, J. Edgar Hoover believed that only cracking down on 
youthful offenders in urban neighborhoods would reduce the crime rate.  “It is time to 
stop slapping young hoodlums on the wrist,” Hoover argued, “and begin clapping them 
into jails and reform schools.”174 Though Title I and the LEAA disproportionately 
touched the fifteen to twenty-four year-old demographic, in the winter of 1968 Johnson 
proposed a separate Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention Act to complement the 
reorganization of federal crime fighting institutions under Safe Streets Act.175  
As a vehicle through which police officers and the juvenile court system could 
monitor urban youth, Youth Service Bureaus formed the cornerstone of the Crime 
Commission’s blueprint to launch a national War on Crime and stood at the center of the 
Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention Act. For Johnson and the Crime Commission, 
Youth Service Bureaus invited an alternative to sending young people to penal 
institutions and provided necessary services in segregated urban areas that encouraged 
local authorities to respond more humanely to youth offenders and avoid, in some cases, 
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separating a delinquent from family members. Johnson recognized that community 
agencies had the potential to better handle youthful offenders than an already burdened 
court system, and the War on Poverty had already established many of these social 
agencies in urban areas.176  “We know that America’s crime problem demands far 
broader efforts to reach young people trapped in poverty—without skills, without 
purpose, without hope,” Johnson informed Congress in February 1968 in support of the 
Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention Act. “Crime rates do increase markedly in an 
atmosphere that breeds hostility and frustration. They increase as the channels of 
opportunity are limited and social mobility is foreclosed.”177 Johnson mentioned youth 
crime in suburban areas in passing, but identified the black urban population as the 
primary target of the juvenile delinquency legislation and new police social programs 
which Johnson viewed as, “giving disadvantaged young people the chance to break free 
of the waste and boredom that would otherwise characterize their lives.”178 
Johnson’s speech evoked the larger view of the Crime Commission on the 
problem of juvenile delinquency, which relied upon Moynihan’s arguments about black 
urban families rooted in “post-industrial pathology” to explain youth crime. Katzenbach 
chaired the Crime Commission’s Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee, whose 
membership also included Secretary of Labor Wirtz and Secretary of Health, Education 
and Welfare John Gardner as well as such law enforcement officials as O.W. Wilson, the 
superintendent of the Chicago police department, who argued: “If we are to reduce crime 
                                                   





on a permanent basis, it must come in the area of control of juvenile offenders.”179  
Missouri’s Democratic Congressmen James Symington directed the subcommittee, and 
firmly believed that it was the federal government’s responsibility to provide 
“institutional substitutes for parents,” as he felt that dysfunctional family life caused 
crime.180 Like Moynihan, Symington felt that, “when parents fail to give the child 
everything he needs psychologically as well as materially for balance and direction, then 
he must get it somewhere else.”181 In more affluent communities, the subcommittee 
advocated, the school system should be charged with encouraging youth responsibility. In 
poor black neighborhoods, on the other hand, only public and private programs could 
provide sufficient alternatives by complementing existing federal programs for poor 
young people like the Neighborhood Youth Corps.  
Crime Commission members carefully framed the juvenile crime control agency 
they designed as the basis of the Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention Act in the form of 
a service bureau to avoid the stigma and potential community outrage in response to new 
law enforcement centers built to handle young black Americans.182  Accordingly, the 
Crime Commission felt it necessary to make participation in Bureau services voluntary, 
“otherwise the dangers and disadvantages of coercive power would merely be transferred 
from the juvenile court to it.”183 The Crime Commission hoped the availability of 
recreational facilities, employment training, tutoring, and youth development 
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programming at the Youth Service Bureau would facilitate the acceptance of this new 
urban law enforcement agency in urban communities throughout the United States.  
The Crime Commission imagined that the Youth Service Bureaus would act as 
the central coordinator of all community-related services for the young and ease an 
overburdened juvenile justice system.184 The Crime Commission required service bureaus 
to accept all court referrals.185 Though the Youth Service Bureau would include 
counseling, foster home placement, work, recreation, and special education programs for 
“less seriously delinquent juveniles,” its primary function, “would be individually 
tailored work with troublemaking youths.”186 While working in tandem with the courts, 
the Youth Service Bureau would “handle many troubled and troublesome young people 
outside the criminal system.”187 Existing organizations, schools, and parents would 
contribute to the Youth Service Bureau’s clientele, but the Crime Commission imagined 
police and juvenile courts would supply the bulk of participants.188 In effect, the 
Commission started a new approach to identifying worthy recipients of public social 
services by relying on law enforcement institutions to supply clients. The outcome 
ensured that federal social programs would be tied to punitive institutions.  
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Title I: Block Grants and the Transformation of the Activist State 
By establishing the block grant system, the Safe Streets Act charted a new course 
for state and federal functions. The LEAA funneled federal crime control funds to state 
governments via block grants to support the development of comprehensive law 
enforcement plans and to fund action programs administered by public and private 
agencies under those plans. In order to qualify for funding, states were required to 
establish law enforcement planning agencies to administer grants. Richard Nixon’s effort 
to reorganize the structure of federal government in the style of his “New Federalism” 
would entrench this governing approach whereby states developed independent strategies 
on how to use federal monies based on their own determined priorities.  
House Republican leaders Gerald R. Ford, Charles E. Goodell, and Albert H. 
Quie contended that the proliferation of grant programs had generated a giant federal 
bureaucracy that could not adequately respond to local needs. These congressmen 
proposed block grants as an alternative to allow state governments to determine how 
federal funds would be allocated. Opponents of the block grant system argued that state 
governments were ill- equipped to handle large sums of money, and critics feared that 
because rural areas often inherited a disproportionate share of funds, cities would not 
receive their due.189 Even though Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress at the 
time, the pressing need to invest in national crime control pushed liberals to support the 
states’ rights approach proposed by their conservative counterparts.  
Although Johnson disliked the concept of block grants, when he signed the Safe 
Streets Act into law and established the LEAA he tacitly endorsed a form of grant 
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making that ended the practice of citizen input—once a cornerstone of the War on 
Poverty—in how government funds would be distributed in a given community. 
Professionals working for state planning agencies now determined the priorities of local 
law enforcement, and the agencies offered limited representation (at best) to residents 
who lived in neighborhoods with the most severe crime rates. Community institutions 
dealing with crime-related problems such as poverty, health, and employment also found 
themselves largely excluded from law enforcement discussions.  
Despite the block grant provision, discretionary funds allowed the federal 
government to take a direct role in local law enforcement matters in urban centers with 
significant black populations. Executive level officials now worked directly with mayors 
and police chiefs in cities like Philadelphia, Baltimore, New York, Detroit, and Los 
Angeles to design and implement crime prevention programs with federal discretionary 
funds. During the Johnson and Nixon administrations, action grants went to police 
departments for technological and statistical equipment and for law enforcement 
experimentation. As the federal law enforcement program unfolded into the seventies, the 
White House assumed a greater proportion of discretionary funds, in direct contradiction 
to its stated commitment to decentralization. 
Both the Crime and Kerner Commissions predated the Safe Streets Act and 
Nixon’s New Federalism in formulating some of the earliest models for block grants that 
materialized in the Safe Streets Act. The Crime Commission favored a multi-purpose 
funding approach, which redirected federal War on Poverty funds away from community 
action grants. As a means through which municipal governments rather than grassroots 
activists could spend federal dollars autonomously, late War on Poverty projects such as 
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the Model Cities program seemed to represent “the most effective weapon in the federal 
arsenal for a long-term, comprehensive attack on the problems of American cities,” as the 
Kerner Commission said.190  In crafting the War on Crime, Johnson and other liberal 
policymakers hoped to continue this type of grant model, one that dispersed federal funds 
directly into local agencies.191 
Block grants empowered state planning agencies to determine how the revolution 
in American law enforcement would shape the lives of the hard-core unemployed and the 
group the Crime Commission labeled “troubled and troublesome youths” who resided in 
ground zero of the War on Crime. As a necessary first step in modernizing American law 
enforcement and criminal justice, the Crime Commission proposed that the federal 
government invest in local police departments to make a quick impact on crime rates and 
to prevent further episodes of urban civil disorder. The transitory social institutions the 
Crime and Kerner Commissions described that effectively integrated police departments 
into social welfare agencies achieved expression in the Safe Streets Act, but the 
legislation positioned state governments to command the foot soldiers in the Crime War 
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instead of municipal governments. The precedent Johnson signed into law through the 
Safe Streets Act helped to ease the transition to Nixon’s New Federalism, and all the 
private contracting that approach to governing entailed.  
* 
If riots in the second half of the 1960s constituted a moment of domestic 
bloodshed the nation had not experienced since the Civil War, the violent nature of these 
incidents brought to the fore the unanswered legacy of emancipation. In this social 
climate, policymakers and many of their constituents feared continued chaos in the 
nation’s cities. At the annual meeting of the National Conference of American Bar 
Association Presidents in February 1968, James C. Davis of Cleveland articulated the 
common concern that mass political violence was on the horizon:  
“Today there are close to 30 million Negroes in the United States. The 
total population of North Viet Nam is about 19 million or a little over 60 
percent of the American Negro population. Yet the relatively small North 
Vietnamese population has tied down more than one million allied troops, 
troops that were unable to maintain security in the face of simultaneous 
disorders in the cities of South Viet Nam…. Should the majority of the 
Negro populations, in these cities alone, move from passive acquiescence 
in riots to active participation in rebellion, it is obvious what the result 
would be.”192  
 
The incidents of collective violence in American cities Davis described provided the 
federal government justification for its post-civil rights crime control priorities. Rather 
than attacking the roots of structural racism, the White House and Congress made a 
decision to cope with the failure of the nation’s social institutions by launching a counter-
revolution that brought to an end roughly three decades of progressive legislation. This 
bipartisan, bi-regional redirection of national priorities led policymakers to privilege 
                                                   
192 Robert Wiedrich, “Growing Disrespect for Laws Called Threat to Our Nation,” Chicago 
Tribune, 17 Feb 1968, W18. 
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punitive measures over providing economic security for all Americans. As the architects 
of modern American criminal justice and law enforcement, Johnson and other liberal 
policymakers conceded to the conservative crime package, which contained the seeds of 
the War on Poverty’s undoing.  
By signing the Safe Streets Act and establishing the block grant system, Johnson 
enacted a fundamental change that ended the direction of the liberal welfare state that 
began with the New Deal and continued through his own Great Society. The federal 
government ultimately granted power to the states to decide how to navigate the social 
and demographic transformations brought about by the Second Reconstruction. With the 
institutions and block grant structure of the federally directed revolution in American 
penal and juridical systems secured through the efforts of the Johnson Administration, 
Richard Nixon took office in a position to profoundly shape the development of what he 


























  The “Long-Range Master Plan”: The Rise and Fall of the New Federalism  
                                                       
I. Freedom from Fear 
By the time Richard Nixon launched his 1968 presidential campaign, “law and 
order” had emerged as a permanent fixture on the national policy agenda and in the 
minds of growing numbers of voters. Polling results indicated that the majority of 
Americans viewed crime as the top domestic problem. Nixon shrewdly made his first 
major policy statement in May 1968 a treatise on how he planned to end the crime 
menace.1  In “Toward Freedom from Fear,” Nixon based his case for the failure of the 
Great Society on FBI statistics that indicated a sharp increase in crime after 1964.2 
Linking the federal government’s attempt to foster greater economic opportunity for 
historically marginalized populations to violence, Nixon repudiated centralized social 
programs and Johnson’s law enforcement strategy that placed the War on Crime inside 
the War on Poverty.  While describing a general atmosphere of lawlessness and implying 
that the changing demographics of cities threatened the safety of “ordinary Americans,” 
Nixon offered no specifics on how new carceral policies would be implemented or the 
process through which states would receive crime control block grants. During the 
remainder of his campaign, and as President, Nixon redefined the urban crisis from a 
problem of inequality to one of violent behavior. 
The “Freedom from Fear” mantra of the Nixon campaign did not resort to 
explicitly racist imagery but did evoke fears of neighborhood change (“vote like your 
                                                   
1 Thomas E. Cronin, Tamia Z. Cronin, and Michael E. Millakovich, U.S. v. Crime in the Streets 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 60. 
2 ibid 61.  
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whole world depended on it”).3 Taking cues from the law and order rhetoric Ronald 
Reagan successfully employed two years earlier in his California gubernatorial campaign, 
Nixon appealed to Americans who feared the social consequences of the great economic 
and legal changes they had witnessed during the previous decade. By selecting as his 
running mate Spiro Agnew, a staunch law and order proponent who once commented that 
the release of the Kerner Commission Report would only encourage more black 
Americans to riot, Nixon offered his “Silent Majority” a formidable crime control ticket.4  
Given the actual similarities between Johnson’s law enforcement program and his 
own, Nixon’s tough on crime stance was to a great extent a matter of rhetoric. John Dean, 
a young lawyer working for Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee who joined 
Nixon’s domestic policy staff, understood the parallels between Johnson and his 
successor. “I was cranking out that bullshit on Nixon’s crime policy before he was 
elected. And it was bullshit, too,” Dean recalled,  “We knew it. The Nixon campaign 
didn’t call for anything about crime problems that Ramsey Clark wasn’t already doing 
under LBJ. We just made more noise.”5 And the noise helped to get Nixon elected. 
Although Republican strategist Kevin Phillips claimed that Nixon’s ascendance 
“bespoke the end of the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new era 
in American politics,” it was, in fact, Johnson who sowed the seeds of postwar 
                                                   
3 “Complete Text of the 1968 Republican Platform,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac 24 (1968): 
987-994.  
4 Although black voters secured Agnew’s victory in the 1966 Maryland gubernatorial race,  he lost 
much of this initial support after he attributed the cause of the 1968 Baltimore riot to the shortcomings of 
black leaders in the community.  
5 Quoted in Cronin 76. 
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liberalism’s demise.6  For without the system of federal assistance to state and local 
governments Johnson established, and without the landmark crime control program his 
Administration designed, the infrastructure would not have been in place for Nixon to 
build his “American law enforcement apparatus.” Johnson expanded the granting powers 
of the president and Congress for social programs, creating a new degree of federal 
influence in urban areas that conservatives seized on to transform the revolution in law 
enforcement and criminal justice in their own image. The first legislative step in the 
process of recasting domestic policy from poverty programs to carceral programs, the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, laid the groundwork for the block 
grant system. The legislation established a new, race-neutral states’ rights paradigm that 
Nixon stepped in as the first president to execute. 
The block grant system stood at the intersection of states rights and race in the 
aftermath of Jim Crow. While the Great Society transferred federal funds to state and 
local governments for the purpose of reducing poverty in the nation’s most devastated 
urban and rural areas via categorical grants, block grants stipulated that decision making 
in crime control should be left to state and local governments with relative autonomy and 
less federal oversight. Republicans and southern politicians favored block grants as a 
means to preserve race-based social hierarchies following civil rights legislation. Over 
the course of his presidency, Nixon presided over a domestic social war that 
disproportionately touched young black urban Americans. The war offered race-neutral 
language; yet in memoranda, private meetings, and comments to the press, Justice 
Department and White House officials often used explicitly racist imagery. However, 
                                                   
6 Phillips quoted in Gareth Davies, From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and 
Decline of Great Society Liberalism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999) 217.  
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after it became clear that many states used block grants to modernize law enforcement 
outside of urban “high crime” areas, Nixon and officials within his administration often 
abandoned their own political beliefs in order to refocus the War on Crime in low-income 
black communities by reasserting federal control. 
The switch to the block grant model gave massive sums of money to states ill-
prepared to manage their respective law enforcement programs. Soon, Nixon and White 
House officials grew frustrated with the limitations of their own small government 
strategy and the tension between upholding states’ rights and setting national priorities. 
By the end of Nixon’s first term the administration’s experience with the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) revealed the shortcomings of this 
deregulatory approach to domestic social programs. The inefficiency, contradictions, and 
corruption within the LEAA and the law enforcement institutions it spawned 
foreshadowed the problems within Nixon’s administration that the Watergate 
investigation revealed, but also (and perhaps more importantly) the danger in ceding 
federal control of social programs intended for the most marginalized populations. While 
pledging to uphold the principle of states rights, the White House and the Department of 
Justice led the federal government in exerting even more control over urban areas. While 
Nixon brought a number of crime control proposals to Congress, during his first term the 
LEAA merely erected a major law enforcement bureaucracy at the national and state 
levels and successfully funneled tens of millions of dollars into local police departments 
for mostly hardware programs. Ironically, the only way Nixon could redesign the 
American law enforcement apparatus would be to abandon his own commitment to New 
Federalism and assume direct control over local law enforcement operations.  
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The New Federalism intended to increase the power of states, but as the crime 
rate rose and states misspent federal law enforcement funds, the federal government 
under Nixon effectively extended its power over local authorities. In cities with “high 
crime” problems especially, the federal government maintained a carceral presence that 
exceeded its power in urban areas during the War on Poverty. Thus, if the federal 
government intended the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to test the 
efficiency of block grants or revenue sharing, the concept failed as a functional method of 
governance and had grave consequences for the targets of crime prevention programs. 
The promise of state autonomy gave the national law enforcement program congressional 
and presidential support, but the Nixon Administration moved to increase federal power 
within the LEAA two years into its operation. Too much, it seemed, had been given to 
the states. 
As a case study in the reasons why the block grant system and Nixon’s New 
Federalism ultimately failed, an examination of how a massive law enforcement 
bureaucracy was built at all levels of government through the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration not only provides a critical view into how American crime 
control institutions rapidly expanded in the 1970s, but also reveals the dangers inherent in 
investing unprecedented federal dollars into poorly planned and supervised programs 
with ambiguous and racially-motivated goals. The bulk of these funds went to private 
companies and existing federal agencies and initiatives that provided hardware for the 
federal crime control project, resulting in the creation of an entirely new criminal justice 
and law enforcement industry that proved highly profitable for those involved. The 
LEAA saw its operating budget grow from 10 million dollars in 1965 to some 850 
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million dollars by 1973.7 Over the course of the seventies, the federal government 
dedicated some 7.25 billion dollars to crime control, equivalent to some twenty billion 
dollars today.8 With full freedom to award block grants to states, the top three LEAA 
Administrators—a constantly-shifting troika due to high turnaround at the Department of 
Justice during the Nixon Administration—commanded the fastest-growing federal 
agency in the 1970s. As new corporations and consulting firms emerged to reap the 
federal law enforcement benefits, the type of corruption this massive influx of funds 
perpetuated mirrored the criminal behavior of Nixon and his officials exposed by the 
Watergate scandal.  
Nixon’s law enforcement measures may have differed very little from Johnson’s 
beyond their preferred grant structures, but Nixon greatly accelerated the shift in 
emphasis of the federal crime control approach from treatment to punishment and from 
attacking root causes to attacking effects. Attorney General John Mitchell carried forth 
Nixon’s managerial approach to the crime issue. Soon after he received his confirmation, 
Mitchell remarked of the Department of Justice: “I think this is an institution for law 
enforcement—not social improvement.”9 Like Mitchell, Nixon believed that Johnson 
focused too much on the social causes that bred high crime environments and did not 
                                                   
7 See Beth Lynch, Dollars and Sense of Justice: A Study of the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration as it Relates to the Defense of the Criminal Justice System (Washington, DC: National 
Legal Aid and Defender Association, 1973). 
8 Vesla Mae Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Politics of Punishment,” (PhD diss., Harvard 
University, 2007) 115.  
9 Quoted in Ronald J. Ostrow, “Richardson to Shift Focus at Justice Department,” Los Angeles 
Times, 17 Jun 1973, H1. 
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hold perpetrators sufficiently accountable for their behavior.10 Their attitudes mirrored 
the general sentiment of the Republican Party, whose 1968 platform declared: “We must 
re-establish the principle that men are accountable for what they do, that criminals are 
responsible for their crimes, that while the youth’s environment may help to explain the 
man’s crime, it does not excuse that crime.”11 Although conservatives tended to stress 
individual and social pathology to explain the breakdown of law and order, Republicans 
and Democrats alike relied upon the blueprint Johnson’s Crime Commission had 
developed to set the national priorities for criminal justice. States received grants based 
on categories Johnson’s Commission established as areas of the criminal justice system in 
need of improvement. These systems— including prisons, corrections, and law 
enforcement technology—had formed the basis of the Safe Streets Act. The revenue 
sharing program the Nixon Administration developed during his first term promised to 
“return power to the people” in the aftermath of landmark social legislation.12  
The cornerstone of what Nixon referred to as “The New Federalism” promised 
state and local governments far greater autonomy than Johnson allowed in developing 
social programs. Johnson and the early federal law enforcement assistance programs 
                                                   
10 Elliott Currie and James Q. Wilson, “The Politics of Crime: The American Experience,” in 
Kevin Stenson and David Cowell, eds., The Politics of Crime Control (London: Sage Publications, 1991), 
op. cit., p. 34; James D. Calder, “Presidents and Crime Control: Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon and the 
Influences of Ideology,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (1982): 574-589; quoted in Nancy 
Marion, A History of Federal Crime Control Initiatives, 1960-1993 (New York: Praeger, 1994) 70.  
11 “Complete Text of the 1968 Republican Platform,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac 24 
(1968): 987-994.  
12 Despite his opposition to the block grant component of the Safe Streets Act, Johnson too 
entertained the concept of revenue sharing. In 1964 Walter Heller, chair of Kennedy and Johnson’s Council 
on Economic Advisors, proposed an alternative to categorical grants that gave states a portion of taxable 
personal income to use as at their discretion. Heading Johnson’s 1964 Task Force on the issue, Joseph 
Pechman of the Brookings Institution developed a revenue sharing program with Heller as a means to 
restore surplus federal funds to the states in a decade of abundance. But as the Vietnam War and the Great 
Society escalated, the Heller-Pechman plan was indefinitely postponed. Marion 76; Cronin et al. 81. 
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followed the grant structure of the War on Poverty by doling out categorical grants to 
states, which distributed federal funds for a specific purpose. The block grant approach 
distributed money for a general purpose, and the federal government exerted very little 
control over how states chose to spend the funds. Mitchell believed that categorical grants 
led to fragmentation by forcing cities and counties to operate autonomously instead of 
collaborating with the federal government to make programs more effective. Mitchell 
viewed block grants as an “auspicious beginning” that would make possible the 
permanent implementation of revenue sharing and Nixon’s New Federalism. Nixon 
officials drew on the work of Edward Banfield and James Sundquist, who privileged the 
authority of state and local governments over a massive federal bureaucracy and shunned 
greater federal responsibility for social programs.13 The Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration represented the first experience in New Federalism. When applied to the 
crime control issue, the Nixon Administration imagined that the federal government 
would provide states and local governments with a general framework to help steer their 
plans for law enforcement projects rather than mandating specific programs. The New 
Federalism promised to cut down on red tape in Washington by decentralizing and 
building smaller bureaucracies via criminal justice planning agencies at the state level.14  
                                                   
13 See Edward C. Banfield, Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1967), and 
The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis (New York: Little, Brown, 1970); James 
Sundquist, On Fighting Poverty: Perspectives from Experience (New York: Basic Books, 1969) and 
Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Brookings Institution, 1969); 
“Planning Assistance: Problems and Implications” Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,  Box 37 
Office of Law Enforcement Programs (Gen) 1970. 
14 Planning did not originate with the Nixon Administration, as Johnson appointed more 
Commissions and Task Forces than any other President. But with respect to crime control, White House 
officials and state bureaucrats steered the course of the law enforcement revolution. The top LEAA 
Administrators viewed planning as, “the process of consciously exercising rational control over the 
development of the physical environment and of certain aspects of the social environment, in light of a 
common scheme of values, goals, and assumptions.” If insufficient planning created mismanagement of the 
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Social scientists and historians have largely ignored the federal role in the buildup 
of the carceral state, in part because state and municipal governments retained their 
control over criminal justice. Yet without massive federal support and subsidies, the 
revolution in American law enforcement would not have produced the largest and most 
expansive penal and juridical system in the world over the course of a single decade. 
Block grants and revenue sharing allowed the federal government to demand that states 
make law enforcement and crime control a priority at all levels of government.15 By 
launching a national War on Crime, the federal government forced states to make law 
enforcement into an issue, shifting the terms of social analysis and the nature of federal 
assistance. The federal government used block grant formulas to urge state governments 
to create criminal justice institutions and dedicate resources to increasing the nation’s 
punitive and carceral capacities. Initially it did this by making states match federal funds, 
but eventually it assumed an even greater responsibility after a House investigation 
exposed vast mishandling of funds at the state level. 16 
Despite the rhetoric of federalism and states rights, direct White House 
involvement in launching the law enforcement apparatus underscored the extent to which 
the federal government designed the national program to focus on street crime in the 
nation’s cities, regardless of whether the states shared this priority. Amidst mounting 
criticism from within Congress and law enforcement institutions, in 1970, two years into 
the national crime control program, officials in the Nixon Administration escalated 
                                                   
War on Poverty, by carefully developing programs, encouraging experimentation, and supporting academic 
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LEAA Box 37 OLEP (Gen) 1970. 
15 Weaver 244.  




federal involvement in state and local government by assuming ninety percent—rather 
than the sixty percent stipulated in the original act—of costs for experimental and highly 
punitive crime control projects in primarily black urban areas. With the federal 
government assuming the great majority of the financial burden of crime control 
initiatives, the Nixon Administration hoped to “create a law enforcement system of 
complete federal financial subsidy for the states, rather than a system of shared 
responsibility.” As one White House official noted, “states are failing to reorder their 
priorities now, irregardless of our consistent prodding them to do so through the matching 
funds program… The only recourse is to involve the federal establishment in state crime 
control to a greater degree, by increasing the ‘federal financial mix.’” 17  By the end of his 
presidency, Nixon revised his New Federalism to end states’ discretion in the use of 
federal law enforcement funds. Now states would have to adhere to LEAA requirements 
and submit a formal application for federal funds.  
With a penchant for longer prison sentences, preventative detention for offenders 
deemed particularly dangerous, and a reform of the criminal code, Nixon moved beyond 
Johnson’s initial focus on patrol and drafted amendments to the Safe Streets Act that 
rested on the assumption that only swift and sure conviction and harsh punishment could 
curtail the rising crime problem.  Under Nixon and Attorney General John Mitchell, the 
War on Crime evolved into a “Vietnam-like conflict” that used federal grants to train and 
equip its state and local police footsoldiers.18 And while Nixon’s crime control programs 
                                                   
17 7-13-70 Memo for Bud Krogh “Review of ‘Brainstorming Session’ Outlining Administration 
Responses and Initiatives Towards the Crime Problem for the Next Year (Santarelli, Kallen, Persce- Drug 
Issue Not Discussed),” no author. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Egil Krogh Collection, Box 25.  
18 Weaver, “Frontlash” 54.  
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included a rhetorical commitment to rehabilitation, his administration moved to impose 
mandatory minimum sentences and harsher penalties, stiffen bail procedures, and 
promote federal judges who favored severe sentences. Nixon’s policies built a massive 
and highly dysfunctional crime control bureaucracy that changed the nature of law 
enforcement and insured that more Americans than ever before would enter the criminal 
justice system, interact with police officers, and face arrest.   
     * 
In December 1968, a month before his inauguration, Nixon’s Advisory Council 
on Crime and Law Enforcement urged the President-elect to “place the crime crisis on 
par with the urban crisis, with national security, precisely where the American people 
placed it months ago during the national campaign, where ‘crime in the streets’ was the 
overriding national issue.” 19 Nixon selected Martin Pollner, a deputy attorney general 
under Kennedy, to sit as executive director of the Council with Los Angeles district 
attorney Evelle Younger as the chair. The Council drafted recommendations for Nixon’s 
national crime control program, and included former LAPD police chief Thomas Reddin, 
Professor Walter Murray (who served as special consultant to the Watts Area Re-
Development and Rehabilitation Project), as well as a number of US attorneys, district 
attorneys, and members and former presidents of the International Association of Chiefs 
of Police, the National Law Enforcement Association, and the American Bar Association. 
Like Johnson’s Crime Commission, the Council developed a blueprint for a massive 
domestic “war,” telling the President-elect: “This war on crime, should be declared with 
                                                   
19 Richard Nixon’s Advisory Council on Crime and Delinquency- Recommendations. Attached to 
12-20-68 letter from Martin Pollner to Martin Anderson; Nixon Library, Martin Anderson Collection  Box 
24 (n.d) 68-70, Folder “Crime” 3 of 3. 
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righteous rhetoric, and it is one that will win support from editorial pages to the 
cloakrooms of Capital Hill.” The members assumed that the “criminal species” could be 
“found predominately in the slums of urban America and not in the suburbs.” Thus, the 
crime war should be directed towards “the urban poor, upon whom [crime] is in many 
ways a heavier cross to bear than poverty.” 20  
The correspondence among members of Nixon’s Advisory Council on Crime 
revealed that, from their perspective, at the heart of the matter of the crime problem lay 
the street crime problem, seen as a black, urban issue. It had already been sensationalized 
for the American public through widespread coverage of urban civil disorder. A few 
months after Nixon’s inauguration, Attorney General John Mitchell committed to getting 
law enforcement funds to cities and deindustrializing towns, allocating additional funds 
to states specifically for law enforcement in high crime, segregated neighborhoods. 21 
While the post-civil rights moment ensured that outright racism would no longer be 
tolerated in the public sphere, and policymakers followed suit by using only non-
racialized language, all levels of government extended their punitive programs into 
specific urban spaces and against already marginalized Americans.  
Nixon officials and Department of Justice employees rarely mentioned race as 
they planned to attack crime in low-income communities, but the Safe Streets Act made 
possible the emergence of a new system of racial subordination in the aftermath of the 
civil rights movement and changes in American racial law. In a major Washington Post 
article in 1972 ruminating on the first years of the War on Crime, former executive 
                                                   
20 ibid.  
21 “States Urged to Aid Cities in Crime Fight” New York Times, 9 Apr 1969, 7. 
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director of the Crime Commission James Vorenburg wrote, “Continuing denial of 
opportunity, combined with the anonymity of city life, is destroying the social pressure to 
abstain from crime. The riots of the mid-Sixties showed one possible outlet for the deep 
frustration and hatred felt by young blacks in the cities—the same group that is already 
responsible for a large portion of serious crime.”22 The language of the Safe Streets Act 
remained race-neutral, but the construction of the legislation and policymakers’ own 
assumptions and desires built racism into the law’s implementation. The racialized 
categories of “violent offender” and “drug addict,” as well as new technological and 
scientific programs, rationalized the increased surveillance and incarceration of black 
urban youth.  
Academic research—much of it funded by the federal government—increasingly 
drew connections between race, geography, and criminality to justify the decision to fight 
the War on Crime in segregated urban communities. Nixon officials called attention to 
the work of G. Robert Blakey, a Notre Dame law professor and former member of the 
organized crime committee of Johnson’s Crime Commission who went on to work on the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures under John McClellan, one of 
the strongest forces behind the Safe Streets Act in Congress. Blakey concluded: “Public 
alarm is, indeed, founded in fact. A full 60 percent of all major crime against person—
rapes, robberies, and assaults—occurs on the street or in other public places… street 
crime is increasing… It is not possible, of course, to talk of street crime without talking 
about the Negro riots that have rocked the ghetto areas of our cities in the last few 
                                                   
22 James Vorenberg, “The War on Crime: Five Futile Years,” Washington Post, 21 May 1972, B3. 
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years.”23  The riots underpinned policymakers’ perception of crime as a problem that 
disproportionately involved unemployed young black men, but the domestic social war 
could not be launched under such specific terms. The ambiguity of the Safe Streets Act, 
subsequent legislation and the block grant concept enabled the War on Crime to unfold in 
segregated urban communities while protecting policymakers from charges of racism or 
discrimination.24  
 
II. An All-Out War on Crime 
 Almost immediately on taking office, Nixon enthusiastically embraced the War 
on Crime, treating it like any other military intervention and eagerly working to 
consolidate the federal law enforcement complex. In a memo circulated early in his 
presidency, White House staff asked themselves: “#1 How do we accomplish total 
mobilization of all our human resources for an all out war on crime?” To which an 
anonymous domestic policy advisor responded: “As is true in a military operation, we 
must get all of our professional and volunteer forces going in the same direction 
following a plan which puts every official and volunteer to work in a job he is qualified 
to do and which contributed to the overall effort in the war on crime.” 25 Nixon’s aide 
                                                   
23 Professor Blakely quoted in Memo from Pollner to Mitchell, “Re: Anticipated Criminal Activity 
Facing New Administration and Proposed Action to Combat Same.” n/d Richard Nixon Presidential 
Library, Martin Anderson Collection, Box 24.  
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before 1965, Time Magazine averaged 20 stories on crime-related issues a year, but shortly thereafter, the 
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Tom Charles Huston wrote in a memo to domestic council advisor and chief crime 
strategist Bud Krogh in early 1970 that the crux of the war meant getting policy 
equipment and hardware to the foot soldiers, as federal law enforcement assistance had 
functioned during the Johnson years. Huston suggested, “we must first establish the 
machinery that enables us to gain control of the problem before we can hope to solve 
it.”26 First and foremost, police departments, like an army, needed better weapons and 
training.  
Nixon viewed the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration as “the primary 
instrument for our attack on crime,” and police programs as the necessary “change 
agents” for the criminal justice revolution.27 Each piece of law enforcement legislation 
Nixon’s White House brought to Congress served as a key weapon in the war. During his 
first six months in office, Nixon worked with Attorney General John Mitchell to draft 
twenty anti-crime bills, introducing some of the most repressive criminal penalties and 
investigation procedures in American history. These included pretrial detention measures, 
stop and frisk policing practices, and a provision that allowed the Justice Department to 
monitor any group deemed “subversive” without having to go through the courts to 
obtain warrants.  
The LEAA functioned as the federal government’s law enforcement consultant, 
filtering to the states and, through them, local governments an unprecedented national 
strategy on crime. It provided and arranged for technical assistance, both directly and 
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through contractors, consultants, and publications produced by the Agency’s research 
arm. 28 As one administrator in the organized crime division put it: “LEAA is needed as 
the motivating force to tie the system together, not as a national system but as a truly 
Federal system, whereby we can provide the necessary means and resources.”29 While the 
LEAA did not operate as a law enforcement agency in its own right, it provided state and 
local governments direction in revolutionizing their criminal justice programs. Only in 
special cases (usually in response to black activism and protest) did the LEAA engage in 
tactical operations on the ground. For example, an LEAA administrator advised FBI 
agents and New Haven police officials when they raided Black Panther headquarters in 
May 1969.30  
Nixon criticized the Johnson Administration’s management of the LEAA during 
the campaign, yet the institution came to suffer from the same problems once he took 
office. The lack of coordination among the various federal agencies involved in crime 
control, coupled with what Nixon officials characterized as a “mass of departments, 
bureaus and agencies with duplicative staffing, competing responsibilities, poor 
coordination and correlation, and self-defeating jealousies and suspicions,” made the 
institution incapable of effectively addressing crime.31 The Nixon Administration worried 
about “overlapping authority,” which placed law enforcement issues under the 
jurisdiction of a range of departments.  Six executive offices and seventeen different 
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bureaus, agencies, and divisions covered narcotics issues, for instance.32 Nixon believed 
that if he coordinated these efforts, implemented planning agencies, and addressed the 
problem of fragmentation the LEAA would be made more effective.  
When Congress created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1968, 
it invested it with a special role as the only grant agency within the Department of 
Justice, but it viewed these initial grants as seed money and did not intend the agency to 
be permanent. The Safe Streets Act sanctioned the LEAA for two years, but it survived 
and its budgetary allocation swelled exponentially throughout the 1970s. By 1972, the 
organization had grown tenfold from its initial incarnation. When it finally disbanded in 
1981 it had appropriated nearly ten billion dollars to the states and nonprofit agencies, 
funding roughly eighty-thousand crime control projects and awarding 155,270 grants. Yet 
even these figures do not reflect the growing allocations dedicated to criminal justice and 
law enforcement at the state level, which amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars.33  
Given the importance of the LEAA to President Nixon and Congress, the 
Department of Justice developed into one of the most highly funded and rapidly 
expanding executive agencies. Although the Nixon Administration made substantial cuts 
to most domestic programs, anticrime and criminal justice funding ballooned. During the 
first two years of Nixon Administration, total federal expenditures for the reduction of 
crime increased sixty-four percent to just under a billion dollars. Within two years, the 
White House earmarked 1,257,000,000 dollars for the War on Crime, nearly doubling the 
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six hundred million Johnson initially secured. 34 With the highest budget the Justice 
Department had ever enjoyed, thousands of new employees joined the agency’s criminal 
division after Nixon took office to concentrate on the problems of street and organized 
crime in cities. Nixon’s commitment to quelling narcotics trafficking also enlarged the 
Department of Justice, as nearly two hundred new Border Patrol inspectors and Bureau of 
Narcotics and Dangerous Drug officers served the national law enforcement program.35 
In addition to block grants, the Safe Streets Act ushered in a new form of 
leadership in federal agencies, a “troika” administration that governed the LEAA from 
Washington. Instead of a single agency head, three administrators made all of the major 
federal law enforcement decisions—two of which had to be of the same political party. 
Initially, the Nixon Administration felt strongly that a Democrat should lead the agency, 
and selected the former head of the organized crime Task Force of Johnson’s Crime 
Commission, Charles Rogovin. Rogovin left his position as an assistant attorney general 
in Massachusetts in charge of criminal investigations and prosecutions to direct the 
LEAA during the Nixon transition. Like many other policymakers. Rogovin believed: 
“there can be no progress in a lawless, disorderly society—no progress for anybody. 
Neither freedom nor any of its tangible benefits can long co-exist with the fear unleashed 
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by widespread crime,” as he told the National Association of Attorneys Generals at a 
conference in St. Thomas in June 1969. 36  A chain-smoker who wore tinted glasses and 
loved to play golf, the thirty-eight year old Rogovin was described by a friend as 
“basically a cop in a way,” in that he, “loves cops, he loves investigative work. He can be 
one of them. They like him and he can talk back to them.” 37 This passion for the justice 
system compelled Rogovin to accept a job in the Philadelphia public defender’s office in 
1959; he left the corporate world just before federal law enforcement programs started. 
He had the experience of working with urban criminals on both sides of the court system, 
conducted major studies on organized crime and held police forces in the highest esteem. 
These credentials made Nixon comfortable with trusting the Democrat to run his anti-
crime agency. Richard Velde joined Rogovin and his three hundred employees as 
associate director. Also in his late thirties, Velde worked as a top aide to Roman Hruska 
when the Republican senator helped create the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance in 
1965 and guided the Safe Streets Act through the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1968. 
Finally, Nixon brought Clarence Coster, the Police Chief of Bloomington, Minnesota, to 
round out the troika.38 Coster’s previous experience as a narcotics officer for the Los 
Angeles Police Department complemented Velde’s knowledge of crime control policy 
and Rogovin’s of organized crime and the judicial system. 
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Nixon appointed Henry S. Ruth to direct the new National Institute of Law 
Enforcement and Criminal Justice. A former Justice Department attorney and University 
of Pennsylvania law professor, Ruth had worked with Rogovin on Johnson’s Crime 
Commission. As Institute director, Ruth chose appropriate research projects to fund, 
primarily in the areas of police training and community-relations methods. At first the 
Institute focused on developments in police technology and equipment, exploring options 
in distributing non-lethal weapons to police departments and improving communications 
technology as a means to foster greater cohesion in the criminal justice system. Ruth, a 
veteran of the army, worked to bring the Department of Defense into crime control 
research, hoping that the lucrative programs the Institute supported would give defense 
an “incentive to get into the crime field.” 39 In addition to its research arm, the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration had a giant constituency of criminal justice 
agencies at all levels of government and in private industry.40 
The federal government’s choice to concentrate its domestic social war on low-
income Americans meant that the LEAA worked closely with a number of departments 
that addressed complex social issues relating to crime control, and particularly in urban 
centers.41 As urban housing became an increasing problem in the 1970s and housing 
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projects evolved into concentrated sites of criminal activity, the LEAA cemented a 
relationship with the Department of Housing and Urban Development and strengthened 
the surveillance of residents in housing projects. Though the LEAA and the Department 
of Justice engaged in a number of “turf wars” with the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare over the issue of drug abuse and juvenile delinquency, it worked closely 
with the Department of Housing and Urban Development and, in some cases, shared 
federal grant monies. The LEAA also sought greater coordination between Model Cities 
and Criminal Justice Planning Agencies and encouraged representation on the boards of 
both institutions. 42  In the fall of 1970, Nixon officials drafted an interagency agreement 
between Housing and Urban Development and the LEAA amounting to 300,000 dollars 
to enable both agencies to conduct studies “on every phase of crime involved in 
dwellings and how to give homes better protection.” The federal government hoped the 
collaboration would lead to a general improvement of “physical systems, direct 
surveillance programs, and protection and education programs.” 43 In Pittsburgh, 
combining federal housing and crime resources allowed policemen on foot to carry 
walkie-talkies in order to communicate with radio car patrols as they policed forty 
thousand residents, seventy percent of them black, inside and outside of the city’s 
housing projects.44  
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In addition to working with federal agencies created during the Great Society, the 
Safe Streets Act opened up new possibilities for defense and intelligence in the domestic 
law enforcement realm. Once the federal government decided to involve itself with law 
enforcement matters, it blurred the lines of distinction set by the Posse Comitatus  Act of 
1878, which limited and in some case prohibited the use of military for law enforcement. 
The National Security Act also outlawed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 
playing a domestic law enforcement role. But to cut costs and make federal crime 
prevention efforts more effective—especially with respect to local police departments—
the army and the CIA played a key role in training local patrolmen. Police departments in 
Washington, DC, Montgomery, and New York all received training from the CIA, 
specifically regarding visual surveillance, bomb disposal, and records filing. 45 The CIA 
maintained that its law enforcement training sessions were consistent with the Safe 
Streets Act’s new federal sanctions for crime fighting agencies. 46 In Montgomery, 
Colonel Kenneth Watkins, the city’s chief of police, admitted that his department 
received “specialized training in street surveillance,” from the CIA and the Department of 
Defense. 47 “Since the CIA is continuously developing investigative techniques abroad, 
some of which are applicable to local police forces in the U.S.,” Watkins commented, 
“we avail ourselves of this resource.”48  
In Washington, DC as well, the police department not only received direct 
guidance from the White House on its law enforcement program, but also worked with 
the major defense and intelligence centers nearby. During the Johnson Administration, a 
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study by the International Association for the Chiefs of Police suggested that in order to: 
“help the police anticipate riots and penetrate organized criminal activity” in the era of 
widespread urban civil disorder, the president should use CIA as consultants. 49 The 
District’s police chief under Johnson, John Layton, may have resisted the intrusion of 
special intelligence forces into his department, but it was “clear to Mitchell that Layton 
wasn’t the guy for a vigorous law enforcement program,” and Nixon installed Jerry 
Wilson into the city’s top law enforcement post.50  Thereafter, the department readily 
exchanged intelligence-related information and equipment and CIA operatives trained 
DC police officers on matters such as lock-picking and electronic eavesdropping as well 
as “stress training” for extremely violent or hostile situations. 51 By 1973, after training a 
dozen city and county police forces on wiretapping, bomb techniques, maintenance of 
intelligence files, and general surveillance, the CIA stopped its public involvement in 
collaboration and consultation with local police departments.52  
More than its reliance on defense and intelligence institutions, the growing power 
of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the substantial amounts of money 
at its disposal encouraged new private law enforcement organizations to form and 
existing ones to expand their influence. The Safe Streets Act ensured a significant role for 
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private institutions in the domestic social war. 53  The federal government did not have 
the resources to produce cutting-edge weaponry and equipment such as walkie-talkies on 
its own and required substantial support from the private sector to make the crime fight 
successful and generate widespread public support. Less than a month into his term as 
attorney general, John Mitchell spoke to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
during a conference on crime and the urban crisis, advocating that the LEAA work more 
closely with industry and pledging to reward private organizations with federal crime 
fighting dollars. As Nixon considered holding town hall meetings to mobilize the larger 
public in the national effort to fight crime and recruit citizens to volunteer in juvenile 
delinquency and ex-offender programs, Mitchell wanted private non-profits to play a 
large role in helping organize the grassroots. Mitchell suggested to the conference 
attendees that they lead the effort in creating local crime coordinating councils to meld 
private and public bodies. 54  
A large portion of LEAA grants went to private non-profit social agencies that did 
not directly invest in fighting crime, but looked instead to raising citizen awareness of the 
issue and framing it into a national problem through a massive public relations 
campaign.55 The State of California received a 740,000 dollar grant from the National 
Endowment for the Humanities for “Law in a Free Society,” a public school program that 
developed classroom material and curriculum “designed to effect a major change in the 
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attitudes of both teachers and students in the lower school levels toward acquired learning 
in the general field of civic education.”56 The Executive Committee chair of the project, 
Pasadena lawyer David K. Robinson, said it started after the American Bar Association 
brought a group of lawyers together to teach people about the legal system in 1970 as a 
response to riots on campuses and in high schools. The LEAA endorsed the project 
wholeheartedly, and fueled the public relations engine by granting “Law in a Free 
Society” a total of 1.3 million dollars by the fall of 1974. 57  To offset the sense of rising 
lawlessness in the nation, the program worked to, “increase understanding of the need for 
the legitimate exercises of authority in the political system, in the social system, and in 
the schools.”58 More than a decade before Ronald Reagan launched his major anti-drug 
school program that also relied heavily on the private sector, the LEAA supported civic 
education projects as part of its effort to expand and modernize American law 
enforcement. Soon these civic programs became curriculum requirements in many public 
school systems.  
The federal government’s public relations and educational efforts on crime 
control extended beyond public school classrooms, and federal support of television 
programs that explored the criminal justice system helped construct law enforcement into 
a national social issue. In the fall of 1974, the LEAA granted the Council on Population 
and Environment’s “To Reshape Urban Systems Together” (TRUST) program more than 
150,000 dollars to air its series “And Justice for All,” which included separate thirty-
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minute segments on courts, police, prisons, and violent criminals.  In an attempt to “bring 
people together thru television to solve their common problems,” the Council organized 
five hundred ten-person volunteer groups to watch the programs and discuss possible 
solutions and actions. 59 The concept fulfilled the LEAA’s need to create a base for 
community action on crime control. 60 In addition to the Council’s program, the LEAA 
also underwrote a controversial 1.2 million dollar TV series for a local PBS station in Los 
Angeles, consisting of sixteen one-hour talk shows. Lirol Productions of Burbank, 
California produced the segments after the firm spent nearly a year researching possible 
television program ideas for the LEAA. The television programs not only served as an 
endorsement for the LEAA as the agency faced mounting criticism by policymakers and 
non-profit agencies, but they normalized new law enforcement techniques and legal 
changes for the American public. 61 
In addition to bringing a punitive dimension to existing social programs, 
encouraging military and intelligence personnel to participate in local law enforcement 
trainings, and educating the public about crime, the LEAA aimed to make law 
enforcement into a viable profession.62 By prioritizing criminal justice, the federal 
government created new jobs in an era of economic stagnation.  When colleges and 
universities launched police science programs, the LEAA funded tuition for many 
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officers, and the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice provided 
academic assistance and created secondary education programs. The Law Enforcement 
Assistance Program (LEEP), supplied colleges and universities with special grants to 
offer to law enforcement personnel. During the program’s first year, in 1970, LEEP 
received eighteen million dollars from the federal government to initiate criminal justice 
programs at eight hundred schools. This benefitted roughly one out ten employees in the 
criminal justice system, or about fifty thousand students. 63 At the height of the program 
the federal government dolled out forty-four million dollars to more than one thousand 
colleges and universities across the United States, funding just under one hundred 
thousand students seeking law enforcement careers. This was a major boon to the field, as 
only one percent of police officers held college degrees in 1964.64 A good portion of 
these police science administration programs benefitted small suburban schools. Triton 
College in River Grove, Illinois, for example, received a thirty five thousand dollar grant 
to begin the law enforcement education program. In North Carolina, Elizabeth City State 
University received a modest three thousand to provide grants for aspiring police 
officers.65  
The federal government came to rely upon data produced by professors and think 
tanks in order to justify increased punitive measures. Research, described by one high 
law enforcement official as “an integral instrument to management,” emerged as another 
crucial tool that the federal government used to pursue the War on Crime. It also fueled 
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the professionalization of law enforcement. 66 In addition to the emerging academic 
emphasis on criminology and police science, criminal justice conferences helped sustain 
the burgeoning industry and enabled the LEAA to assist, direct, and consult states and 
municipalities. The LEAA also posted a number of announcements in the weeks after 
Nixon took office, offering federal funds to support manuscript preparation, to “speed up 
publication of research articles and books which contribute substantially to crime 
prevention and control and to the improvement of the administration of justice.”67  Such 
grants encouraged academics to undertake research projects that could contribute in some 
way to the prevention of crime and the enhancement of law enforcement.  
By making crime into a science that could be predicted and anticipated, 
policymakers hoped that federal law enforcement initiatives would reduce crime levels. 
Statistics could assist police departments and criminal justice planning agencies in 
predicting with greater accuracy when or where crime would occur, making law 
enforcement and criminal violence into a rational science. The Philadelphia, St. Louis, 
and Washington, DC police departments used the LEAA’s suggested mathematical 
principles of operations research to make crime predictions by feeding up to thirty five 
“factors” into a computer system—including the type of crime, the neighborhood in 
which it occurred, the demographics and numbers of the violators, the time of day, 
temperature, and even the phase of the moon. This would allow computers to “forecast 
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crime and deploy police manpower and equipment in anticipation of crime.” 68 The 
predictions resulted in disproportionate amounts of punitive resources flowing into 
segregated urban neighborhoods. 
Prediction and computer management functioned as means through which 
institutions at all levels of government could classify and control specific groups of 
people. The federal government supported research that attributed criminal and violent 
tendencies to individual pathology rather than social conditions. In line with the 
sentiment of his White House colleagues, Ruth energetically sought psychological studies 
for the National Institute to fund that would determine the connections between political 
activity and violent behavior.69 Attorney General John Mitchell awarded Temple 
University a 122,578 dollar grant to study “why some young people become delinquents 
and others do not,” by observing youth from homes receiving government assistance and 
non-welfare families at the poverty level and middle-class teenagers. The study aimed to 
uncover “how family values, attitudes and circumstances influence the behavior of the 
youths.” 70 The findings of such projects would assist the federal government in 
identifying patterns of criminality. Norval Morris and his team of researchers at the 
University of Chicago received a discretionary grant from the LEAA to study patterns of 
repeat violent offenders in order to “determine a plan to prevent recurrence of such acts 
from violence-prone persons.” 71 The federal government’s embrace of scientific inroads 
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in the realms of law enforcement and criminal behavior evolved as a key element that 
articulated a highly racist rationale in race-neutral, academic terms. By conducting 
research projects based on the premise that crime rates in low-income black communities 
were the result of pathological, rather than structural, conditions, many of these studies 
reinforced notions about inherent violence amongst black Americans that justified greater 
social control measures on the part of the federal government. 
The substantial federal grant funds available for law enforcement purposes even 
helped lobotomy make a comeback after the procedure declined in the mid-1950s.  The 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration partnered with the National Institute of 
Mental Health to study the “role of neurobiological dysfunction in the violent 
offender.”72 The federal government awarded the Neuro-Research Foundation of Boston 
108,931 dollars to conduct electrophysiological and neurophysiological tests on inmates 
in Massachusetts prisons to see if violence could be medically or technologically 
prevented. The awardees won the attention of the federal government after arguing in a 
Journal of the American Medical Association article that social conditions were not a 
causal factor of the 1967 Detroit riot since only a fraction of the population rioted and 
most participants did not engage in violence.73 Authors Frank Ervin and Vernon Mark 
proposed the use of prophylactic treatments on those they determined had the 
pathological tendency to riot based on a preventive screening test to detect brain 
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disease.74 Ervin and Mark went on to write Violence and the Brain in 1970, arguing that 
living in a violent environment caused alterations in brain tissue that could be genetically 
transmitted, a line of research which interested both the LEAA and the National Institute 
of Mental Health, who supported the neuroscientist’s research. 75  
The federal government also funded controversial psychological and scientific 
studies in public school systems. In Baltimore, elementary schools subjected 4,500 
mostly black children to a psychological testing project to identify and treat potential 
juvenile offenders after 1970. Funded in part by the LEAA, the school system’s tests 
would determine if the children displayed “maladaptive behavior” that could eventually 
lead them to engage in violent acts. Although local officials and community activists 
questioned the accuracy of the tests results, researchers at city schools requested a 
combined 2.4 million dollars in funds from federal, state, and local programs to expand 
the project in Baltimore. In late 1973, after nearly two years of operation, Baltimore 
Mayor Donald Shafer decided to terminate the program after receiving complaints from 
parents and local organizations that it was, “totalitarian in concept and subject to possible 
abuse by government agencies.” 76 
Psychosurgery and psychological testing complimented the general assumption 
that technological innovation and research would increase the chances for arresting and 
removing offenders and potential offenders from society by making criminal histories 
and figures readily available to law enforcement. The FBI began its coordination of 
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criminal information with the National Crime Information Center, which involved only 
ten states in 1968. After a fifty million dollar LEAA grant, it took only four years for 
forty-seven states to participate. In addition, several State Planning Agencies rallied 
behind Project SEARCH (System for Electronic Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal 
Histories) in 1969, the first computerized attempt to make criminal histories accessible to 
officers. Five years into the project, every state had implemented a SEARCH. The effort 
of these new major statistical programs (which FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover 
unsuccessfully tried to house in the his agency) created a data collection monster with 
states selecting the kind of information they would store in their own autonomous 
systems, in some cases compromising the privacy of numerous Americans. In Kansas 
City, Missouri, the police department stored information on outstanding parking tickets 
and college students who participated in protests.77 These statistical programs eased the 
burden for states to comply with new mandatory crime reporting laws in order to qualify 
for LEAA funds.  
Although hardware and statistics may have received the greatest portion of LEAA 
funds, the federal government did not ignore the Crime and Kerner Commissions’ focus 
on improving police-community relations. The effort was largely symbolic (one former 
police commissioner turned LEAA official during the Johnson Administration 
characterized many of the community relations programs as “window dress”), but 
allowed the LEAA to claim that the agency supported fundamental changes in urban 
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patrol practices as departments used federal grant monies to purchase new hardware.78 
Still, federal research supported further inquiry into how to ease the “so-called ‘ghetto 
effect’” on urban police forces. The LEAA funded a fifty thousand dollar study 
conducted by the Miami police department to determine the ways patrolling low-income 
black communities “contributes to the psychological stresses and strains on the 
policemen.” 79  The study discovered that “some policemen speak of their nightly patrols 
in black areas as ventures into Vietnam.” 80  While this and other research endeavors 
recognized that the increasing presence of white policemen in black neighborhoods 
“inculcates bigotry” on both sides, their findings emphasized the importance of fostering 
“a more peaceful community.” 81 This aim materialized in the form of greater 
surveillance and improved weaponry, rather than programs that eased interactions 
between officers and groups of already marginalized Americans. The grants themselves 
favored policemen and not the residents of their patrols.  
The LEAA also supported some police storefront centers modeled on the Crime 
and Kerner Commissions’ suggestions, which raised the presence of punitive forces in 
low-income neighborhoods. In Fort Worth, Texas, a community relations program used a 
“service oriented policemen” to” assist illiterates in obtaining drivers permits” and  
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“forward complaints about garbage or landlords to the proper authorities.”82 The LEAA 
awarded the Gary, Indiana police department 150,000 dollars to set up four police-
community relations storefront centers in the troubled deindustrializing city. Richard 
Hatcher—the city’s black mayor—claimed the program would “help improve the image 
of police officers in the community, and identify them accurately as being totally 
involved in the life of the entire city,” as a means to, “help dissolve neighborhood 
problems that produce tension, anger, fear and frustration in the city.” In addition to the 
storefront centers, Gary received federal funds to support a mobile emergency center, a 
closed circuit television system, and a legal advisor for the police department, among 
other incentives. 83  
To “avoid sharp conflicts with the Negro majority,” the federal government 
accompanied the push to enlarge and improve police forces in low-income segregated 
communities with special training programs and seminars.84 In Washington DC, a private 
non-police organization received nearly one and a half million dollars from the Office of 
Economic Opportunity, led by Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, to provide twenty 
hours a month of training to three hundred police officers. The Justice Department 
granted the New York City police department 160,000 dollars to provide “intensive 
psychological training” for eighteen police officers before they could work for a special 
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family crisis unit. 85 Like similar projects already underway in California, the criminal 
justice planning agency in New York city funded weekend activities for police and youth 
and dialogues between firemen and juveniles. But unlike many of its counterparts in other 
states, the New York planning agency did not abandon the Johnson Administration’s 
emphasis on root causes. LEAA grants helped give “multiracial teams of youth in tense 
neighborhoods” the opportunity to participate in vocational education and job placement 
programs at the East Harlem Youth Employment Service.86 Following the advice of the 
Crime and Kerner Commissions, Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter offered job 
training, therapy, and weekend camping excursions at new storefront youth centers 
staffed by former gang members. 87 In the early 1970s, the Los Angeles Police 
Department California turned away from the entertainment outings it planned for young 
people in Watts and other low-income black and Latino communities after the riot and 
started distributing gifts to thousands of junior high school students as an “outreach tool.” 
The California Criminal Justice Planning Agency hoped that offering young people mini-
bikes would “develop and improve their self concept” in order to make the youths more 
comfortable with the increased presence of police officers in their neighborhoods.88 
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Using federal law enforcement research findings, the planners in California assumed the 
tactic would lead to a general reduction in juvenile delinquency.  
Taking its cues from the California planning agency, 350 YMCAs, police 
departments, boys clubs, and county agencies across the country continued the mini-bike 
program, or the “National Youth Project Using Mini-Bikes,” as part of its national 
juvenile delinquency prevention campaign supported by a substantial donation from the 
LEAA and ten thousand mini-bikes from Honda. 89 By 1976, more than four thousand 
young people between the ages of eleven and fifteen participated. The majority (seventy-
five percent) of the youth were referred to the program from juvenile courts, probation 
officers, police, and schools. The YMCA recast the emphasis from the California 
program slightly, requiring the youth participants to set weekly behavioral goals under 
the advisement of the program director or school authorities. As a reward for meeting the 
weekly goals, the youth had the opportunity to ride a mini-bike or participate in planned 
activities at the YMCA—which included day trips to the beach, amusement parks, and 
tours of local universities and police departments. 90   
By the early 1970s, Nixon officials turned against police-community relations 
programs as an effective crime prevention measure. In a memo to Nixon’s Domestic 
Counsel John Ehrilchman responding to the FBI’s “Outlook for racial violence in 1970” 
report, Special Counsel Leonard Garment (a friend of the President’s and partner in his 
law firm), observed: “In our urban areas, the ingredients which could precipitate 
wholesale rioting and violence are present. Tensions in the ghettos remain high, largely 
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as a result of the seemingly implacable hostility of black youths to local police, despite 
efforts in many cities to improve community relations with police departments.”  No 
major urban civil disorders occurred after the series of outbreaks following the 
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in the spring of 1968, but Garment went on to 
reiterate the FBI’s conclusion that: “Danger signals pointing to the possibility of racial 
violence in the United States are as plentiful this year as they have been every year since 
1963.” The rhetorical gesture towards root causes remained to a degree, as Garment 
recognized that a “marked improvement in the social, economic, and educational 
conditions of the Negroes,” would curtail crime rates. Garment emphasized, however, 
that the cause of crime lay in “the attitudes of urban black youths toward the police” who 
would only continue to engage in, “such acts of violence as snipings, attacks on police, 
killings, arson, and sabotage.”91 Garment’s outlook shaped how he and other 
policymakers planned the War on Crime, a strategy that assumed urban crime—
particularly among juveniles—was inevitable.92   
Popular law enforcement theories proposed that equipment had a direct impact on 
crime rates, and Garment’s view of urban crime also reflected the general sentiment of 
the nation’s top law enforcement officials, who did not see the same value in community 
relations programs as did state planning agencies and local authorities. Hoping to refocus 
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the efforts of these agencies away from “police psychiatrist activity” and towards more 
punitive programs, Richard Velde wrote Rogovin one year into the LEAA’s operation, 
“next year our efforts in the police area could turn to more fundamental areas such as the 
problems of ‘vertical policing’ in high-rise apartments… This appears to be a very major 
and growing problem for which the police departments almost uniformly seem to be 
unprepared.”93  Even though police-community relations programs often appeared 
alongside modernization schemes in LEAA literature, the Department of Justice 
disproportionately supported equipment purchases, salary increases, and job training 
centers for officers. A quarter of LEAA grants in the first year went to equipment 
purchases alone.94 
In St. Louis a police-community relations initiative, whereby teams of officers 
counseled “hard-core delinquents,” did not receive the 150,000 dollar grant it requested 
from the LEAA, but growing numbers of low-income youth entered the criminal justice 
system as a result of a computer identification project launched by the same police 
department. This carceral measure catalogued demographic information on suspects 
based on the voluntary interviews officers conducted with teenagers largely unaware of 
their right to refuse such intrusions. As Geoff Shepard, a White House official who 
observed the program noted, “one immense difficulty here is that the computer files do 
not consist of convictions or even of records of arrests, but rather of opinions by police 
officers on individuals. Civil Rights is not my bag, Bud, but this stuff scares me to 
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death.”95 Clearly, some members of the Administration had an awareness of the 
inherently racist dimension of these practices but they were funded nevertheless, either 
directly by the LEAA or the state planning agency supported by the LEAA.   
The St. Louis program manual stated: “If a youth persistently stays in a group of 
questionable purpose, charges of behavior injurious to his welfare by loitering may be 
brought against him.”96 Recognizing the general disregard of freedom of assembly and 
the extent to which the “probable cause” for the field investigation rested on the race, 
class, and age of the suspects in question, Shepard wrote: “What you have here is the 
compilation of police-men’s opinions, without court tested evidence or proof, which turns 
people into suspects for future crimes. It seems to me that this could amount to 
computerized harassment, since the police will begin picking up suspects from their 
computers and the suspects will have no way of removing themselves from the computer 
files unless they can convince policemen that they are not likely to commit crimes.” 
Shepard’s remarks raised serious questions about the constitutionality of new law 
enforcement provisions and the racial dimension embedded within the federal program. 
Yet the administration pushed forward in an effort to restore the “forgotten civil right” 
and to stamp out what it saw as lawlessness. “What troubles me the most,” Shepard 
ended his memo, “is that the project is probably very effective.”97 
Regardless of whether they embraced highly questionable law enforcement tactics 
in practice, every state received a two hundred thousand dollar federal grant to develop a 
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state planning agency to address the crime control problems that Johnson’s Crime 
Commission had identified. Once the LEAA reviewed state plans to address the problem 
of crime in areas such as training personnel, detecting and apprehending criminals, and 
improving prosecution and the courts, the states received a grant of over 100,000 dollars 
with additional funds based on population. The state planning agencies had full authority 
to dispense block grants to worthy local projects and special programs at the state level. 
Even through the LEAA guidelines frequently changed, the institution rarely turned down 
a proposal and often funded poorly conceived plans. In addition to the state planning 
agencies, a portion of block grants went to non-governmental agencies for demonstration 
projects ranging from rehabilitative centers to vocational training for juveniles.  
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration imagined that state planning 
agencies would represent a broad range of officials within the criminal justice system, but 
in fact local law enforcement officers and policymakers predominated. Though California 
produced the most polished and powerful planning agency, one UCLA Professor 
described it as “a ponderous Byzantine bureaucracy which spins its wheels in the sand.”98 
It had twenty-nine members, including two oil company lawyers and a radio station 
secretary, as well as a small handful of sympathetic black elected officials from local 
governments. Sixteen separate planning boards reported to the agency. Across the 
country, most planning representatives had a personal stake in criminal justice and 
strongly supported the expansion of punitive measures, and so it is not surprising that 
within the first eight years of federal law enforcement initiatives, thirty-five states 
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enacted new capital punishment provisions, and twelve moved towards establishing 
mandatory minimum sentences for various crimes.99 
The lack of clear policy guidelines or purpose posed a fundamental problem in the 
structure of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration that created a series of 
conflicts among agency officials. The federal government could easily blame the states 
for the ineffectiveness of the national law enforcement program. When an LEAA official 
asked Nixon’s deputy attorney general, Richard Kleindienst, how to “correct and 
revolutionize law enforcement in a time that crime is a political issue,” he responded, 
“that’s up to the states.” 100 For some Department of Justice administrators who oversaw 
state projects, block grants allowed them to adopt a “hands off” approach to crime 
control.  As an institution that pumped law enforcement funds to states in the name of 
crime prevention, the LEAA did not hold itself responsible for reducing crime; instead, 
officials within the agency concentrated on how to allocate resources to state and local 
governments.  
This federal approach entrusted state planning agencies mandated by the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration with much of the power in shaping the 
development of the American law enforcement apparatus on the ground. Officials within 
the LEAA saw the agency as a “business” which served “clientele” on the state level, as 
planning agencies determined fund expenditures with guidance from the parent 
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administration.101 The president, however, preferred to command the domestic social war. 
“I don’t particularly like military metaphors,” Nixon told a cross-regional group of state 
criminal justice planners, “but if they are appropriate anywhere, it is in fighting crime. As 
the general staff in that campaign, your plans will determine what forces we array, on 
what ground we stand, and where we attack.”102  From his perspective, the members of 
the state planning agencies functioned as state-level commanders, selecting how the 
crime fight would play out on the ground. They reported to the LEAA generals, who 
guided the course of the War from their offices on Indiana Avenue. This dynamic 
allowed LEAA officials to claim that federal bureaucracy had been kept to a minimum, 
as the planning agencies utilized far more resources and employed far greater numbers 
than the Department of Justice in Washington. 103 It seemed, given the general attitude 
demonstrated by White House and Department of Justice Officials, that federal law 
enforcement policy was highly contradictory: while Nixon declared a crime war with 
grand rhetoric early on, implementation was left largely to the fifty states. 
 
III. The Long-Range Master Plan 
President Nixon promised a new age of reform in his first state of the union 
message in January 1970, telling the American public that “the seventies will be a time of 
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new beginnings.” The president pledged to end the Vietnam War and promote world 
peace while stepping up the war at home.  “If there is one area where the word ‘war’ is 
appropriate it is in the fight against crime,” Nixon said:  “We must declare and win the 
war against the criminal elements which increasingly threaten our cities, our homes, and 
our lives.”104 Revisiting the fear-mongering rhetoric of the 1968 campaign, Nixon 
prepared the nation for an all-out battle to restore law and order in cities. The first phase 
of the War on Crime had involved a massive investment into police equipment and 
hardware: in this next phase Nixon looked to prisons and courts as aspects of criminal 
justice system deserving legislative attention, even as a disproportionate amount of 
federal resources continued to support the acquisition of new equipment for local law 
enforcement. Nixon ordered the U.S. Bureau Prisons to draft a ten year “Long-Range 
Master Plan,” for the construction and expansion of the federal penal system that would 
serve as a model for the nation.105  
As the Bureau of Prisons planned for a revitalization and expansion of the 
nation’s correctional system, Nixon focused on local street crime issues. The president 
believed that lack of safety in Washington, DC, where his fellow policymakers would not 
“dare leave their cars in the capital garage and walk home alone,” was a “tragic example” 
of the national problem. The capital city had been a guinea pig for federal law 
enforcement initiatives since the Kennedy Administration. Launching a unique and 
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highly punitive crime control program in the District, where White House officials could 
work closely with police, judges, and corrections officials, Nixon anticipated that he 
would be able to claim that his administration embarked upon “the most massive effort to 
control crime in the nation’s history” in time for the 1972 election just two years away.106 
By familiarizing the public with his local law enforcement project, one that 
encouraged additional patrol forces and sanctioned new laws to allow widespread arrests 
and incarceration, the Nixon Administration intended the Washington DC Crime Bill of 
1970 to “serve as a model for many crime ridden cities.”107 Nixon’s proposed bill 
contained mandatory minimum sentence of five years for anyone convicted of a second 
armed offense and allowed life sentences for those convicted of a third felony. It also 
standardized sentences by establishing several categories to control how judges 
determined the extent of punishment. “Dangerous criminals” committed “offenses with 
high risk of additional public danger if the defendant is released,” such as bank robbery 
or narcotics trafficking; “repeat offenders” involved a far broader definition than 
dangerous crime; and judges could now sentence “narcotics addicts” in the capital city to 
prison time.  
The latter category received special attention from members of Nixon’s domestic 
council, who labored to turn drug abuse into a criminal issue. As Krogh asserted: 
“Probably no more predictable person exists than the addict who must raise money to 
feed his habit… Only when the addict appears to have ‘graduated’ to crimes of violence 
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can he be subjected to pretrial detention.”108 The Act manifested the crime control ethos 
of the most ardent law and order policymakers, who believed only severe sentences and 
widespread arrests could make a dent on urban crime. In addition to overturning bail 
reform decreed by the Warren Court, the DC Crime Control Bill also posed a direct 
assault on the Court’s expansion of defendants’ rights and search and seizure rulings by 
sanctioning broad wiretapping authority and “no knock” searches by the police.  
Preventative detention, or the practice of detaining suspects deemed especially 
dangerous to the community without bail for months, offered a “reasonable and necessary 
approach to the crime problem,” as Nixon officials saw it.109 The American and New 
York Bar Associations, however, charged that the “almost Kafkaesque” policy posed, “an 
unconstitutional abridgement of the presumption of a defendant’s innocence and of his 
right to bail.”110 Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina—a staunch supporter of the federal 
assault on organized crime—called the DC bill “a garbage pail of some of the most 
repressive, nearsighted, intolerant, unfair and vindictive legislation that the Senate has 
ever presented.” 111 Nevertheless, Nixon signed the bill into law in July 1970, the same 
month that Nixon submitted his “White House Enemies List” to the directors of the FBI, 
the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Known as 
the Huston Plan after its author, White House Coordinator Tom Charles Huston, the list 
included political dissenters from Black Panthers to George Wallace’s American 
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Independent party. 112 Hoover and the Nixon administration knew they would be unable 
to garner a substantial enough mandate through an ideological war to destroy the radical 
groups like the Panthers. Thus, the Huston Plan masked itself as a campaign against 
criminals and terrorists. Thereafter, the Black Panthers weren’t simply “radicals,” they 
were “criminals,” and the administration increased its efforts to link Party members with 
criminal activity. In this sense, Nixon recast the War on Crime to complement the work 
of special federal initiatives like COINTELPRO that sought to undermine the radical left 
beginning in the late 1960s.113  
Congress, too, moved to establish increasingly punitive policy to meet Nixon’s 
lofty goals for the War on Crime. Shortly after the Nixon Administration introduced the 
DC crime bill, Senators McClellan, Hruska, and Ervin sponsored the Organized Crime 
Control Act which also sanctioned mandatory minimum sentences for repeat offenders 
and effectively changed criminal procedure. Because the bill permitted adult trials for 
juveniles, adult courts soon heard more than half of all juvenile cases. As part of the 
larger push to make the American judicial system more effective, Nixon looked to court 
reorganization in DC to offer a model for the nation, and his effort doubled the number of 
felony indictments. The Act permitted judges to increase the sentence of habitual 
offenders by thirty years if the suspects were charged with a third offense, and applied the 
same formula to first time offenders if the crime seemed to fit a “pattern of criminal 
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conduct” or if the suspects appeared to be “dangerous special offenders.” These 
provisions resulted in the incarceration of thousands more Americans, particularly from 
urban neighborhoods where federal resources were dedicated to monitoring black 
residents.  
 Simultaneously, college students found themselves subject to the kinds of 
brutality and surveillance many left-wing activists experienced, practices that were 
relatively commonplace in “high crime” urban areas. Despite his campaign promise to 
gradually withdraw American soldiers from Vietnam, Nixon ordered American troops to 
Cambodia as a means to cut North Vietnamese supplies in late April, 1970 and students 
around the country quickly rose in protest. In May, when the Ohio National Guard at 
Kent State University and local police at Jackson State University in Mississippi opened 
fire and killed a combined total of six students, law enforcement came to play a more 
dominant role on campuses across the country.114 Four million students went on strike at 
350 colleges and universities, and troops occupied twenty-one campuses. The growth of 
the antiwar movement during the first year of the Nixon administration convinced the 
president that federal law enforcement programs were critical the maintenance of 
domestic social order.  
 With only forty-two Republicans in the Senate and 192 in the House, Nixon did 
not have as much control over the legislative agenda as Johnson and struggled to secure 
passage of many of his law enforcement measures. By 1970, Nixon officials recognized 
in a memo that, “the public is not persuaded that the Administration has succeeded with 
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anti-crime drive.” 115 The White House opted to shift the blame to Congress for its 
inaction on crime bills “and concurrently hammer home comprehensive Administration 
programs.”116 In a rare public appearance before a group of law enforcement officials in 
August 1970, Nixon flew to Denver for the national meeting of Criminal Justice State 
Planning Agencies. In front of the courthouse, Nixon gave a rousing speech reported on 
national evening news programs, briefing the press on the administration’s “commitment 
to wage the crime fight,” and promising that while his administration made substantial 
cuts to other domestic programs like the Office of Economic Opportunity and the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare the budget for law enforcement would 
continue its upward climb.117 “I am personally proud of the LEAA’s record,” Nixon told 
the state criminal justice planners at a private meeting following the press conference, 
“because to me it is the beginning of the kind of government I want to bring to the United 
States.”118 The comment reinforced Nixon’s dedication to New Federalism and his 
recognition that the LEAA’s block grant structure was at the “cutting edge” of the 
emerging law enforcement apparatus and a test case for the future direction of federal 
social programs.  
As the midterm election approached, Democrats in Congress responded to 
Nixon’s charges by enacting many of his major crime control proposals with very little 
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debate. The DC crime bill passed even with its controversial preventative detention and  
“no knock” provisions as liberals competed to assume the mantle of law enforcement. 
This continued after the election. Democrats, who lost four seats in the Senate but 
retained control over both chambers, led Congress in exceeding Nixon’s own proposed 
allocation for the LEAA in fiscal year 1971 by roughly two hundred million dollars, 
bringing the young agency’s budget up to one billion for 1972 and 1.5 billion for 1973. In 
an attempt to be seen as a strong “law and order” Congress, both chambers passed the 
Safe Streets Act of 1970 in early October, reauthorizing the LEAA for an additional three 
years.  Early in 1971, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a group life insurance bill for 
police officers sponsored in part by the federal government. Representative Jonathan 
Bingham of New York backed a “safe schools” bill to provide federal aid for security, 
alarm systems, stop and frisk searches of students, and other measures to improve the 
safety of educational facilities. Senator Walter Mondale urged a crackdown on narcotics 
trafficking, and critiqued the Nixon Administration’s drug control efforts.  
Nixon officials believed that only a “massive infusion of police power” or the  
“allocation of force in high density crime areas” could sustain the turn towards arrest and 
detention stipulated by federal law enforcement legislation. 119 On the ground, Nixon’s 
law enforcement measures increasingly brought black urban areas under an increasingly 
harsh gaze of local police departments, whether through high intensity street lighting 
initiatives, the physical presence of greater numbers of officers on the streets, or the 
increased opportunity to detain suspects. Not surprisingly, with Hruska and McClellan 
leading the fight to enact the DC Crime Act, the Senate bill that eventually passed 
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contained far harsher provisions than the House version. It gave judges the authority to 
place individuals on probation without a verdict, and established a requirement for ex-
offenders to submit to drug testing. The Senate also allocated nearly fifty million dollars 
for the federal War on Crime in DC, funding a four person “warrant squad” to arrest 
parole violators and measures to supervise suspects released on bail by relying on 
statistical systems like the National Crime Information Center and Project SEARCH.120 
The firm conviction that crime could not be reduced unless arrest and imprisonment 
increased justified the federal government’s overwhelming reliance on police hardware as 
its primary crime prevention device.  But the strategy failed to dent the crime rate.  
The federal government could exert the most direct authority over states by 
turning to the corrections arm of the criminal justice system, and as crime increased after 
the LEAA placed more police officers with advanced weapons on the streets, the Nixon 
administration led Congress in enacting fundamental changes to the practice of 
imprisonment. Incarceration now offered “the surest way for crime rates to go down,” as 
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee concluded during its hearings considering the 
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, introduced by McClellan and cosponsored by 
Hruska and House Minority Leader Gerald Ford.  Congress devoted an entire section of 
the 1970 Act to prison acquisition, construction and renovation. Part E funded seventy 
five percent of the cost of prison projects and dedicated twenty percent of all block and 
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discretionary grant funds states received to corrections.121  This forced states to increase 
spending on prisons, so that by 1971 states allocated 134 million dollars to corrections 
programs, while in 1969 the allocation had been two million dollars.122 
As increasing numbers of mayors and local officials criticized the LEAA for 
ineffective use of grant funds and LEAA officials themselves worried that the agency 
was going down the “OEO road,” meaning that it had “little quality control and 
inadequate fiscal oversight,” Part E and the turn towards corrections responded to general 
uncertainty about the function of the agency. 123 LEAA Administrators treated Part E as a 
“block grant within a block grant,” that is, “as a means of expressing national priorities 
without interfering with the states’ planning responsibilities.”124 But because the federal 
government directed a greater proportion of discretionary funds toward “high crime” 
areas in cities, it offered an approach amenable to Democrats, who sought to revise block 
grant formulas to favor urban constituencies. 
The ambiguous terms of Nixon’s Crime Control Act obscured the extent to which 
federal law enforcement legislation aimed to control specific parts of the citizenry. The 
provisions of the DC crime bill and the surveillance precedent it set in cities elsewhere 
disproportionately touched young urban black men. The detention of this specific group 
accounted for half of the increase in incarceration during what Velde saw as a “threshold 
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of a new era” for corrections.125  The Nixon Administration conceived of a new class of 
violators against which it aimed the crime control legislation it proposed to Congress. 
These categories of offenders reinforced the sentencing model the White House 
conceived for DC and retained gendered and racialized notions of criminality. From the 
outset, officials in the Nixon Administration felt that  “our correctional systems are ill-
equipped… to deal with and attempt to rehabilitate this most difficult category of 
prisoners…. The violent, aggressive, or disturbed offender.”126 LEAA officials painted 
this violent criminal in more specific terms. “Many offenders come from urban slums,” 
Velde proclaimed at a law enforcement conference, “few have the equivalent of a high 
school education, and offenders also tend to lack vocational skills.” 127 As a member of 
President-elect Nixon’s Advisory Council, former U.S. Bureau of Prisons director James 
V. Bennett forcefully shaped the administration’s stance on the prison problem. Both 
Bennett and Nixon viewed prison as the site where many offenders acquired criminal 
knowledge, as roughly sixty percent of those discharged returned within five years.128 
Bennett urged the president to focus federal policy on the group responsible for the bulk 
of reported crime, the “half million alcoholics, pocketbook snatchers, two-bit numbers 
peddlers, sneak thieves, joy riders and marijuana dealers who go in and out of jail two, 
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three, perhaps even five times a year. This latter group has a sizeable component of social 
misfits, mental defectives, untreated epileptics, queers, panhandlers, pimps and bums.”129  
The “Large Cities Special Grants” section of the Safe Streets Act had sanctioned 
the disproportionate amount of federal assistance DC enjoyed, but when Congress 
reauthorized the LEAA in 1970 it allocated more funds for experimental law enforcement 
and crime control projects in, “the nation’s large cities where high crime incidence and 
law enforcement problems present the most difficult challenges.” 130 More than forty 
percent of the total discretionary allocation went to special grants, which advanced the 
federal government’s commitment to fighting urban street crime. 131 Though officials 
tended to shy away from police-community relations programs in practice, the grants 
aimed to improve “coordination and understanding,” whereby “a major emphasis must be 
on building material cooperation and understanding in high crime neighborhoods with an 
active citizen role,” as a means to reduce violence.132  Still, nearly half of the twenty five 
million available for these projects went to police improvement programs that focused on 
hardware and manpower needs. New York City received the largest grant, taking the 
maximum award of one million dollars.  
Even though the rhetoric of crime control stressed block grants and New 
Federalism, in practice the federal law enforcement program pushed for greater 
centralization. The White House and Congress struggled to address the tension between 
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reported crime rates (usually in urban areas) and where LEAA block grants actually 
ended up (usually in rural towns). LEAA Administrators and Nixon Officials grew 
increasingly frustrated that millions of federal grant funds to fight urban crime ended up 
in the hands of rural police departments and legislators. The War on Crime was meant to 
target high-crime urban areas, as a means to dispel urban civil disorder and manage the 
effects of urban crisis, not revamp smaller departments with reportedly lower crime rates. 
Rogovin remarked less than a year into his directorship that, “there can be no assuming 
that the money is being intelligently spent on the local level.” 133 His concerns were valid: 
for example, Denver received less than twenty percent of the Colorado’s 1.8 million 
dollar LEAA grant, even though the city was home to thirty percent of the state’s total 
population and seventy percent of its crime; and New York City, which claimed roughly 
two thirds of serious reported crime in the state, received only thirty nine percent of the 
New York’s total action grant. States claimed that the discrepancy between crime rates 
and allocation of funds resulted from the constantly changing LEAA grant-making 
formulas.134   
In addition to the misappropriation of federal law enforcement grants to rural 
police departments, state planning agencies used substantial portions of grants for other 
agencies, such as the Federal Housing Authority and the Department of Defense, which 
could claim jurisdiction over some law enforcement projects.135   Other projects funded by 
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the LEAA did not go directly to matters relating to the criminal justice system, and in 
some cases the agency assumed direction over anti-poverty programs. The LEAA wanted 
states to dedicate resources to police, courts, and corrections, but planners in states like 
Indiana used action grant funds to send cards to citizens urging them to pledge their 
commitment to the ten commandments as a crime prevention measure. 136  In San Mateo, 
California as well, the LEAA inadvertently funded a 75,000 dollar project designed to 
“aid kindergarten pupils with chronic problems,” and assumed the cost of a 216,000 
dollar program for a youth employment service in New York City that had been 
previously funded by a poverty agency. 137 
 From the perspective of LEAA administrators themselves after nearly two years 
of operation, the plans the federal government received from state agencies were, on the 
whole, “poor.” 138 Administrators wondered if this paltry performance reflected general 
confusion over the planning process, or the imperatives of planning agencies in the realm 
of law enforcement. The federal agencies debated “the degree of federal intervention 
required to achieve national purposes,” wondering how to remedy the unforeseeable 
consequences of planning at the state level.139  In an internal document describing the 
planning process, LEAA officials concluded that: “neither State or local government is 
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presently staffed, organized, or financed in a manner to enable effective planning and 
coordination. In some rural areas and smaller cities, there is absolutely no planning 
capability in existence.”140 They concluded that the problem was state inefficiency. The 
Nixon Administration and the LEAA took precautious, in blatant contradiction of their 
own rhetorical and ideological commitments to states’ rights, to ensure that “high crime” 
urban areas would be adequately patrolled and that “hard core” urban criminals would 
receive a swift and sure punishment.  
 
IV. Law Enforcement Assistancegate 
Introducing a new national grant model in early 1971 that promised to uphold 
states’ rights, Nixon’s annual message anticipated the end of postwar liberal reform. “The 
time has now come in America to reverse the flow of power and resources from the 
States and communities to Washington, and start powering and resources flowing back 
from Washington to the States and communities and, more important, to the people all 
across America,” the president said.141 The New Federalism restructured the Great 
Society by directing what Nixon called “narrow purpose aid” programs into the revenue 
sharing categories. Among other federal programs that emerged in the 1960s, Nixon’s 
revenue sharing approach touched all of the programs under the Elementary Education 
Act, including Head Start and Americorps, and the 575 million dollars the federal 
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government spent on Model Cities. “This can be a revolution as profound, as far-
reaching, as exciting as the first revolution almost 200 years ago,” Nixon hoped.142 
New Federalism and the reorganization of the federal bureaucracy it entailed 
effectively increased the power of the president. While operating on a decentralized 
premise, “bringing power to the White House [was necessary] in order to dish it out,” as 
Nixon said.143 Like the drive to incorporate business management models into local law 
enforcement institutions, Nixon sought to make the Executive Branch more effective. 
Almost immediately after his election, Nixon appointed the CEO of Litton Industries, 
Roy Ash, to head the Advisory Council on Executive Organization. With private 
executives and Texas’s Democratic Governor John Connally filling its ranks, the Council 
approached the reorganization of the Executive branch using business models. In its 
recommendations to Nixon, the Council proposed that by consolidating social programs 
such as the Office of Economic Opportunity, Legal Services, Head Start, and Job Corps 
and Manpower Training, centralized authority that resembled corporate management 
techniques would foster a more results-oriented bureaucracy.  
 Policymakers who took issue with Nixon’s proposed revolution attacked the 
LEAA in part to reveal the shortcomings of New Federalism. The House Legal and 
Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations opened an 
investigation of the LEAA in July 1971, ultimately concluding in its report, titled “The 
Unrealized Promise of Safe Streets,” that the LEAA’s block grant program had no impact 
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on crime rates, even as it spent a total of 1.4 billion in taxpayer dollars in three years.144 
Connecticut’s John S. Monagan, who discovered gross spending irregularities in the 
federal government’s urban renewal program just a few years prior to his attack on the 
LEAA, chaired the special investigation and stacked his team with fellow Democrats. 
The Department of Justice and the LEAA, on the defensive, charged that the 
subcommittee and other critics of the federal crime program only focused on a few 
problem states and used the LEAA, in the words of new director Jerris Leonard, as a 
“whipping boy for those people who oppose special revenue-sharing.”145 Although the 
subcommittee exposed corruption at the highest levels of the Administration, general 
revenue sharing went on to pass just before the 1972 elections.  
In effect, revenue sharing brought money from Washington to deal with serious 
gaps resulting from the vast reduction or complete dissolution of social programs. 
Although policymakers conceded direct control to states via block grants and revenue 
sharing, liberals in Congress appreciated the increase in public expenditures the program 
provided, while conservatives knew that most of the funds would go to Republican 
governors with no federal strings attached. Yet soon it became clear that revenue sharing 
programs promoted highly uneven development. Although the program enabled states to 
cut taxes in some instances, major metropolitan centers still struggled to maintain basic 
services while some affluent suburban communities built golf courses or horseback riding 
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trails with the revenue sharing funds.146 While most governors welcomed the outpouring 
of block grants to spend as they chose, executives within Nixon’s own federal agencies 
expressed a strong distaste for the program.147 Local authorities, too, grew increasingly 
frustrated with the imposition of the new system. “I find myself chagrined that I don’t 
know now what I have, except that I have less money in the short run and probably the 
prospect of less money in the long run,” said Boston’s mayor Kevin While, “The tough 
thing about Nixon is that he’s like an ally you went to war with, and when the battle is 
over, you find you’re being partitioned, and it’s your ally that’s doing it.”148  
As revenue sharing faced mounting criticism, Monagan’s hearings set the climate 
for the upcoming 1972 mid-term election and commenced just as a new director stepped 
into the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Frustrated with continued 
disagreements with Velde and Coster and the restrictions imposed by the troika 
leadership model, Rogovin left the LEAA in March 1970, resigning along with Henry S. 
Ruth at the National Institute of Law and Criminal Justice. Associate Administrators 
Coster and Velde insisted that all decisions within the LEAA be unanimous, and Rogovin 
could no longer handle the constant disputes with his two Republican colleagues over the 
direction and purpose of the LEAA.149 After their official resignations, Ruth and Rogovin 
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continued to work as private consultants for the agency until Ruth stepped in to serve as 
special prosecutor during the Watergate investigation.150 The Safe Streets Act stipulated 
that Nixon appoint a Democrat in Rogovin’s place, and the President opted to leave the 
top leadership position in the Administration vacant until Congress amended the law so 
that he could designate a Republican to shape the development of American law 
enforcement.  
After nearly a year without an official agency head, in the spring of 1971 Nixon 
selected Leonard to direct the LEAA based on his commitment to conservative principles 
and his work on federal law enforcement legislation. An aide to Roman Hruska, the 
Senate’s loudest proponent of carceral measures, Leonard lacked any direct experience in 
law enforcement or criminal justice. A party man since his undergraduate days working 
for John Mitchell, Leonard isolated himself from increasing scrutiny of the organization, 
carefully selected his public speaking engagements, and refused to hold press conferences 
or speak to reporters concerning the crime issue at length. 151  
 Like many of his counterparts in the Nixon Administration, Leonard engaged in 
highly corrupt practices that protected questionable decisions among top White House 
officials and the Republican Party, and only investigated charges of civil rights abuses 
when they did not hurt personal and political interests. John Mitchell’s commitment to 
protecting the “forgotten civil right” provided a model for Leonard’s own approach to the 
issue amidst calls for “Black Power.” Both Justice Department officials often placed 
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crime prevention and law enforcement programs above protecting black Americans from 
further discrimination and racial exclusion by failing to cut off funds when states violated 
civil rights laws. When Mitchell testified before the Senate Appropriations subcommittee 
in the summer of 1969, he lobbied for additional funding for urban crime control by 
reducing employees in the civil rights division at the Department of Justice, claiming that 
the urban crime fight deserved “immense” and “urgent” federal attention.152 
When he took office, Mitchell chose Leonard as deputy attorney general in charge 
of handling the problem of racism even though Leonard had to resign from three all-
white social clubs in Milwaukee before he could be sworn in.153  As head of the civil 
rights division and the LEAA, Leonard followed Mitchell’s orders. When Leonard 
brought Mitchell a proposed suit which he described as “solid” with “good facts” alleging 
racial discrimination by the real estate firm Coldwell-Baker, the civil rights division 
quickly backed off after a conversation with Mitchell, who, as Leonard explained to his 
assistants, “knows some of top people in Coldwell-Banker and can’t believe that these 
practices are ‘co. policy.” 154 When charged with desegregating schools in Mississippi, 
Leonard delayed the process until he eventually—if reluctantly—forced the state to 
comply. Nixon knew that as LEAA director, Leonard would continue to uphold the 
ideological principles of the administration.  
 In keeping with the outlook of Mitchell and White House officials, Leonard 
stepped in to head the LEAA in 1971 with the intent to refocus the national effort on 
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urban areas. He doubled the size of the LEAA’s auditing staff to supervise grant 
expenditures and the flow of federal funds. To support projects that Leonard determined 
had the potential to “revolutionize criminal justice,” he established another bureaucratic 
layer to the national law enforcement apparatus by creating regional offices that gave 
final approval for anticrime plans.155  Despite his commitment to greater oversight, 
Leonard operated the crime control grant system with urgency, and states received 
federal law enforcement funds in less than a month, in some instances before the LEAA 
had a chance to approve grant proposals.156  The decision to bestow final grant approval 
outside of the LEAA’s federal offices reflected the Nixon Administration’s desire to 
channel crime control funds to riot-prone cities and to the expansion of the correctional 
system.  
Even though Leonard had a massive budget from which to operate the growing 
law enforcement apparatus, and reorganized the LEAA, he inherited an agency that 
suffered from extreme misuse of federal crime control funds. In a number of states, the 
law enforcement program had evolved into a system of political patronage. The director 
of the Indiana Criminal Justice Planning Agency resigned within the first year of the 
program, telling LEAA officials that the governor appointed close acquaintances and 
“people who are publicly somebody but who don’t know anything about crime.”  The 
city of Gary, considered the epicenter of crime in Indiana, had no representatives on the 
state planning agency entrusted with disbursing half a million dollars worth of federal 
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law enforcement funds. 157  The director of the southwest LEAA region notified an LEAA 
Administrator that the Texas Criminal Justice Agency spent too much on narcotics and 
organized crime and not enough on riot control, and complained that “New Mexico’s 
Governor is wont to use the SPA as his personal staff for speech-writing.”158 Florida also 
bankrolled additional staff with law enforcement funds to enlarge the governor’s office 
instead of the criminal justice planning agency.159  
Congressman Monagan’s investigation unearthed the waste of federal law 
enforcement funds at the state level to make a case for tighter federal controls, and 
exposed the problems inherent in New Federalism. St. Paul police officers enjoyed a 
marked car to bring home with them and drive off-duty as a crime deterrent, without any 
controls to measure the benefit of such practices. 160 In Illinois, the LEAA paid twenty 
thousand dollars a year for a luxurious Des Plains office that the Illinois Criminal Justice 
Planning Agency rarely used.161 The Illinois SPA also bought a state airplane with LEAA 
funds in order to transport governor Edgar Whitcomb to various functions. 162 
  The scale of corruption in LEAA practices that Monagan revealed occurred at all 
levels, as governors, members of the boards of criminal justice planning agencies, top 
LEAA Administrations, and corporate executives extracted funds from the expanding 
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federal criminal justice pot to suit their own interests. State policymakers used the 
available grants for moneymaking schemes. Louisiana invested more than thirteen 
million dollars worth of anticrime funds in U.S. Treasury bills and collected more than 
fifteen thousand dollars in interest from the money it loaned back to the federal 
government. In Arkansas, four state officials bought stock in the Texas consulting firm 
Interlock just before it received a half million-dollar LEAA grant to set up a 
computerized traffic safety information system and draft a prison management program 
for the State Board of Corrections. 163  
The government contracting program made possible by the block grant system 
benefited corporate leaders closely tied to the Nixon Administration who joined the crime 
war. Headed by prominent members of Nixon’s re-election campaign, the national 
accounting firm Ernst & Ernst received giant subsidies from the LEAA for various law 
enforcement projects. The chief of Ernst & Ernst’s Washington office, Julian O. Kay, 
organized a number or fundraising galas for the “Victory ’72 Dinner Committee.”164 
Ernst & Ernst’s managing partner, Richard Baker, also chaired the volunteer Certified 
Public Accountants Committee for the Re-election of the President. In all, Ernst & Ernst 
employees donated twenty thousand dollars to Nixon’s campaign. 165 The company 
worked on both the state and local levels to report crime rates and draw up law 
enforcement literature. It conducted forty thousand dollar surveys for the Washington, 
DC police department and the state of New Mexico. In two separate manuals for 
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Louisiana, law enforcement planners working at Ernst & Ernst plagiarized significant 
portions of existing government publications and still collected thirty thousand dollars.166  
Indiana, ripe with corruption and misuse of federal funds, granted the firm three hundred 
thousand dollars in law enforcement contracts without competitive bidding.167 
In some cases, criminal justice planning agencies supported consulting firms that 
formed to reap the newly available federal grants. In Alabama, a TV announcer, a 
newspaper editor, and an oil company executive started Criminal Justice Systems to 
design state-wide crime prevention plans. The firm received an LEAA contract just shy 
of six figures on the same day it incorporated. The three men used the funds to draft a 
proposal that involved spending a half million dollars on a secret state police force. 
Though the Justice Department did not accept that plan, Criminal Justice Systems 
received funds from the Alabama Law Enforcement Planning Agency. The LEAA sent 
five inspectors to the state and also discovered that the Alabama SPA funded a police 
cadet college costing the federal government more than a hundred thousand dollars, 
mostly attended by the sons, friends, and relatives of high ranking state officials. 168 Fed 
up with the misuses of federal funds, Velde met with governor George Wallace in early 
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1971. The federal government did little to curtail these practices, as Velde found himself 
“just charmed by George” during the visit. 169  
Leonard’s indifference to corruption and discriminatory practices embedded 
within the LEAA and the block grant system is not surprising given his track record in 
the Republican party and the civil rights division. The LEAA continued to misuse War on 
Crime funds and pump millions to states with a general lack of oversight. In the fall of 
1972, Leonard sanctioned a renovation of the LEAA headquarters on Indiana Avenue 
that cost slightly more than two hundred thousand dollars as part of the reorganization 
effort, redesigning his own office with modernistic silver foil. 170  George McGovern 
attempted to capitalize on the corruption charges as he launched his bid for the 
Presidency in 1972 and based much of his domestic platform on ending the block grant 
system.  James Vorenburg, a former Crime Commission director and advisor to 
McGovern, called the Nixon years “the worst crime years in the nation’s history,” but 
coming into 1972 White House and Department of Justice officials appeared as the 
winners.171 Leonard left the administration in 1973 to represent Republican National 
Committee Chair George H.W. Bush. After building a strong case against the LEAA, 
Monagan lost his seat in the House in 1972. As it set the course for the revolution of 
American law enforcement and the restoration of law and order, the LEAA continued to 
expand and Congress eagerly allocated hundreds of millions more to the agency despite 
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its knowledge of mismanagement, corruption, and inefficiency. The Nixon 
Administration moved to remedy the problem by making sure major cities and smaller 
deindustrializing towns would be the primary battlegrounds for the War on Crime.  
 
V. Back from Lawlessness  
Even though no major civil disturbances occurred after 1968, in the fall of 1970 
the New York Times boldly declared: “America’s cities seem to be on the edge of a form 
of guerrilla war.” In 1970, a group of young people living in Chicago’s Robert Taylor 
Homes opened fire on police manning the housing project, forcing the officers into a 
deadly gun battle, and police monitoring black neighborhoods elsewhere faced attacks by 
rocks and bottles on a nightly basis. The violent incidents in Chicago and other cities 
seemed to indicate that “the divisions have only deepened, with blacks and other 
minorities increasingly frustrated and angry and the police frightened and vengeful.” 172 
These sorts of news accounts, all too common in the mainstream media, depicted black 
urban residents as violent perpetrators who victimized police officers. “Just as the police 
have become more militarized,” the article reported, “alienated black youths appear to 
have begun to adopt ‘urban guerrilla’ techniques.” 173 A number of articles speculated 
about the prospect of urban rioting for the summer, not just in the nation’s major cities, 
but in smaller towns also experiencing high rates of unemployment.174 The first eight 
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months of 1970 witnessed the slaying of sixteen officers across the country. Even as the 
media increased its coverage of urban violence after 1965, rationalizing the federal 
government’s law enforcement initiatives and reinforcing a sense of general disorder in 
urban centers, the coverage also implicitly called into question the effectiveness of the 
War on Crime.  
In order to address the problem of  “high crime” urban areas, the Nixon 
Administration and top officials in the LEAA turned to discretionary programs to 
compensate for the fact that many state planning agencies funneled money to rural law 
enforcement initiatives. Municipal authorities very much appreciated the renewed 
presidential attention. The Mayors of sixteen small cities in the Midwest, including Flint, 
Kalamazoo, Urbana, and Madison complained to the Attorney General, in a petition 
called “The Forgotten Cities,” that state planning agencies kept law enforcement funds 
from the places in the state with the most serious crime problems and the highest 
minority populations in order to place crime control funds in the hands of powerful state 
legislators representing rural constituencies. These mayors as well as like-minded 
policymakers contended that urban crime was as much a threat to the security of the 
United States as Vietnam.175  “The forces of lawlessness appear to be alarmingly close to 
victory over the forces of peace,” Indiana Democrat Vance Hartke told his colleagues in 
Congress, “If positive action is not taken, and taken soon, a crime crisis of unprecedented 
proportions will soon surely envelop the nation.”176  It seemed to Hartke and many other 
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legislators, businessmen, and law enforcement officials that the LEAA did little more 
than build criminal justice bureaucracies at the state level.177 
Although the White House and the Justice Department lacked control over state 
criminal justice expenditures, they shaped the course of federal crime control in the 
nation’s capital during Nixon’s first term through special LEAA operations. Nixon’s DC 
Crime Control Act of 1970 converted the capital into an experimental site where 
innovative law enforcement techniques could be tested in haste. As Velde explained, “we 
have had to resort less to reforming institutions here than pouring a lot of money into 
police and narcotics.” 178 Roughly an eighth of the total LEAA budget for federal crime 
control went to DC, resulting in the largest number of police per capita in the world. 179 
With mounting pressure coming directly from the White House, Washington police chief 
Jerry Wilson instructed his captains in 1971 to reduce crime in the city or expect to leave 
the force.180 Velde noted, “we are not getting at the root causes of crime,” but Nixon 
needed results coming into the election of 1972.181  Just as Nixon vowed in his first state 
of the union message two years earlier, the special involvement of his Administration in 
managing DC’s unique but pressing crime problem went on to serve as a blueprint for 
similar programs in cities elsewhere.  
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In the spring of 1973, when the end of the Vietnam War seemed imminent, Nixon 
escalated the Crime War. The Administration widdled away at many existing federal 
social investments set in motion by the Johnson Administration and federal anti-crime 
efforts gained top priority.182 While drastically cutting other programs, the administration 
proposed in its budget for fiscal year 1974 to increase the LEAA’s spending authority 
from 35.8 million to over 891 million dollars. At the same time, Nixon pounced on the 
remnants of the War on Poverty. He moved educational programs such as Head Start into 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and abandoned the Better Schools and 
Better Communities Act—once a cornerstone of Nixon’s New Federalism program.183 
Nixon also transferred many programs administered by the Office of Economic 
Opportunity to other federal departments. In one of his most controversial appointments, 
Nixon positioned Howard Phillips to direct the OEO and ordered him to withhold 
community action funds in anticipation of the agency’s dissolution.  However, a Federal 
District Court forced the unconfirmed Phillips to resign and ruled that the president could 
not withhold funds that had been allocated by Congress.184  
 Although the LEAA was meant to be the hallmark of New Federalism as the first 
federal block grant program, the agency actually contradicted the tenets of the governing 
approach. In the end, Congress did not pass an act that would generate special revenue-
sharing for law enforcement, but instead passed a three-year, 3.25 billion dollar 
reauthorization of the agency that tightened federal review of state and local crime-
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fighting programs.185  And despite the small government mantra of New Federalism, in 
the mid-1970s the LEAA moved towards further consolidation of law enforcement 
agencies. For instance, the agency suggested that police departments of fewer than ten 
officers merge with nearby forces for improved effectiveness and efficiency. 186  
The move towards centralization within the Department of Justice responded to 
charges that the LEAA functioned as the hub of a massive new criminal justice 
bureaucracy and little else. Many senators, once optimistic about the promise of federal 
crime control funds, found the LEAA to be generally ineffective. Senator Edward 
Kennedy remarked that the did not think the LEAA “had any significant impact of 
crime,” despite claiming the largest budget in the Department of Justice and its well-
publicized penchant for hardware. 187 Police chiefs in Alabama, Birmingham, and 
Berkeley echoed Kennedy’s sentiment, calling the LEAA a “tremendous failure” 
characterized by “bureaucracy and red tape.” 188  A staff member of the Criminal Justice 
Council in California shared a poem he wrote about the agency with the Los Angeles 
Times: “I joined this crew to fight high crime/ But now I just can’t find the time/ Oh well, 
we can always reminisce/ Of many former days of bliss/ When the criminal victim’s 
impassioned pleas / Could be answered in other than bureaucratise.”189  More frustrating 
was the fact that the LEAA gave 235 million dollars to California in its six years of 
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operation, but crime rates continued to rise in the state—and at a much faster rate than 
before the agency was established. 190  
“In spite of the difficulties, we have made dramatic progress,” Nixon insisted in 
his final crime message on March 14th, 1973. With no major incidents of urban civil 
disorder on his watch, Nixon believed his administration had restored America from the 
“record breaking lawlessness” of the 1960s.191  Evidence of this was the unprecedented 
amount of funds his administration pumped into state and local law enforcement 
institutions, on “the front lines of the battle against crime.”192  While operating within the 
tenets of his New Federalism on the surface, Nixon created new opportunities for White 
House and Department of Justice officials to shape directly penal and juridical 
institutions on the local level. The effort subjected low-income residents to 
unprecedented levels of federal surveillance and detainment and proved to only 
exacerbate crime and violence in these neighborhoods. 
Yet despite his self-aggrandizement, Nixon did not heed early warnings from high 
law enforcement officials about the consequences of the continued escalation of state 
force in segregated low-income communities. Back in 1969, the nation’s first SWAT 
team premiered in Los Angeles under the tutelage of Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration funds. The city’s police chief suggested to his captain school: “In areas 
where there has been a pattern of using strong physical force to achieve police objectives, 
a concurrent pattern of resistance develops within the individual or group. The result is 
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resistance and lack of cooperation on the part of the law violator and the subsequent 
necessity for resorting to force on the part of the police. The use of force is thus-self 
perpetuating.”193 Davis’s point about self-perpetuating force offers a telling commentary 
on Nixon’s War on Crime.  
State-sanctioned violence is often seen as a response to crime, but in the case of 
the federal government and the urban police forces it modernized through the LEAA it 
should be understood as preemptive. Those who engaged in urban civil disorder and the 
groups of “juvenile delinquents” the Nixon Administration went on to target responded to 
their violent conditions; the federal government forced state and local authorities to 
respond with greater penetration that disproportionately touched non-white Americans 
despite the race-blind terms of anti-crime legislation. Once the growing law enforcement 
apparatus successfully channeled resources to carceral programs at all levels of 
government, Americans living in segregated “high-crime” neighborhoods confronted 
increased incarceration and police brutality. The new, ever-more punitive laws enacted 
by the federal government invested heavily in the surveillance and incarceration of black 
urban Americans. In turn, the institutionalized racism and benign neglect entrenched in 
federal crime control policy fostered sociological discrepancies that fertilized post-
industrial violence. As his second term began,  having essentially abandoned the New 
Federalism when it came to the War on Crime, Nixon positioned the federal government 
to work directly with municipal authorities and police departments, cultivating federal 
involvement in the lives of historically marginalized Americans that far surpassed 
postwar liberal programs.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
A “Reign of Terror”: 
Tactical Squads, Community Mobilization and the Battlegrounds of the Crime War 
 
I. High Impact 
 By the early 1970s, with the law enforcement bureaucracy established by the Safe 
Streets Act rapidly developing at the federal and state levels, new local crime control 
institutions hit the ground at full force. The grant process had been completed, and police 
departments now had new levels of funds in their budget and many more patrolmen. 
Street wars between tactical units operating in segregated urban neighborhoods and 
young residents emerged as a consequence of the federal government’s increase of 
punitive forces in those areas deemed “high crime.” Simultaneously, White House and 
Department of Justice Officials looked to redesign the urban landscape itself in an effort 
to create a living environment that would allow law enforcement institutions to bring 
residents of housing projects and low-income communities under the gaze of the state.  
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and federal law enforcement 
officials responded to the racist outcomes of its crime control policy by proclaiming a 
commitment to equal opportunity, affirmative action, and minority recruitment. In 
practice, however, the LEAA was generally uninterested—even symbolically—in 
challenging the racial status quo in law enforcement. More important was to appear tough 
on crime by providing local law enforcement with greater opportunities to make arrests, 
and giving judges the tools to send violators to prison under stiffer penalties and longer 
sentences. The White House and the Department of Justice waged a domestic social war, 
which quickly evolved into an actual violent conflict with real gun battles, real victims, 
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and real strategy and collective mobilization on the part of the police departments and 
residents of the neighborhoods they increasingly came to monitor. 
The most ambitious project the LEAA launched in its short history, the High 
Impact Program, aimed to restore law and order in eight carefully selected cities with 
sizeable populations of black Americans. Discretionary funds had largely been used for 
modest projects; High Impact was the first major program funded and designed by the 
federal government.1 It retained the decentralization premise of New Federalism, 
however, in that the LEAA gave each city a considerable degree of freedom to use the 
discretionary funds as they deemed appropriate. Somewhat ironically, it took the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration four years before it launched the type of major 
federal urban crime control program that Lyndon Johnson had sponsored in his original 
drafts of the Safe Streets Act. Despite the fact that Richard Nixon increasingly concerned 
himself with corrections, and the LEAA came under fire as a police weapons supplier, the 
High Impact Program, touted as an “across-the-board attack on burglaries, robberies, 
muggings, assaults and rapes,” focused primarily on increasing patrol on the streets of 
racially marginalized communities and improving public relations for the president.2  
Vice President Spiro Agnew, Attorney General John Mitchell, and head Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administrator Jerris Leonard planned the one hundred and sixty 
million dollar venture with researchers at the National Institute of Criminal Justice 
Enforcement for three months before announcing the initiative in January 1972 to great 
media fanfare. The Administration hoped the program would meet the twin goals of 
                                                   




justifying the tens of millions of dollars in federal research funds the Institute received to 
research crime prevention techniques, and would allow the president to appear aggressive 
on crime on the eve of his re-election bid. But like its parent institution, the LEAA’s 
Impact Program suffered from the same overly ambitious goals and a disorganized 
administration.3 
No matter that the project promised to reduce crime rates by 1976, and arbitrarily 
lower the categories of serious crimes by five percent in the first two years and as much 
as twenty percent within five years. The symbolic presence of the program far 
outweighed its limited success. Martin Danziger, one of the main High Impact planners at 
the Institute, later commented on the crime indication figures: “I just made them up. It 
sounded good… It got attention… They needed the twenty percent goal for sex appeal. It 
was an educated guess and it was important to start sending quantified goals in the 
criminal justice system.”4 As a model program for other urban areas, the Department of 
Justice and the LEAA designed High Impact to “bring sharp, rapid reduction in street 
crime and burglary—the types of violent, serious crime most prevalent and most feared 
by the public.” 5  This meant that only cities with populations of 250,000 to one million 
with serious crime problems were eligible for High Impact funds. The federal 
government chose Newark, Denver, Baltimore, Dallas, Cleveland, Atlanta, and St. Louis 
for High Impact funds because of their size and location in key states that could help 
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secure Nixon’s reelection.6 Federal officials screened each of the mayors to determine 
whether they would use funds effectively, and required that each city supplement the 
grants with a twenty-five percent matching grant.7  
 It is no coincidence that as State Planning Agencies faced mounting criticism, 
Congress enlarged the amount of discretionary funds and special projects hand-selected 
by the highest government officials. White House staff also increased their direct 
participation in the crime fight. Nixon aide Bud Krogh described how the domestic 
counsel and the president together determined the use of discretionary funds on the 
streets of major American cities:  “Whatever discretionary money there was… in many 
cases would come directly to the White House, and be addressed there by Mr. 
Ehrlichman, by my staff, and in some cases the president directly.”8 Like many other law 
enforcement officials with federal crime control money at their disposal, Nixon often 
signed the grant checks himself, and usually when the deal benefitted him in some way. 
When the President needed an endorsement from Philadelphia mayor and former police 
chief Frank Rizzo, he sent Krogh to review law enforcement plans with city officials. 
Within days of the meeting, Nixon authorized a one million dollar grant to the city of 
Philadelphia. Nixon also gave local police chiefs discretionary funds when they 
organized narcotics strike forces through the Office of Drug Abuse and Law 
Enforcement. These special LEAA funds went to Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New 
York for narcotics treatment programs, to Miami for added police protection during the 
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national party conventions, and to the city of San Clemente in order to protect Nixon and 
his family when they visited their hometown. As one group of scholars observed some 
years later, “the discretionary portion of LEAA’s budget had originally been a lever for 
congressional liberals to get more money to their constituents in the cities, it was now a 
tool of the Republican administration to advance its own interests in the 1972 elections.”9 
Like many of the grant guidelines the LEAA drafted, the High Impact Program 
also operated under vague law enforcement guidelines. It aimed to improve, “anticrime 
patrols by police—more policemen, with better tactics, equipment, and training. 
Equipment could include helicopters—which have been successful as a crime deterrent in 
some areas—and improved radio and dispatch systems to get police to the crime scene 
faster.”10 Although this approach resembled previous programs, Leonard promised 
Nixon’s domestic counsel John Ehrlichman: “This will not be another demonstration or 
pilot program. We expect concrete results.” Leonard hoped the experiment would allow 
the Administration to, “make the blueprints of the programs in each of the eight cities 
available to every small, medium, and large city in the country.” Like Nixon’s venture 
into crime control in DC, “We have every reason to expect that successes in the High 
Impact cities will prompt development of comparable programs in scores of other 
metropolitan areas.”11 By providing local law enforcement the tools to better patrol and 
monitor residents, the High Impact program increased the extent of punitive forces in the 
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nation’s most troubled urban neighborhoods and, by extension, the number of black 
Americans in the criminal justice and prison systems.  
The eight cities that enlarged their crime fighting capabilities with federal High 
Impact funds continued the practice of investing in hardware, special tactical squads, and 
increasing patrol, even if it remained to be seen whether such efforts could be sustained 
without federal assistance. Initially, Atlanta did not make the short list of cities eligible 
for funds, but Mayor Sam Massell presented a strong appeal to the Justice Department by 
demonstrating how closely his law enforcement measures aligned with the larger 
objectives of the War on Crime. The city focused on improving police training and 
education by introducing tuition incentives and psychological testing and raising 
patrolmen’s salaries by twenty-two percent. High Impact funds allowed the Atlanta chief 
of police to hire an administrative assistant with a twenty-eight thousand dollar salary and 
redesign report forms at a cost of some seventy-thousand dollars to ease the completion 
process for policemen. 12 Atlanta also joined Los Angeles, DC, and Detroit and spent a 
million dollars on helicopters while also increasing mounted patrol on the streets. 13  
Massell received additional support for these efforts from the Atlanta Regional 
Commission and the Atlanta Commission on Crime and Juvenile Delinquency and 
contracted with the International Association of Chiefs of Police to start a twenty man 
narcotics squad. High Impact funds allowed Massell to continue these practices and to 
fund a special drug police force. 14  
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Unlike Atlanta—seen as an exemplar High Impact city—St. Louis received the 
grant because of its demographics and markedly high crime rate but did not know how to 
properly spend the vast amount of law enforcement booty it received. One police officer 
remarked: “We’re suddenly rich, but we don’t know who gets what.”15  The city was 
unsure which agency should receive the funds, and how and to what programs the 
resources should be allocated. Mayor Alfonso Cervantes also rightly worried that the 
deindustrializing city with a declining tax base would be unable to support the salaries of 
new police officers added to the force with High Impact funds at the close of the 
program. 
The Department of Justice selected Baltimore as a High Impact city due to its 
especially grim crime figures: homicides rose from 249 in 1970 to 353 in 1971 and the 
school system experienced four separate shooting incidents resulting in the death of one 
student. Baltimore officials told the federal government that High Impact funds would 
help the city reach its goal of increasing foot patrolmen from seventy to 410 by 1973. 
Once it received its first check (before any other city selected for the program, in the 
amount of 1.8 million dollars) Baltimore spent 633,008 dollars to place fifty-two new 
policemen on the streets. 16 The additional funds bought a number of walkie-talkies, two 
helicopters, and allowed the police department to set up nine special five-man teams at a 
cost of over half a million dollars. The police force added officers with college degrees in 
the social sciences, humanities, and education to talk with grassroots organizations and 
make home visits in order to improve police-community relations. The federal grant also 
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continued the larger objective of additional surveillance through police-community 
relations programs, as the city pumped resources into the state parole and probation 
division, making possible more intensive supervision of residents who committed violent 
crimes.17 As in Atlanta, Baltimore used High Impact funds to focus on police desk work, 
and employed civilians in order to free officers for street patrol at a cost of nearly half a 
million dollars. To bolster the capacity of police departments to monitor citizens living in 
segregated poverty, Baltimore spent another half million dollars on a helicopter patrol 
system, and more than two hundred thousand for additional guards, television monitors, 
and intercoms in public housing projects. 18 For other cities, High Impact proved to be 
crucial for the larger effort to boost public relations for crime control. With Cleveland’s 
grant, the city focused on law enforcement employment, deterrence, detection, 
apprehension control, and the state planning agency, but also spent one hundred thousand 
dollars on publicity alone. 19 
Newark was still recovering from the riots five years prior at the time the federal 
government selected it for High Impact. Suburban commuters held half of the jobs in the 
city, and black men confronted a thirty percent rate of unemployment. Just over half of 
the city’s adult population received an education beyond the eighth-grade level. Even 
those residents who found jobs made, on average, roughly fifteen hundred dollars a year, 
far below the six thousand dollar national average. The extreme level of segregation and 
poverty in the city (seventy-one percent of residents were nonwhite), and the fact that 
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Newark led the nation in infant mortality, venereal disease, and crime made it a prime 
candidate for special federal attention.20 
Although Newark’s program resembled the majority of its counterparts in that it 
funded police training seminars and community-relations programs, bought helicopters, 
implemented new court programs to prosecute street criminals, and turned to street 
lighting, the LEAA forced Earl Phillips, the only black executive director of any High 
Impact Program, to resign. 21 The administration threatened to give Newark’s twenty 
million dollar grant to another city unless Phillips vacated his post. A psychologist in his 
late thirties who previously had directed Newark’s Urban League chapter and worked 
with the Urban Coalition in DC, Phillips used High Impact to plan community-based 
programs that addressed the intersections between crime and social issues. As High 
Impact director, Phillips proposed alternative high schools for dropouts, citizen-based 
crime patrols and neighborhood probation centers. This agenda conflicted with larger 
federal goals that intended to make High Impact, “basically a matter of police work and 
enforcement,” as Phillips put it.22 Mayor Kenneth Gibson, who had appointed Phillips, 
strongly opposed his ouster, and called Vice President Agnew to discuss the problem but 
White House officials remained adamant. Leonard justified the LEAA’s coup on the 
basis that Phillips  “could not operate, did not have the capabilities and was causing 
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delays.”23 The Washington Post characterized his resignation as the result of institutional 
insensitivity to blacks, and to racism, and  “a victory for the forces of repression in 
America.”24 The incident underscored the fact that the High Impact Program encouraged 
experimentation and radical new approaches to crime prevention, only as long as these 
approaches retained the punitive drive behind Nixon’s law enforcement policies.  Any 
vestige of the structural emphasis Johnson embraced was quickly marginalized by the 
Nixon Administration’s War on Crime. 25  
Despite the promises of the nation’s top law enforcement officials, the High 
Impact program was, on the whole, a failure. Instead of dropping five percent as Attorney 
General Mitchell promised, total crime in the eight cities rose more than forty-three 
percent from 1972 to 1974.26 As it focused on hardware and security for housing projects, 
crime in Baltimore went up 49.6 percent during this period. 27 In Dallas, which wasted 
more than fifty thousand dollars on a program that tied sensory burglar alarms to a 
helicopter response system, crime skyrocketed 81.9 percent. 28 In the end, High Impact 
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received a grand total of 140 million in federal funds for 233 various anticrime projects 
that had no immediate effect. 29 
When in 1976, the National Security Center released an assessment of the 
program, it largely blamed the LEAA and its “multiple layers of red tape” as the reason 
for the rising crime rates.  The Center’s report concluded: “Many of the cities had no idea 
how to effectively spend such a high level of funding in such a short period of time and 
complained bitterly of LEAA’s lack of assistance.”30 The Center determined the 
discretionary initiative to be “an irresponsible, ill-conceived and politically motivated 
effort to throw money at a social program.”31  Highly critical for the rehabilitative and 
experimental dimension of High Impact’s stated goals, the Center argued that its findings 
indicated that: “So far, the agency’s biggest accomplishment seems to have been to prove 
that Washington can’t do much about street crime across the nation.” 32 
In addition to the National Security Center, the LEAA granted a private firm, 
Mitre Corporation, 2.4 million dollars to evaluate the results of the High Impact Program 
in 1976. Mitre felt that Nixon officials “foolishly” claimed the program alone would 
reduce crime, and that the urgency with which the administration launched the High 
Impact program, in all its, “political pressures to achieve the goal and to set specific 
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projects,” ultimately discouraged adequate planning.33 Perhaps because the evaluation 
was itself bankrolled by the LEAA, Mitre argued that the crime increases in the eight 
cities “might have been much greater if the program had not been in operation,” and it 
also provided “officials in the eight cities valuable training in planning and carrying out 
crime-fighting projects.” 34After the Security Center and Mitre’s studies went public, 
policymakers and the news media seized upon High Impact as evidence of the failure of 
the federal government’s foray into crime control. In July 1976 the Wall Street Journal 
proclaimed the program a “dud.”35 Even the pioneers of federal law enforcement efforts 
looked dismally upon the ability of the government to effectively control crime by the 
mid-1970s. “I was once optimistic,” top LEAA Administrator Henry Ruth lamented, “But 
now, after examining the problem from every angle, I’m not.’”36 The federal 
government’s decision to focus on hardware and patrol without simultaneously focusing 
on adequate training for officers and major socio-economic reform failed to adequately 
manage the material outcomes of declining tax bases and disinvestment in the nation’s 
cities.  
Once the federal government presented crime to the American public as a major 
domestic social problem and a general security issue, it unleashed a seemingly 
inescapable punitive apparatus. “Because more and more people are worried about 
crime,” a senate staff member commented, “there’s a tremendous amount of pressure for 
the government to ‘do something.’ The problem is that nobody knows just what the hell 
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to do. Everybody knows what we can’t do, and that is to pull out altogether.” 37 As 
Senator Edward Kennedy explained in defense of High Impact: “You can’t just throw out 
something like that… I mean, you have to make sure it gets a fair test.’”38 Awareness of 
the mismanagement, corruption, and contradictory premises of the federal crime control 
programs did not discourage policymakers from fundamentally restructuring or even 
reforming new punitive measures. In fact they moved in the opposition direction and 
expanded the upward climb of the carceral state. 
 
II. STRESS and Tactical Squads 
As eligible cities received their first High Impact checks, cities ineligible for the 
program’s funds like New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Atlanta, Los Angeles and 
Detroit used other sources of federal support to create elite tactical squads to patrol high-
crime, low-income communities. White House officials and many other policymakers 
subscribed to the popular law enforcement theory that the key to reducing crime lay in 
increased arrest and incarceration. To meet these objectives, many big city police 
departments turned to patrol tactics that blurred the line between entrapment and sound 
undercover detective work. By placing officers in targeted areas as “prey” in order to 
provoke assailants, suspects could be identified and apprehended with far greater ease. 
Many criminal justice and civil rights organizations deemed  these types of operations 
“ineffective,” but the tactical decoy squads did satisfy crime control needs by pursuing 





potential criminals who police departments felt belonged under the supervision of the 
criminal justice system. 39     
The most violent and notorious of the tactical squads, STRESS (an acronym for 
“Stop the Robberies, Enjoy Safe Streets”), was inaugurated in Detroit in January 1971. 
During the first fifteen months of its operation, STRESS officers killed a young, black 
male roughly once a month, and often in the dead of night in Detroit’s Cass-Woodward 
corridor. In just two years, STRESS made more than six thousand arrests and caused the 
deaths of eighteen civilians and suspects, all but one of them black.40  
The Detroit Police Department’s use of decoy operations was not new, for the 
first squad premiered just before the city erupted in flames in July 1967. In March of that 
year, the department created a small plainclothes patrol unit to address the recent upturn 
in reported robberies, using surveillance of possible victims and suspects as their 
principal means of prevention.41 Although reported rates of increase coincided with new 
innovations and federal requirements for crime reporting, the lack of impact the 
plainclothes force seemed to make on crime did not stop Nichols from expanding the 
program in the 1970s. 42 Like law enforcement officials in Washington, Nichols opted to 
research the problem further and ordered the department to study patterns of street crime. 
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For Nichols believed: “If we can predict in which direction the criminal will move we 
can be waiting for him.”43 The study determined that victims were usually nonwhite 
males living in the neighborhoods where the robbery occurred and that the perpetrators 
were usually armed, young nonwhite males.44  
To drastically reduce the onslaught of robberies and assaults in Detroit, Nichols 
implemented STRESS to patrol the low-income, mostly black neighborhoods the study 
identified.  When the Detroit police department announced the program, eight hundred 
men volunteered immediately for duty. About half of these men received some degree of 
screening, and from those screened a quarter were accepted—only nine of them black. 
The majority had five to seventeen years of experience on the force, but forty percent had 
only two to five years of service when they took the STRESS post. Even without careful 
screening or extensive training, the tactical officers were heavily armed. All too often, 
STRESS policemen “simply draw their guns and shoot instead of trying to catch the 
suspect without using deadly force,” critics of the unit charged. 45 The consequences of 
the lack of adequate pre-screening cannot be understated. Nichols appointed Raymond 
Peterson as one of the STRESS crew chiefs because of his commendable record (he had 
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one thousand arrests behind him during his eleven years on the job), despite the fact that 
when Nichols formed STRESS in January 1971, Peterson already had nine citizen 
complaints. But once Peterson assumed a leadership position within the elite tactical 
squad, he took it to a new level of violence. 
Every morning, Peterson and other commanders of the three to four-person 
STRESS crews met at headquarters to plot the previous day’s street crimes to determine 
patrol routes in the identified “problem areas” that covered between two to four police 
precincts. As the normal patrol cars monitored their designated territories, STRESS 
officers in car models “not usually associated with police duty” drove the streets in the 
targeted neighborhoods.46  The small teams would then walk streets where the 
department predicted crimes would occur in one-one-two configurations: a point person, 
his immediate backup, and two others following as cover. 
STRESS police officers enjoyed the results of the massive federal investment in 
police equipment and technologies. Each officer carried a “prep radio,” or a small, 
concealable version of a military walkie-talkie, and each officer wore a “second chance” 
armored vest made of fiberglass.47  The STRESS officers “all dressed in such a way as to 
blend in with the neighborhood,” posing as pedestrians, indigenous residents, cabdrivers, 
deliverymen, bill collectors, and newsboys.48  If a handful of victims reported a purse 
snatching on a particular block, STRESS officers even dressed in wigs and dresses to 
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trick potential robbers.49 Peterson embraced his role as an undercover police officer, 
patrolling Detroit neighborhoods dressed like a “radical college professor,” as one 
national newspaper described his STRESS costume.50  This type of work was exciting, 
and risky: when the crew decided to “drop off a target” to goad residents  who appeared 
suspicious, the necessary distance from the rest of the crew and patrolmen made key 
decoys like Peterson vulnerable to attacks.51 Moreover, as Nichols testified before the 
Select Committee on Crime in 1973: “Depending on the time of day and ethnic 
characteristics of the neighborhood, the race of the officer may give him away, so this is 
an important consideration in team composition.”52  Sometimes the decoy or plainclothes 
tactic worked, sometimes residents would recognize a STRESS crew team member and 
avoid contact, and sometimes residents approached disguised officers to warn, “watch 
out, he looks like a STRESS copper,” or that “the man” was in the area.53  
The presence of STRESS operations in these targeted communities seemed to 
achieve the intended results. As Nichols reported: “Many arrests have resulted from this 
type of orientation. However, far more apprehensions have resulted from the presence of 
officers on or near the scene of the crime, operating as surveillance units, unrecognized 
by the criminal.”54  As long as punitive and carceral forces made their presence known, 
law enforcement officials believed potential crimes could be curtailed. Although the 
                                                   
49 ibid. 
50 Graham “How the City.”  
51 Ricci in 4-12-1973 Hearings Before the Select Committee on Crime, 394. 
52 4-12-1973 Hearings Before the Select Committee on Crime, 418. 
53 4-12-1973 Hearings Before the Select Committee on Crime, 418. 
54 ibid 387. 
  
190 
Detroit police department refused to disclose specific numbers, STRESS officers likely 
totaled somewhere between one hundred and 250 of Detroit’s five thousand man force. 55 
Commenting on the lack of disclosure, Nichols testified that STRESS had a profound 
“psychological impact” in that, “if the average person knew exactly how few officers 
there were out there we would be depriving ourselves of the major effect, which is a 
deterrent effect.”56 
Less than a year into his position as STRESS crew chief, Peterson was already 
involved in a number of shootings that resulted in the deaths of eight black residents and 
serious injuries to three more. Among Peterson’s victims was a twenty-six year old 
Peterson claimed tried to rob him in the spring of 1971, followed by a resident Peterson 
claimed attacked him at knifepoint just a few days later; two weeks passed before 
Peterson killed a twenty-two year old who the STRESS chief said tried to rob him. It 
seemed Peterson loosened his grip on the revolver for a number of months, but in the fall 
of 1971 Peterson killed a twenty-four year old he said tried to resist arrest, followed by a 
twenty-one year old suspect who attacked a member of Peterson’s STRESS crew with a 
broom handle.57 Peterson explained his actions by the nature of the unit’s patrol work: “I 
think the reason I’ve been involved in so many shootings is because we’re walking so 
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much,” he told a reporter. 58 Nichols retained Peterson on the STRESS payroll in spite of 
his record. 
Finally, in March 1973, Peterson killed yet another black resident, but this time 
his attempted cover-up exposed corrupt police practices and the brutal practices of 
STRESS received media coverage outside of Detroit. After Peterson murdered twenty-
four year old Robert Hoyt when he was off-duty, he stuck to his usual routine. Peterson 
filed a report claiming that while driving with another off-duty patrolman, the two 
officers noticed Hoyt and forced his car to the side of a freeway service drive. Peterson 
said Hoyt promptly slashed him with a knife, leaving a six-inch tear in his top coat, and 
the STRESS officer fired shots in self-defense.59 Yet when investigators examined the 
knife, the cat hairs they found on its handle belonged to Peterson’s own pet. The lab tests 
led to second-degree murder charges against the most notorious killer on the squad.60  
Although Peterson may be an extreme example, his patrol practices arose from a 
climate within the unit that seemed to advance a relentless assault on young black 
Detroiters. In March 1972, a five minute gun battle ensued between one of the teams of 
black STRESS officers and four black sheriff’s deputies playing poker. While the 
STRESS officers remained unharmed, deputy Henry S. Henderson lost his life and 
deputy James Jenkins faced serious injuries. When the STRESS officers burst into the 
apartment and interrupted the game, Jenkins threw his hands in front of his face and 
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yelled, “We’re police officers in here,” mistaking the STRESS officers for robbers. 61 But 
the STRESS team assumed the sheriff’s deputies were hardened criminals trying to resist 
arrest, and quickly fired shots. Their bullets hit Jenkins in the stomach, temple, and leg, 
causing the officer to lose sight in one of his eyes. 62 “Henderson was pointing a gun at 
Mr. Martin and Patrolmen David Marshall and Dennis Shiemke, when they opened fire,” 
as Wayne Country prosecutor William Callahan believed, “They were, therefore, not 
using undue force,” and thus did not did not face charges.63 Although Callahan’s office 
did bring assault charges for Jenkins’s injuries, all of the officers eventually received 
acquittals. By that time, STRESS had earned a reputation in the Midwest for the slayings 
it brought into Cass Corridor, but Henderson’s murder received widespread national 
coverage and sparked an outcry from the black law enforcement community. 64 
The Guardians, a black policemen’s organization representing some 325 officers 
in the Detroit Metropolitan area, used the Henderson killing and the twelve other 
STRESS-related deaths to demand that Mayor Roman Gribbs abolish the unit. Nichols 
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defended STRESS as the department’s principal means to reduce street crime, for he 
attributed it to the city’s 9.9 percent reduction in robberies in 1972. 65  This justified 
further expansion, even though young people continued to die from STRESS bullets. 
Weeks after Henderson’s murder, STRESS officers killed a fifteen year old boy and 
wounded two of his friends. The officers claimed they acted out of self defense after five 
teenagers held up a decoy at knifepoint. 66  
Soon young residents of Detroit launched what appeared to be a counter-attack on 
STRESS officers. In December 1972, on the northwest side, a group of young men who 
the police believed to be riding shotgun for a narcotics runner fatally shot four 
plainclothes officers and seriously wounded three others. A few days later, another off-
duty STRESS officer lost his life as he tried to stop a bank holdup. 67 Finally, in January 
1973, a twenty-five year old STRESS officer died in what Nichols called an “execution-
style” shooting by “mad dog killers.”68 Almost immediately, the Department held John 
Perry Boyd Jr. 23; Clyde Bethune, 22; and Hayward Brown, 18 responsible for all of the 
patrolmen’s deaths.  
In retaliation, STRESS officers resorted to a new degree of harassment and 
violence against the suspects’ families. They launched what black Detroit residents aptly 
called a “campaign of terror” in the name of bringing the killers to justice. The excessive 
search—the largest in Detroit’s history up to that point—reinvigorated the energy behind 
grassroots campaigns against STRESS and raised serious questions about the practices of 
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big-city tactical squads.69 Fearing another large scale rebellion, the city council held an 
open hearing at Ford Auditorium. For more than three hours, witnesses testified before 
nearly two thousand concerned citizens about their encounters with STRESS officers. 
The pastor of the New Galilee Spiritual Church remembered STRESS officers smashing 
his front door down at four in the morning on December 27th and holding a gun to his 
head. A young woman spoke about the night of January 6th, when STRESS officers 
forced her to strip to her underwear after the crew received a tip that her family planned 
to leave Detroit. 70   
Nichols listened to the descriptions, then stepped to the podium before the mostly-
black audience to read his prepared statement. The Police Chief acknowledged that his 
men made “some errors” and promised to investigate the witnesses’ charges.  He noted 
that Michigan law permitted police to enter any building without a warrant if they had 
reasonable cause. But once Nichols defended STRESS officers’ indiscriminate use of 
firearms, the crowd erupted. “Mad dog killer!” they shouted—a fitting reappropriation of 
Nichols’ indictment of the three young suspects. Nichols remained on the stage through 
the taunts with his arms crossed. Unable to finish his prepared statement, the police 
commissioner shook hands with the seven council members and left. 71  
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While for Nichols the meeting was a complete failure, it as a triumph for Detroit-
based activists who struggled against these issues for decades. The former labor organizer 
and League of Revolutionary Black Workers co-founder Kenneth Cockrel used the 
meeting as a basis to start a coalition of local organizations. He collected 100,000 
signatures on a petition that called STRESS nothing more than “a murder squad with an 
unlimited license to kill and maim.”72 Again the community demanded for the unit’s 
abolition. The coalition had a point: STRESS and the Detroit police department had the 
largest number of civilian deaths at the hands of law enforcement officers than anywhere 
else in the United States. 73  
If STRESS operated within an existing climate of violence, its very presence 
helped to sustain and even worsen that climate. A year into the operation of the squad, 
Detroit’s homicide reached a peak. Yet prominent members of the Detroit police 
department insisted that it helped reduce crime rates in the city based solely on 
impressive conviction rates, at seventy-five percent on felonies and ninety-four percent 
on misdemeanors.74 Detective Inspector James D. Bannon, the head commander of 
STRESS, remarked to a reporter: “We’re involved in a violent business. We just don’t 
walk up and shoot somebody. We ask him to stop. If he doesn’t, we shoot. The criminal 
himself can set the rules of the game.”75 Nichols also defended the squad in earnest. “It is 
a traditional dilemma. If you do not police those areas, you’re not providing the 
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services,” Nichols remarked to a New York Times reporter, “If you do come in, you’re an 
occupying army. How do you police a whole community without alienating some 
elements? You can’t do it.”76 Head commander Bannon and police chief Nichols seemed 
to rationalize the violent tendencies of STRESS officers by emphasizing the challenges of 
police work in segregated urban neighborhoods.  
As the mayoral election of 1973 approached, Coleman Young used the 
widespread community mobilization against STRESS to ground his campaign against 
Nichols. The black candidate pledged to abolish STRESS, effectively assuring his forty-
five percent black constituency that a Young Administration would reform the Detroit 
police department.77 As part of a growing cohort of more than a 100 black mayors across 
the United States presiding over deindustrializing and rural towns as well as major cities 
in crisis, Young stuck to his campaign promise and officially disbanded STRESS in 
March 1974. As a replacement, Young instituted thirty twenty-four hour mini-stations in 
Cass Corridor and other low-income black neighborhoods—much like the storefront 
centers suggested by the Crime and Kerner Commissions. Young also committed to 
increasing black representation in the Detroit Police Department by fifty percent by 
1977.78 This liberal approach allowed Young to focus on community policing while 
continuing the steady increase of law enforcement officials in neighborhoods deemed 
high-crime. Even though federal support for these types of programs lasted only a few 
years, in the 1970s the highly experimental, even radical direction of law enforcement 
                                                   
76 William K. Stevens, “Tactics of an Elite Police Unit Election Issue in Detroit,” New York Times, 
11 Jun 1973, 30. 
77 “Mayor Young kills STRESS in Detroit,” Baltimore Afro-American, 16 Mar 1974, 3. 
78 “Detroit’s STRESS Unit Abolished by Mayor Young,” Philadelphia Tribune, 19 Mar 1974, 5. 
  
197 
programs funded by the LEAA made possible the indiscriminate use of decoy and street 
patrol in targeted urban areas that had experienced urban civil disorder in the late 
1960s.79    
Outside of Detroit, Police Commissioner and former Crime Commission member 
Patrick Murphy established a unit in New York City as police chief that often engaged 
and even sustained an environment rife with street wars. But Murphy believed his own 
decoy squad to be “very successful” because it managed to make a substantial number of 
arrests while involving itself in only half a dozen shootings and one death during its two 
and a half years of operation.80  One of the central architects of federal and local crime 
control policy, Murphy worked as the public safety director for Washington, DC during 
the Johnson Administration, served as the first Administrator of the LEAA, and accepted 
a position as Detroit Police Commissioner prior to the more high-profile role in New 
York City.81 As president of the National Police Foundation—an offshoot of the Ford 
Foundation focused on innovative crime control techniques—Murphy viewed these 
decoy squads as part of the federal government’s larger move towards police 
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professionalism. Murphy’s tactical squad, called the “Citywide Anti-Crime Section,” 
consisting of two hundred men and six women, sought out as much publicity as possible. 
Like STRESS, New York City’s anti-crime section managed to make a large number of 
arrests—3,600 in 1972 alone.82 With Murphy’s endorsement, the decoy squad evolved 
into a key model for the LEAA to assist in meeting its law enforcement objectives.83 If 
nothing else, it gave frustrated officers who, in the words of Murphy, felt they were 
“losing the war on crime” amidst ever-rising crime figures, a new sense of purpose.84  
As Detroit Police Chief John Nichols boasted before the House Select 
Subcommittee on Crime in 1973: STRESS had become a “nationwide symbol.”85 For 
Nichols and his supporters, STRESS epitomized a new approach to fostering greater 
protection and safety for innocent residents, but for many others the force symbolized 
brutality and discrimination.  “I am black and am no law and order man of the ilk of Vice 
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President Agnew, but I am no thief and robber either,” a black resident wrote the police 
department in gratitude, “Many other blacks are glad to have policemen around 
regardless of their race, but for them to say so publicly leaves them open for much 
criticism and harassment.”86 Other community members expressed an opposing view, 
charging that STRESS inflicted, “a reign of terror upon honest citizens of the black 
community.” By the time the unit disbanded, it had illegally entered the homes of black 
Detroit families, kicking in their front doors without the benefit of a search warrant (an 
iteration of the same no-knock policies the Nixon administration produced for 
Washington, DC), and had lined up residents in their own homes and waved guns in their 
faces.87 “We know,” black residents wrote in a joint community statement, “that no 
suburban community would allow for one instant the kind of abuses, intrusions and 
excesses now being exercised in the City of Detroit.”88  Widely regarded among law 
enforcement officials as “as a policeman’s policeman,” Nichols could not deny the 
indiscriminate use of force in segregated areas of Detroit, a practice that mobilized  
community members Detroiters against the onslaught of police officers patrolling their 
neighborhoods.89 
 
III. Minority Representation  
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The Nixon administration could not obscure the extent to which the federal crime 
control program disproportionately touched the lives of black Americans. But it could 
deny that racism affected the development of the LEAA and policymakers more 
generally by promising to increase minority representation and business ownership. 
However, Nixon’s policies ultimately fostered racist results and exacerbated the problem 
of urban inequality. To appeal to both black militants and the silent majority, Nixon 
advocated “Black Capitalism” during his 1968 presidential campaign. The separatist 
dimension of Nixon’s response to increasingly vocal and militant protest not only 
appeased certain nationalist advocates of Black Power but also white voters wary of 
integration.90 Although on the surface “Black Capitalism” seemed a reasonable economic 
program for a president associated with the progressive wing of the Republican party, it 
implicitly promised to retain segregation and Nixon associated it with the larger domestic 
campaign issue of “law and order.” Nixon emphasized the links between the two 
problems, as he commented to a reporter in the spring of 1968: “People who own their 
own homes don’t burn down their neighborhoods.” 91 Indeed, black ownership offered 
Nixon a formidable response to urban civil disorder. It allowed him to embrace continued 
segregation instead of fundamental structural change. “There’s a danger,” warned 
speechwriter Raymond K. Price warned Nixon in 1967, “in letting the rash of riots harden 
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attitudes into a simple formula of ‘it’s us against them.” 92 Only by replacing, in Price’s 
words, “the Negro habit of dependence,” with “one of independence” and “personal 
responsibility,” could the trend be reversed. Though urban neighborhoods would face an 
increased punitive and federal presence, residents could now enjoy unrestrained and 
assisted access to property, consumer goods, and capital. This sentiment guided Nixon’s 
approach to race-specific programs. White House staff member Sallyanne Payton 
commented that Nixon and his advisors believed that “getting black people to behave like 
whites,” or “get into business, go to school, become homeowners,” would solve the 
problem of poverty and racial marginalization. 93 
 The brainchild of economist Alan Greenspan, “Black Capitalism” presented an 
alternative to the War on Poverty as a means of reducing socio-economic inequality and 
crime. In the fall of 1968, Greenspan suggested in a memo to Nixon that federal policy 
shift from “reparations for past exploitation” to programs that would “help Negroes help 
themselves.” 94 The Nixon campaign settled on expanding economic ownership and 
inviting black Americans to participate in the free market as a means to address the 
effects of racism in a challenging electoral climate.95 As Martin Anderson wrote in a 
memo to Domestic Council Ehrlichman, Black Capitalism  “built heavily on the concepts 
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of pride, self-esteem and the opportunity to have control over one’s work,” and had won 
the President, “instant acclaim across the entire political spectrum.” Nixon’s embrace of 
opportunities for black ownership offered a “fresh departure” from Johnson’s emphasis 
on education, jobs, and housing.96  
Almost immediately after taking office, Nixon formed the Cabinet Committee on 
Minority Enterprise, and wrote in a memo to the heads of all departments and agencies 
that expanding property and business ownership among black Americans was “a major 
concern of this Administration.” 97  Like federal crime control policy, the Johnson 
administration provided the foundation for these initiatives. In 1967, Congress instructed 
the Small Business Administration to dedicate half of its loans to business owners in 
hyper-segregated urban areas. As a response to urban civil disorder and urban crisis, the 
special loans fit well with other Great Society programs. Yet Johnson’s effort failed to 
make a dent in the lack of minority ownership: by 1969, black and Latino Americans 
represented just under twenty percent of the population but owned only four percent of 
businesses and one percent of total business assets. 98 When Nixon established the Office 
of Minority Business Enterprise by Executive Order in March 1969, he hoped to shift the 
course of black economic development and reduce crime in the process. 
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 As black Americans waged more militant, structural demands for policies that 
could begin to repair historically specific legacies of exploitation and exclusion in calls 
for self-determination and community control, Daniel Patrick Moynihan and other 
advisors close to Nixon proposed he approach racial problems from a more inclusive 
lens. “As you have candidly acknowledged,” Moynihan wrote to Nixon in January, 1970, 
“the relation of the administration to the black population is a problem.” Moynihan 
praised Nixon’s “intense effort” to “develop programs that will be of help to the blacks. I 
dare say, as much or more time and attention goes into this effort in this administration 
than any in history. But little has come of it.”99 Stepping into the presidency at the end of 
the civil rights movement, Nixon enacted key liberal reforms and retained Great Society 
programs like Model Cities, even as his New Federalism promised states greater power to 
spend on social programs via block grants and revenue sharing.100 In this social milieu, 
Moynihan suggested: “The time may have come when the issue of race could benefit 
from a period of ‘benign neglect’ … We may need a period in which Negro progress 
continues as racial rhetoric fades. Greater attention to Indians, Mexican Americans, and 
Puerto Ricans would be useful.”101 Like Nixon’s special counsel Leonard Garment, 
Moynihan proposed that the administration approach the problem of racism in its 
entirety, responding to the needs of all racial minorities. 
 As the Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) moved to implement 
Black Capitalism, White House officials felt that the initial burst of energy that marked 
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the concept faded once it assumed its bureaucratic form and the program’s focus on black 
Americans hampered its potential political impact. To prepare for Nixon’s first annual 
message, Anderson proposed that Nixon expand the concept to include “not only blacks, 
but all the disadvantaged,” and rename it the “New Capitalism—of extending the 
opportunity of ownership to everyone, regardless of color.” 102 This, Anderson felt, would 
allow the administration to “recapture most, if not all, of the civil rights ‘cards’ we held 
in the summer of 1968.” 103 Nixon responded enthusiastically to Anderson’s idea, opting 
to incorporate a more multicultural tone into the state of the union and consider “New 
Capitalism” as a possible domestic program for 1970.104 But a program that would open 
up opportunities for access and ownership to racially marginalized Americans required a 
budget far surpassing that of the LEAA, Model Cities, and the Office of Economic 
Opportunity combined. The administration lacked a commitment to such spending. “One 
important, final point,” Anderson declared as he closed his memo, “the cost of such a 
program should be relatively small.” 105  
Much like the LEAA, the Office of Minority Business Enterprise struggled to 
accomplish its stated goals—in part because the initial thrust of the agency went to 
building up a new federal bureaucracy. It, too, suffered from high turnover rates. The first 
director, Thomas F. Roeser, stayed for only six months; Abraham Benablean, the 
agency’s first black director, left in early 1971 and was replaced by John Jenkins, another 
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black director who worked to invigorate corporate and private sector support of the 
program as Congress cut its funds.106 The effect, as with the LEAA, was to centralize the 
program within the White House where Leonard Garment and Robert Brown, Nixon’s 
liaison to minority groups, coordinated policy. 107  At the urging of Brown and Moynihan, 
Nixon settled on a multi-billion dollar procurement program for the office that included 
minority set asides. Nixon took special precautions not to upset white voters, and ensured 
that OMBE programs would not appear to give black Americans an unfair advantage, or 
“preferential treatment.” 108  
Echoing similar criticisms of the LEAA, one historian described the Office as 
“hampered by excessive promises, narrow focus, and structural problems, not to mention 
meager funding, bureaucratic in-fighting, and popular skepticism.” 109 And like the 
LEAA and other federal agencies during the Nixon Administration, OMBE advanced 
Nixon’s presidential campaign and later forced grant recipients to support his reelection. 
Nixon advocates received large funds from the Office, like “one of our most stalwart 
black supporters in Texas,” as Brown described one grantee in a memo.110 Others, like 
the chair of the Watts Labor Community Action Committee, felt pressured to support 
Nixon’s bid or risk losing his 1.5 million dollar contract with the agency. 111 Like some 
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LEAA grant recipients, Nixon campaign contributor and former pro football player Jim 
Brown applied for a renewal grant for his Black Economic Union in 1973, despite the 
fact that the Union accomplished, in the words of an aide to John Ehrlichman, “absolutely 
nothing” with the hundred thousand dollar grant it received in 1972. Yet based on an 
“assessment of performance,” Brown’s Union received 250,000 dollars the following 
year. 112 Moreover, members of the Small Business Administration awarded contracts to 
white-owned firms with “minority” funds. 113  Despite the mismanagement from 1970 to 
1975, minority business purchases managed to increase 265 percent, reaching just under 
five hundred million dollars. 114 By 1971, the Office of Minority Business Enterprise had 
enshrined a set of policies that went on to steer affirmative action programs in the 
decades to come.  
The LEAA followed suit and in 1971 established a civil rights compliance office 
in order to ensure that black Americans did not suffer discrimination in the professional 
law enforcement realm.  With the OMBE working to foster black capitalism, the LEAA 
emerged as a testing ground for the federal government’s commitment to affirmative 
action and equal opportunity. While the five largest police forces in the United States 
increased the number of black officers nearly twenty-five percent in the aftermath of the 
Safe Streets Act, other departments remained ambivalent about hiring black officers.115  
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Even as Nixon and the Department of Justice committed to increasing the number 
of black law enforcement officials, the LEAA responded sluggishly to charges of racial 
discrimination. Black policemen’s organizations launched vocal protests and campaigns 
against local departments. The most prominent such movement came out of Chicago, 
headed by Renault Robinson, the president of the city’s Afro-American Patrolmen’s 
League. In June 1971, the League requested the LEAA investigate the hiring, promotion, 
and operational policies of the Chicago Police Department with respect to minorities. The 
LEAA sent a specially appointed team of investigators to Chicago for three months to 
examine the department’s practices. The investigation ultimately confirmed the League’s 
claims, citing racial discrimination in the police department that affected both 
employment and methods of operation. The League in turn requested the removal of the 
six million dollars the Chicago Police Department received from the LEAA until it 
complied with the agency’s recommendations. The LEAA, however, refused to cut off 
the funds despite the fact that it had determined the police department violated federal 
law, gently encouraging voluntary compliance instead. Robinson and the League 
continued to fight as the department brought 1,400 new hires into the force, with fewer 
than ten percent of them minorities, in direct defiance of the LEAA provisions. The 
department also promoted twenty-five police lieutenants, only one of them minority. 116  
In an impassioned Chicago Defender editorial Robinson wrote: “Since the Chicago 
Police Department was assured there would be no fund cut off by LEAA, it had 
absolutely nothing to lose by not complying with the federal law.” 117 And while the 
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LEAA admitted in May 1973 that “there was no hope in securing voluntary compliance” 
by the police department, it continued to grant funds to Chicago police and transferred 
the case to the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division. 118 
Facing mounting pressure from Chicago and other state and local law 
enforcement institutions, the LEAA released equal employment opportunity guidelines in 
the spring of 1973. As a forerunner for federal equal employment guidelines, the LEAA 
became the center stage to test the extent of the federal government’s commitment to 
affirmative action policies. The guidelines stipulated that “Any law enforcement agency 
which receives LEAA financial assistance in excess of 25,000 dollars and which employs 
fifty or more persons is required to implement and maintain an Equal Employment 
Opportunity Program if the population it serves has a minority component of at least 
three percent.” 119 The guidelines also brought the Civil Service Commission into the 
effort, responsible for the “recruitment and selection of minorities to new posts and 
promotions.”120 While policymakers regarded the LEAA as a leader in the field of equal 
employment, the agency refused to even pause the expansion of American law 
enforcement and continued to grant funds to police departments it knew discriminated 
against black officers. 
With standards in place that carried far greater power than the LEAA’s office of 
civil rights compliance, major national organizations combated the racist practices of 
federal and state law enforcement with an onslaught of class action lawsuits charging 
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violations of the Civil Rights Act. Sometimes the Department of Justice partnered in the 
suits against states, sometimes it defended the discriminatory practices of local law 
enforcement agencies.121 Class action suits succeeded at the local level, but only if the 
state criminal justice commission supported the goal of increasing minority 
representation in law enforcement. In November 1974 in Detroit, Robert Booth and 
William Harris, with more than fifteen years each on the police force, filed a federal suit 
charging that the results of an arbitrary oral examination excluded them from promotion 
within the police department.  At the time, the Wayne County Sherriff’s Department 
received roughly 3.8 million dollars from the LEAA annually, for a police force that was 
twenty eight percent black but did not have black officers in any top-level positions and 
kept only a small number of black sergeants and detectives. Although Booth and Harris 
won the case and the court ordered the sheriff’s department to give fifty percent of future 
promotions to black officers, the LEAA refused to withhold funds from the Detroit Police 
Department when it failed to follow the judge’s order. 122 In Pennsylvania, the NAACP 
and National Organization of Women filed a suit in which the federal court ruled in favor 
of the plaintiffs in July 1975 and required the governor’s Justice Commission to withhold 
all LEAA grants to the Pittsburgh police bureau until the city submitted proper 
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affirmative action plans.  For the first time, a state planning agency sanctioned by the 
LEAA halted the flow of federal law enforcement funds to a major American city. 123 
The National Black Police Association—which included thirty nine black police 
organizations across the country—filed a series of police bias complaints with the LEAA 
in 1975. The Association and civil rights organizations viewed these suits as a powerful 
tool. As Robinson noted, “no police department I know of has found a way yet of being 
able to get along without the federal money.”124 The LEAA responded by monitoring the 
hiring of state and local law enforcement agencies, but still refused to cut off funds from 
departments completely, once again encouraging voluntary compliance.  
 The federal government’s lackadaisical approach to equal employment and 
disregard for its own guidelines compelled the National Black Police Association to sue 
the LEAA for failure to comply with the Civil Rights Act in the fall of 1975. The 
Association had fifty member organizations in seventeen states, and its lawsuit cited 
places where the LEAA permitted discriminatory practices. Massachusetts only had two 
officers on its 870-man force. 125 In Indiana, the state police department had a total of 937 
uniformed troopers, only three of them black, despite the fact that the state had a seven 
percent black population. 126 In Ohio, the Akron police department had 523 policemen in 
its ranks, with only fourteen—or less than three percent—black officers. The DC police 
department, responsible for the safety of an eighty-five percent black population, had 
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only 1,600 black officers on its 4,500-member force. 127 In New York City, Police 
Department minorities constituted only 8.7 percent in a city where the minority 
population was thirty percent.128 Finally, states like Alabama and Mississippi violated the 
Civil Rights Act by excluding black officers from state police forces, but they too 
continued to receive federal LEAA grants. The figures moved the ACLU, the United 
Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice and the NAACP to file a joint class 
action lawsuit against the Department of Justice and the LEAA on behalf of the 
Association in an attempt to force the agency to cut off funds to discriminatory 
departments. 129  
The LEAA did not consider representation to be a goal worth upsetting the flow 
of federal crime control funds. Even in rare instances when the LEAA did threaten to 
withhold funds rather than urge voluntary compliance, some police departments and 
municipal authorities responded with strong resistance. The Los Angeles City Council 
proposed a complete break with the LEAA in 1976 on the grounds that the agency 
violated its own affirmative-action law by implementing a hiring quota system for 
women and minorities. City Attorney Burt Pines informed Attorney General Edward Levi 
of the city’s “indignation over the bad faith demonstrated by the LEAA,” and its intention 
to refuse to distribute 3.5 million in federal funds allocated to the LAPD.130  Police Chief 
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Edward M. Davis claimed that Richard Velde threatened that if the city refused to accept 
the LEAA’s guidelines for hiring, the federal government would retaliate. Davis 
informed the city council that Velde, “told me that if you dump us and send the money 
back… you’ll have about thirty minutes of protection because we’ll have the general 
revenue-sharing people from the Treasury Department down on you. And then if that 
doesn’t go, in another fifteen minutes we’ll get the Office of Civil Rights Compliance of 
the Department of Justice on you.”131  Under the LEAA’s “quota demands,” Davis 
complained that black Americans, women, American Indians, and other minorities would 
eventually comprise fifty five percent of the department. “LEAA probably has reached 
the position where it should be abolished,” Davis remarked to a reporter, “For one 
percent of your budget, they become your personnel department and run your 
organization.” 132 Opposition helps to explain why the LEAA seemed ambivalent about 
its own stated commitment to minority representation in law enforcement.  
The equal opportunity issue might would have achieved greater salience for the 
LEAA had it included nonwhite Americans in its policymaking. The agency itself had 
only eighty-seven black and three Latino Americans on a staff of 466. Only nine of its 
black employees, one Latino, and one Native American occupied high-level positions.133 
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The problem was rampant throughout the Department of Justice and other agencies 
responsible for the federal crime control program. The Joint Center for Political Studies 
and New York Congressmen Charles Rangel issued a report in 1973 that revealed that 
federal institutions administering drug abuse programs had a extremely low number of 
black Americans and minorities in “top decision-making positions, even though the 
problems of drug abuse have a heavy impact on these minority groups.” 134  The Special 
Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention did not include any minorities in its top fifteen 
policymaking positions. The division of narcotic addition and drug abuse at the National 
Institute of Mental health had only eight black and two Latino Americans out of a staff of 
149, and only one black man held a high-level position.135  
The issue of representation seemed to provide black organizations with some 
power over the development of the American law enforcement. The efforts of black 
leaders and their constituencies forced police and public agencies to hire more minorities 
and women to participate in decision-making. And even though the class action suits had 
mixed outcomes, the LEAA began to make civil rights compliance reviews in some cases 
before it awarded grants. Between October 1973 and June 1974, the agency reviewed 
some seventy-three criminal justice proposals, requiring twenty-one recipients to meet 
equal hiring criteria.136 Yet for some elected officials and community organizations, this 
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was not enough. They hoped to formulate a collective response to the new punitive 
programs the federal government implemented that targeted low-income black 
Americans.  
 
IV. Black on Black Crime Control 
A larger transition within black politics occurred after the civil rights movement. 
As COINTELPRO and internal ideological debates crippled many promising social 
justice movements, black activists invested in the electoral system and economic 
development by the mid-1970s. Instead of pressuring the federal government to approach 
the problem of crime through job programs, rehabilitation, and improved community-
relations, the most vocal response amongst established black organizations stressed 
reform in the already existing law enforcement system. While the black press and 
political leaders often viewed crime as the consequence of larger structural issues and did 
not share the pathological conclusions of many policymakers, black politicians retreated 
from new approaches to law enforcement and instead looked inward to discuss violence 
within the community. Grassroots efforts in New York, Philadelphia, New Orleans, 
Memphis, Buffalo, Washington, and Chicago mobilized to address the issue of what 
black elected officials deemed “black-on-black genocide.”137  
Seeking to take some of the federal crime fighting capacity outside of the LEAA 
and foster greater accountability between police departments and the segregated low-
income neighborhoods they patrolled, Detroit’s John Conyers, the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced legislation to 
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authorize the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice to “provide anti-
crime assistance grants for the purpose of improving community relations with the 
criminal justice system and increasing the level of citizen involvement and cooperation 
with local governments in crime prevention efforts.” 138 Conyers’ effort to link private 
industry, business and labor to larger citizen-based anticrime efforts was in line with the 
federal shift towards privatization of community-based crime prevention and 
rehabilitation programs. But he criticized the LEAA on the floor of the House, charging 
that the agency, “is not structured to provide the kind of assistance necessary to improve 
community relations in the criminal justice system… Very little LEAA money and 
resources have been directed to the critical area of improving community relations with 
the criminal justice system.” 139 By the mid-1970s, policymakers and key civil rights and 
law enforcement organizations could recognize the LEAA suffered from an unbalanced 
commitment to hardware and technology and failed to dedicate sufficient resources to 
solving some of the fundamental issues, such as police brutality and arbitrary detainment, 
that resulted from the increase of police patrol in low-income communities of color. 
Other black leaders throughout the United States mobilized in response to the 
immediate impact of crime in their communities. A national study released in 1976 found 
that young black men were both the most common perpetrators and victims of crime. As 
Executive Director of the Urban League Vernon Jordan pointed out: “Black people 
constantly rank crime in their community amongst their most serious concerns.’”140 The 
                                                   
138 Quoted in “Conyers Introduces Community Anti-Crime Assistance Measure,” Atlanta Daily 
World, 20 Jul 1973, 8. 
139 ibid. 
140 Quoted in “Safer Black Neighborhoods,” New York Times, 8 Nov 1976, 30. 
  
216 
United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice sponsored a two-day series of 
workshops in Washington, DC in October 1974, representing one of the first attempts by 
black leaders to design a national strategy to fight crime. “For years we have shied away 
from the problem for fear of being accused of joining the establishment,” said Charles E. 
Cobb, the executive director of the Commission, “But we are here this weekend to work 
on the problem.” 141 Most of the meetings and critiques ultimately reinforced the 
conclusions of the Department of Justice and the White House: that the federal 
government needed to stimulate minority participation in law enforcement professions. 
For black leaders, representation would balance the disproportionate expansion of crime 
control in black communities.  
The federal government strongly resisted funding black grassroots organizations 
that sought to direct and control anti-crime programs. The Urban Coalition charged as 
early as the summer of 1969 that the LEAA did not involve minorities in planning federal 
law enforcement programs, but with no result. Nevertheless, black groups started to 
operate their own projects without government funding, ranging from educational videos 
to “big brother” counseling programs. In Chicago, residents of the Robert Taylor Homes 
signed a compact not to buy stolen goods. 142 The city’s Woodlawn Organization acted as 
a liaison between residents and the police department through its “block watcher 
program.”143 Chicago’s Metropolitan Anti-Crime Coalition also produced a number of 
videos for community groups instructing citizens on how to cope with various crimes. 
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Jesse Jackson’s Operation PUSH started a campaign in Chicago that sought to involve 
parents and children in the problem of school discipline through catchy slogans like “Get 
off the dope, get on hope.”144  
In Memphis, the NAACP used its own funds and worked with the black 
policemen’s association to mentor two hundred young men in female-headed households. 
In New Orleans, the Dixon Research Center did receive federal funds in its attempt to 
reduce “black on black” crime through education and research, relying upon 
consciousness-raising workshops and audiovisual presentations. It employed twelve 
teenage volunteers to patrol the construction site of a new Treme Community Center for 
three hours a day in order to prevent vandalism.145 In Buggalo, Louisiana, the “We Care 
Committee” brought fifty black men and women  representing twenty-two public and 
private social and government agencies to counsel black youth in a “big brother” 
program. Finally, the New York Amsterdam News launched a War on Crime of its own, 
emphasizing maximum involvement by black citizens. 146  
National black political organizations, however, grew increasingly vocal about 
race-based exclusion from planning and participating in crime control projects. In July 
1976, a group of black criminologists charged at the Urban League’s national 
symposium, “Black Perspectives on Crime and the Criminal Justice System,” that 
“predominately white interest groups in the criminal justice system… had deliberately 
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kept blacks out of crime prevention projects.” 147 Robert L. Woodson, Director of the 
League’s Justice Division, summarized the group’s views: “the continuing experience 
finds the efforts of blacks to play an active role in programs to control and prevent crime 
are greeted with cold indifference, limited technical and funding support and, on too 
many occasions open and hostile resistance…. How strange it is that the war on crime has 
been one of the few battles in our nation’s history in which the black community has not 
been enlisted.’”148 Woodson had a point: while LEAA studies revealed that black 
Americans fell victim to crime at a much higher rater than their white counterparts, they 
were not involved in the development of critical crime control policy within federal, 
state, and local law enforcement institutions.149  
Both the National Urban Coalition and the Urban League pressed federal and state 
government to give black Americans a greater voice in the development of crime control 
programs. “Blacks resent the suggestion that either they have been covering up for 
criminals or that they have been afraid to look at the problem,” said the first black 
President of the National Urban Coalition, Carl Holman, “It has not been the minorities 
who have had control of the machinery to deal with crime.”150 Woodson continued: 
“None of the current research on black crime is being done by blacks… And part of that 
has to do with the fact that the LEAA has only one black in a policy-making position.”151 
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In response to these and other charges, in 1976, the LEAA established a Minority 
Advisory Council on Criminal Justice composed of nine black Americans, two Mexican 
Americans, a Native American, a Puerto Rican, a Cuban, an Asian American, and four 
women. 152 As Velde proclaimed: “The council represents a cross section of minority and 
female viewpoints with firm backgrounds in the criminal justice system.”153  The fifteen 
member council advised the LEAA on problems specific to the recruitment of women 
and minorities in state and local criminal justice institutions, but its efforts did not 
fundamentally alter the exclusion of nonwhite Americans from top law enforcement 
policy-making positions. 
 Frustrated by the lack of black influence on federal punitive measures, the Urban 
League launched a national program of its own to coordinate community-based efforts in 
1976. Launched with a grant from the Carnegie cooperation, the project was spearheaded 
by Woodson, who concentrated the League’s efforts on an education program and a 
national data bank “so that the League can serve as a clearing house for services to citizen 
crime fighting units.” 154 By 1976, the League’s crime control program operated in ten 
cities and had recruited 12,025 black and Hispanic Americans and provided them free 
preparation for the necessary civil service exams. The League successfully placed 5,159 
minority recruits in law enforcement positions in various cities.155 In addition, Woodson 
launched a pilot demonstration project in Chester, Pennsylvania, an industrial community 
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thirteen miles from Philadelphia with one of the highest crime rates in the nation and 
three times that of its Metropolitan neighbor. By establishing a model to deal with family 
disputes and neighborhood conflicts—said to account for some fifty percent of all 
homicides and in the arrest and incarceration of many perpetrators—the program brought 
League volunteers into homes and neighborhoods to resolve disputes through mediation. 
The early success of the program compelled the League to move to plan for its 
expansion.156 
Residents of communities facing increased patrol, as well as the black left and 
nationalists, observed new law enforcement programs unfold in black urban centers with 
a careful eye, sometimes adding to “law and order” hysteria and sometimes forcefully 
critiquing the LEAA and local police departments. In Philadelphia, the New York Times 
reported that the census could not take accurate statistics in black neighborhoods because 
“ghetto residents believe that the information is being gathered as part of a plan to 
exterminate Negroes.” Appearing on the public broadcasting show “Black Journal” in 
Atlanta, Newsweek’s Washington correspondent Samuel F. Yette contended that the 
LEAA “is right now building what they call regional detention facilities which, in fact, 
are concentration camps in virtually every state and country.” On PBS’s “Check it Out” 
show, Muhammad Kenyatta, Daoud Fattah, and Rev Wycliff Jangdharrie pointed out that 
“every time hell is raised about the cops, they wind up getting more money—your tax 
dollars.”157 In Philadelphia, syndicated columnist Pamela Haynes wrote that the city’s 
police force, “has been stimulated to do its own thing in the Black community… It wants 
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law and order when it applies to ‘those people’ only. When the law orders the 
Philadelphia Police Department to obey the law, that’s a different story.” Despite these 
criticisms, the statistics indicated an increasing crime rate, and federal crime control 
resources rose accordingly.158  
 The fact that ten years of federal law enforcement programs and hundreds of 
millions of federal funds allocated to construct the law enforcement apparatus had 
resulted in a marked increase in crime rates brought the entire war on crime into question. 
Atlanta public safety director Reginald Eaves charged that the lack of concrete results 
reflected the fact that the federal government had, “no commitment to reducing 
crime.’”159 The Wall Street Journal criticized the LEAA’s apparent concern with 
“sociological matters,” arguing that the agency, “was created as a direct federal response 
to public concern about crime—not about minority recruitment…”160 The task of 
revolutionizing American law enforcement within the confines of New Federalism and 
block grants kept the agency from operating with a clear and well-executed focus. While 
the LEAA would continue to consult with state planning agencies throughout the 
remainder of the decade, the federal government under Gerald Ford’s administration 
would move beyond the LEAA to modify existing criminal law. If the federal law 
enforcement bureaucracy struggled to shape the national law enforcement apparatus as 
federal policymakers originally hoped, they could enact reforms that would eventually 
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bring violent offenders and those identified as potential violent offenders under state 
supervision.  
 
IV. “Got Ya Again” 
Even with the widespread community outrage and harmful media coverage 
tactical plainclothes squads received, the federal government continued to fund decoy 
operations. But it shifted support from police patrol to police sting operations that made 
mass arrests possible.161 In the spring of 1976, the LEAA granted police departments in 
New York, Washington, and Chicago money to purchase stolen goods and set up 
warehouses to fence the black market merchandise. Like STRESS, the practice of fencing 
came dangerously close to entrapment. The stings, carefully orchestrated by law 
enforcement officials at the federal, state, and local levels, baited criminals or would be 
criminals.  Although the federal government helped launch these projects in the name of 
attacking organized crime, they quickly evolved into an attack on black petty thieves.  
The Washington, DC police department conducted the most elaborate and 
contrived sting effort ever staged in any metropolitan city. Beginning in the fall of 1975, 
police officers posing as Mafia “dons” sold 2.5 million dollars in stolen property to 
hundreds low-income black residents in DC for a five month period.162 Working with the 
FBI, the Treasury Department’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and the 
LEAA, the project, called “Operation Sting,” succeeded in its intended goal: to 
incarcerate hundreds of low-income crooks. The effort culminated in a huge party thrown 
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by the police department and the FBI posing as New York Mobsters. The undercover 
agents encouraged the mostly black fencers to attend and spread the word about the 
event, held in a warehouse near Langdon Park in the northeast side of the District. At the 
party, the participants (referred to as “street hoodlums” by the law enforcement officials) 
had the opportunity to sell stolen typewriters, adding machines, radios, television sets, 
and government checks to a major New York City-based “don.” 163  
For the police officers themselves, the ornate acting involved in Operation Sting 
offered a welcome break from routine beat work. “We played a game with them,” one of 
the detectives remarked, “We were romance, the mob, the greatest thing that ever 
happened to them.” 164 Lieutenant Robert Arscott echoed this sentiment, commenting of 
the crooks: “They thought they were in Hollywood.” 165 The undercover police officers 
and FBI agents who participated all gave themselves Italian names, straight out of the 
recent Godfather films: such as “Angelo Lasagna,” “Rico Rigatone,” “Pasquale 
Larocca,” “Tony Bonano,” “Mike Franzino” and “Bohana LaFountaine.”  
After the “mobsters” arrived at the party in a fleet of limousines, a hidden video 
camera in the warehouse recorded all of the transactions in order to arrest every 
individual who brought fenced merchandise. The New York Times reported, “The 
operation was conceived by the police as the easiest way to draw the string on their net 
and make tidy arrests.” 166 And arrest they did: almost immediately, the mobsters slapped 
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handcuffs on sixty of the thieves, and later issued warrants for more than fifty others 
caught on camera. In all, two hundred offenders faced charges for their participation. 167 
Yet the burden of the mass arrests fell on the city jail and the criminal court docket, 
already overcrowded from the court reorganization plan and preventative detention 
practices the Nixon administration had implemented in the District.  Residents in DC also 
expressed outrage at the stereotypical Italian characterizations the law enforcement 
officers portrayed and wrote letters to Police Chief Maurice J. Cullinane. In response, the 
officer posing at Pasquale LaRocca thanked “the Italian-Americans for the use of their 
mythology,” and insisted the police did not act in an ethnically insensitive manner. “We 
meant no harm, except to the thieves,” he assured the public. 168  
Federal law enforcement institutions and the DC police department found 
Operation Sting to be so successful that they planned and funded another fencing event 
that summer called “Got Ya Again.” This time, police officers posed as “customers,” 
eager to buy goods in a bogus fencing operation. Instead of the ethnically insensitive 
Mafia front, the officers courted the thieves and potential thieves by operating under a 
fake company name called PFF Inc, or “Police-FBI Fencing Incognito.” 169 FBI Agent 
Charles E. Harrison handled most of the goods, which included more than 1,500 stolen 
credit cards, welfare checks, negotiable papers, and personal household items like 
stereos, televisions, radios, and cameras. The police and FBI also managed to recover 
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seventy-one guns. 170 A more expansive effort than the previous sting, “Operation Got Ya 
Again” involved police departments in Prince George County, Alexandria, and 
Montgomery County; as well as the FBI, the US Attorney’s Office, Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms, the General Service Administration, and the US Secret Service. Police 
believed that half of the 141 suspects were repeat offenders, many of whom were out on 
bail, and many of whom had also participated in Operation Sting. 171 
Even though its proximity to major federal law enforcement centers rendered DC 
an opportune site for such elaborate schemes, the federal government supported local 
fencing operations across the United States.  Police in Atlanta bought nineteen cars, six 
trucks, and 1,700 stolen items with sixty-four thousand dollars in federal funds. The 
effort led to the arrest of one hundred thieves, who sold the fences roughly 1.5 million 
dollars worth of stolen merchandise, or about two-thirds of the one hundred thousand 
dollars provided by the LEAA.172 
Once the sting operations in DC received national coverage and acclaim, police 
departments in other cities also wanted to participate in fencing federally-financed stolen 
goods. “Frankly, we’ve been swamped with requests,” LEAA Administrator Richard 
Velde said in a press release shortly after Operation Sting, “and we would like to do even 
more if we could get the money.” 173 Yet when reports of the fencing operations hit 
national newspapers, many others objected to the controversial police tactic, as they had 
to STRESS. The journalist Sanford J. Ungar astutely noted in a Washington Post 
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editorial: “the very existence of a major fencing operation in Washington’s inner city—be 
it government run or a form of free enterprise—may in effect encourage burglaries and 
robberies by providing a viable outlet for their proceeds. That is a hazard and a factor that 
must be considered before LEAA, pumped up with funds by Congress, runs off and sets 
up a kind of nationwide chain-store fencing network.”174 With STRESS police officers in 
Detroit behaving as cold-hard killers in their own right, and federal agents posing as 
mobsters encouraging low-income residents to steal from one another, federal law 
enforcement programs seemed to make the problem of crime into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  
  While the use of urban tactical squads fizzled by the mid-1970s, the federal 
government continued to invest in fencing and sting operations through the Reagan 
administration. Stings made possible mass arrests, a tactic that enabled law enforcement 
officials to identify and imprison repeat offenders in an efficient manner. By the end of 
the 1970s, the federal government focused fencing operations on larger thefts and 
complex crimes as “Operation Bear Trap II” in Baltimore. Financed with a quarter of a 
million dollars from the LEAA, “Bear Trap II” led to the arrest of forty-seven residents 
on charges related to 1.5 million dollars in stolen property at the end of a seventeen 
month undercover investigation.  Law enforcement agents set up an antique store, an auto 
parts store, and a brokerage firm that allowed officials to pose as fences to target career 
criminals. The stolen property confiscated by Baltimore police included fifty thousand 
dollars worth of silver from the Hampton Mansion, a National Historical Site in the city. 
Like Operation “Got Ya Again,” these criminals faced arrest in the context of an 
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orchestrated law enforcement spectacle, involving two hundred state, city, and county 
police officers as well as a host of journalists and television reporters.175 In a similar 
operation in San Francisco in 1978, federal agents opened up what they called “The 
Store,” and moved 721,900 dollars worth of stolen property before arresting nearly three 
hundred people in a single day on charges ranging from car theft to burglary. 176 In 
Nashville, three hundred thousand dollars from the Department of Justice bankrolled 
“Operation Sting.” Like “Got Ya Again,” federal agents posed as Mafia fences and 
arrested one hundred people in a matter of hours and obtained warrants for two hundred 
more.177  
 With the LEAA allocating eight million dollars for federal, state and local joint 
sting operations in 1978, it is not surprising that police departments from Penobscot 
County, Maine to Norfolk, Virginia welcomed the opportunity to hone their acting skills 
and make sweeping arrests. The Los Angeles County sheriff’s department received the 
largest federal grant for a major sting, called “Operation Tarpit,” whereby thirty three 
deputies and FBI agents set up fake storefronts at seven locations. Once the local police 
had established a formidable underground economy for nearly two years, they had 
gathered forty-two million in stolen property with nearly half a million dollars in buy 
money. 178 In the four years after the “Got Ya” test-case in Washington, DC, police went 
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on to issue arrest warrants for a total of 4,222 people on 6,817 separate charges and 
recovered 114 million dollars in stolen property. The LEAA was particularly enthusiastic 
about the operations because of the ninety-eight percent conviction rate for sting-related 
charges, and the high percentage of guilty pleas many defendants accepted. 179   
 The reliance on decoy, fencing, and sting operations to identify, arrest, and 
incarcerate potential criminals evolved into a key tactic in the War on Crime. In effect, 
federal, state, and law enforcement literally invested into criminal enterprise and created 
crime markets in order to fight crime. By manufacturing crime, local police departments 
were able to make mass arrests. From the mid-1970s onwards, this tactic was critical to 
the engine of mass incarceration.  
 
V. Defensible Space 
As municipal governments managed the millions they received from the White 
House to launch the High Impact program, and tactical squads roamed the streets of the 
nation’s inner cities, top law enforcement and domestic program officials moved away 
from police-community relations as a crime reduction tactic and focused on developing 
surveillance and patrol methods for low-income housing projects. With crime control as a 
top domestic priority and an issue of national security, the federal government invested 
millions of dollars in crime prevention research that would offer a punitive solution to the 
urban crisis. An LEAA-funded study found that in New York City, a massive high-rise 
project and a modest six-story unit across the street from one another and virtually 
identical in size, population density, and social demographics experienced markedly 




different levels of violence: the high rise had a fifty six percent higher crime rate than the 
project across the street.180 The federal government worked with local and state law 
enforcement and housing agencies under the assumption that the design of housing 
projects encouraged residents to resort to crime. The research justified the expansion of 
the law enforcement institutions into public housing, targeting low-income black 
Americans in the process.  The architectural designs the Nixon Administration funded to 
create what planners and policymakers called “defensible space” laid the groundwork for 
the integration of urban policy and punitive policy in the last decades of the twentieth 
century. The construction of barriers, walls, and gates helped to create a carceral climate 
in areas of segregated poverty that extended the bounds of correctional institutions 
themselves.  
 Policymakers and the scholars they consulted frequently treated the urban crisis as 
inevitable, a condition bound to continue for decades given the reality of 
deindustrialization, middle-class flight to the suburbs, and eroding municipal tax bases 
that left many cities unable to maintain public services. Rather than pursuing major socio-
economic changes that addressed unemployment, failing schools, and the decline of 
social programs, the White House and Congress concluded that government reform was 
incapable of eliminating slums or preventing chronic poverty and chose to manage the 
problem through crime control programs. Nixon officials and LEAA administrators 
frequently cited Edward Banfield in their internal correspondence on crime control and 
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urban crisis, and his work best expresses this view.181 “The presence of large 
concentrations of people who have relatively little education and income accounts for—
perhaps I should say constitutes—the so-called urban crisis,” Banfield wrote in Daedalus 
in 1968, “Most of these people are black.”182 And while Banfield recognized, “it is the 
presence of a large lower class, not of Negroes as such, that is the real source of the 
trouble,” the assumptions his analysis contained about racial pathology influenced 
housing legislation and law enforcement programs as the hit the ground during Nixon’s 
first term.183  
Nixon, and later, Ford officials supported research and endorsed the concept of 
“defensible space” as a means to improve surveillance and security in segregated 
neighborhoods while addressing urban architectural problems. Assuming that major 
residential developments bred crime, defensible space was, as Ford aide Malcolm Barr 
would come to define it,  “anchored in the belief that opportunities for and fear of crime 
can be substantially reduced through design approaches that utilize the natural setting to 
increase social cohesion and territoriality and to discourage entry and escape by 
intruders.” Defensible space presented the federal government “an approach to facilitate 
physical and social integration.”184 Here, “social integration” meant the entrance of law 
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enforcement institutions, technologies, and offices into the neighborhoods and living 
spaces of public housing residents.  
Beginning in March 1973, the Nixon administration moved to finance research 
into “defensible space” as an “attempt to reduce so-called crimes of opportunity such as 
muggings and rapes in dark alleys and armed robberies in subways.” 185 The LEAA 
invested two million dollars into a major new national crime prevention program centered 
on the idea. The movement relied on architects to design buildings, public schools, street 
patterns, and public transportation elements that would lead to safer living conditions. 
The description of the program opened itself to broad implementation, but the federal 
government targeted the new, radical architectural schemes on two cities with reportedly 
high crime rates. 186 Not surprisingly, the turn towards street lighting—already underway 
in the majority of High Impact Cities and experimental law enforcement centers like 
Washington, DC and Los Angeles—fit into the concept’s general purpose, that is “the 
elimination of physical conditions that encourage crimes of opportunity.” 187   The federal 
government opted to get a better sense of who engaged in these crimes than in the socio-
economic factors that bred these conditions.  
 The LEAA’s National Institute for Criminal Justice Planning conducted a major 
study meant to buttress the federal government’s defensible space program by examining 
crime in housing projects. Backed by more than 150,000 dollars in grants from the LEAA 
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, New York City-based architect 
                                                   





Oscar Newman investigated a number of sites in order to assist other architects and city 
planners. Newman concluded that a rising generation of young delinquents in housing 
projects preyed on their elderly neighbors and suggested that future housing plans offer 
separate facilities for older Americans. Newman found youth primarily responsible for 
theft and vandalism in housing projects because it was easier to “engage in burglary, 
muggings, and mailbox theft among neighbors rather than more sophisticated white-
collar crimes.” 188 Newman’s solution involved replacing high-rise projects with smaller 
enclaves of defensible space that would allow residents to monitor and control their 
immediate environments. 189  Ultimately, Newman’s study found that defensible space, as 
a concept, would only work if families who lived in housing projects shared similar 
social backgrounds. Newman argued that federal urban developers working in the mid-
twentieth century had designed housing projects to combine retired, older Americans 
with young families, but “the results backfired and fostered criminal tendencies among 
the low-income young.” 190  While the housing projects were originally conceived under 
“a vision of the new contemporary man no longer tied to his own individual hearth and 
garden,” Newman’s report found that by the mid-1970s, the effect of the environment 
was to “produce crime, fear, and decay instead of freedom.”191 As a remedy, defensible 
space did little to change rates of crime and violence in high-rise projects, but it provided 
the federal government a means to fund law enforcement programs and research that 
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would allow local police departments to better monitor segregated low-income 
Americans. 
With Newman and other urban planners set out to create “defensible space” in 
low-income neighborhoods, in the final months of Nixon’s presidency, federal, state, and 
local law enforcement and housing institutions in Atlanta worked together to reduce 
“stranger-to-stranger” crimes by hastening police response time. The LEAA awarded 
Atlanta Model Cities and the local police department nearly half a million dollars to add 
fifteen patrol policemen to the federal housing project and operate two storefront police 
offices.192 In Pittsburgh, the local police department, the Housing Authority, the State 
Criminal Justice Planning Commission, and the Tenant’s Organization collaborated to 
operate a special Housing security force comprised of fifty patrolmen operating in ten 
high-rise apartment buildings. Initially, Housing Authority director Churchill Kohlman 
wanted to install surveillance cameras throughout the housing authority, and conceived of 
the security force as an eighty-five man team. Strong tenant opposition to these measures 
successfully stalled their implementation. Kohlman stepped down from his position, and 
the end product designed by the Housing Authority responded to residents’ concerns by 
adding community service officers to the force and giving the tenants representation in its 
decision-making.193   
The final plan, funded largely through an LEAA grant, called for only fifty guards 
with limited gun carrying powers and eighteen community service officers to function as 
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liaisons between the tenants and the security force as well as the police department.194 
While the security guards operated only in senior citizen homes, the Housing Authority 
installed closed circuit televisions in every housing project in Pittsburgh. 195  The service 
officer position, also part of the collaborative program in Atlanta Model Cities, offered 
tenants a new prospect for steady employment (the positions each paid $8,000 a year). 
Still, the “number one priority” of the force was to guard federal housing in urban centers 
by preventing vandalism and destruction of property.196 While these gestures may have 
addressed some of the concerns of the Metropolitan Tenant’s Organization, the additional 
officers only further entrenched a punitive presence in the city’s Housing Projects in the 
name of community relations.  
In addition to state agencies, the LEAA also relied upon the private sector to help 
it better monitor low-income citizens. The agency’s largest competitive private contract 
went to Westinghouse Corporation of Baltimore’s program to “reduce crime in homes, 
schools, business and transportation through environmental design” at a cost of two 
million dollars. 197 As part of the larger aim of the LEAA to reduce crime by redesigning 
segregated neighborhoods, Charles Work, a Deputy Administrator for the LEAA, 
described the agency’s rationale for funding the private contract. “In many communities 
the environment is custom-made for crime. Streets are often poorly lighted and deserted, 
doors and windows can be easily entered, and bus and subway stops offer natural lurking 
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places for the criminal.”198 Westinghouse would create a “model environmental design” 
for homes, schools, transportation systems, and commercial centers to reduce burglary 
and robbery to ease the violent consequences of urban crisis in Baltimore.199 These and 
other measures intended to create “defensible space” in areas identified statistically as 
“high crime” made it easier for law enforcement authorities to patrol and monitor 
residents, but did not improve the violent social conditions many communities 
confronted.  
As federal policy and ever-more punitive initiatives at the state level 
disproportionately targeted low-income urban neighborhoods, black Americans emerged 
as the victims on two fronts: by one another and by state forces. In conjunction with the 
census bureau, the LEAA conducted a major survey to ascertain a more nuanced portrait 
of crime and violence in America than FBI statistics could provide. The survey revealed 
that poverty correlated to crime more directly than race, as both white and black families 
who earned less than 7,500 dollars annually suffered from violent victimization at a 
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higher rate than the rest of the nation.200 Yet black males were victimized at alarming 
rates: eighty-five of every hundred black males experienced violent crime, while seventy-
two of every thousand white males had been victimized. 201 Given the special attention 
young black men received from Congress, the LEAA, and the White House, the fact that 
by the mid 1970s, young black men were more likely to be victimized than any other 
group of Americans is not surprising. 202 For the remainder of the decade, after the Ford 
Administration revitalized the nation’s juvenile justice system and imposed handgun 
sanctions, rates of victimization as well as arrests and incarceration reached historic 
levels. 
VI. To Ensure Domestic Tranquility  
The contradiction between Nixon’s pursuit of law and order and the lawlessness 
and criminal behavior rampant in his own administration finally ended his political career 
in August 1974, when the House Judiciary committee voted to impeach the president for 
obstruction of justice. Key figures in the federal crime control program, including 
Attorney General John Mitchell and domestic council John Ehrlichman, served time in 
the criminal justice system they had labored to modernize while in their Washington 
offices. Gerald Ford, who served as House Minority Leader when the Safe Streets Act 
passed and mobilized the Republican Party and Southern Democrats to insist that the first 
federal law enforcement program include block grants, stepped into office and selected 
Nelson Rockefeller as his Vice President. A strong proponent of crime control, 
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Rockefeller took office on the heels of signing the extremely punitive Rockefeller Drug 
Laws in his home state of New York.  
Like Nixon, Ford was a staunch New Federalist who advocated small government 
in all things, except for law enforcement. The 1975 reauthorization of the LEAA included 
a “High Crime Program” based on the War on Poverty categorical grant structure. Ford’s 
Attorney General Edward Levi proposed a supplemental block grant program, modeled 
on the High Impact Program, that could draw on the discretionary law enforcement 
budget to offer cities and counties with high crime rates additional federal assistance. 203 
Unlike High Impact, however, the special High Crime Program would channel funds into 
major metropolitan centers like Detroit, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles. It aimed 
to “assure that areas with high crime rates received additional funds for programs 
specifically designed to addressed those ‘crime of fear’ most prevalent in highly 
urbanized areas,” as James T. Lynn informed to President Ford.204 This would, in effect, 
create a categorical grant program for localities with significant low-income populations 
living in segregation. 205  
It took ten years for a critical mass of policymakers, including the conservatives 
who refused to include categorical grants in the first federal crime control legislation, to 
embrace the grant structure Johnson originally intended for the Safe Streets Act. While 
the Nixon Administration developed the High Impact program in part because White 
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House aides knew that pumping federal funds into the inner-city for punitive purposes 
had electoral benefits, the turn towards categorical grants carried forward Johnson’s 
desire to foster strong crime control partnerships between federal and local governments. 
Jim Cannon, the Executive Director of Ford’s Domestic Council, wanted to use half of 
the block grants for the high crime program. This, as Cannon wrote to Ford, “would give 
added vitality to your expressed interest in reducing ‘street crime’ and would not require 
the expenditure of new monies.”206 As Congress imposed greater restrictions on how 
states and cities could spend crime control funds, the Advisory Commission of 
Intergovernmental Relations also embraced the Johnson model, suggesting that the 
agency make direct grants to large cities rather than channeling resources through state 
governments. 207   
The shift towards more centralized control of the LEAA by the Attorney General 
reflected the general tendency to shift the agency’s thrust every time it faced a 
Congressional reauthorization.  In the first reauthorization in 1970, Nixon mandated that 
the corrections system receive special funds, since police hardware programs had enjoyed 
the great majority of federal crime control resources. As he continued Nixon’s proposals 
for mandatory minimum sentences, Ford steered the LEAA’s focus to courts. To 
implement the mandatory minimum program, Ford recognized that the federal 
government would need to stimulate more judgeships and help shorten the trial process. 
Common legal theory held that mandatory minimums would generate a reduction of 
guilty pleas and encourage greater numbers of offenders to seek trial. Thus, to 
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compensate for the harsher, more punitive policy Ford hoped to enact, the LEAA needed 
to reorient its approach towards courts, prisons, and the police. Detention facilities 
needed to be further developed and modernized with improved security, and even more 
police officers would be placed on the streets in high crime areas to apprehend repeat 
offenders.208 Ford argued that the federal government could make a major dent in the 
crime problem by modifying the federal code to make sentences mandatory and, 
consequently, punishment more certain. 
In the spring and summer of 1975, as Congress debated the LEAA’s 
reauthorization, Ford worked on his first message to Congress on Crime. White House 
officials wanted the president to make clear that crime “is becoming intolerably 
destructive of the quality of life for Americans of all regions and races.”209  As Ford’s 
“crime guy” Richard Parsons (one of the most prominent black officials in his 
Administration) observed in a memo to Cannon:  “the antiquated ‘law and order’ rhetoric 
was and is empty—it sets us against one another; it invites us to be careless of our 
heritage of civil liberty; and, it offers no practical program suggestions.”210 Instead, Ford 
needed to reaffirm that the federal government would insure domestic tranquility by 
fostering swift and sure punishment. Policymakers increasingly blamed a small group of 
repeat offenders for the rising rate of crime in the nation, and Ford’s program centered on 
sentencing restrictions, so that anyone convicted of a second felony would serve a modest 
minimum prison term. First offenses that involved a firearm would also carry a 
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mandatory penalty.211 If increasing street patrol and installing video cameras into public 
housing had failed to lower the crime rate, then perhaps focusing on repeat offenders 
would. Ford believed that, “the crime rate will go down if persons who habitually commit 
most of the predatory crimes are kept in prison for a reasonable period, if convicted, 
because they will then not be free to commit more crimes.”212  
When courts, jails and prisons became overcrowded as arrest rates soared in the 
aftermath of the Safe Streets Act, the tendency to release offenders early meant that 
convicts served only half of their sentence in many districts.213 Ford officials felt this 
encouraged an environment that bred crime and made it profitable. “The fact seems to be 
that for many unskilled persons crime (with the present low risk of doing time) is in fact 
more profitable than selling their modest capacities for modest wages,” Parsons wrote, 
“in such a cost-benefit context crime, with its excitement and relatively big rewards for 
time and effort expended, has an unfair competitive edge over gainful employment or 
training (anti-poverty style) for employment. The edge must be eliminated.” 214 The Ford 
Administration argued that the imposition of mandatory minimums would effectively 
reduce discrimination in the criminal justice system, as the “horrendous sentencing 
discretion presently exercised by judges gives rise to differences in treatment of similar 
offenders which are often capricious and increasingly perceived as unfair to the point of 
                                                   
211 The memo read: “As it is clear that most crimes are committed by repeaters (J.Q. Wilson) there 
will be a reduction in the crime rate simply through incapacitation…” ibid. The federal government relied 
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scandal.”215 Mandatory minimums, then, seemed a means to make the criminal justice 
system more predictable and equitable.  
Although Ford did not make his approach to the national crime control program 
public until he addressed Congress on June 19, 1975, roughly two months prior to the 
message, he delivered the keynote address at the Sesquicentennial Convocation of Yale 
Law School. Ford used the occasion at his alma mater to preview his crime message to 
Congress and to reveal his plans for federal crime control.216 “Have we achieved on our 
streets and in our homes that sense of domestic tranquility so essential to the pursuit of 
happiness?” Ford asked his audience, “Do we provide that domestic tranquility which the 
Constitution seeks? If we take the crime rates as an indication, the answer has to be no.” 
217 While discussing Watergate and “crime in high places” Ford pledged “to restore to the 
Executive Branch decency, honesty, and adherence to the law at all levels.” 218 Yet Ford 
vowed that, as president, he intended to focus his energy on confronting the problem of 
“street crime, crime that invades our neighborhoods and our homes, murders, robberies, 
rapes, muggings, hold-ups, break-ins—and the kind of brutal violence that makes us 
fearful of strangers and afraid to go out at night.” 219 Ford went on to blame the onslaught 
of these types of crimes on repeat offenders, “the core of the problem” from whom, “the 
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216 After chatting with his former professor Myers McDougal, who interviewed the future 
president before he was admitted to Yale Law, Ford started his address just before ten pm. 4-25-1975 
Remarks of the President at the Yale Sesquicentennial Convocation Dinner. 





rest of the American people have a right to protection from their violence.” 220 Ford also 
expressed compassion for victims of crime, “the poor, the old, the young, the 
disadvantaged minorities, the people who live in the most crowded parts of our cities, the 
most defenseless.”221 By describing crime as a problem of inner-city street life, and the 
victims of crimes as residents of “disadvantaged” neighborhoods, Ford identified the 
specific location where federal law enforcement programs already had forcefully 
unfolded, and where they would continue to unfold during his presidency. 
The bulk of Ford’s remarks at Yale law, however, focused on the chaos federal 
crime control programs helped to foster in the court system. Ford blamed plea bargaining 
for preventing many cases from actually reaching the trial stage. The problem seemed 
also to stem from the fact as arrests increased more the number of judges, prosecutors, 
and public defenders remained stable. This discrepancy created an imbalance that favored 
guilty pleas. Ford citied a recent LEAA-funded report that revealed that in New York, 
half of those convicted of felonies received no detention time. Of the other half of 
convicted felons, only one-fifth received a sentence of more than a year of imprisonment. 
“I am urging that virtually all of those convicted of a violent crime should be sent to 
prison,” Ford promised.222  It seemed, however, that as the LEAA made arrest more 
possible, law enforcement struggled to accommodate the onslaught of new offenders, and 
the prison population system grew to numbers that state and local governments could not 
handle. Although Ford primarily concerned himself with urban crime threat, it was a 
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young white woman, a follower of Charles Manson, who first pointed a gun at the 
president on his way to address the California legislature on crime in the fall of 1975. 
Ford proceeded to deliver his remarks as scheduled, calling for a nationwide effort to 
control crime and “the abandonment of partisanship on a scale comparable to closing 
ranks in war time against an external enemy.”223 After nearly a decade of federal law 
enforcement programs launched in the name of modernization and efficiency, Ford 
inherited a criminal justice system quickly spiraling out of control.   
 
                                                   
223 James Naughton, “Ford Safe as Guard Seizes a Gun Woman Pointed at Him on Cast; Follower 
of Manson is Charged,” New York Times, 6 Sep 1975, 49. 
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        CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Pre-Emptive Policy: 
Juvenile Delinquency and the Ford Administration’s Assault on Urban Youth 
Ten years into the national law enforcement program urban violence peaked and 
the War on Crime appeared to be an utter failure. The rise of thefts and homicides 
coincided with the rise of federal crime control initiatives. Yet once the federal 
government began to invest in law enforcement, policymakers could not retreat until the 
statistics improved. The White House and Congress moved to intensify crime control 
programs. The commitment to states’ rights and the strategy of increasing patrols and 
investing in hardware generated a record number of arrests that caused urban juridical 
systems to collapse and prisons to overflow. By 1974, when the crime rate rose seventeen 
percent over the previous year, the Department of Justice received a record two billion 
dollars from Congress to remake the juvenile justice system. This process involved 
integrating crime control and urban social programs that disproportionately targeted 
young black men.  
Although a formal law enforcement system designed for young offenders did not 
exist before the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, the issue 
underlay the creation of the modern carceral complex. Beginning with the New Frontier, 
juvenile-focused policy uniquely positioned the federal government in low-income black 
communities. President Kennedy combined anti-poverty programs with programs 
designed to reduce juvenile delinquency when he created the Office of Juvenile 
Delinquency and Youth Development in 1961. Lyndon Johnson included an attack on 
juvenile delinquency as part of his larger War on Poverty when the federal government 
enacted a juvenile crime control policy in 1968 and designed youth service bureaus 
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through which the courts and police could constantly monitor, rather than institutionalize, 
black urban youths. And Richard Nixon’s Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
worked with the private sector to implement community-based corrections for juveniles.  
Yet by the mid-1970s, the crime problem and the material conditions urban youth 
confronted reached a turning point. As the last significant piece of domestic legislation 
during Nixon’s presidency, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 
absorbed the issue into the growing national law enforcement apparatus. The Act moved 
juvenile delinquency programs from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s 
purview to the Department of Justice and enhanced federal power over those young 
offenders by establishing an Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
tasked with administering 350 million dollars in federal grant funds to municipal 
authorities via state planning agencies. By placing delinquency, rather than social welfare 
or rehabilitation, at the center of its approach to the problem of urban youth crime, the 
federal government launched a juvenile justice program premised on arrest and state 
supervision.  
By reducing the power of executive-level departments concerned with social 
welfare programs, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 
completed the War on Crime’s redirection of the War on Poverty. Although the 1974 Act 
retained the strategy of preventing would-be delinquents from committing crime, the 
program would now support juvenile court systems, foster and protective care programs, 
and shelter facilities rather than school systems and youth service bureaus.  Under the 
purview of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, these Great Society-era 
programs had proven, in the words of Congress “inadequate to meet the needs of the 
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countless, abandoned, and dependent children who, because of this failure to provide 
effective services, may become delinquents.”1 By labeling all young Americans living in 
segregated poverty “potentially delinquent” the 1974 Act criminalized urban social 
problems. In low-income urban communities across the United States, arrest, detainment, 
and incarceration of young black Americans skyrocketed.  
The Act was a pre-emptive strike, waged by the federal government, to 
institutionalize young offenders. It offered a quick response strategy focused on swift and 
sure punishment as means of ensuring domestic tranquility—the hallmark phrase of the 
War on Crime under Gerald Ford. The category of potentiality introduced by the 
legislation made possible the intrusion of punitive programs into the everyday lives of 
marginalized youth in the name of attacking crime. Although Johnson was the first to 
mention the importance of offering “potential delinquents,” or those young Americans 
from “broken families, burdened with financial and psychological problems,” an 
alternative to incarceration, the concept did not take hold until the federal government 
prepared to enlarge the nation’s prison population as a mode of deterrence. 2  
When Ford assumed the presidency, he continued to amass greater control over 
urban social programs by enlarging the discretionary portion of the crime control budget 
in order to target the population seen as responsible for the crime problem: young black 
Americans. The perception among Ford officials that “most young offenders who commit 
acts of violence and pursue criminal careers come from minority ghetto and poverty 
                                                   
1 “Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974” 42 U.S.C. 5601, 1. 
2 "Message to Congress: Johnson on Children and Youth." In Congressional Quarterly Almanac 
1967, 23rd ed., 20-54-A-20-58-A. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1968. 
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backgrounds” structured the administration’s general approach to crime control.3  With 
nearly one hundred and fifty million dollars to use at the discretion of his administration, 
Ford strengthened the federal government’s attack on two overlapping aspects of the 
nation’s urban crime problem: gangs and guns.  
Working with the new Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
Ford and officials within his administration targeted young black Americans via two 
separate but interrelated White House initiatives: the Career Criminal Program and 
“Operation Disarm the Criminal.” The Career Criminal or Repeat Offender Program 
implemented a separate, expedited criminal justice system with maximum sentencing, 
while “Disarm the Criminal” established a federal handgun control squad operating in 
urban centers. These two initiatives illustrate how juvenile justice policy and executive-
level law enforcement measures functioned as pre-emptive crime control strategies that 
disproportionately targeted black urban teenagers and their families.  
 
I. The 1972 Act: Prediction and Potentiality 
Urban civil disorder in the 1960s had served as a catalyst for the national law 
enforcement program, and the federal government saw juvenile delinquency policy as a 
way of preventing future outbreaks and as a solvent for rising crime rates.  Nixon and his 
advisors believed that young black Americans represented “the hard core group 
participating in the urban riot,” a group that needed to be controlled in order to restore 
                                                   
3 “The Justice Department’s Fight Against Youth Crime: A Review of the Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention of he Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,” Prepared by 
Robert W. Woodson, Consultant to the Subcommittee on Crime. Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee 
on the Judiciary, House of Rep, 95th Congress, Second Session, December 1978, 6. 
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public safety.4 Throughout the first ten years of the War on Crime, juvenile programs 
remained rehabilitative and community-based. The mid-1970s witnessed a punitive shift 
in the federal government’s approach to low-income youth that ushered in more black 
and Latino teenagers into the prison system and buttressed the rapid and substantial 
expansion of the carceral state. 
Congress saw youth criminality as “a growing threat to the national welfare 
requiring immediate, comprehensive, and effective action by the Federal Government,” 
and set out to reconstitute the nation’s juvenile justice system.5 In enacting the Juvenile 
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1972, the Democratic-controlled Congress claimed 
greater federal jurisdiction over youth anti-crime programs. The legislation established a 
channel from the federal government to private nonprofit and public youth service 
programs, and it opened new possibilities for the development of community centers and 
social programs based on law enforcement principles. Policymakers meant for their 
investment to reach troubled cities like Baltimore, where local police attributed half of 
the city’s crime rate to juveniles.6  
If the War on Poverty failed to dent the rising crime rate, an identification of the 
root cause of crime transitioned during this period, one that carried racist assumptions 
about criminality to justify the federal government’s assault on youth crime.  The 
                                                   
4  n/d letter to Jack (Caulfield) from Tony;  Nixon Library, John Dean Files Box 25 n.d.; April, 
1968 Letter from the Republican National Committee Press Release, April 22, 1968 from Richard Nixon 
Presidential Library, John Dean Collection, Box 27, 7. 
5 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities of the Committee on Education and 
Labor, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, Second Session on HR 6265 and HR 9298. Held in LA 
March 29; Wash DC April 21, May 1, 2, 8 and 21 1974. 




arguments about family pathology Daniel Patrick Moynihan put forth in his 1965 The 
Negro Family: The Case for National Action to explain inequality and crime remained 
influential through his tenure as special domestic policy advisor to President Nixon and 
beyond. Policymakers drew on popular depictions of black children growing up in broken 
families with little parental guidance to link these youth to crime and violence in the 
United States. 
Here, theory and the practice were mutually reinforcing: the federal government 
invested in increased surveillance and patrol in areas of segregated poverty, a practice 
that subjected young Americans of color to arrest at unprecedented rates. New mandatory 
crime reporting laws implicated black urban youth in roughly half of all violent crime, a 
statistic that fueled increasingly punitive guidelines for urban social programs. This 
occurred, in part, because Congress planned juvenile delinquency policy based on the 
arrests rates federal data had predicted. 7 Accordingly, the concept of potentiality 
sanctioned by the legislation made possible the criminalization of this entire population 
of young people of color. Acting largely on anticipation, Congress authorized a new level 
of punitive control in areas of segregated poverty. 
Actual and predicted arrest rates underpinned the potentiality clause, or the intent 
to bring those “in danger of becoming delinquents and their families” into the domain of 
                                                   
7 Reported crime committed by juveniles increased faster than reported crime in general. White 
House officials estimated that youth crime had increased 144% since 1960, while adult crime increased 
only 17%. Youths under age 18 accounted for 45 percent of the arrests for all serious crime in the U.S. 
during 1973. Juveniles were involved in 23 percent of the arrests for homicide, rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault. They represented 51 percent of the arrests for major property crimes, or burglary, 
larceny, and auto theft. Arrest data for 15-to-18 year olds for the period 1963 to 1975 indicated that the 
arrest rate for violent crime steadily increased, moving from 2.4 per 1000 juveniles in 1963 to 5.2 in 1973. 
5-15-75 Memorandum to Jonathan Rose, Douglas Marvin, Jack Fuller from Malcolm Barr, Director Office 
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rehabilitative and preventative services. 8 The legislation required that the new juvenile 
delinquency prevention agencies exist apart from formal law enforcement and criminal 
justice programs. Congress recognized that once law enforcement authorities detained a 
typical first time offender, “it is much more difficult to help him because he has already 
been labeled and has probably labeled himself as ‘delinquent’ or ‘troublemaker,’ ” as the 
House Education and Labor Committee wrote in its Report on the bill. 9 After some 
debate over the meaning of “potential criminal,” the Senate vaguely defined young 
people “in danger of becoming delinquent” as youth “whose conduct might bring him 
within the jurisdiction of a juvenile court.”10 To avoid ushering more youth into an ill-
prepared justice system, the legislation envisioned programs that could reach potential 
criminals and admit them into community-based carceral institutions such as youth 
service bureaus or group homes. 
The decision to base federal crime prevention strategy on the identification of 
violent-prone children before they had contact with police did not pass through Congress 
without vocal objections to the language of the potentiality clause. 11 A number of 
Congressmen argued that the legislation made, in the words of Missouri’s Republican 
Representative Durward Hall, “vague promises that there has been a technical 
breakthrough so that we can ascertain those impinging upon near delinquency…As a 
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profession, I just do not believe it.” 12 Another Republican, Ohio’s John Ashbrook, 
pointed out that by encouraging the diagnosis and treatment of future criminals, the 
legislation “can open up a Pandora’s box. How do we diagnose and treat a youngster in 
danger of becoming delinquent? I think anybody with common sense knows that every 
youth is in danger of becoming delinquent… Where do we draw the line?” 13  
The pre-emptive strategy of preventing crime by targeting potential criminals 
restored power to local governments they had not enjoyed since the Great Society.14 By 
1972, Congress and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration wanted to 
compensate for the mismanagement of block grants at the state level and with the 
overlapping authority of law enforcement and criminal justice programs. The Nixon 
Administration and Congress restored Lyndon Johnson’s categorical grant approach in 
the administration of juvenile delinquency prevention programs. Novel use of 
discretionary aid provided an opportunity to ensure that preventive programs reached 
low-income minority youth without compromising the principles of New Federalism.  
Discretionary funds allowed law enforcement institutions to heighten their 
punitive approach in places like the predominately black city of Compton, with one of 
highest crime, unemployment, and youth population rates in the nation. 15 In the 
immediate postwar period, black Americans who made industrial gains moved to the 
western edge of Compton’s outskirts. Located just south of South Central, this settlement 




15 Chief Edward Davis in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities of the 
Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, Second Session on HR 6265 
and HR 9298. Held in Los Angeles March 29, 1974, 35. 
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had been the first area in Los Angeles where working-class black residents enjoyed the 
promise of suburban paradise in southern California. 16  White resistance to integration, 
block busting and “panic selling” rapidly segregated the city through the 1950s, and 
Compton emerged as the largest black American town outside of the south: black 
Americans comprised seventy percent of the population, Chicanos represented twenty 
percent. 17  With an unusually high proportion of young people representing over half of 
the population, by 1967 Compton had one of the highest rates of youth poverty in the 
United States. 18    
Based on predictions that one hundred thousand young people would be arrested 
in Los Angeles County in 1973, and that young African-American and Mexican-
American men would account for more than half of these potential suspects, the 
Probation Office requested emergency discretionary funds for Compton.19 “There is a 
disadvantaged culture there and poverty,” Chief Kenneth E. Kirkpatrick explained to the 
House Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities, “that really contributes towards the overall 
incidents of delinquent acts.” 20  For Kirkpatrick and federal policymakers, this pathology 
represented a major cause of crime that could be controlled by pre-emptive strategies. 
                                                   
16 See Douglas Flamming, Bound for Freedom : Black Los Angeles in Jim Crow America 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 
17Leroy F. Aarons “Anxiery Pervades a Black Community” The Washington Post, Times Herald 
29 May 1973 pg. A8 
1856 percent of men and 52 percent of women in Compton were under the age of twenty. See Josh 
Sides, L.A. City Limits : African American Los Angeles from the Great Depression to the Present 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 
19 Kirkpatrick in ibid, 99.  
20 ibid.  
  
253 
The way the legislation defined the potential delinquent, as a young person prone 
to contact with penal and juridical authorities, effectively joined crime control and social 
programs serving low-income Americans. With new federal funds available, community-
based institutions emerged soon after the 1972 Act passed to serve those youth who the 
federal government saw as “in danger of becoming delinquent.” This preventative 
approach augmented the punitive power of state and local crime control institutions in the 
lives of young Americans from low-income backgrounds. To receive funding, urban 
social programs now included crime control measures in their programming and relied on 
law enforcement agencies to supply clients. Youth service bureaus, a vestige of the War 
on Crime under Johnson, coordinated services for young potential criminals in order to 
ease overburdened urban court systems in a number of cities.21 The “Prevention of 
Delinquency Through Intensive Supervision” program, or PODTIS, in Los Angeles, 
handled less serious first-time offenders, or, as Kirkpatrick called them, “the youngsters 
who are actually the delinquent-prone youngsters, mostly incorrigibles.”22 PODTIS 
worked within low-income, mostly black families to “keep the youngster in the 
community and get the family communications reestablished and get the family problems 
worked out.”23  
As arrest rates escalated alongside the intensification of urban law enforcement, 
the need for a juvenile justice infrastructure large enough to meet construction, personnel, 
and court service needs became an immediate concern. When the Juvenile Delinquency 
                                                   
21 Johnson, “The Challenge of Crime to Our Society;” Cliff Sessions, “Poor Moms, Dads Can Be 
Replaced,” Chicago Defender, 26 Oct 1965, 11. 
22 Kirkpatrick in  3-29-74 Hearings. 
23 ibid.  
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Act came up for reauthorization in 1974, Congress called for a massive federal 
investment in youth crime control and the formation of a permanent federal office to 
manage the problem. Liberals led this effort, advocating strongly for the expansion of 
federal criminal justice programs for juveniles.24 Yet some moved further away from the 
socio-economic approach that had guided New Frontier and Great Society programs. 
“We can no longer afford the luxury of confusing social progress with progress in the war 
on crime. We face the crime menace now,” Senator Edward Kennedy wrote in the New 
York Times, “Perhaps the social policies we initiate in the 1970’s will reduce the crime 
rate in the 1980’s. But that is too long to wait. We fool ourselves if we say, ‘No crime 
reform until society is reformed.’” As the White House and Congress prepared to revisit 
the problem of urban crime, seen largely as a problem of juvenile delinquency, Kennedy 
informed the American public, as well his colleagues in Congress: “It is time to fight a 
more practical, less ideological war.”25 
Like Kennedy, policymakers who supported crime control measures from the 
outset wanted to give the Department of Justice greater authority in the national juvenile 
justice program they established in 1974. In many ways this would continue the fight 
against urban youth “in danger of becoming delinquent” set in motion by the 1972 Act. 
“The essential goal is one of delivering needed services or attention in such a way and at 
a time that may be crucial in preventing the development of a criminal career,” officials 
of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration emphasized in congressional 
                                                   
24 By serving on the House Select Committee, Chisholm hoped to “protect the most powerless and 
helpless in this entire situation, the juveniles who have been just cast aside at the bottom of everybody’s 
priorities because they are not a real power group in the sense of the word to be reckoned with in our 
county in terms of money and grants.” In Hearings before the Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities of the 
Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, Second Session on HR 6265 
and HR 9298. Held in LA March 29; Wash DC April 21, May 1, 2, 8 and 21 1974, 434. 
25 Edward M. Kennedy, “Punishing the Offenders,” New York Times, 6 Dec 1975, 29. 
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testimony. 26 As the juvenile delinquency program unfolded under the purview of the 
Department of Justice, the concept of prevention indicted entire communities as criminal.  
 
II. The 1974 Act: A More “Practical” (and Punitive) War 
While the 1972 Act labeled children from so-called disadvantaged backgrounds as 
“in danger of becoming delinquent,” the 1974 Act subjected those young potential 
criminals to punitive supervision before they had committed a crime. The national crime 
rate doubled after ten years of federal law enforcement programs and the investment of 
billions of taxpayer dollars. Without questioning the effectiveness of the LEAA or the 
federal crime control program generally, policymakers assumed that the rising crime rate 
resulted from a breakdown of social values that began in the 1960s and had reached epic 
proportions by the mid-1970s. Although the crime rate and the sense of urban crisis only 
escalated alongside the massive federal investment in punitive measures, the statistics 
justified a continued infusion of federal funds into juvenile delinquency programs.  
Debates about whether to place the new, more powerful juvenile delinquency 
agency within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare or the Department of 
Justice reflected political divisions and tensions in Congress. The House version of the 
1974 Act offered a juvenile justice program that continued to provide rehabilitative and 
preventive social services. Representatives wanted the first federal office of juvenile 
delinquency and the first block grant for such purposes to remain in the Department of 
                                                   
26 Charles Work in 3-29-74 Hearings. 
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Health, Education, and Welfare and passed the bill in early July by an overwhelming 
majority. 27    
But the Senate’s more punitive vision for the federal juvenile justice intervention 
ultimately prevailed. The nation had reached a “turning point in the way we handle 
children in trouble,” the Senate Judiciary Committee reported, and it was the federal 
government’s responsibility to devise new methods of “redirecting behavior that 
endangers society.”28  Juvenile crime rates had increased under the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare’s watch, and the Senate wanted the new federal system to 
manage delinquency with punitive force rather than rehabilitative or preventative 
services. The Senate did give the social welfare agency authority over the only aspect of 
the national juvenile delinquency program associated with the white middle class: 
runaway youth. At up to ninety percent of the cost, the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare funded special programs and facilities for runaways, a category that rarely 
included black children.29 Viewing social issues facing young people living in segregated 
poverty as matters of crime and punishment, the Senate insisted that the Department of 
Justice handle the problem. Even though the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration had a record of waste and mismanagement, it had experience using the 
                                                   
27 On July 1, an overwhelming majority (329-20) approved the bill. Albert H Quie, the Republican 
from Minnesota, argued that “juvenile justice and delinquency prevention programs are not separate 
entities and should not be treated separately,” and introduced an amendment that shifted responsibility to 
LEAA from HEW.  The House rejected the transfer, with only 114 Republicans and 30 Democrats 
supporting the measure. "Juvenile Delinquency," Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1974, 30th ed., 278-
82. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1975. 
28 ibid. 
29Steven Nicholas, Associate Director of Focus Runaway House in Las Vegas in Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Equal Opportunities of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of 
Representatives, 93rd Congress, Second Session on HR 6265 and HR 9298, 272.  
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block grant system and thus was seen as the only agency that could meet the new federal 
objectives for juvenile crime control.30  
The formation of the Office of Juvenile Delinquency offered the federal 
government with an opportunity to address the problem of crime and violence among 
young Americans by addressing related problems in urban public school systems, public 
housing, and low-income neighborhoods. Instead, Congress shifted the federal 
government’s approach to delinquency towards punishment and managing the symptoms 
of urban crisis. On the day his fellow representatives approved the more punitive 
direction of juvenile justice, Congressman William Steiger issued a grave warning. “By 
eliminating HEW,” the Wisconsin conservative said on the House floor, “we have done 
serious damage to our efforts to prevent people from becoming delinquents instead of 
simply seeing them wound up in the juvenile justice system as it is now.”31 Steiger’s 
points reinforced the way debates about preventative approaches did not follow liberal or 
conservative divisions.  
With delinquency framed as a matter of crime control in the 1974 Act, the Senate 
considerably enlarged the national juvenile justice program. While the House requested 
380 million dollars for a three-year program to be dispersed under Health, Education, and 
                                                   
30 Given his influence in shaping the Safe Streets Act of 1968, it is not surprising that Roman 
Hruska introduced the key amendment that transferred juvenile justice authority to the LEAA. The five 
members of Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency who voted against the Hruska Amendment 
were Birch Bayh (the Democratic Senator from Indiana), Phillip Hart (the Democratic Senator from 
Michigan), John Tunney (the Democratic Senator from California), Charles McC. Mathias Jr (the 
Republican Senator from Maryland), and Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts.  
31 By the end of July, even those who strongly opposed the placement of the Office of Juvenile 
Delinquency in the Department of Justice, like Chairman of the Judiciary Juvenile Delinquency 
Subcommittee Birch Bayh, passed the bill in order to get it enacted as soon as possible. On July 25th the 
Senate version passed with only one vote of opposition from North Carolina Republican Jesse Helms. 
quoted in "Juvenile Delinquency," Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1974, 30th ed., 278-82. Washington, 
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Welfare, the Senate gave the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency in the 
Department of Justice six hundred million dollars in block grants but required the states 
to dedicate two-thirds of the juvenile crime control funds to local programs, supported by 
the federal government at ninety percent of the cost. To ensure that this investment 
reached youth “in danger of becoming delinquent,” the Office awarded block grants to 
states based on age and income characteristics alone.  
To make youth crime control a national priority, all fifty states received a 
minimum of two hundred thousand dollars to establish juvenile delinquency advisory 
boards that brought together relevant public and private figures to plan and implement 
programs. The legislation also created a federal counterpart, the Coordinating Council on 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, which required the attorney general and key 
Department of Justice officials to meet with the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and 
various representatives designated by the president.  
The 1974 legislation’s broad programmatic definition of juvenile delinquency 
gave the federal government punitive authority in the lives of all youth whose families 
received government assistance or who participated in social programs.32 As defined by 
the Act, a “juvenile delinquency program” constituted any activity related to, “the 
development of neglected, abandoned, or dependent youth and other youth who are 
potential criminals.”33  Now any public or private agency working toward this goal could 
                                                   
32 The Department of Labor defined “disadvantaged,” as: “those on public assistance and those 
whose family income levels are below the poverty guidelines established under criteria issued by the Office 
of Management and Budget.” 4-8-1976 “Summer Youth Employment Programs Fact Sheet,” Ford Library 
Parsons Collection Box 17 “Summer Jobs for Urban Youth.” 
33 “Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974” 42 U.S.C. 5601, 4.  
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receive federal juvenile justice grants, and any youth-based program conducted by the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, the Department of Justice, or the Office of Economic Opportunity 
constituted a delinquency program. The effect was to increase contact between the 
emerging carceral state and young Americans living in segregated poverty. 
Resistant to a socio-economic attack on juvenile delinquency, the federal 
government relied upon the private sector to address the structural factors at the root of 
the problem. Congress empowered nonprofit organizations to direct criminal prevention 
and rehabilitation programs by earmarking twenty percent of all youth crime control 
funds to agencies outside of public control. The Teledyne Packard Bell Corporation used 
funds from the Office of Juvenile Delinquency Prevention to offer black and Chicano 
youth from low-income neighborhoods training in automotive mechanics, welding, small 
appliance and furniture repair, food service, and forklift operations. The young men 
traveled eighty miles from their homes in Los Angeles to Camp Fenner Canyon for two 
weeks of vocational courses, remedial education, job placement assistance, and 
employment coaching.34 In Manhattan, the Department of Justice established the 
Supported Employment for Adolescents Program on the Lower East Side. The Henry 
Street Settlement handled the organization’s daily operation, which employed local 
residents aged fourteen to sixteen in social service projects for ninety dollars a week.35  
Yet even as it worked to provide vocational opportunities for potential 
delinquents and softened previously stiff penalties on minor offenses, the first major 
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juvenile delinquency legislation ensured that young Americans would enter adult and 
youth correctional facilities at unprecedented rates. Following the Supreme Court’s 1967 
decision guaranteeing juveniles the right to due process, the 1974 legislation 
deinstitutionalized status offenses for curfew violators, truants, and runaways. Because 
policymakers viewed juvenile detention centers as the gateway to criminal careers, the 
legislation stressed diversion programs that offered nonviolent young offenders treatment 
and counseling. 36  The Act also encouraged the use of community-based detention, 
whether in a juvenile facility close to home or foster care, and required separate 
corrections facilities for juveniles and adults.37   
At the same time, the legislation lowered the age threshold for violent crimes. 
Now, any sixteen year-old who committed a crime that would be a felony punishable by a 
maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment or more, life imprisonment, or death, could 
be tried as an adult if the attorney general deemed the offender to be particularly 
“dangerous to the community.”38 In anticipating the expansion of the national prison 
population as a consequence of these measures, Congress added a special amendment to 
the juvenile justice bill that also introduced the National Institute of Corrections within 
the Bureau of Prisons as a means to strengthen the federal role in penal institutions. 
Although Congress created the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention in the final months of Nixon’s presidency, the Ford Administration steered the 
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course of the new national program. Ford officials believed the nation was on the verge 
of a major demographic change that needed to be controlled and managed. The theory 
behind the actual and predicted crime increases used psychological pathology as an 
explanatory factor for urban violence. White House Officials argued that “trends in 
family structure and in the divergence of values among Americans” had produced, 
“amoral youths—youths without remorse for brutal acts, who show no signs of 
‘conscience’ as we know it.”39 The Ford Administration crafted a crime control program 
that sought to institutionalize these types of offenders to foster greater public safety.  
Ambivalence about the potentiality clause introduced by juvenile delinquency 
policy did not outweigh the general cynicism among Ford officials about the federal 
government’s ability to develop public policy that could address income stratification, 
education, employment, and housing conditions. These changes, as Public Relations 
Director Malcolm Barr wrote, “would require massive social and economic reforms in 
our society which should be pursued or not pursued for reasons more important than the 
control of crime and delinquency.” 40 Barr warned that the potentiality approach “becomes 
problematic since our ability to predict which youths will become delinquent is not well 
developed and by identifying certain youths as high risk, we may be creating self-
fulfilling prophecies.” 41 Yet despite his own reservations, Barr suggested that the 
president “focus on identifying those youths who would appear likely to become involved 
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in delinquency” as a cost-effective approach to juvenile crime control amenable to the 
American public. 42 In effect, the federal government resolved to base its juvenile crime 
control program on assumptions, potentiality, and prediction.  
 
IV. The Policing of Black Youth  
Urban school systems took on new crime control functions when the federal 
government began constructing a national system of juvenile justice and detention. 
Young Americans who survived on public assistance, lived in housing projects, or 
attended segregated urban schools came into contact with patrolmen, probation officers, 
and surveillance equipment on a daily basis. They were the “potential delinquents” of the 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.   
The federal government approached the problem of school violence as it had the 
rest of its crime war battles: through planning, patrol, and hardware. None of these 
strategies fostered the greater social control policymakers and law enforcement officials 
had intended. At the same time that Congress brought the Department of Justice’s 
authority into public school systems, it introduced crime control programs in schools 
serving “economically and educationally disadvantaged children,” when it renewed the 
Secondary Education Act in the summer of 1974.43 The “Safe School Study Act” 
authorized widespread patrol in school hallways and classrooms and asked the National 
Educational Association to gather data on the scope of the problem. The figures 
                                                   
42 ibid. 
43 Bell in Hearings before the Subcommittee one Equal Opportunities of the Committee on 
Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, Second Session. 
  
263 
suggested that American public school students committed one hundred murders, twelve 
thousand armed robberies, nine thousand rapes, and two hundred four thousand 
aggravated assaults against teachers and students in 1975. Vandalism alone cost local 
public schools a combined six hundred million dollars.44   
The Ford Administration responded to these unfavorable statistics by increasing 
patrols. In the spring of 1975, White House officials proposed “target hardening” 
techniques, or the combination of electronic surveillance, improved security of school 
buildings, and an increasing presence of law enforcement officials on the campuses of 
urban public schools. While some Ford staffers recognized that the approach “may 
contribute to a feeling that the schools is really under siege,” the president and Congress 
pressed on for implementation. 45 
In major urban areas particularly, public schools evolved into key sites of punitive 
contact as a result of juvenile delinquency policy. In Washington, DC, the police 
department established the Action for Children in Trouble (ACT) Team to identify youth 
“in danger of becoming delinquent” by attacking truancy. While the 1974 Act had 
reduced the penalty for this offense, the Ford Administration viewed absenteeism as a 
gateway to delinquency. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
enthusiastically funded seventy-five percent of the cost of the ACT program, which 
involved interrogations of suspected truants in a public housing development from an 
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apartment owned by the police department but decorated to look like a comfortable 
family room.46  
In the predominately black community of Crenshaw, the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s Family Treatment Program connected probation officers and social work 
students to families in conflict with school authorities at local elementary schools.47 
Federal juvenile delinquency and secondary education funds also enabled the city of Los 
Angeles to install cameras to monitor children on school buses and in classrooms.48 Not 
only did teachers working in South Central lock their classrooms from the inside, schools 
were also assigned police task forces as large as one hundred. Schools became guarded 
like prisons, with monitored entrances, stationed patrol cars, and flying helicopters.49 By 
1976, at the annual meeting of the National Association of School Security Directors in 
Alexandria, security companies and law enforcement experts hawked the inventions they 
had produced with federal grants: metal detectors, hidden cameras, ultrasonic alerters, 
and fountain pens that functioned as communications devices for urban high school 
teachers. 50 
The treatment of students by school authorities and instructors had profound 
consequences for the criminalization of black youth and the national portrait of juvenile 
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delinquency. School districts with a ninety percent minority enrollment expelled black 
students at a rate three times higher than their white counterparts. In southern schools, 
now largely integrated, black children faced severe rates of expulsion.51 An NAACP 
study examining the twenty largest school districts with significant numbers of black 
students found that they received 90,000 of 125,000 total suspensions.52 In Little Rock, 
two decades after white resistance forced President Eisenhower to deploy the National 
Guard to accompany black children in the initial process of integration, black children 
faced a seventy percent expulsion rate even though they represented less than a third of 
children attending public schools.53    
As a former New York City public school teacher, Congresswoman Shirley 
Chisholm explained the connection between youth crime and school disciplinary 
measures, or the “push out” phenomenon. “When school systems are not able to cope 
with the uniqueness and specific needs of black children… we find the development of 
discipline problems,” Chisholm said as she opened the Subcommittee on Equal 
Opportunity’s hearings on juvenile delinquency. “We find these children being forced out 
of school without any kind of follow-up. In many instances, they will become juvenile 
delinquents.”54 Fellow members of Congress did not act upon Chisholm’s call for policies 
that would address discrimination and marginalization within American school systems. 
Instead punitive practices endured.  
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The increased surveillance and patrol of students spawned a climate of 
delinquency that created greater opportunities for arrest, supported the practice of 
discriminatory expulsions, and severely compromised educational access. A number of 
southern school districts resorted to tactics from the days of Jim Crow: students who 
failed to pay school fees found themselves vulnerable to suspension.55 After a fight 
erupted between black and white junior high school students in Raleigh, North Carolina, 
the police arrested the black students and jailed them for five days. At their court hearing 
the students all received expulsion notices. Seventy miles south of Raleigh, in Sampson 
County, black students attempted to hold a meeting with the principal and administrators 
to address their mistreatment by staff and fellow pupils. Instead of hearing the students’ 
grievances, the administration suspended all of the students who agreed to attend the 
meeting. The Los Angeles Public Schools expelled an average of forty-five students a 
year in the 1960s; by 1973, the system expelled a record number of 225 students. 56 If a 
student received more than one expulsion from the predominately-black Washington, 
Fremont, Crenshaw, or Jefferson High Schools, he or she would be banished from the 
Los Angeles Public School System altogether. 
In line with the federal government’s larger approach to the urban crisis, instead 
of working to combat the racism black students experienced in administrative offices and 
classrooms, the Ford Administration and Congress used juvenile delinquency prevention 
funds to support alternative school systems that would handle youth with disciplinary 
problems. A high school student in Dade Country, Florida who received a suspension for 
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more than ten days would attend an alternative school. If he received an expulsion, he 
would face closer supervision in a special penal school or an “opportunity center.” In 
both cases, he would receive vocational training instead of the traditional college 
preparatory curriculum. And in both cases, as a “potential delinquent,” he would be 
removed from the general student population and placed in a highly disciplinary, 
criminalized environment. As the director of a nonprofit organization working to protect 
black children in newly integrated southern schools testified before Chisholm’s 
subcommittee, just as penal institutions were accused of being colleges of crime, “schools 
are being found to be harborers of institutions of delinquency.”57 The federal government 
failed to target educational inequality as part of its pre-emptive attack on the population 
identified as potentially delinquent, preferring instead to manage the problem’s 
symptoms as they manifested themselves through crime. In the process, violence festered 
within urban public classrooms and hallways and spilled out into surrounding 
communities when the final bell of the school day rang.  
 
V. Gangs and Guns 
By the mid-1970s, officials at the local level described an emerging form of crime 
in the oil crisis economy, a type of post-industrial violence that emerged at the moment 
when the federal government prepared to move beyond the hardware stage of its national 
law enforcement program. Testifying before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Juvenile Delinquency, Los Angeles police chief Ed Davis brought this “new phenomenon 
in the black community,” or “killing someone you have never seen before on the street, 
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by a juvenile,” to the federal government’s attention.58 Youth gangs in Los Angeles, 
Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia emerged alongside the school expulsion and 
coincided with the sharp upturn in the federal crime control budget during the first half of 
the 1970s. 59  The gang-related deaths of young men from these urban centers skyrocketed 
in this period; in Los Angeles the police department attributed fifty to seventy five 
percent of homicides from 1972 to 1974 to gang violence, and from 1964 to 1974, 
juvenile arrests increased 168 percent.60  Even more alarming was federally funded 
research arguing that black and Latino Americans comprised eighty percent of gang 
membership nationwide and that minority youth in large cities had “the highest potential 
for involvement in violent and predatory crime.”61  
Ford officials turned to what they called the most “obvious solution” to the gang 
problem: urging urban street patrols and juvenile courts to “deal more harshly with repeat 
offenders who are gang members and remove them from the community.” 62 In an internal 
memorandum, White House Officials argued, “the need for swift and sure punishment of 
serious violent gang members is apparent. Repeat offenders who are gang members must 
be prosecuted and removed from the community… This removal from the community 
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would protect the public and the young less hardened members of the gang.”63  When the 
Ford Administration introduced the idea of removal into its crime control strategy it  
ushered in a turn in federal law enforcement towards the construction of penal institutions 
in rural and suburban areas.  
In late September 1974, Ford outlined the two major priorities of his 
administration’s War on Crime at the annual meeting of the International Chiefs of 
Police. First, law enforcement needed to concentrate on “violent crime and street crime in 
the inner city.” Ford believed that crime in these neighborhoods, committed by repeat 
offenders and gang members “does the most damage to our whole urban structure.”64 
Ford hoped to manage the crisis many cities confronted by sending more residents to 
prison and preventing future crime in the process. In a memo to President Ford, staffer 
Dick Cheney summed up the rationale and process plainly: “the data points out that most 
of our violent crime is committed by a relatively small number of individuals, and with 
the right kind of effort we could substantially reduce the crime rate simply by taking 
them off the streets.”65 Many of the police chiefs in the audience shared this view of 
rehabilitation as a failure and incarceration as the chief crime deterrent. 
To further the larger federal commitment to punitive force in designated 
communities, Ford’s second priority involved intensifying and accelerating the urban 
juridical process in urban areas to “ensure that swift and prolonged imprisonment will 
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inevitably follow each offense.”66 Ford officials believed that the crime increase resulted 
from a proliferation of caseloads in urban areas that courts and correctional facilities 
could not handle. The assembly-line approach many American court systems assumed 
after the Safe Streets Act of 1968 encouraged prosecutors to strike plea bargains with 
suspects, and defense attorneys knew that requesting continuances and postponements 
could help secure a dismissal or acquittal. Research funded by the federal government 
made clear that police investigations and case management procedures needed to be 
improved in order to guarantee that dangerous, professional, and recidivistic criminals 
would face jail time.67 A study conducted by the Institute for Law and Social Research 
revealed that prosecutors rejected or dismissed half of felony arrests without a trial or a 
plea. A third of these dismissals resulted from a lack of witnesses, while the Institute 
attributed another third to lack of evidence.68 
The national law enforcement program that emerged after major urban civil 
disorder produced historic arrest levels of black men; by the mid-1970s, the steady influx 
of patrolmen this policy endorsed caused the urban court system to reach a breaking 
point. Speaking as head of the newly formed National Institute for Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, John Greacen declared to the Associated Press that fifteen 
percent of the nation’s young offenders needed to be “locked up because they’re 
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dangerous and we don’t know what to do with them.”69 Even with the twenty-five million 
dollars Congress earmarked for juvenile crime control programs, Greacen lamented: “I 
don’t see any substantial likelihood that the amount of youth crime in the United States is 
going to go down any substantial degree between now and 1990.”70 In response, the 
federal government empowered local court systems serving significant black populations 
to imprison larger numbers of suspects. If block grants limited the White House from 
imposing its own priorities, the Ford Administration prepared to work with police, 
prosecutors, and judges to implement an accelerated and highly punitive criminal justice 
program in select cities to make punishment more certain.  
A stay in Juvenile Hall became the norm for most gang members. Stanley Tookie 
Williams served time in a juvenile detention center—or what he called “prison prep 
school”— until he was released on his seventeenth birthday. Seeking to “attack and 
declare war” on “neighboring gang menaces,” Williams co-founded the Crips. 71   Shortly 
after his release, Williams was interrogated by a police officer while walking in a white 
neighborhood and returned to Central Juvenile Hall. Because the arrests of Black youth 
were so easily justified, thousands entered into the system as small children and 
teenagers, often on minute chargers.72 Authorities recognized that the Juvenile justice 
system was flawed, but they identified the quick release of youth back into the 
                                                   
69 “Prisons Urged for 15% of Young Felons,” Los Angeles Times, 21 Aug 1975, 2. 
70 ibid. 
71 Stanley Tookie Williams, Blue Rage, Black Redemption (New York: Touchstone Books, 1997) 
69. 
72“Violence in L.A. Schools Come Under Fire From 3 Directions” Los Angeles Times, 15 Dec 
1972, A1; Jah and Keyah 27. 
  
272 
community as the source: they argued that young offenders were released only to commit 
more crimes.73   
The Ford Administration’s Career Criminal Program established a separate 
criminal justice system for new categories of offenders that laid the groundwork for the 
widespread arrest and detainment of young black, Chicano, and Latino Americans. By 
spending discretionary crime control funds wisely, the White House hoped to “take the 
criminal out of circulation,” as Ford articulated it, by providing law enforcement officials 
with the tools to prosecute and secure convictions of Americans with limited formal 
employment opportunities who appeared to make crime into a career.74 Although the 
program focused on gang members, federal policymakers and law enforcement officials 
used the less rhetorically charged “Career Criminal” to launch the program.  
Shortly after Ford spoke to the big city police officers, Attorney General William 
Saxbe appeared on the CBS morning news program “Face the Nation” to generate public 
support for the Administration’s law enforcement agenda. In the face of accelerating 
crime rates, Saxbe argued that locking up criminals would circumvent the pervasive 
“atmosphere of violence” sweeping the nation. “We do not believe that you are doing 
them any favors by saying well, he’s misunderstood, he’s poor, he’s black and send him 
back to the community where he is going to get in trouble again,” the attorney general 
told host George Herman. 75 If local court systems failed to sentence criminals to long 
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prison terms, “there is every possibility that crime will inundate us,” Saxbe warned law 
enforcement officials in Chicago: “The nation would then be faced with the prospect of 
falling apart or devising a national police force in one final effort to restore domestic 
order.” 76 The Career Criminal Program would stamp out the root causes of crime by 
increasing opportunities to arrest and incarcerate the group seen as responsible for the 
problem.  
Beginning in 1975, the federal government invested three hundred and thirty 
million dollars in Career Criminal Units in twenty-two American cities, from San Diego 
to Memphis, Kalamazoo, and Providence.77 The typical career criminal selected for 
special prosecution tended to be a single nonwhite man, without employment, and under 
the age of twenty-four. 78   After only a few months of operation the program had begun to 
produce a high rate of conviction and had successfully reduced the time from arrest to 
trial by at least three weeks.79 With a stronger and more punitive criminal justice system 
in place in key urban areas, Ford argued, “the career criminals now realize that serious 
cases will no longer simply slip through the cracks in the system.”80 In the name of 
fostering a swift and sure justice system, the Career Criminal Program would help 
guarantee that habitual offenders, or gang members, received convictions. Meanwhile, the 
federal government opened up new carceral space by investing twenty-four million 
                                                   
76 Quoted in Joel Weisman, “Saxbe Sees Prospect of U.S. Police,” The Washington Post, 28 Aug 
1974, A1. 
77 Nicholas von Hoffman, “Throwing Money At Crime: the Multibillion-Dollar Nightstick,” The 
Washington Post, 8 Oct 1976, B3.  
78 “Picture Painted of a Criminal,” Los Angeles Times, 28 Sep 1976, A1. 
79 Ford Speech before the International Association of Chiefs of Police.  
80 ibid.  
  
274 
dollars in relocating young people charged with minor offenses into private, community-
based facilities closer to home.81  
Almost immediately, black Americans recognized the direct consequences of 
these federal measures within their communities. The Baltimore Afro-American warned 
of the Career Criminal Program: “Unless President Ford looks at those poor people in the 
inner city ghetto and their relationship to crime in a different way, his crackdown on 
crime will prove another disaster.” 82 Robert Woodson, the director of the Urban League’s 
criminal justice program, noted: “The Harvards of this country can never solve the 
problems of the Harlems of this country.” 83 These critiques went largely unnoticed, even 
though the Ford Administration emphasized its concern about the impact of crime and 
violence in black urban communities. When White House officials spoke about the crime 
issue to reporters and national audiences, they consistently expressed concern for the 
disproportionate rate of victimization black Americans experienced in the mid-1970s. 
The states quickly joined the federal government’s new battle against gang 
members and juvenile delinquency. In Houston, one of the first cities to receive a 
discretionary grant, four experienced district attorneys, a statistician, an investigator, 
several police officers, and a secretary composed the special “Career Criminal Unit.” If 
the team decided to place a defendant in the program, the judge immediately set 
exorbitantly high bail so that he or she would remain in detention. The Houston unit 
successfully placed five hundred offenders in the program each year, sentencing them to 
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an average of thirty years in prison.84 In effect, Houston’s Career Criminal program 
developed an early formulation of the “three strikes and you’re out” sentencing approach 
later adopted by California and New York. Houston expanded its crime categories to 
include felons previously convicted of a violent crime and another conviction of any 
kind, even a misdemeanor. One defendant tried under these terms received a life sentence 
for possession of a firearm.85 
The Career Criminal program also encouraged local district attorneys to try 
juveniles as adults. Another early recipient of LEAA discretionary funds for Career 
Criminal Programs was the District Attorney’s Office in Indianapolis, Indiana. After 
three years, Indianapolis’s prosecuting Attorney James F. Kelley boasted that defendants 
convicted as Career Criminals received fifty percent longer sentences and noted a 
decrease in plea bargaining and an increase in trials. Most of these career criminals had 
long crime records in juvenile courts, a fact that led the unit to prioritize its prosecution 
of juvenile offenders, or “identifying these youthful criminals and waving them over to 
felony court to be tried as adult career criminals.”86 Similarly, New York’s democratic 
governor Hugh Carey held a “small core of violent youngsters” responsible for the urban 
crime problem. As Carey told a New York Times reporter, the foremost responsibility of 
law enforcement authorities was to “protect the community from this group of youths 
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who threaten our safety and welfare.”87 Based on the lower age limits authorized by the 
1974 Juvenile Justice Act, Carey introduced legislation that required offenders aged 
fourteen and above who were found guilty of a major violent crime and ruled “dangerous 
to society” to receive a mandatory minimum sentence in family court.88 
Prosecutors who operated Career Criminal Units soon found themselves with an 
increased status within their districts and a greatly enlarged budget. These special 
attorneys tended to have lighter caseloads than their staff prosecutor counterparts, who 
handled three times the number of trials on a weekly basis. The result was to speed up the 
sentencing process, and Career Criminal cases typically took thirty to sixty days less from 
arrest to conviction that defendants prosecuted under standard court procedure. The 
United States Attorneys Office also ran its own Career Criminal Program called 
“Operation Doorstop,” named after its principal goal: “to stop the revolving door of 
arrest-release, conviction-release, rearrest-release, that for too long has characterized the 
criminal justice process,” as Earl Silber, the US Attorney for Washington, DC, 
characterized it.89 Silber framed “Operation Doorstop” and other Career Criminal 
Programs as urban programs, or, “an integral part of our national effort to revitalize our 
beleaguered cities.”90 For the Chairman of the District Attorney’s Career Criminal 
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Committee George Smith, “the violent, career criminal is the number one enemy of big 
city life.”91 And if prison removed criminals from their communities, the US Attorneys 
could claim they generally improved urban social conditions by securing a ninety-two 
percent conviction rate. 92 Fencing and sting operations funded by career criminal grants 
also created possibilities for identification of repeat offenders and mass arrests. 93  
Although judges tended to support the federal government’s attempt to revitalize 
urban justice systems, a number of civil rights organizations and criminal defense 
attorneys challenged the practices of the Career Criminal units. The National 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Social Justice endorsed an American Enterprise 
Institute report that found that the focus on black youth for special prosecution in New 
York City and Philadelphia “may result in the discriminatory labeling of minority 
children,” and called for a more equitable selection process.94 The National Commission 
warned: “This incompetent and insensitive administration of this program, whether 
intentional or not, is condemning countless minority youths to misery and failure within 
the criminal justice system.” 95 A number of the defendants presented as career criminals 
appealed their prison terms on the grounds that the program had denied them due process 
and equal protection. In Ohio, Robert Morton Walker felt he suffered discrimination 
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based on his selection for the program and challenged his conviction on theft and robbery 
charges in the State Supreme Court. The court ruled that the selectivity of defendants in 
criminal law enforcement did not violate Fourteenth Amendment protections and rejected 
his  appeal.96 
The program had seemingly produced results, however, and continued unabated. 
In urban areas where Career Criminal units operated, crime rates decreased by as much as 
eight percent.97 In the nation’s ten largest cities, the program convicted a combined 6,641 
habitual criminals on more than ten thousand separate charges. Career Criminal units 
receiving discretionary funds boasted a ninety-five percent conviction rate with the 
average sentence at fifteen years. 98  In the United States as a whole, crime decreased by 
five percent in cities with more than twenty-five thousand residents. Still, in calling for 
the nationwide expansion of the career criminal program, policymakers cited FBI data 
indicating that a quarter of a million Americans continued to pursue careers in street 
crime. 99 
The conservative columnist James Kilpatrick lauded the program in an editorial 
that ran in both the Baltimore Sun and the Los Angeles Times in the fall of 1976, calling 
the career criminal program the first effective federal law enforcement initiative.  
Kilpatrick defined the career criminal as “utterly without conscience, he is indifferent to 
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every consideration of right conduct; his animal instincts lead him, without pity to prey 
on unoffending victims.” 100 According to Kilpatrick, arguments linking crime with social 
conditions had failed to stop the rising incidents of urban violence, and when it came to 
this latest major LEAA venture: “The purpose is plain—to prosecute the career criminals 
to the very limit of the law, and to send them to prison for long, long terms. In a word, 
incarceration… The object is to get these particular criminals on ice, behind bars, where 
for a number of years they cannot terrorize the people.” 101 
Given the impressive incarceration record of this prosecutorial approach, four 
years into the initial pilot program Congress moved to make Career Criminal units more 
permanent and juvenile-focused while expanding operations to fifty cities during the first 
half of Jimmy Carter’s presidency. The Repeat Offender Prosecution and Prison 
Improvement Act of 1978, introduced by New York’s Democratic Congressmen Edward 
Pattison and Maryland’s Republican Senator Charles Mathias, proposed establishing 
criminal career prosecution projects as part of the LEAA’s larger aim to identify and 
expedite the prosecution of habitual offenders under severe prison terms. As Ford had 
argued when he announced the program, the federal government wanted to guarantee the 
conviction of young offenders and Americans in their early twenties—the population 
seen as susceptible to continued violent infractions. In practice, however, many units 
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often apprehended older offenders and slapped them with harsh prison sentences, while 
crime-prone youngsters remained on the streets.102  
With federal support, the RAND Corporation conducted several research studies 
examining the repeat offender phenomenon, and ultimately suggested that the federal 
government further concentrate its efforts on young adults, entering “the most active 
period of their career.” Fifteen year olds experienced the highest rate of arrest in the 
country, followed closely by sixteen year olds, and RAND determined that criminality 
peaked before the age of twenty-four. As young people accounted for the highest rates of 
burglary, larceny, and auto theft, the federal government needed to make career criminal 
programs more responsive to juvenile offenders in order to secure prison terms.103 
Meanwhile, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention gathered 
data that reinforced the federal government’s decision to target repeat offenders in urban 
areas. The LEAA awarded Walter Miller of Harvard Law School’s Center for Criminal 
Justice forty-eight thousand dollars to determine the source and solution to the problem 
of violence in cities with gang problems. Miller did not speak with a single gang member 
during the course of his study, but his understanding of youth crime, one that placed gang 
activity at the core of urban violence and guns at the core of gang activity, profoundly 
shaped popular conceptions of black neighborhoods and the national crime control 
program.  
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Although Miller viewed gangs as historically endemic to urban life, by the mid-
1970s, the problem of youth violence was, “of the first magnitude which shows little 
prospect of early abatement.” 104 Miller pointed out that gang members tended to be males 
between the ages of twelve and twenty-one concentrated in low-income neighborhoods 
throughout the twentieth century, but the increase in the population of urban young 
people of color, “a population that currently manifests the highest potential for 
involvement in violent and predatory crime,” in Miller’s words, required new federal 
gang control and prevention resources.105  The increasing demographic significance of 
young black and Latino Americans indicated to Miller that gang violence would escalate 
over the following decade. “Only massive infusions of federal money or massive jailing 
of gang members could stem the coming tide of youth gang violence,” Miller concluded 
in a nod to the larger objectives of the Ford Administration. 106 
Using the findings from Miller’s study,  Ford officials worried about the 
significant share of homicides youth gangs in New York and Philadelphia committed, but 
the fact that the research indicated that black and Chicano gang members committed fifty 
to seventy-five percent of all murders in Los Angeles alarmed the administration.107 
Miller also brought what he called “proto-gangs” or “troublesome youth groups” rising in 
Cleveland, Baltimore, St. Louis, and Washington, DC to the attention of policymakers. 
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The research revealed that the availability of high-quality weapons on the 
campuses of schools shaped the nature of gang violence.108 In Miller’s description, public 
schools evolved into a site where, “the gang extorts fees of a quarter to a dollar from 
students for the ‘privilege’ of passing through hallways or using school facilities.”109 The 
situation had deteriorated to the point that one official in Philadelphia called the schools 
“citadels of fear.” 110 In Los Angeles, gangs had “taken over individual classrooms and 
would have taken over the whole school if the police had not intervened.”111  The 
principal of Crenshaw high school nicknamed the institution “Fort Crenshaw,” and with 
Washington high school serving as the Eastside nexus of the Crips, the gang spread 
rapidly through South Central.112   Thus, in the years after the federal government made 
juvenile delinquency policy, punitive forces in urban schools, and a concerted attack on 
gang members the centerpiece of its new crime control strategy, the very problems it 
attempted to solve had only escalated. 
The outpouring of support the Ford Administration’s attack on youth gangs 
received from criminal justice and law enforcement institutions also helped the cause 
gain salience publically and legislatively. Drawing on Miller’s work, the American Bar 
Association endorsed Ford’s hard-nosed strategy in its report on the Juvenile Justice 
System in 1976. It seemed the administration’s approach was necessary to address the 
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inevitable increase of “youth gangs roaming city streets and terrorizing residents.” 113 In 
the words of LEAA director Richard Velde, Miller’s work was both “important and 
disturbing,” and the Department of Justice quickly took action. 114 
The release of Miller’s report in May 1976 served two political purposes for Ford: 
it instilled fear in the voting public and supplied figures enabling the president to call for 
greater social control in designated urban areas. The Chicago Tribune recalled 
sensationalized depictions of urban civil disorder: “Gun-toting teenage gangs with such 
names as ‘Savage Skulls’ and ‘King Kobras’ represent a growing threat to schools and 
communities in the nation’s big cities.”115 Meanwhile, as Ford prepared for his southern 
tour during the 1976 campaign, he assumed an even tougher stance on crime. At an event 
in Miami Beach, he called for juveniles to be tried as adults. “If they are big enough to 
commit the crimes they are big enough to go to jail,” Ford said, “Too many violent and 
street-wise juveniles are using their age as a cloak of immunity.” 116 When the president 
proclaimed: “It is time to give the streets back to the law-abiding citizens and put the 
criminal behind bars,” the audience launched into uproarious applause 117 
* 
In the spring of 1975, with the Career Criminal Program underway in its first 
eleven cities, the Ford Administration had simultaneously developed a firearms policy 
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meant to target handgun use among youth living in segregated poverty. Ford’s “Handgun 
Crime Control Act” carried with it a mandatory minimum sentence of up to three years 
and could help create opportunities for law enforcement authorities to identify and 
remove career criminals and gang members in possession of firearms from the 
community. Ford officials hoped the measure would help the embarrassing escalation of 
the nation’s reported crime rate.  
The discriminatory gun control program policymakers developed demonstrated 
the extent to which the White House used discretionary funds to meet its own desired 
purposes while operating through a block grant, states’ rights paradigm. The outpouring 
of support this racially targeted measure received from ardent gun control opponents such 
as Republican National Committee Chairman Bob Dole and Senate Republican leader 
Hugh Scott seemed to contradict their Party’s commitment to the second amendment. But 
the legislation carefully distinguished between the rifles, shotguns, and well-constructed 
handguns “ordinary Americans” and “sportsmen” possessed for leisure activities from the 
“shoddy” handguns offenders carried on the streets of the nation’s most poverty-stricken 
cities. 118  
As a statutory control on low-income urban Americans premised on possession 
rather than victimization, Ford’s handgun control Act advanced federal preemptive 
strategies based on abstract notions of potentiality.119 The policy targeted black and 
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Latino Americans by proposing a ban on “Saturday Night Specials”—or cheap ($50 or 
less), low-quality (.32 caliber or less), and easily concealed guns policymakers associated 
with urban street crime. Ironically, the availability of these weapons increased only after 
the Gun Control Act of 1968 banned the importation of low-cost handguns. The 
legislation inadvertently promoted a gun trafficking system whereby factories in the 
south assembled the parts of low-cost handguns and shipped them to urban centers in the 
north. A 1973 study conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms traced 
the source of half of the firearms used in New York City street crime to South Carolina, 
Georgia, Florida, and Virginia.120 Although thirty-seven Democrat and thirty-one 
Republican Senators supported Ford’s proposed measure, the House ultimately declined 
to pass major gun control legislation on the heels of the 1976 election. 
Yet with novel use of discretionary aid, Ford pressed on with “Operation Disarm 
the Criminal.” Attorney General Edward Levi and other Ford officials even exploited the 
terms of the 1965 Voting Rights Act to justify the anticipated punitive intervention into 
low-income urban areas.  For this landmark civil rights legislation contained the statue 
the Ford Administration understood as the most “nearly analogous to a selective handgun 
control law.” Drawing from the Supreme Court’s decision in Katzenbach v. South 
Carolina, which empowered Congress to “limit its attention to geographic areas when 
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action seemed necessary,” Ford and Levi reasoned it could “prevent excessive localized 
misuse” of handguns by implementing selective controls.121 
But the attempt to ban Saturday Night Specials was largely a federal concern. 
Police chiefs in Boston, Los Angeles, San Antonio, Atlanta and Newark argued in 
separate testimony before the Government Operations Committee for far broader gun 
control laws—some even proposing banning all handguns in their jurisdictions. For these 
local law enforcement chiefs, the proposed federal measure to attack only the distribution 
and possession of Saturday Night Specials would guarantee arrests of urban teenagers but 
would not alleviate the general problem of gun violence.122 Here, the United States was 
unique. Unlike most of Western Europe and Asia, licensing and registration was required 
to possess a handgun, and a number of European, Asian, and African countries prohibited 
handgun possession.  
Like drugs, the issue of firearms enabled the president and Congress to exert 
direct influence over designated communities. “Operation Concentrated Urban Law 
Enforcement” (CUE) was formed shortly after Ford’s major congressional message on 
crime in June 1975, and used the terms of Johnson’s Gun Control Act and the Explosives 
Control Act of 1970, which prohibited “the acquisition of firearms or explosives by 
certain types of individuals considered to represent potential threats to society.”123 The 
program doubled the number of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agents engaging on 
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“street work,” or acting undercover to purchase guns from illegal sellers in the eleven 
largest cities, where Career Criminal Programs were just getting underway. Using 
discretionary funds, the Ford Administration awarded the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms its requested 15.5 million dollars for the program, using two million dollars 
for support programs and the rest to hire new agents. The force did not reflect the 
demographics of the communities where it operated: of 1,674 total agents working for the 
Bureau, only forty-eight were black or Hispanic, none of whom worked in the southeast 
region.124 
To complement the addition of federal gun control agents on the streets of every 
major American city and to focus these manpower sources, Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms worked with White House Officials to implement what they called the 
“Significant Criminal Enforcement Program.” The broad definition the Bureau used to 
identify significant criminals made possible widespread arrest and federal prosecution of 
offenders. The program gave the federal government authority to label any “active 
criminal (even though not previously convicted) with a high potential towards crimes of 
violence, as documented by specific current and reliable intelligence data.”125 The Bureau 
would use the arrest records of the significant criminals to compile a secret list of 
firearms violators, much like the FBI’s Most Wanted List, although the names would not 
be available to the public.  
The Concentrated Urban Enforcement Program culminated in a sweeping series 
of handgun raids in Delaware, South Carolina, Kentucky, Virginia, Maryland, North 
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Carolina, and Ohio. Working with federally-financed fencing operations like “Operation 
Sting” already underway in cities like Washington, DC, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
agents drew from more than 1.5 million dollars in federal funds to purchase firearms at 
gun shows in cities like Baltimore, Boston, Chicago and on the black market.126 
These operations ultimately led the Bureau to determine that young urban 
adolescents used guns with greater frequency than any other group, and that this use 
constituted a cause of the overall juvenile delinquency problem.  Congress and the 
president cited these and other data to legitimize legislative initiatives that would 
continue to target low-income teenagers. A study of ten thousand minority youth in 
Philadelphia funded by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare found that only 
650 of the group accounted for a third of the arrests and half of the convictions in the city 
and that “over half of the black youngsters were delinquent, as compared to 28.64 percent 
of white youngsters.”127 The study, conducted by the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Marvin Wolfgang, ultimately suggested that since “more non-whites go on after the first 
offense to more offense,” the federal government’s “major concern should be with this 
racial group.”128 
This research reinforced Walter Miller’s findings on gangs, and encouraged 
policymakers to make sweeping statements about the relationship between racial 
background and violence. “Most young offenders who commit acts of violence and 
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pursue criminal careers come from minority ghetto and poverty backgrounds,” Charles 
Work of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration testified to Congress based on 
Wolfgang’s findings, and “so do their victims.”129 From the perspective of federal 
policymakers, the problem could be solved only by subjecting these groups to intensive 
patrol, court processing, and imprisonment.  
At the same time as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms cracked down 
on gun law violators in the final weeks of the Ford Administration, the Treasury 
Department moved to reorganize its ever more powerful law enforcement arm by de-
emphasizing field investigations. As quickly at it got off the ground, the federal 
government’s gun control squad came to an end with the Ford presidency.130 But the 
widespread arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of young Americans who joined gangs, 
possessed Saturday Night Specials, or had the potential to commit such crimes had only 
begun. 
 
V. The Mass Incarceration of Black Youth  
By the late 1970s, when the Career Criminal program failed to halt the rising 
crime rate and Ford’s Handgun Control Bill faltered, policymakers grew increasingly 
concerned about the breakdown in law and order they perceived. In order to prevent 
crime, as Senator Lloyd Bentsen argued: “The time has come for a concentrated effort to 
imprison those hardened and dangerous criminals who repeatedly commit violent acts.”131  
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What Bentsen called the federal government’s “new realism” with respect to the national 
law enforcement program sounded like the law enforcement theory behind Ford’s Career 
Criminal Initiative, as it represented a “concentrated attack on the chronically violent, a 
method of imprisoning the dangerous and making deterrence a factor in criminal law.”132 
Moreover, the federal government’s effort to “make justice an integral, not secondary, 
aspect of urban policy,” was at the center of the “new realism” and greater bipartisian 
consensus about crime by the late 1970s.133 
When Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, assessments of crime that took into 
account socio-economic factors returned to federal conversations about the issue, as they 
had during the previous Democratic administration. Yet like Johnson’s framing of the 
crime problem and the need for federal intervention to solve it, practices adopted by the 
Carter administration complemented the government’s larger impulse to assert greater 
punitive control in areas of segregated poverty as a means to manage the symptoms of 
urban crisis. During his presidential campaign, Carter painted the LEAA, or what he 
called “The Republicans’ showcase agency,” as wasteful, poorly coordinated, and grossly 
mismanaged. The federal government had invested more than five billion dollars into 
state and local law enforcement since the Johnson Administration, but the national 
agency had made “no contribution to reducing crime.” 134  Carter’s advisor to the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Lynn A. Curtis, believed that the 
prevalence of crime led to urban deterioration, and the federal government should 
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develop anticrime policy in order to reverse the general trend of residential desertion and 
the decline of urban tax bases.  
In the face of mounting crime rates and rising youth violence, liberals like Curtis 
argued that the idea of deterrence needed to move beyond the prison and include 
economic and social programs. As the prison population rose to 110 to 115 percent 
capacity at the national level and up to 175 percent in some southern prisons by the late 
1970s, inmates “could be regarded as part of a secondary labor class, with little chance of 
escaping perpetual joblessness,” as Curtis pointed out to Congress. Without question, the 
federal government’s decision to manage the urban crisis punitively had created its own 
crisis with respect to the national prison population.135 Curtis had a clear analysis of the 
net impact of the deterrence philosophy favored by the previous administration, which 
had provided “intellectual rationalization for the continued Vietnamization of the 
criminal justice system—more men, more equipment, more incursions, swift and sure 
punishment to deter a nonwhite enemy whose psychology the white power brokers of this 
Nation presume to understand.”136  
Criticizing Ford’s focus on repeat offenders as too narrow, the Carter 
Administration believed that the federal government needed to work towards effective 
and efficient administration of justice that reduced fundamental inequalities in the system 
while also undertaking massive urban rehabilitation and revitalization programs as a 
crime prevention measure. With federal researchers and civil rights organizations 
estimating the unemployment rate for black youth at forty to sixty percent, it seemed for 
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some liberal policymakers that a guaranteed jobs program was the answer. As Curtis 
explained, employment opportunities would help make the nonwhite crime rate “more 
comparable to the crime rates of whites.”137 The Carter Administration similarly believed 
that by focusing on the labor issues of “the most desperate people in the critical places” 
crime rates would decrease.138 Conservatives, however, clung to punishment as the only 
road to deterrence and, by extension, the national crime problem.  
Even as Congress and the Department of Justice recognized near the end of the 
1970s that, “federally funded programs to combat juvenile crime are perpetuating class 
and racial segregation,” the government turned towards greater institutionalization and 
concentration of federal funds to reach what policymakers now defined as “at-risk” 
populations. In the end, Carter’s crime proposals essentially continued the objectives of 
his predecessors. Carter called for swift and uniform sentencing for crimes and court 
reform. He continued to concentrate on serious and violent crimes and policing high 
crime urban areas as well as increased pay and training for officers. And he saw 
community-based initiatives such as street lighting and recreational opportunities for 
urban young people as necessary measures for preventing crime. 139  
As the 1980s approached, Congress warned that the decade would be marked by 
“a greater concentration of minority youth in the ‘at-risk’ population,” the potential 
consequences of which meant that, “an even greater number of minority youth will be 
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handled by juvenile and adult correctional facilities than is currently the case.” 140  Based 
largely on demographic research, these predictions linked birth rates to crime rates. Faced 
with the continued rise in the population of low-income youth, the federal government 
prepared for an even greater influx of marginalized Americans into the ranks of the 
carceral system. In one of the first major research projects funded by the Office of 
Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention, University of Chicago law professor Frank 
Zimiring used birth rates in the “at risk” population to warn that the a justice system 
would concentrate its resources on nonwhite Americans.141  
Drawing on Zimiring’s work, Congress blamed the Office of Juvenile 
Delinquency for building a system that pushed alarming numbers of nonwhite youth into 
adult correctional facilities. 142 It seemed the agency had focused too much on diversion 
and de-institutionalization, and not enough on programs that would reach potential 
delinquents, disadvantaged youth, or the “at risk” populations Congress now 
envisioned.143  The block grant structure proved to be a highly limited model. As in the 
case of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, block grants dispersed through 
the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention did not prevent states from 
spending money on crime in rural and suburban communities. “The Justice Department’s 
Fight Against Youth Crime,” the first major Congressional report on the activity’s of the 
Office, concluded that the failure of the federal government to concentrate its program on 
                                                   






youth living in segregated poverty and investments into runaway youth and community-
based diversion programs at the state level meant that “at risk” populations had not 
received their necessary share of crime control resources.144  In the middle of the Carter 
Administration, at the height of the federal government’s awareness of the racism 
inherent in its crime control program, Congress failed to act. Policymakers witnessed the 
phenomena of post-industrial violence, hard drug use, and structural deterioration happen 
before their eyes as white homeowners in California passed Proposition 13 by an 
overwhelming majority, cutting social programs and decreasing property taxes.   
The emergence of juvenile delinquency policy and the Ford Administration’s 
attention to young black urban men through its career criminal and handgun control 
programs reveals the ways in which, when it came to disrupting racial hierarchies, 
policymakers consistently turned to an increasingly punitive approach which clouded 
their attention to other social problems in urban centers. Instead of arresting actual 
criminals, the federal government entered the category of potentiality into juvenile justice 
legislation to hunt for future and possible criminals. Policymakers’ view of juvenile 
delinquency as the pathological result of welfare, poverty, and racism rationalized their 
investment in police departments and court systems to solve social problems. The federal 
government blamed the victim. Policymakers focused on pathology as though it was a 
surprise when they knew that poverty, subpar school systems, and unemployment created 
crime.  When Ford attempted to remove young delinquents and potential delinquents 
from targeted communities by creating a special court system and instituting a corps of 




special federal agents to arrest handgun violators, the federal government demonstrated 


































Urban Policy as Crime Policy: The End of the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration and the Rise of the Modern Carceral Complex 
 
I. The Carter Synthesis 
The combined impact of the exodus of domestic manufacturing from urban 
centers and the decision to invest in punitive institutions in the aftermath of civil rights 
legislation and urban uprisings reached a structural breaking point by the late 1970s. “The 
riots have ended,” a Carter campaign paper declared, “but the cities have grown more 
violent. They have become the enclave for the poor and they are becoming less and less 
able to support a growing demand for social services.” 1 This understanding of historical 
inequality led Carter and his advisors to conclude that federal policy in the postwar 
period had caused many of the social and economic problems the nation faced in the late 
1970s. “It was federally-financed farm mechanization programs that cost thousands of 
jobs for southern black people and it lured them to our urban areas,” Carter pointed out, 
in addition to “mortgage subsidies and highway construction programs” that facilitated 
suburban growth.2 With respect to crime control, Carter believed the federal government 
was responsible for building more equitable institutions. “We pride ourselves on having a 
good, fair criminal justice system,” Carter told Bill Moyers in an interview, “Now wealth 
is a major factor in whether or not you get justice.”3  
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The development of federal punitive policy over time, involving the use of 
tactical police squads, high impact hardware programs, pre-emptive policy, firearms 
sanctions, and career criminal court units, resulted in the unprecedented entrance of 
young black men from urban areas into the ever-expanding national prison system. 
During the campaign, Carter insisted that a full employment program and the end to 
federal law enforcement assistance could revitalize the neighborhoods where 
disproportionate numbers of these inmates had once resided.4 “Overall, I think the best 
way to reduce crime is to reduce unemployment,” a Carter position paper on crime 
stated.5 Campaign polls indicated that most Americans believed “cleaning up social and 
economic conditions in our slums and ghettos” would reduce crime. These results made 
Carter comfortable in suggesting a more structural approach. 6  The limitations of the 
block grant model favored by the previous administrations had fully revealed themselves.  
It seemed to many federal policymakers that autonomous state-level authority 
over local programs generated a “kaleidoscope of waste,” resulting in the greater 
marginalization of Americans living in urban segregation. 7 Carter believed the situation 
could be remedied only by turning back to the categorical model the Johnson 
Administration originally proposed for national law enforcement. Like Johnson’s, 
                                                   
4 ibid. 
5 Jimmy Carter, speech at Portland, Oregon rally, 27 September 1976, quoted in The Presidential 
Campaign 1976, Vol. 1, pt. 2 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978); ibid. 
6 3-31-80, “Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program First Annual Report to Congress in Response to 
the Public Housing Demonstration Act of 1978 and as Part of the President’s National Urban Policy,” 
Carter Library, Administration—Staff Offices, Ethnic Affairs, Box 1, Folder Anti-Crime Program [Lynn A. 
Curtis]. 
7 9-18-76 Letter to Governor Carter from Sam Bleicher Thru Stu Eizenstat RE: Re-authorization 




Carter’s punitive intervention invested directly in local programs, cutting out the states as 
the middlemen. Using population and crime data to devise a formula determining the 
needs of a given community, Carter hoped to foster a more effective and equitable 
funding structure. Whether through block grants or formula grants, or through a welfare 
framework or a crime framework, general purpose or categorical funding options enabled 
the federal government to maintain a degree of control in low-income communities. 
During the campaign and in the early into his presidency, Carter promised to 
restore confidence in the federal government and foreign affairs by stressing equity and 
human rights. He played up combating poverty in the “Third World,” remedying the 
urban crisis, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and solving international ruptures 
through diplomatic negotiation. He promised to bring inflation down by increasing 
government expenditures, but ended up abandoning the Keynesian policy of spending to 
combat the recession and turned instead to high interest rates. Domestically, corporations 
mobilized against unions, and the combined impact of unemployment and inflation 
promoted economic restructuring based on a service economy. Rather than improving the 
social conditions of middle and working-class Americans and promoting international 
cooperation and progressive social development in former colonial nations, by the end of 
the Carter administration inflation peaked at twenty percent and the drastic increase in the 
nation’s military budget severely cut social spending and federal economic regulation. In 
effect, Carter positioned the Reagan administration to continue the drive towards 
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privatization, the unprecedented growth of the military-industrial complex, and the rise of 
mass incarceration.8  
Like Carter’s approach to foreign policy and the domestic economy, the policies 
of his administration in practice did not approximate the president’s idealistic rhetoric 
and his attention to the structural causes of inequality. Instead, the administration 
synthesized the approaches of his predecessors and laid the groundwork for the Cold War 
policies and deregulation of the Reagan Administration. While Carter sought to increase 
federal control at the local level, he did not want new anti-crime resources for low-
income communities to arrive in the form of law enforcement grants. 
 By conjoining crime control and urban policy, the Carter Administration turned 
the popular debate stemming from the Johnson era about the root causes of crime on its 
head by treating crime as the root cause of urban decay. With all urban policy classified 
as crime control policy, the Carter Administration removed federal punitive programs 
from urban communities and recast them as general social programs. The 
administration’s Urban Anti-Crime Program exemplified how the full inclusion of law 
enforcement functions into urban social programs operated on the ground. As the first 
attempt to make a “comprehensive, long term commitment to the Nation’s urban areas” 
since Johnson, the program focused on revitalizing the most troubled public housing 
projects in the nation with security hardware. 9   
                                                   
8 See Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the 
Seventies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).  
9 Jimmy Carter: "National Urban Policy Message to the Congress. ," March 27, 1978. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.  
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For the Carter Administration, the resources of federal agencies could be easily 
combined in public housing projects to make an immediate impact on crime and, with it, 
larger urban problems. Carter officials framed the Public Housing Security 
Demonstration Act of 1978 as an anti-crime measure, but inside the White House, 
officials considered the legislation an “ethnic” proposal. 10 The funds were targeted at the 
most deteriorated and segregated areas in the country: places like the South Bronx, 
Chicago’s Robert Taylor Homes, and Liberty City in Miami.11 Even as the Carter 
Administration cast the Public Housing Demonstration Act as a community-based 
initiative, in practice the program functioned to increase patrol and surveillance in public 
housing communities.  
* 
From the Johnson Administration onwards, managing the modernization and 
expansion process of the lucrative law enforcement apparatus was a presidential 
responsibility.12 The federal investment in law enforcement and criminal justice 
institutions approximated five billion dollars alone, and total national expenditures 
increased three-fold from 1965, when Johnson’s Office of Law Enforcement Assistance 
first opened its doors, to 1977, when Carter moved into the White House. 13 The growth 
                                                   
10 In the Jimmy Carter Presidential Archives, the Public Housing and Security Demonstration Act 
of 1978 is filed under “ethnic affairs.” 
11 7-1-1980 Letter to Stephen R. Aiello, Special Assistant to the President for Ethnic Affairs, from 
Lynn A. Curtis Director Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Ethnic 
Affairs-Aiello. Box 10 Folder “Urban Anti-Crime Initiatives [Meeting] Shoreham Hotel 7-15-80.” 
12 “The Urban Crisis.” 
13 While in 1965, the nation spent 4.6 billion on criminal justice, by 1977 the figure had reached 
twenty-three billion, or roughly seventeen billion in constant 1965 dollars. Spending at the state and local 
level followed the federal government’s example and grew eighty-seven percent from 1971 to 1976. 
Federal government spending more than doubled (101.6 percent), state government spending was up by 
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was remarkable: Nixon started the LEAA with a sixty-three million dollar allocation in 
1969; five years later, the agency received its highest budget from Congress, at 871 
million dollars.14  Even in the context of inflation in the 1970s, the exponential increase 
of the federal government’s investment into law enforcement at the state and local levels 
occurred as other domestic programs received substantial cuts.  
As much as Carter wanted to avoid the “policy of confrontation with our cities” 
adopted by Nixon and Ford,  and hinted that he would abolish the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration during the campaign, he quickly discovered that the national 
carceral complex could not be easily dismantled. 15 Nixon had converted the LEAA into 
“a bureaucratic monster,” as one Carter campaign called it, so that by 1976, the agency 
supported five hundred planning and development agencies and 2,400 staff members.16  
With leadership constantly in flux—the LEAA fell under the command of five attorney 
generals and six head administrators before Carter took office—the agency could not 
function to meet its stated goals. 17  For the Carter campaign, the FBI data proved this. 
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Jerry Brown succeeded Ronald Reagan, the Office of Criminal Justice Planning reduced its employees 
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Crime had increased fifty-eight percent over its pre-Nixon levels, and rose an alarming 
twenty-seven percent during the Ford Administration alone.18  
Like the law enforcement budget, incarceration rates had reached historic heights 
when Carter announced his candidacy. Street patrol, longer sentences, and stricter parole 
boards resulting from federal punitive policy had promoted the rapid construction of 
prisons during the Nixon and Ford Administrations.19 After falling in the 1960s, the 
population reached nearly a quarter of a million inmates by the 1976 election, and 
corrections authorities planned for eight hundred and sixty additional facilities.20 If 
construction continued at this pace, five hundred thousand new inmates would occupy 
two thousand new penal institutions by May 1980, effectively doubling the nation’s 
prison population.21 In 1945, the average sentence was sixteen and a half months, by 
1965 it had jumped to nearly three years, and by 1975 the average sentence was just 
under four years. 22  Mass incarceration seemed imminent. 
Recognizing the legal system as too overburdened to provide humane treatment 
and prisons and jails as too antiquated to “correct” offenders, Carter developed punitive 
                                                   
18 7-19-76 Letter to Arnold Sagalyn; 9-18-76 Letter to Governor Carter from Sam Bleicher.  
19 “Some Random Notes on Crime and Corrections”/ “Sykes Memo,” Jimmy Carter Presidential 
Library, 1976 Campaign Files, Box 33, Issues Office-Bleicher, Folder Crime and Criminal Justice [4]. 
20 Each correctional institution averaged seven million dollars a piece, or roughly than twenty-six 
thousand dollars an inmate, and two hundred thousand American entered the American prison system from 
1972 to 1978. “Magnitude of the Wave of Jail and Prison Construction in the United States During the 
1970s,” National Moratorium on Prison Construction, January 1977, JCL, Gutierrez, Box 11, Folder 1; 
“Jimmy Carter on Prisons,” sent as a memo to Sam Bleicher. Re: Paper on Prisons, JCL, 1976 Campaign 
Files, Box 33- Issues Office Bleicher, Folder Crime and Criminal Justice [4]; 2-8-78 Open Letter to 
Attorney General Griffin Bell from Milton G. Rector, President of National Council on Crime and 
Delinquency, JCL Gutierrez Box 11, Folder 16. 
21 “Magnitude of the Wave of Jail and Prison Construction.”   
22 2-8-78 Open Letter to Attorney General Griffin Bell from Milton G. Rector. 
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urban policy that would dissolve federal law enforcement programs as a solution.23 Carter 
noted a “direct correlation between high unemployment t, high crime rates, and high 
inmate populations,” and linked his commitment to provide segregated and incarcerated 
Americans with jobs in the urban policy he formulated. 24  
The campaign internally recognized that black Americans bore the brunt of the 
intersection Carter identified. On the surface, the figures seemed to be improving: black 
families earned more money in 1974 than they did in 1964. During the recession of 1975 
to 1976, however, one hundred thousand black families fell below the official poverty 
level, and the unemployment rate for black Americans was two times that of their white 
counterparts. 25 Nearly thirty-six percent of all black teenagers could not find jobs.26 The 
fact that social scientists described a typical inmate as a black twenty-six year old high 
school dropout serving a six and a half year sentence for a violent crime further embodied 
these circumstances. 27 By the end of his administration, Carter successfully reduced the 
federal crime control function and made patrol and surveillance of segregated 
communities an easier task for law enforcement via his urban policy. But the social 
conditions in low-income urban neighborhoods failed to improve significantly: crime and 
                                                   
23 “Some Random Notes on Crime and Corrections”/ “Sykes Memo.”  
24 “Jimmy Carter on Prisons.”  
25 “Strategies for Controlling Crime: A Position Paper,” Prepared by The Administration of Justice 
Division, National Urban League, March 1978, JCL, Gutierrez Box 12, Folder 8.  
26 Thirteen percent of black Americans were unemployed in at the end of 1976, ibid.  
27 By 1977, the typical woman prisoner in the United States was black and under the age of thirty. 
This is finding of $289,025 study by LEAA and the California youth Authority interviewing some 3,000 
women in 15 state prisons, 42 local jails. “LEAA Study Shows: High Numbers of Women Prisoners are 
Young Blacks,” Philadelphia Tribune, 13 Aug 1977, 4; “Typical State Inmate Called Black, 26, Dropout,” 
The Baltimore Sun, 1 May 1977, B2. 
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drug use worsened, employment discrepancies remained, and record numbers of black 
Americans entered the prison system.   
 
II. Back Towards Johnson 
In the spring of 1977, the newly inaugurated Carter and Attorney General Griffin 
Bell appointed a joint study group to examine the controversial LEAA and make 
recommendations for its future. 28 During the campaign Carter aides considered the idea 
of abolition, and many others in the law enforcement community questioned the utility of 
federal assistance to states. In 1976, the Center for National Security Studies had 
evaluated the LEAA as a complete failure and suggested closing it down, and Baltimore 
City Police Commissioner Donald D. Pomerleau also called for the disbanding of the 
agency.29 Others, like the Independent Twentieth Century Fund believed the agency 
could still contribute to crime control by focusing on statistical research and cutting ties 
to local and state law enforcement and criminal justice institutions.30  
The first Democratic attorney general since Ramsey Clark, Bell made his 
dissatisfaction with the LEAA clear from the outset. At the time, the agency took up 
                                                   
28 As fellow Georgians and close friends, Bell and Carter could meet “on some of the most 
important things in five minutes,” yet fundamental tensions between the White House and the Department 
of Justice remained. Carter’s domestic policy staff felt that “Bell apparently feels that much of what they do 
is not really our business, and largely a function of enforcement…. Bell is very skiddish about White House 
‘interference’ at Justice.” Similarly, Bell refused to take action when the Department of Justice did not 
share its law enforcement priorities with the White House, often. In March of 1977, for example, when 
Carter began talking about the fight against organized crime as a critical element of his law enforcement 
program, Bell stalled in developing a comprehensive approach to the problem.  Memorandum for Stu 
Eizenstat from Annie M. Gutierrez. Subject “Getting to Work with Bell and Justice” March 24, 1977. 
Gutierrez Files, Box 24 Folder 4 “Justice, [Dept. of]- Policy.”; United Press International Clipping, 3-24-77 
in Gutierrez files Box 12 Folder 1 Crime [2]; Timothy D. Schellhard, “Carter’s Lawman,” Wall Street 
Journal, 20 Jan 1978, 1. 
29 Roger Twigg, “Pomerleau faults LEAA study release,” The Sun, 17 Apr 1977, B8.  
30 “A Good Concept Gone Awry,” Los Angeles Times, 28 Jul 1977, D6.  
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thirty-two percent of the Department of Justice’s budget, exceeding the FBI’s 513 million 
dollar allocation by nearly two hundred and fifty million. 31 Bell was especially upset 
about the types of programs the LEAA operated and funded. The agency spent two and a 
half million dollars on brochures encouraging police departments to seek federal law 
enforcement funds, and 1.5 million on three thousand bulletproof vests that had failed on 
test animals. 32  The new attorney general immediately fired LEAA director Richard 
Velde, who had worked as deputy administrator from the time the agency first opened its 
doors and commanded it during the Ford Administration. Velde’s vacancy left the agency 
without a director for the first half of Carter’s presidency.  
 The Carter administration charged that planning under the block grant concept 
spawned corruption and mismanagement. 33 Under the previous administrations, without 
coherent objectives or strong leadership, the LEAA had established a bureaucratic 
apparatus so vast that it could not effectively deliver money to the “areas of greatest 
need.”34 The problem was immediate and crime had increased under state control. Bell 
and Carter proposed formula grants to fix the LEAA’s problems. A channel needed to be 
reestablished between the federal government and local organizations. 35  If the federal 
government could resolve the inaccuracies in crime reporting, it could disperse funds 
                                                   
31 John M. Goshko, “LEAA’s Fate Weighed at Justice Dept.,” The Washington Post, 9 Apr 1977, 
A1.  
32 ibid. 
33 3-28-77 Memorandum For Peter Flaherty, Deputy Attorney General from Bill Albers, Subj 
“LEAA Recommendations,” Carter Library, Gutierrez Box 25, Folder 10.  
34 7-10-1978 Letter to Congress from Office of the White House Press Secretary, JCL Neustadt 
Files, Box 25, Folder 1. 
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more effectively. By ensuring that states would receive funds for law enforcement and 
criminal justice purposes based on a preset formula, Carter’s crime control policy focused 
resources on urban centers and offered Congress a punitive program in the form of an 
urban program.36 
  In the summer of 1977, Carter began to reorganize federal law enforcement 
agencies. The president ordered the Department of Justice to close all regional LEAA 
offices by the fall in order to cut a quarter of all agency employees and effectively 
“streamline” federal crime control. 37 Deputy Attorney General Peter F. Flaherty said 
when he announced the program, the change would “improve existing services provided 
by the LEAA, by reducing delay and providing more direct communication between 
LEAA and the states and localities involved.”38 By cutting out a layer of bureaucratic 
obstruction, the Carter Administration moved closer to its desired local target.  
 With the first step towards dissolution in place and the comprehensive evaluation 
of the LEAA by private consultants well underway, the White House began working on 
Carter’s first major crime message in November 1977.  Requesting his input on the 
president’s law enforcement program, Vice President Walter Mondale wrote to Bell: 
“This program could be one of the most important initiatives of the Administration. The 
crime issue cuts across the regional, economic, and social differences that so often 
                                                   
36 “A Good Concept Gone Awry,” Los Angeles Times, 28 Jul 1977, D6.  
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separate and divide Americans.”39 Both the White House and the Department of Justice 
believed that, if the LEAA could not be entirely abolished, criminal justice councils 
should replace state planning agencies and include local representatives.  
 The criminal justice community that had emerged alongside the LEAA had a 
mixed reaction to Carter’s proposed abolition of the agency. While local authorities 
praised Carter immediately after he closed the LEAA’s regional offices, governors did 
not respond as enthusiastically. The states wanted the focus of national crime control to 
remain on hardware and to provide autonomous spending of criminal justice funds. In 
late December 1977, two dozen state and local criminal justice officials met in Columbia, 
Maryland to discuss the federal government’s proposal restructuring the system of crime 
control. Their consensus statement urged for the preservation of the comprehensive 
planning process in each state, argued for the necessity of block grants for criminal 
justice, and resisted the gestures towards greater community involvement.40  Recalling 
the old debates surrounding Johnson’s Safe Streets Act, the governors argued that by 
earmarking crime control funds for specific purposes in a formula, rather than through a 
block grant model the federal government would compromise the nation’s safety. The 
lack of access to adequate planning resources at the local level would create even greater 
fragmentation in the national crime control program. 41    
                                                   
39 11-2-1977 Memorandum for Attorney General from Vice President, Subj: Crime Message. 
Carter Presidential Library, Eizenstat Files, Box 164, Folder 4; Carter sent the request to attorney general in 
9-16-77 memorandum for his cabinet officials “Crime Program,” JCL Eizenstat Collection, Box 164, 
Folder 2. 
40 “Consensus Statement Resulting From Criminal Justice Leaders’ Meeting,” 12-20-1977 
Columbia, Maryland, JCL, Gutierrez Files, Box 25, Folder 8.  
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 Carter and Bell also confronted a host of private agencies dependent on federal 
law enforcement grants as a critical source of funding. Although the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police had been in existence since 1893, when the LEAA 
opened its doors the organization received twelve million dollars from the federal 
government for fifty-three crime control programs.42 By the summer of 1978, after 
pressure from the International Association and other private law enforcement and 
criminal justice interests, Carter backed off from his proposed overhaul of the LEAA. 
Law enforcement grants to these agencies could continue as long as the federal 
government supported research and pilot programs, and the Carter Administration 
planned a new federal law enforcement agency that preserved this partnership.  
 Ten years after the federal government required states to modernize their crime 
reporting systems, it became clear to policymakers and experts that fundamental 
inaccuracies in data gathering had created systemic flaws in the execution of federal 
punitive policy. Conflicting figures produced by seventeen departments using fifty-four 
different data sets had compromised the federal government’s ability to create effective 
programs. By surveying victims, the LEAA found little, if any, increase in property 
crimes in 1975, while the FBI reported that crime rate increased nearly ten percent. 43 The 
only inference that crime statistics made clear was that police patrol and technological 
                                                   
42  These included the Police Legal Office Program, a Farm Equipment and Theft Program, a 
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advances had failed to impact urban violence and crime. 44 From the perspective of 
Carter’s domestic policy staff, the criminal justice data was virtually useless. All of the 
administration’s consultants confirmed to the White House that: “We simply do not know 
why the rate seems to be declining. It may suddenly go up.”45 Carter deliberately avoided 
discussing the crime rate at all in his public statements on the issue, in light of unreliable 
data and failed past promises.  
 If measuring the crime rate itself posed the “single biggest issue in the American 
criminal justice system today,” as law enforcement consultants told White House 
officials, then refocusing the federal law enforcement program as a research and data-
gathering enterprise could offer a more responsive and effective alternative.46 After 
spending more than a year reviewing the LEAA, the Carter administration devised a plan 
that maintained some of the functions of the agency, but divided it into three separate 
organizations.47 The LEAA would continue to provide money to state and local law 
enforcement agencies, the National Institute of Justice would oversee all federal crime 
control research, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics would be a clearinghouse for the 
data the LEAA and the FBI gathered. All three agencies would report to the new Office 
of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics designed by Bell in the summer of 1977. 48  
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The Institute would replace the crime reporting function of both the FBI and the LEAA to 
standardize and centralize federal law enforcement planning and research effort. 49  
 The administration assured states that their share of federal block grants for law 
enforcement would remain constant, but the Office of Justice Assistance could devise 
formula grants that took into account crime rates, local criminal justice expenditures, and 
tax bases to determine how to direct available federal funds. For federal policymakers, 
the formula approach ensured that the grants would foster greater community 
participation in cities with high crime rates. Meanwhile, with the LEAA’s end looming, 
state planning agency employees recognized that they were the next to go and many 
resigned from their positions.50 Across the board, Americans working in domestic 
programs found themselves vulnerable to layoffs as part of Carter’s larger effort to 
refurbish the social service function of the federal government.  
* 
 Carter announced his crime control plan from the White House Rose Garden on a 
ninety-degree day in early July 1978. The Justice System Improvement Act would limit 
the amount of criminal justice funds that could be used for hardware, salary increases, 
and construction and instead focus on research, local empowerment, and community 
participation.51 By placing crime control policy inside urban policy, Carter promised to 
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51 Carter also cut down on the lavish conferences and training seminars the agency sponsored. The 
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“target resource to those areas of the country with especially severe crime problems” 
while providing cities with flexibility in deciding how to use crime control funds via 
formula grants.52  
  Carter placed cities with severe crime problems front and center of his new anti-
crime legislation. It seemed reasonable to provide the seventeen states responsible for 
fifty-five percent of crime in the nation with additional urban law enforcement funds. 53 
Local governments confronting high crime rates “will be given greater discretion to select 
projects and programs particularly suited to their own crime reduction and criminal 
justice needs,” Carter told Congress.54 By improving the research and statistical 
capabilities of the federal government, policymakers could devise computerized formulas 
to “eliminate guesswork in state and local budget processes and result in the maximum 
lead time possible for sensible program planning.” 55 The field of criminology emerged 
when the federal government set out to modernize law enforcement institutions, and more 
than a decade’s worth of field research and statistics provided policymakers the grounds 
to treat crime as a scientific phenomenon that could be anticipated and controlled. 
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  In effect, Carter’s Justice System Improvement Act planted the seeds of the end 
of the LEAA. The legislation gave state and local government a three-year timeline to 
apply for federal grants, thereafter they were expected to operate law enforcement 
programs independently. As Assistant Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti told the press: 
“The scheme is to get more money to the counties, major cities and high crime areas with 
less red tape, less overhead, less bog-down in both money and time than through the prior 
grant process.” 56 The Act reduced planning requirements to offer states and local 
governments a different kind of autonomy in the implementation process. Instead of 
submitting a criminal justice plan the size of a telephone book every year, states now had 
three years to produce a more condensed version. 57 Under these provisions, cities like 
Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta, and Newark now provided the federal government with 
one application a year instead of forty.  
 As one political scientist aptly observed: “Even as the LEAA took on a life of its 
own, it became the unwanted child of the national government.”58Although Congress 
rejected the vast majority of Carter’s domestic policy proposals, including the 
decriminalization of marijuana, policymakers agreed that it was time to “phase down the 
LEAA program.” The dissolution of the LEAA occurred just as the agency had its first 
black director, and grassroots community members received an unprecedented degree of 
representation in the national law enforcement program.59 The budget cuts Carter 
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proposed in late 1979 and early 1980 to a host of federal social programs as inflation 
increased eliminated the agency and with it all federally funded crime-fighting programs 
in the face of accelerating violence. Only federal juvenile justice programs and the new 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics survived.60  
 
III. From Police Hardware to Housing Hardware 
 The federal government’s punitive turn in the context of deindustrialization and 
accelerating unemployment created extreme cases of marginalization and isolation in 
American cities. 61 Carter believed that only “increased access to opportunity for those 
disadvantaged by economic circumstance or a history of discrimination” could reverse 
the urban crisis, but punitive policy was still necessary to retain social control in the 
statistically violent neighborhoods in the Unites States. 62 Like his plan for federal law 
enforcement, Carter’s national urban program involved fostering partnerships between 
the public and private sectors and community and volunteer organizations. 63 As his 
predecessors recognized, the federal government could launch public works programs, 
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but could not tackle the problems of the “long-term unemployed and the disadvantaged in 
cities” without substantial support from the private sector. 64  
 The Justice System Improvement Act advanced Carter’s assault on the LEAA by 
giving the Department of Housing and Urban Development authority over urban crime 
control programs. Even as Carter cut off LEAA funding for police hardware programs, he 
sent Congress a housing hardware program framed as an urban revitalization initiative. 
With some of the worst living conditions in the country, the federal government believed 
that housing projects with more than twelve hundred units like Columbia Point in Boston, 
Stella Wright in Newark, Hunter’s Point in San Francisco, and Carmelitos in Los Angeles 
required a punitive intervention to be improved and secured. 65  
 As a visible manifestation of both socio-economic and crime problems, public 
housing projects offered Carter a viable testing site for punitive urban policy.66 At the 
time, the Federal Housing Authority handled two million units inhabited by 3.4 million 
Americans, but it grew especially concerned by the 152 “problem projects” scattered 
throughout the nation, the large family projects in “problem neighborhoods of distressed 
cities” where minorities—the large majority under the age of eighteen—constituted sixty-
three percent of all residents. 67 These sites were, “breeding grounds for crime, 
vandalism, delinquency and despair,” as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
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Patricia Harris described them. 68 The Carter Administration believed that until conditions 
in these projects improved, crime would continue unabated. By defining social services 
and neighborhood programs as security measures, Carter reframed the way in which the 
federal government presented its role in crime control. 
 Carter’s choice to place the anti-crime program within the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development embodied his synthesized approach to law enforcement that 
conflated anti-crime policy with urban revitalization policy. 69 It was the first major law 
enforcement assignment the Department of Housing and Urban Development had 
received. Linking crime prevention with urban redevelopment, the Carter administration 
wanted to address the needs of the majority of public housing tenants, who had “low 
income levels, high unemployment rates, high percentages of people receiving Aid for 
Dependent Children, high percentages of female-headed single parent households and 
high percentages of youth,” as the Act characterized its intended constituency. 70 In all, 
the federal government invested more than two hundred million dollars to make public 
housing “more attractive and to make them less crime-ridden.”71 The hope was that by 
the end of March 1980, the Department of Housing and Urban Development could launch 
a comprehensive, nationwide program based on its experience in the first thirty-nine sites 
selected from a pool of nearly two hundred applications.72  
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  In the context of inflation, economic stagnation, and budget shortages, Carter 
approached the urban crisis by “co-targeting funds” and using the full resources of his 
cabinet.73  The Urban Anti-Crime Program brought together officials from thirteen 
separate federal agencies and a new federal nonprofit organization called ACTION with 
local criminal justice and law enforcement employees, community leaders, security 
directors, tenants, and municipal authorities. Carter was especially proud of the new 
representation his crime control program opened up to “local folks.” 74 The Department 
of Housing and Urban Development contributed the largest share of funds for the 
program. It allocated twenty million dollars for physical development, which translated to 
more secure lobbies, improved doors and locks, and better lighting in housing projects, 
and gave two million to help pay for the salaries of law enforcement officials involved in 
the effort.75 The LEAA committed nearly a half a million dollars for a program 
supporting victims and witnesses.76 The Department of Labor handled the youth 
employment dimension of the program, giving eight million to youth conservation and 
improvement projects that offered employment to “at-risk” youth living in housing 
projects.77 
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 More than direct employment, the Carter Administration focused on providing 
incentives for private investment in deteriorating urban communities. With respect to the 
cities and public housing projects selected for Urban Anti-Crime funding, Carter’s 
concern responded to the exodus of business from urban areas. Three-quarters of his 
urban policy involved strong incentives that would attract private investment in what 
Carter officials termed “distressed communities.” 78 Following the previous 
administrations, Carter also looked to the private sector to provide jobs to “the long-term 
unemployed and disadvantaged in cities.” 79  
 Private firms were reluctant to remain or return to many cities because of crime, 
and the Carter administration needed to offer businesses an anti-crime component in their 
incentives package to ensure the program’s success. 80  The president pointed to the 
success of the subcontracting awards the Department of Defense started in urban areas to 
stimulate employment and redevelopment.81 In the face of continued resistance to urban 
economic revitalization, by the end of the summer in 1978 Carter signed a series of 
executive orders that directed agencies to reestablish themselves in downtown urban 
areas and to work with local retailers in areas with high rates of unemployment. The 
NAACP lobbyist Clarence Mitchell interrupted the signing ceremony to say: “In my 30 
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years in Washington, this is the most magnificent thing I have seen done by 
government.”82 Carter’s merger of urban policy and crime policy seemed to be working. 
 
The Urban “Software” Program 
 Carter frequently mentioned the importance of vibrant neighborhoods during his 
campaign and as president. He advocated community participation at a moment when 
Americans were increasingly growing more fearful, more segregated, and more isolated. 
As he framed it for the public, the Justice System Improvement Act would place 
grassroots organizations at the center of the Urban Anti-Crime Program. The Carter 
Administration allocated more than half of the funds provided by the legislation on 
“software programming.”83 Program officials believed this “people-oriented” approach 
could, “have a greater, more cost-effective impact on crime prevention for the dollar.” 84 
 Although the legislation incorporated community-based programs into its public 
housing initiative, the Carter Administration ultimately empowered crime prevention at 
the grassroots level in affluent and middle-class areas. Under Carter’s broad definition of 
urban program, small towns could also qualify for funds. In the process of reasserting its 
partnership with local governments via formula grants, the federal government created 
assistance programs in small towns and newer communities. The arrival of organizations 
from these areas asking for federal aid influenced Carter’s focus on smaller suburban and 
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rural communities. In 1976, the National Association of Towns and Townships and the 
American Association of Small Cities opened up office headquarters in Washington. 85  
 The Carter Administration did not include punitive measures in the programs it 
designed for these smaller suburban and rural communities. The Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare and the Department of Labor formulated an interagency 
agreement to build three hundred rural health clinics and to train five hundred local 
residents to staff them. 86 Carter also focused on public works in these areas, offering 2.5 
billion dollars in water and sewer grants to small communities, and supplementing the 
improvements with training programs for 1,750 rural Americans.87 The Carter 
Administration believed this interagency, community-based approach offered a “model of 
partnership and cooperation for the 1980s.”88  
 In low-income neighborhoods, on the other hand, a “self-help development 
program” encouraged local residents to participate alongside local government and the 
private sector in housing and revitalization projects. To assist in its drive to encourage 
community participation in urban crime prevention, the federal government brought the 
volunteer agency ACTION into collaboration with the LEAA and the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to administer the Urban Crime Prevention Program 
with 5.5 million dollars. Incorporated non-profit groups in cities with 250,000 residents 
could receive up to a half million dollars to develop crime prevention projects for low-
and-moderate income neighborhoods to “improve urban life and make our cities safer and 
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safer places to live,” as LEAA Administrator Henry Dogin put it. 89 This community-
based approach to crime prevention would ease the shift away from the direct presence of 
federal law enforcement institutions in areas of segregated poverty. 90  
 Even with his emphasis on community and neighborhood-based voluntary 
initiatives, the Carter Administration knew that a strong correlation existed between 
unemployment and crime. By the late 1970s, policymakers treated crime as a fact of 
American life and blamed it for eroding urban tax bases. But instead of investing in major 
new employment and education programs, the federal government decided to phase out 
its own law enforcement agency and infuse its previous responsibilities with domestic 
social programs.91 ACTION based its criminal justice program on the supposition that 
socio-economic factors caused crime, and that crime reduction programs needed to 
address material conditions. As ACTION’s director Bill Albers wrote to Carter’s 
domestic policy staff, the agency “recognizes that the criminal justice system is 
characterized by a crime control mentality and capability not well-suited to the task of 
delivering social services. ACTION’s approach recognizes that citizens and not the 
police, prosecutors, judges, defenders, jailers, prison and parole officials must be 
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responsible for holding that system accountable.”92 If the federal government itself was 
unwilling to produce major new employment measures for potential delinquents, it could 
rely on ACTION to give unemployed, inner-city youth the opportunity to earn modest 
wages through community service programs. 93  
 The Department of Housing and Urban Development moved residential security 
to the forefront of its programming in the late 1970s. In housing projects, as the black 
planner and criminologist Victor Rouse suggested to Harris, “software” and “hardware” 
approaches needed to be combined for an effective residential security system. 94  The 
idea was to use hardware grants from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
with software grants from the LEAA and ACTION for youth service and community-
based programs. 95 By fostering stronger neighborhoods and encouraging volunteer and 
citizen involvement, the federal government believed it was stimulating a powerful 
deterrent to crime. 96  
 As stipulated by the Public Housing and Demonstration Act of 1978, the 
“software programming” approach involved three aspects of residential safety: 
management, tenant involvement, and youth employment. The management dimension 
trained internal security forces, screened tenants, evicted tenants, and improved “the 
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exterior personalization of buildings to facilitate tenant social interaction and stake.” 97  
The federal government wanted to fund projects that would bring additional security 
guards into public housing, heighten awareness of housing authority rules, group elderly 
residents in clusters, and prevent vandalism by keeping apartment units occupied.  
 Past experience taught program officials that, “receiving ‘help’ from outsiders 
often perpetuates the sense of impotence and powerlessness that is a cause as well as a 
consequence of poverty.” 98  The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
believed that for the program to successfully function as a viable crime prevention 
measure, planned activities must emerge from the people who lived in the housing project 
themselves. It would encourage, “enabling the poor to take charge of their own lives, on 
helping them gain a feeling of competence and worth, a sense of being somebody who 
matters.” 99  On the surface, low-income Americans had opportunities to become involved 
in shaping domestic social policy once again. 
 The emphasis on grassroots involvement was, in part, a measure of necessity. 
Urban police forces were undermanned and overtaxed as a result of the decline of 
manufacturing and the middle class in cities, and tenant patrols promised to solve the 
twin problems of community exclusion from law enforcement activities and lack of 
adequate surveillance.  Yet even as the Act demonstrated a commitment to citizen-based 
initiatives and grassroots representation, under the terms of the program community 
groups could not operate their plans without approval from the city or the federal 
                                                   





government. The Act stipulated that local police, court, corrections officials, and 
delegates from the mayor’s office were included in all neighborhood group decisions.100 
 Aware that young people disproportionately committed crime in and around 
housing projects, and that young people in the nation’s “problem projects” also suffered 
from an unemployment rate of sixty percent and above, the legislation mandated that 
Public Housing Authorities use resources from the Department of Labor to train and 
place young people in crime-fighting and security positions. 101 The idea was that by 
paying young people to install security hardware, landscape, maintain and repair 
buildings, participate in “team policing” with police officers, and work in drug treatment 
and senior citizen programs, residents could gain viable skills and training in the field of 
crime prevention that would eventually benefit them in the larger labor market. Residents 
welcomed the new tenant patrols as an alternative to the encroachment of law 
enforcement officials and private security officers.102 
 One housing authority used its demonstration grant to train youth in security 
hardware and establish a small business to offer continued employment to program 
participants. At another housing project, a local community college worked with youth 
residents to provide vocational training and partnered with unions to establish 
apprenticeship programs. Some of the young residents who joined the federal 
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government’s urban anti-crime effort even received college credit for their community 
service contributions. 103  
 The local programs essentially mirrored the larger objectives of the Carter 
Administration for urban crime prevention. In Rochester, the Urban League received a 
two-year joint grant from the LEAA and ACTION in the amount of 350,000 dollars to 
implement seven neighborhood project organizations. One of the projects provided 
services for victims, two separate initiatives addressed the growing problem of arson, and 
another set up a community dispute center for civil matters. These ventures would 
“reduce social isolation and fear of crime in specific inner-city neighborhoods” and 
“increase the cohesiveness of neighborhoods through the regeneration of grassroots, 
volunteer involvement in crime prevention activities,” as the Urban League described the 
program’s goals. 104  In Newark, the Coalition for Neighborhoods received nearly half a 
million dollars for ten projects to address the rise of property crimes and arson in the city. 
Working in housing projects, schools, and with nine different community organizations, 
the Coalition hoped to “motivate citizens to become active participants in the partnership 
with the City and criminal justice system to address the rapidly escalating crime rate and 
the socio-economic forces which affect it.”105 But the ambitions of these community-
based programs did not have an opportunity to fully execute their vision, as the Carter 
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Administration ceased funding in early 1980 as part of his elimination of the LEAA’s 
grant function. 106   
 
The Urban “Hardware” Program 
 In practice, Carter’s Urban Anti-Crime Program allocated the vast majority of its 
funds to hardware programming even though the administration framed it as a 
community-based effort. For all his rhetorical gestures and awareness of institutionalized 
inequality, Carter’s law enforcement investment differed very little from his 
predecessors. The Public Housing Act formulated by the Carter administration set “a 
Congressional mandate to mitigate crime and fear in public housing.” 107 It did so by 
constructing physical barriers, new landscaping, new walkways and lighting to increase 
security. The Act added new surveillance technology and patrol to the lobbies of housing 
projects. It equipped apartments with metal doors, peep holes, dead bolts, double locks, 
steel framed windows, and bars on the first floor windows of federal housing projects 
with concentrated populations of black Americans.108  It also called for a complete 
physical overhaul of public housing, which required a far greater share of funds than 
programs for tenants themselves.   
 Although the Carter Administration steered the federal government away from its 
investment in most local police forces, policymakers recognized that patrol coverage in 
housing projects was highly inadequate, and that patrol should be increased “to whatever 
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point diminishing returns set in.” 109 The Act emphasized hiring more police to monitor 
residents of housing projects, but it also stressed the need for sensitivity training of these 
forces, including specialized police services. To stop crime more effectively, police 
officers needed to understand “social dynamics” in the dwellings and work more closely 
with management. 110 New community centers inside housing projects would serve as 
substations of police precincts as a means to improve general communication between 
police departments and residents.  
 Even though White House officials believed that “jobs for kids in this program 
are just as important as sensitively trained police in housing projects,” this insight was 
not reflected in the types of programs that actually received funding. 111 For example, in 
New Orleans, the St. Thomas housing project received 1.2 million dollars from Public 
Housing Crime Prevention funds. Half went to physical security and modernization, 
53,000 to community development, and 260,000 to programs that employed youth in the 
security field.112 A four bedroom unit in the St. Thomas project was converted into the 
Anti-Crime program center, where the resident council acting as the program advisory 
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board met, and where the youths who were responsible for installing security hardware 
and working on improving the general facilities to create “defensible space” picked up 
their modest paychecks. 113  Similarly, the Jeffries Homes and the Douglass projects in 
Detroit spent 1.3 million dollars on physical security hardware; roughly half a million for 
youth employment opportunities that involved installing light fixtures, fences, and a new 
lobby control system; and just fifty thousand dollars to fund the forty-person youth 
security patrol and pay the salary of the new Safety and Security Coordinator.114 Working 
with the Detroit Urban League, the Health Department, and the County Department of 
Social Services, the Brewster project established a youth recreation facility and a new 
mini-police station. 115  
 The residents of the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago had called for their own 
“War on Crime” in February 1978, a time when public programs and private security 
guards seemed incapable of keeping tenants safe. Chicago police estimated that roughly 
ten percent of the rapes, murders, and assaults in the city occurred in the massive 
complex, consisting of twenty-eight high rises.116 In this milieu, the Residents Advisory 
Council, the Afro-American Patrolman’s League, and tenant organizations formed the 
League to Improve the Community and unsuccessfully demanded that the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development fund unarmed resident patrols to keep the twenty 
                                                   
113 ibid. 
114 “Detroit, MI Public Housing Agency,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Office of 
Congressional Liaison Moore, Box 80, Grants File, Folder HUD Anti-Crime 9-25-79. 
115 ibid. 
116 Clarence Page, “Taylor Homes Residents Declare War on Crime,” Chicago Tribune, 13 Feb 




thousand tenants living in the housing project safer.117 Months later, the federal 
government arrived with a form of the League’s model that ushered in new degrees of 
surveillance.  
 The Department of Housing and Urban Development awarded the Robert Taylor 
Homes its largest grant under the Public Housing Act. In summer of 1979, the Carter 
Administration allocated 3.4 million dollars for improving living conditions in the project 
via surveillance and security measures, matched by an additional two million from the 
city of Chicago. Nearly three million dollars of the investment went to hardware, half a 
million for youth employment to install hardware and make repairs, and a quarter of a 
million for tenant organizations.118  
 The housing authority of the Taylor Homes decided to focus the program on the 
reconstruction of lobbies, the use of fences to secure courtyards, the installation of 
vandal-proof mailboxes, security outpost offices, and elevator safety. 119 Tenants were 
hired as Security Building Managers to monitor the lobbies and establish block watches 
and patrols.  Young residents worked as receptionists and security aides. The city 
supplemented these community-based patrols with a thirty-man police force to monitor 
tenants. 120  Using the “vertical policing” technique developed by the LEAA in the early 
1970s, many of these officers simply rode up and down the elevators all day. The effect 
of these practices continued the hardware approach under a social welfare guise and 
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created new opportunities for local law enforcement to bring already marginalized 
Americans into the criminal justice system. 
 
IV. The Rise of the Modern Carceral Complex 
 As the Carter Administration worked to eliminate federal law enforcement 
involvement outside of research and criminal justice, the federal and state prison system 
expanded rapidly. Without taking into account demographic shifts, unemployment, new 
sentencing patterns, and the inaccuracies the Carter administration identified in the crime 
rate, the federal government led the states in a massive prison construction project based 
on prediction and projection. The federal government and law enforcement officials 
insisted incarceration would reduce crime, mandatory sentences would ensure law and 
order, prison alone offered the best deterrent, and removing offenders from the 
community would ensure safe streets. None of these myths, however, proved to have a 
substantial impact on crime and violence in the nation.121 
 These approaches had produced a carceral complex that disproportionately 
incarcerated nonwhite Americans by the late 1970s. A study conducted by the American 
Foundation’s Institute of Corrections revealed that states “with low crime rates and high 
black population rates had larger prison populations; conservative states incarcerated 
more; no correlation could be established between race and crime rate, but rather race and 
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incarceration rates.” 122  The state with the largest percentage of black Americans, 
Mississippi, had a lower crime rate, while states like Nevada and Colorado, with a much 
smaller minority population, had higher crime rates.123  
 The demographic changes in the nation’s prison population emerged after Nixon’s 
Crime Control Act of 1970 stimulated prison construction. Federal funds earmarked by 
the legislation required states to craft master plans for the design and building of prisons 
with assistance from architectural and construction firms. At the same time, statisticians 
projected prison populations and informed policy based on those projections. The 
situation did nothing for the crime rate and was already draining limited state resources. 
Organizations like the National Council on Crime and Delinquency called for a 
moratorium on prison construction. Carter was sympathetic to this view but turned to 
community-based programs.124 Instead of a complete halt to construction, the Carter 
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Administration explored alternatives to incarceration and the decriminalization of minor 
drugs as a means to reduce overcrowding. Yet Carter failed to redirect the federal 
government’s turn towards incarceration as a means to control crime. Instead the prison 
population soared as the national law enforcement program unfolded on the heels of 
Ronald Reagan’s presidency. 
* 
 When Nixon called for a ten-year, “long range master plan” to expand and 
modernize the American correctional system in 1970, he did not subscribe to the belief 
that poverty fostered criminal behavior, but he did see imprisonment as a factor in 
preventing it. “We cannot effectively combat crime unless our correctional processes 
become more effective in reshaping the attitudes of the offender and giving him the 
education and training which will enable him to become a law abiding citizen,” Nixon 
wrote to Attorney General Mitchell: “It is well known that most crime in this country is 
committed by persons who have been through the correctional processes.” 125  Referring 
to prisons as “colleges of crime,” Nixon argued that the key to reducing crime lay in 
expanding the correctional system and reforming punitive practices to turn ex-offenders 
into productive members of society.126  
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 Nixon urged Mitchell to place regional facilities for  “hard-core criminals who 
require close supervision and particularly secure quarters, and with the mentally ill and 
narcotics and alcoholic addicts who need extensive medical treatment” at the center of 
the ten year plan 127 This included new juvenile programs, probation services and group 
homes that could be coordinated with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 
After a joint LEAA and census bureau survey conducted in 1970 revealed that more than 
half of inmates in local and county jails were detained for reasons other than conviction 
of a crime, that only thirty five percent were arraigned and waiting trial, and that another 
seventeen percent were being held for other reasons or awaiting arraignment, the 
restructuring of jails and the creation of regional facilities seemed a particularly expedient 
law enforcement measure.128 If prisons were meant to keep society safe by removing 
hardened criminals from the streets, it was curious that the majority of incarcerated or 
detained Americans had not been convicted of a crime at all. 
 To meet the aims of the Nixon Administration’s long range plan, the LEAA 
created a National Clearinghouse of Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture. The 
Administration recruited the Department of Architecture at University of Illinois to 
design adult prisons, and the Architecture Department at the University of Pennsylvania 
to plan juvenile facilities. State prison bureaus received the final products through their 
respective criminal justice planning agencies. The architects at Illinois favored a “total 
systems planning approach,” to fix general correctional problems and the physical 
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environment of the prison as well as alternatives to incarceration through community 
treatment programs.129 The administration also sent out teams of correction specialists 
composed of technical personnel, architects, food service specialists, and management 
experts to provide general guidance and assist prison authorities with any problems they 
encountered as an influx of new inmates joined the system.130 
 By May 1972, the master plan envisioned building thirty-five prisons before the 
decade’s end. It represented an entirely new plane of expansion for federal prisons: the 
government operated only three for the first thirty years of the Department of Justice’s 
existence, and slowly opened twenty-four more over the course of three decades. 131  
Under Nixon’s watch in the initial phase, law enforcement institutions prepared to 
embark on a half a billion-dollar program to double the number of federal prisons. The 
federal government set out to construct a dozen prisons for adult men, a dozen 
reformatories, four women’s prisons, four psychiatric facilities, and special Metropolitan 
Correctional Centers to replace overburdened urban jails. 132 As the long range master 
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plan unfolded on the ground, the Bureau of Prisons refused to share its contents with the 
larger law enforcement community. 133 Corrections expert William Nagel explained to the 
National Council of Crime and Delinquency at its annual meeting: “Everywhere the 
Bureau approaches its problems in secret.”134  
 The Bureau had to keep quiet as prominent criminologists and law enforcement 
experts called for a moratorium on prison construction, and the National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals urged that construction of new 
adult prisons should cease and that juvenile detention facilities should be closed, and 
implicated penal institutions in creating, rather than preventing, crime.135 
 As part of a separate prison construction plan, the Bureau of Prisons planned to 
add twelve new youth institutions at a time when a number of demographers claimed the 
youth population had already peaked for the foreseeable future.136  This contrasted 
sharply with the figures federal policymakers citied when they drafted juvenile 
delinquency legislation in 1974. During the Carter Administration, with prison 
construction well underway, law enforcement and correctional officials began to question 
the utility of preparing facilities for nearly thirty thousand new offenders in the context of 
a decline in the youth population and the general crime rate. 137  
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 Meanwhile, the number of black Americans in the federal, state, and local prisons 
skyrocketed as a direct result of the five hundred million dollar construction project 
initiated by the Nixon Administration. In Philadelphia, the percentage of black prisoners 
in the county jail increased from fifty percent in 1970 to ninety-five percent in 1974. 138 
In the state as a whole, black citizens accounted for more than sixty-two percent of those 
in Pennsylvania jails, even though they constituted less than ten percent of the entire 
population. 139 In federal prisons, black Americans received longer sentences and more 
punitive treatment.140  If the Bureau of Prisons worked to eradicate the institutionalized 
racism in its sentencing practices, it would have freed up hundreds of new cells instead of 
merely constructing more. 141  Nagel put it plainly: “We must conclude, therefore, that the 
new prisons are for blacks.” 
 Instead, the additional prison beds the long-range master plan called for came to 
be occupied almost entirely by black and Latino Americans. By 1977, the total number of 
juvenile and adult prisoners had reached 450,000, fifty-five percent of whom where white 
offenders. 142 In the seven years after the Bureau developed its ten-year plan, fifteen new 
federal prisons opened for 4,871 new inmates. During that time, the percentage of 
nonwhite federal prisoners increased from 27.4 percent to over thirty-eight percent, or the 
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addition of 4,904 black and Latino prisoners into the federal system—exceeding the 
available new beds by thirty inmates. 143 It is not surprising that black Americans filled an 
alarming share of these newly constructed prison spaces given the grim socio-economic 
trends federal researchers observed. In 1972, when thirty four percent of black Americans 
lived below the poverty level as opposed to ten percent of the white American 
population, forty-two percent of all Americans in jail were black. 144  
 Given the historic arrest levels low-income black Americans faced after the 
federal government began to invest in local law enforcement institutions, access to 
educational and employment opportunities often determined the likelihood of 
incarceration.145 Of these black Americans detained in local jails, seventy percent did not 
receive a high school diploma, and nearly sixty percent earned less than three thousand 
dollars a year. 146  Similarly, in state prisons, forty-eight percent of all inmates were black 
in 1973. Of those, sixty four percent did not complete high school, and seventy-five 
percent were under the age of thirty. In Florida, where black Americans constituted only 
fifteen percent of the state population, they took up fifty five percent of the prison beds. 
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In Alabama, where they accounted for twenty-six percent of the total population, they 
accounted for sixty percent of the prison population. 147  
 Despite the fact that black Americans were disproportionately represented in 
criminal justice statistics as both victims and offenders, they were largely excluded from 
planning and implementing the national law enforcement programs. Their exclusion 
hindered the federal government’s ability to bring an end to crime and violence, and may 
have even worsened the problem. The federal government had funded enough studies that 
indicated that nearly half of all non-whites were afraid to walk in their communities alone 
at night. Even though Carter’s urban policy stressed community participation and 
grassroots representation as a means to foster a sense of residential safety, the decision to 
invest most of these funds in security hardware and to include law enforcement officials 
in all community-based programs forced many residents to turn to their own tactics. An 
Urban League Report noted: “It is not unusual to see entire neighborhoods in black 
communities with bars on windows and doors resembling fortresses of old.” 148 The effect 
was to perpetuate the “culture of fear” in urban centers, leading to social isolation and 
hindering the development of vibrant communities.  
 
V. Urban Fire 
 American cities burned again as new carceral institutions emerged in the 1970s. 
In the South Bronx, vacant lots and ashes of apartment buildings were so prevalent that 
had they burned down all at once it would have been declared a national disaster. Private 
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businesses set many of the fires in an attempt to collect a shred of insurance—more 
valuable than maintaining a business in an area of extreme poverty. Residents, however, 
set most of the fires themselves. 149  Policymakers who ventured to the area in the mid-
1970s noted: “the overall effect of driving through areas of the central and south Bronx is 
that of driving through Berlin shortly after the second World War. Shell after shell of 
empty burned out buildings greets the eye, relieved here and there with empty lots, which 
are left after the buildings themselves have been completely demolished. An occasional 
packing case in which people are actually living punctuates this dreary landscape.” 150 
And while the Bronx may have represented a more extreme case of the impact of 
deindustrialization and divestment in areas of segregated poverty, New York was burning 
elsewhere, too—in Brownsville, Bushwick, and Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn; and in 
Harlem and the Lower East Side in Manhattan.  
 Astute observers of urban social trends saw the flames coming.  As early as 1970, 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan mentioned the likelihood to Nixon as special advisor to the 
president on urban policy. For Moynihan, arson in “slum neighborhoods, primarily 
black,” was linked to the “certain types of personalities which slums produce,” and 
paralleled general crime problems. 151 “Fires are in fact a ‘leading indicator’ of social 
pathology for a neighborhood,” Moynihan wrote Nixon, “They come first. Crime, and the 
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rest, follows.”152 Moynihan believed the fire setting phenomenon expressed the extreme 
degree of social alienation low-income black Americans experienced. 153    
 Moynihan’s warning foreshadowed what characterized the urban landscape for 
the remainder of the decade, and by the late 1970s, arson was the nation’s fastest growing 
major crime. 154  It began to rise sharply in 1972, two years after Moynihan penned his 
memo on the subject. 155  The problem did not receive attention until the Aerospace 
Corporation received its “Arson and Investigation” Report, researched with a ninety 
thousand dollar grant from the LEAA.156 The study uncovered that property losses from 
arson amounted to 1.2 billion dollars in 1974, compared with only 325 million dollars in 
1964. Almost immediately after the Aerospace Corporation released the report and the 
National Fire Protection Association produced data sets confirming its conclusions, the 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations called a series of hearings to begin 
planning a federal fight against what was fast becoming a “nationwide epidemic.”157 In 
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declining cities, the Department of Justice concluded that arson had reached “near-plague 
proportions.”158 
 The Department of Justice quickly made its “Arson Control Strategy” a top 
priority. Even as the LEAA closed down offices, fired employees, and prepared to cut off 
its law enforcement assistance to states, the agency launched a four million dollar anti-
arson program in 1979. 159 That year alone, communities across the United States faced 
thirteen thousand deliberately set or suspicious fires. Law enforcement officials estimated 
that juveniles set about a quarter of these fires, and accounted for more than half of all 
arson cases in some jurisdictions. 160 
 In drawing Nixon’s attention to urban fire setting, Moynihan argued that riots 
constituted a precondition, or a mass incidence of fire, from which crimes subsequently 
flowed. “Fires in the black slums peak in July and August,” Moynihan wrote, “The urban 
riots of 1964-1968 could be thought of as epidemic conditions of an endemic 
situation.”161 And while the federal government did not confront any major incidents of 
urban civil disorder in the 1970s, when Miami’s Liberty City housing project erupted in 
May 1980 it reopened the familiar debates about pathology, poverty, crime, and decay 
that had inspired the federal government’s punitive policy during the Johnson 
Administration.  
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  After an all-white jury acquitted four Miami police officers for the brutal death of 
black insurance agent, former Marine, and beloved Liberty City resident Arthur 
McDuffie during a routine traffic stop, black and West Indian residents turned their 
outrage into material violence. At the time, Miami had an official black unemployment 
rate of twenty-three percent, and some estimates placed it as high as fifty percent.162 
Although Liberty City (nicknamed “germ city” by its young residents) bore the brunt of 
the damage from the riot, eruptions occurred in neighboring black communities of 
Brownsville, Overtown, and Coconut Grove. In an attempt to provide a constructive 
outlet for the community after the McDuffie verdict, black moderate political leaders 
called a silent protest vigil. Five thousand residents promptly arrived to protest in front of 
the Miami police department courthouse, chanting “we want justice!” The militant turn of 
the vigil quickly spiraled out of control.  
 Unlike the more contained urban civil disorder in the 1960s, the riot spread to 
white communities nearby and was brutally violent. While black-owned businesses were 
largely unaffected by the uprising, the participants torched factories, clothing stores, and 
supermarkets along Northwest 54th street—the central commercial district of Liberty 
City—leaving most of the businesses virtually empty or completely destroyed. 
Segregated bands on all sides hunted for residents to shoot, and some even mutilated and 
burned civilians. 163   It took 3,600 National Guardsmen and the local police department 
four days and eight hundred arrests to halt the uprising.164  
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 On June 9th, Carter attended a meeting with local leaders at the James E. Scott 
Community Association conference hall. In line with general cuts to domestic programs, 
Carter informed the audience that he could not provide any programs or federal 
investment for the devastated area, but would “meet the community half-way” in any 
plans they devised to rebuild the riot-torn neighborhoods of Miami. 165 As the Miami 
Times reported: “The audience was almost speechless.” 166 When Carter left the 
conference hall, destined for Air Force One, black youth and Liberty City residents threw 
bottles and bricks at the president and his entourage. 167 In the end, most of the federal 
grant money Carter managed to provide benefited Cuban business owners, many of 
whom followed the lead of Sears, JC Penney, and Grand Way Supermarket: they left the 
riot area after the incident and never returned. 168 If the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration offered a federal response to urban civil disorder and violence beginning 
in the mid-1960s, then the riot in Liberty City and the enduring marginalization of low-
income black Americans seemed to fully justify the end to the agency the Carter 
administration had secured and the full integration of urban and crime control policy.  
 The return of urban civil disorder coincided with renewed demands for law and 
order. New political opportunities opened for conservatives as white Americans grew 
increasingly anxious about the decline of the U.S. economy and international relations 
during the Carter years. Inflation made conservative tax principles, cuts in social 
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spending to encourage private investment, and reduced government regulation appealing 
to those Americans resentful of the progressive social rights movements championing 
gender equality, gay liberation, and immigrant rights. Neoconservative thought arguing 
that domestic political developments in the 1960s led to a decline in morality and 
defiance of traditional authority gained ground. Although many neoconservatives had 
once participated in left-wing movements and supported liberal causes, they came to 
believe that social programs were more harmful than helpful, that welfare encouraged 
unwarranted dependency, laziness, and single motherhood rather than eliminate poverty. 
The Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute emerged in the early 
1970s but grew in popularity during the Carter administration and further decimated these 
ideas. Neoconservative principles proved highly influential to Ronald Reagan as he 
prepared for another presidential bid.   
 White House officials and consultants had a profound understanding of the larger 
social impact of the federal government’s punitive turn, even if they were unwilling or 
unable to address the structural discrepancies within it. In his luncheon speech at the 
National Institute for Crime and Delinquency’s annual meeting, the Carter 
Administration’s law enforcement consultant William Nagel described the daily 
operations of Philadelphia’s court system to emphasize the consequences of crime control 
programs as they operated on the ground:  
“Each morning at 8:30 am, I pass through the courtyard of the magnificent 
French Renaissance building that is our City Hall. There, 15 to 20 
policemen (Friday 19 of the 20 were white) with shiny boots, Nazi-type 
hats, mace, shot guns, pistols and police dogs oversee the unloading of 
two, three, four blue buses marked Philadelphia Sheriff’s Department. 
And anywhere from 70 to 150 prisoners—almost exclusively black—file 
out in handcuffs and sometimes chains. They have been locked up in our 
jail, in our handcuffs, in our chains, and that night—after their day in 
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court—many will be locked up in our prisons. As Bill Moyers has 
observed we are withdrawing into a locked up society with locked up 
homes, locked up expectations; locked up human urges. We are not an 
integrated people, we are a separated people.” 169 
Within the first ten years of the national crime control program, more black Americans 
died on the streets in neighborhoods of segregated poverty than in the fields of 
Vietnam.170 If arson and the Liberty City riot represented a symptom of general urban 
decline and decay, they also represented the devastating impact of the rise of the carceral 
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From the War on Crime to the War on Drugs 
The limitations of civil rights legislation to fundamentally alter race-based 
inequality quickly revealed themselves to policymakers by the time Watts erupted in the 
summer of 1965. Daniel Patrick Moynihan and many others in the Johnson 
administration pointed out the need for federal programs to foster greater socio-economic 
inclusion of black Americans. Although Johnson briefly committed his Administration to 
a “War on Black Poverty,” widespread and mounting incidents of urban civil disorder 
convinced the president and Congress that a restoration of “law and order” in areas of 
segregated poverty was essential. Sensationalized coverage of the riots convinced the 
nation that crime was indeed rising when in fact it had stabilized since the prohibition era. 
Believing that “warring on poverty is warring on crime,” the Johnson administration 
produced a blueprint for a national law enforcement program modeled after the federal-
local partnership the Great Society established in the nation’s urban centers. Contrary to 
popular belief, Johnson did not reluctantly sign the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 because he opposed federal punitive policy, but because he knew in 
doing so he would bring postwar liberalism to its end by changing the course of 
federalism and endorsing the legislation’s block grant provision. Johnson could not have 
foreseen the unintended consequences of the process he put in motion.  
 Yet the decentralized approach to governance—championed by the Nixon, Ford, 
and Reagan administrations as the “New Federalism”—failed to meet federal social 
control objectives. In the aftermath of the riots, the problems of the cities and the plight 
of urban black Americans were major domestic concerns. After it awarded block grants 
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under a general purpose, the federal government grew frustrated with state-level 
mismanagement of tens of millions of dollars in new law enforcement funds. If it did not 
succeed in substantially lowering the crime rate or stopping urban violence, the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration did succeed in constructing a massive and highly 
corrupt bureaucracy that grounded the modern security industry, the professionalization 
of law enforcement, and the expansion of carceral institutions. Frustrated with the lack of 
federal authority the block grant system provided, Nixon reallocated increasing amounts 
of the law enforcement budget to use at his discretion. This translated to increasing patrol 
and hardware for police departments responsible for monitoring predominately black 
urban areas that FBI statistics identified as “high crime.” 
 The War on Crime’s material manifestations spawned and reinforced violence 
within the communities it targeted. This is itself reflective of the ironic consequences of 
federal punitive policy during its first twenty years. Soon after states received their first 
federal law enforcement grants, the police footsoldiers engaged in street battles with 
black urban youth. Tactical mobile units—from STRESS in Detroit to the Citywide Anti-
Crime Section in New York—unleashed the “self-perpetuating force” Los Angeles Police 
Chief Ed Davis warned about back in 1969. In the immediate context of Nixon’s Office 
of Minority Business Enterprise and early affirmative action programs, black political 
organizations responded to the intrusion of police officers and surveillance equipment in 
their neighborhoods by accepting the premise of national law enforcement and 
demanding greater representation to offset the effects of police brutality. Meanwhile, as 
the Nixon administration eradicated community action programs and other Great Society 
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initiatives, local police officers overshadowed the social workers and grassroots activists 
that had once benefitted from federal partnerships.  
 By the mid-1970s, with the court system on the brink of collapse as a result of 
increased urban patrol and the corresponding increase in arrests of young black men, the 
Ford administration moved beyond the police hardware stage to focus on juvenile 
delinquency and the judicial system. By framing its attack on the root causes of crime as 
an attack on black youth “in danger of becoming delinquent”—which translated to all 
low-income young people living in housing projects, on government assistance, or from a 
“high crime” area—the Ford administration criminalized entire communities in urban 
centers struggling to compensate for the decline of domestic manufacturing and with it 
the middle-class tax base. To sharpen the federal government’s ability to reach this 
“potentially delinquent” population, Ford supported handgun control programs in 
designated cities and a new, expedited court system for gang members. 
 Ten years after the Safe Streets Act, the fact that both the crime rate and socio-
economic inequality increased called the entire national law enforcement program into 
question. Carter dissolved federal law enforcement assistance programs by conjoining 
urban and punitive policy. Now law enforcement would factor prominently in all 
domestic social programs. Carter anticipated many of the policies later adopted by the 
Reagan administration with respect to urban policy and deregulation.  Rather than a sharp 
break, the Carter administration positioned Ronald Reagan to revolutionize the federal 




The unprecedented expansion of the prison system in the mid-1980s and 
sensational media coverage of the War on Drugs has served as a point of origin for most 
examinations of the rise of mass incarceration in the late twentieth century. Yet by 
considering Reagan’s Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 as the culmination of the 
federal crime control measures described above, we can understand the contemporary 
carceral complex as part of a much longer historical process. Twenty years after the 
federal government’s first major crime control bill, Reagan’s 1988 legislation brought to 
fruition some of the most radical proposals put forth by the Nixon and Ford 
administrations, refurbished federal law enforcement in the institutional vacuum the 
Carter administration created, and opened up what had previously been a domestic social 
war to the military. Although Johnson ignited the federal government’s retreat from 
postwar liberal reform when he signed the Safe Streets Act with the block grant 
provision, Nixon and Ford transitioned federal domestic programs away from Democratic 
officials. The promise of state autonomy benefitted conservative strongholds in small 
towns and suburbs, and Reagan and George H.W. Bush reinvigorated “New Federalism” 
by drastically reducing federal domestic programs.  
During the mid-1970s, as crime rates escalated alongside the federal law 
enforcement budget, pre-emptive policy criminalized urban social programs and made 
encounters between young urban Americans and law enforcement authorities a frequent 
occurrence. In the context of stagflation, the rise of Soviet forces in the Middle East, and 
unsuccessful military interventions in Southeast Asia and Latin America, Carter scaled 
back domestic spending to reassert the military strength of the United States. Reagan 
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advanced this strategy by shifting the federal government’s focus towards defense 
concerns while extending this policy into crime control via the War on Drugs.  
By framing his crime control program as a narcotics control program, Reagan’s 
War on Drugs connected the Department of Defense with the Department of Justice. It 
was a domestic social war that required patrol both at the nation’s borders and in 
segregated urban neighborhoods. Defense agencies shared responsibilities with local law 
enforcement by land, air, and sea, and Congress criminalized drug users, especially low-
income black users, by deciding to concentrate and stiffen penalties for crack cocaine. 
Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” program and a major anti-drug public relations campaign 
unfolded when the most destructive drug epidemic the nation confronted in its history 
bore devastating consequences in the communities where the federal government had 
been fighting a War on Crime for two decades.  
“In the eleventh hour of this presidency,” Reagan said when he signed the 1988 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act, “we give a new sword and shield to those whose daily business it 
is to eliminate from America’s streets and towns the scourge of illicit drugs.” 1 It was the 
last major piece of domestic legislation the Reagan administration secured, the product of 
a seven year effort. 2 “We worked hard in the early ‘80s on our national recovery so that 
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we might be able to recognize, indeed, deal with social problems that had been too long 
ignored and sometimes obscured in the past,” Reagan said. But the president was not 
interested in dealing with the root causes of the social problems he mentioned. Over the 
course of his political career, Reagan redefined notions of governmental accountability 
by refusing to enact policy that attempted to remedy historical injustice.3 By centralizing 
control over federal law enforcement programs, inviting the military to fully participate 
in the domestic social war, and bringing black drug users into the prison system at 
unprecedented rates, Reagan believed he had effectively ushered in a “renewal of our 
fundamental beliefs and values as a nation.” 4  
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 made possible a militaristic intervention in 
domestic crime control, a critical policy shift that received widespread support from 
Congress. Thirty-nine Democratic senators and thirty Republicans sponsored the Act, and 
it passed the House by a 346-11 vote. A number of Democrats in Congress worked 
alongside the Administration during the 1980s to bring about the militaristic turn. “Crime 
is a national defense problem,” said Senator Joe Biden in 1982, “You’re in as much 
jeopardy in the streets as you are from a Soviet missile.”5 Indeed, Democrats also treated 
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domestic social war as any other war. In the words of Oklahoma’s Congressmen Glenn 
English: “We in the Democratic Party realize that the war on drugs has to be fought like 
World War II—a complete and thorough effort, one dedicated to victory at any cost.”6 
Ironically, while Reagan gained popularity by pledging to fight big government, 
his renewal of the fight against the USSR’s “evil empire” sponsored the largest military 
buildup in the history of the United States. As the administration continued to cut federal 
spending on domestic programs, seeking instead private solutions, it wasted billions of 
dollars on a “Star Wars” space-based system to intercept enemy missiles under the 
Strategic Defense Initiative. By casting the War on Drugs as part of his larger 
commitment to preserving traditional American values in the face of outside influences, 
Reagan made battling street crime and stopping the urban drug trade at any cost the 
foremost domestic concern of his administration.  
* 
The LEAA had sponsored special equipment and training programs for local 
police officers administered by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence 
Agency in the early 1970s, but during the Reagan administration policymakers worked to 
solidify national security partnerships. After directing Secretary of Defense Frank 
Carlucci in May 1988 to “tap the best minds both inside and outside government to come 
up with creative solutions on how we can better use military resources and technologies 
to detect drugs and support civil law enforcement agencies in interdiction,” Reagan 
delivered a rousing speech at the commencement exercises of the United States Coast 
Guard. “Our military assets can be used for greater command and control functions in 
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surveillance and drug detection,” Reagan reminded the graduates. 7 In effect, Reagan 
integrated the domestic social war into the objectives of defense agencies fighting the 
Cold War. 
Immediately after Reagan’s inauguration, White House officials set out to revise 
the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which precluded military involvement in domestic law 
enforcement. Reagan’s Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies 
Act passed at the end of his first year in office. It permitted defense agencies to provide 
local law enforcement institutions access to weapons, intelligence, research, and military 
bases to improve drug interdiction efforts. Following the Administration’s lead, when 
Congress reauthorized the Department of Defense in 1982 it expanded the Military 
Cooperation Act’s definition of “indirect military involvement” to include the exchange 
of information, equipment, facilities, and manpower. 8 The new authorization allowed the 
Navy to offer vessels to the Coast Guard and air surveillance assistance to local law 
enforcement, the Air Force to give police sea and air traffic information, and the Army to 
lend customs and the Drug Enforcement Agency aircraft and helicopters. 9  
The rise of military involvement in domestic law enforcement coincided with the 
demise of the crime control institutions associated with Reagan’s predecessors. Widely 
accepted as an inefficient failure during the Carter administration, which phased out the 
agency in 1980 after thirteen years of existence and a total of eight billion dollars in 
expenditures, the LEAA shut down completely on April 15, 1982. Although state-level 
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criminal justice bureaucracies remained the prevailing legacy of the LEAA, the concept 
of “massive federal expenditures of the Great Society sort and not spending much time 
defining the problem is dead,” Deputy Attorney General Stanley Morris declared when 
the Department of Justice closed the agency.10  
In the absence of a single federal institution responsible for directing the 
ambitious scope of the War on Drugs, Reagan officials worked to coordinate federal 
resources. The Carter administration introduced the War on Crime into domestic social 
programs, especially in urban areas of segregated poverty, and Reagan similarly 
introduced the War on Drugs into defense programs, especially on the Caribbean and 
Mexican border. Building from the partnerships the Military Cooperation Act established, 
Reagan directed Vice President George H.W. Bush to implement the border control 
dimension of the Administration’s law enforcement program. Early in 1982, Bush called 
the South Florida Task Force to coordinate all law enforcement and defense activities in 
the Miami area. A year later, Reagan expanded the program as the National Narcotics 
Border Interdiction System. Under Bush’s direction, the interdiction system coordinated 
federal, state, and local law enforcement and defense resources in an international anti-
drug effort.11  
Meanwhile, as Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” campaign gained ground in 
American public schools, Congress passed its first major piece of crime control 
legislation in fourteen years. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 offered 
what Reagan’s Attorney General William French Smith called, “the most far-reaching 
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and substantial reform of the criminal justice system in our history.”12  By imposing the 
radical sentencing and bail procedures tested by the Nixon administration’s D.C. Crime 
Control Act of 1970, the 1984 Act ensured that incarceration rates would similarly rise in 
states and locales far outside the nation’s capitol.  
Among twenty-three other law enforcement measures, Reagan’s Act authorized 
judges to indefinitely hold defendants deemed potential “dangers to the community” 
when setting bail. This practice had disproportionately touched young black men in 
Washington, DC after Congress passed the Nixon administration’s measure, but it 
persisted once the 1984 Act instituted pretrial detention nationally. 13 The legislation also 
obliterated the federal parole system by requiring judges to use “truth in sentencing” 
stipulations without the possibility for early release. Detailed guidelines developed by the 
United States Sentencing Commission included a mandatory minimum of five years in 
prison for any person who used a firearm in connection with a violent crime or terrorists 
who damaged domestic aircraft.14  As a result of the sentencing provisions contained in 
the Act, the average prison sentence increased thirty-three percent, from forty-six months 
in 1980 to sixty-one months in 1986.15 The legislation also moved narcotics violations 
from the criminal to the civil realm so that offenders could be tried in a court system with 
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a lower burden of proof, and allowed local police departments to seize as much as ninety 
percent of cash and property from accused drug dealers.16 
The forfeiture provisions introduced by the 1984 Act brought the federal 
government, local police departments, and civilian whistle blowers lucrative returns from 
the assets of drug dealers and other criminals. Nixon’s Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 included a civil forfeiture clause, but the practice 
lead to the substantial budgetary increases in local law enforcement after the 1984 
amendments allowed police departments to keep the majority of the proceeds. Many state 
and local governments initially resisted this massive imposition on limited local resources 
to fight a war that eluded serious and violent crime. However, the promise of huge cash 
grants obtained through forfeiture subdued the views among some local officials that the 
War on Drugs violated states’ rights and local control. After the legislation passed, gross 
receipts of all seizures increased from one hundred million dollars to over one billion 
within three years. 17 As Vice President Bush said:  “We can use the criminals’ own 
property to help finance law enforcement.” 18 Sharing the federal forfeiture surplus with 
state and local governments would advance the entire system and improve state-level 
investigations.  
Although federal law enforcement agencies supported small-scale sting and 
fencing operations beginning in the mid-1970s, forfeiture practices in the 1980s 
encouraged major operations leading to the arrest of thousands more. Even if a suspect 
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was acquitted his property was still subject to forfeiture, and the provision hit low-income 
Americans unable to afford adequate representation the hardest. While Washington, DC’s 
“Operation Got Ya Again” led to the detainment of 250 suspects in 1974; by 1988 Miami 
police arrested five thousand suspects in a single sting.19 The federal government helped 
to make crime in order to fight crime; by the end of the Reagan administration and 
beyond, crime and violence in the United States had fully emerged as mutually 
reinforcing.   
The dismantling of the LEAA meant police departments only received federal 
benefits for drug-related programs.20 While making the War on Drugs a local priority, the 
federal government offered patrol officers training in narcotics investigations to increase 
arrest levels. The Drug Enforcement Agency launched Operation Pipeline in 1984, 
teaching representatives from more than three hundred state and local law enforcement 
agencies how to turn a routine traffic stop into an opportunity to conduct a drug search by 
manipulating consent from a reluctant suspect.21 This practice, known as a “pretext” 
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traffic stop, encouraged racial profiling and proved to be an important tactic in the War 
on Drugs. The majority of drug-related searches that started with a routine traffic stop did 
not end in possession charges, but the practice meant that the drug war loomed heavily 
over segregated urban areas that were already under extreme surveillance.  
In anticipation of the next major frontier of the national crime control program, 
the Reagan administration reestablished federal law enforcement assistance for prison 
construction. During the Ford and Carter presidencies and Reagan’s first term, the prison 
population at the state level ballooned from 204,000 inmates to 400,000. The cost of each 
new bed, ranging from thirty thousand to ninety thousand dollars, posed a strain on state 
governments that federal policymakers believed required special attention.22 While 
ending the practice of block grants for police departments and court systems, the 1984 
Act established a national clearinghouse at the Department of Justice to assist states in 
expanding penal institutions via general purpose funds. Indeed, the legislation 
represented what Senator Strom Thurmond championed as the “beginning of a new era” 
in law enforcement, coinciding with the launch of the private prison industry: the 
Corrections Corporation of America opened its first for-profit facility in Texas that 
year.23  
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With parole eviscerated, new sentencing practices in place, and public and private 
prison construction underway, the Reagan Administration could fully reconfigure the 
federal government’s two-decades long War on Crime as the War on Drugs. In doing so, 
the president established tougher penalties for federal drug offenses and stronger money 
laundering laws. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, or the “Drug Free America Act” as 
Reagan called it, doubled federal spending on the criminal justice system during the 
Administration’s first term and tripled drug enforcement resources so that national 
expenditures on criminal justice reached an all-time high of nearly three and a half billion 
dollars.24  In April 1986, Reagan transformed drugs into a matter of national security by 
issuing National Security Decision Directive 221.25 By framing narcotics trafficking and 
consumption as a threat to the national well being, the policy strengthened cooperation 
among local, state, and federal law enforcement with defense institutions. Although 
Reagan placed the issue of narcotics treatment and education at the center of his “national 
crusade against drugs” when he spoke to the American public, in practice the nine 
hundred million dollars allocated by Congress for drug abuse programs went mostly for 
the purchase of helicopters, airplanes, and intelligence-gathering facilities.26  
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Reagan’s form of “New Federalism” broke sharply from Nixon’s when it came to 
social policy, and the administration refused to offer major law enforcement assistance 
programs. Given the dismal track record of the LEAA and the President’s penchant for 
centralized power and privatization, the Reagan administration formed crime control 
boards and committees as an alternative to block grants and major bureaucratic 
institutions. In 1987, Reagan convened a National Drug Policy Board by Executive 
Order. Chaired by Attorney General Ed Meese, the former White House counselor during 
Reagan’s first term, the Board brought together the Secretaries of Defense, State, 
Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Education, the CIA Director, the National 
Security Advisor, and other relevant cabinet officials and consultants to coordinate all 
activities concerning public safety needs. 27  
The terms of the 1988 Act prohibited the Board from awarding “restrictive 
categorical grants” or, “attaching conditions to Federal grants that are unrelated to the 
purpose of the grants; detracting from the Administration’s zero tolerance policy; and 
establishing highly prescriptive and burdensome requirements for certification of private 
laboratories.”28 To implement the Board’s policies and bring together officials at all 
levels of government, the legislation established law enforcement coordinating 
committees, chaired by United States Attorneys, in every judicial district. 29  
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The Drug Policy Board’s first annual report to the President reinforced the larger 
directives of the Reagan administration with respect to crime control and drug 
enforcement. It prepared to carry forth some of Reagan’s most controversial strategies. “I 
join the Chairman in emphasizing that we cannot tolerate criminals who violate our 
borders, terrorize our communities, or poison our citizens,” Reagan announced when he 
received the report from Meese to great media fanfare in June 1988, “likewise, we cannot 
tolerate drug users who provide the illegal market for the drugs or who benefit from the 
taxpayers’ generosity through Federal grants, contracts, or loans.”30 The board 
recommended greater accountability for drug users by making federal student loans 
“conditional upon a college’s adopting an effective anti-drug program,” and withdrawing 
federal student aid from those convicted of drug offenses. 31 At the end of his 
administration, through mandatory drug testing for all federal employees and the refusal 
to award drug users federal grants or assistance, Reagan enabled the War on Drugs to 
exert authority over every facet of American life within its reach.32  
During the Reagan administration the Supreme Court emerged as “a loyal foot 
soldier in the Executive’s fight against crime,” as Justice John Paul Stevens noted.33 The 
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police fought the primary battles of domestic social war during its initial phase, but as the 
national crime control program evolved from the mid-1970s onward, juridical institutions 
worked with federal, state, and local law enforcement to make the court process swift and 
sure and prison sentences severe. In the 1980s, the court not only compromised the 
Fourth Amendment by upholding the constitutionality of a number of unreasonable 
search and seizures, but it defended racial bias in the law enforcement and criminal 
justice systems.34  
* 
While the federal government focused on strengthening patrol at the nation’s 
borders, it also witnessed a substantial rise in homelessness, eliminated half a million 
families from welfare rolls, and declared one million Americans ineligible for Food 
Stamps.35 The poverty rate drastically increased during the Reagan administration, from 
fifteen percent in 1975 to twenty three percent by 1987. 36 Clamping down on basic social 
services as deindustrialization peaked in metropolitan centers stimulated the expansion of 
underground economies that sustained themselves via narcotics trafficking.  In Los 
Angeles, the recession from 1979 to 1982 completely wiped out the industrial 
manufacturing sector, and dealing crack evolved into an employment option of last 
resort.37 Ultimately, Reagan responded to the devastating impact of deindustrialization 
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and urban divestment as it materialized in the crack epidemic by attacking social welfare 
programs and replacing them with punitive and carceral programs.  
Included among the twenty-nine mandatory minimums Reagan’s Anti-Drug 
Abuses Act of 1986 imposed were sentences for “offenses involving one hundred grams 
of heroin, five hundred grams of cocaine or five grams of cocaine freebase known as 
crack.”38 As drug-related arrest skyrocketed, the disproportionate number of black 
Americans who abused crack rather than powder cocaine rendered the law virtual 
“apartheid sentencing.”39 In the same year that Reagan’s Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984 passed, when income inequality had returned to higher levels than the nation 
experienced before World War II, the crystalline rock form of cocaine, or crack, visibly 
emerged in the streets and public housing projects of “high crime” urban areas, the same 
neighborhoods that caused policymakers great concern from the riots onwards.40  
Although Reagan pledged to aim the drug crusade at major kingpins, in practice 
the domestic social war led to the mass incarceration of black and Latino men, who 
compromised as much as ninety percent of new inmates for drug offenses in many 
states.41 Most of those arrested on narcotics charges were eventually dismissed, and most 
of the cases judges tried did not involve hard drugs. By the 1990s, nearly eighty percent 
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of drug arrests were for possession of marijuana.42 Moreover, the massive amount of 
public support Reagan’s drug crusade received was not based upon an actual shift in drug 
use.43 Instead, the perception of drug use as a major domestic problem arose from the 
way the media reported the Administration’s crime control policy. 
Extensive news coverage of “thugs” and “crackheads” fueled the engine of mass 
incarceration and the racial discrepancies within it. For policymakers, crack abuse was 
the root cause of violence in the inner city, the deterioration of housing projects, and the 
rise of urban gangs employing highly sophisticated weapons. 44 Just as the House 
allocated two billion dollars to the War on Drugs in 1986, Time Magazine anointed the 
crack phenomenon the “issue of the year” and Newsweek called it “an authentic national 
crisis.”45 
In the era of multiculturalism, when conservatives declared that civil rights gains 
had solved historical inequality, the Supreme Court tacitly endorsed racism in the 
criminal justice system. The Court’s ruling in 1987’s McCleskey v. Kemp declared racial 
bias in law enforcement acceptable for the sake of public safety. Sentenced to the death 
penalty for killing a white Atlanta police officer, Warren McCleskey appealed on the 
grounds that the all-white jury administered the verdict in a racially discriminatory 
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manner. The Court upheld McCleskey’s execution. “If we accepted McCleskey's claim 
that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision,” the majority 
opinion stated, “we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of 
penalty.”46 The alarming statistics McCleskey’s lawyers produced on racial discrepancies 
in Georgia sentencing failed to persuade the Court. “In order to successfully challenge 
racial bias in the criminal justice process, offenders would need to prove that discretion 
had been abused or that law enforcement enacted or maintained a statute because of an 
anticipated racially discriminatory effect.”47 The decision preserved the role of racial 
profiling in the criminal justice process, and particularly the discretion of police officers 
to interrogate potential suspects. Not surprisingly, courts used the McCleskey precedent 
to absolve the system from charges of racial discrimination in crack sentencing laws.48  
* 
When Ronald and Nancy Reagan invited more than a thousand concerned citizens 
to the White House Conference for a Drug Free America in early 1988, Reagan could 
boast of his administration’s accomplishments. Drug convictions had doubled since 1979. 
Prison sentences were forty-percent longer. 49 The federal government had seized 
hundreds of millions of property gained through the drug trade. The military provided 
sixteen thousand hours of air surveillance and 2,500 ships to assist in the fight, and 
twenty-three countries now worked with the United States in drug eradication programs, 
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up from just two foreign nations in 1981. 50 The demise of the LEAA increased the 
funding for the FBI more than fourfold (from eighty-six million dollars in 1981 to 181 
million in 1991), generously expanded the Drug Enforcement Agency (from a budget of 
eighty six million to more than a hundred million), enlarged antidrug allocation for the 
Department of Defense (from thirty-three million to more than a hundred million) and 
increased the United States Bureau of Prisons by thirty percent.51 Internationally, 
Reagan’s anti-drug crusade had only stimulated international trade and production, as 
cocaine imports increased by fifty percent between 1982 and 1984. When sixty-three tons 
of cocaine came into the United States in 1984, the price of the drug reduced drastically, 
bringing the availability and affordability of heroin down with it. 52  
By 1988, crack was a profound and devastating expression of what had changed 
from the earlier period covered by this dissertation. In urban landscapes undergoing 
deindustrialization, deteriorated and abandoned buildings made ideal spaces for crack 
dealers, who set up twenty-four hour centers for consumption, sales, and distribution. The 
problem was concentrated in housing projects especially, where, a decade prior, Carter 
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had launched his integrated approach to urban and crime policy.53 One resident of New 
York’s Winbrook complex described living conditions in the housing project where drug 
sales flourished: “At night, when people are trying to rest, hallways are being used for 
smoking crack, stairwells are being slept in, elevators are being mutilated with people 
using them for personal bathrooms… There are brand new doors that have been put on 
that have been taken off.” 54 Officials estimated that 97,000 young people under the age 
of sixteen used crack heavily in New York state, the majority of whom lived in 
subsidized housing. 55  
 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 required that public housing projects remain 
drug-free, and included provisions to terminate the lease of public housing tenants who 
abused narcotics. Under the terms of the policy, any tenant who engaged in illegal 
activity in the vicinity of a public housing site could be evicted, and any person convicted 
of a drug offense would be permanently eliminated from all federal benefits. If the 
previous attempts to increase patrol and surveillance authority in low-income urban 
areas—first through the “defensible space” initiatives during the Nixon and Ford 
administrations, then through Carter’s Urban Anti-Crime Program—the 1988 legislation 
intensified the criminalization of racially marginalized communities.  
To meet the lofty “zero tolerance” goals of Reagan’s drug war, urban law 
enforcement agencies resorted to extreme measures to achieve results, as high arrest 
levels guaranteed additional federal funds. Local police officers worked with federal 
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officials during the summer of 1986 to seize the cars of drug buyers.56 The following year 
in Cleveland, the police department encouraged undercover drug dealing officers to 
operate in black communities. One informant testified before a federal grand jury that he 
made more than half a million dollars in drug sales and returned all of the money to the 
Cleveland police department, which funneled the cash into a larger sting operation. 57  The 
department’s designation of black neighborhoods in the city for undercover crack dealers 
prompted the NAACP and civil liberties organizations to call for an investigation. 
Funded with federal and state drug control grants, these operations were key to sustaining 
and creating criminal networks to feed the expanding prison system. 
Continuing the law enforcement practices of STRESS and other tactical squads in 
the 1970s, the most radical decoy practices in the 1980s emerged in Southeast Florida, 
where Bush’s interdiction system battled traffickers. After two sergeants and a small 
group of Miami police officers began selling drugs undercover in the spring of 1986, the 
officers took over crack houses and established themselves as dealers in the city’s black 
and Latino neighborhoods. 58  As a means to curtail open drug markets like the public 
housing provision, Miami’s crack sting operations recalled the controversial tactical 
police units and fencing decoys launched during the Nixon and Ford era. In Fort 
Lauderdale, police recorded the license plates of cars entering communities under 
                                                   
56 ibid.  
57 Sharon Jefferson, “NAACP Calls for Investigation,” Call and Post, 22 Jan 1987, 1A. 
58 Peter Kerr, “Police Use New Tactic to Deter Drug Buyer,” New York Times, 21 Feb 1987, 5.  
  
368 
surveillance and promptly mailed letters to the owners notifying them that their vehicle 
was present in a drug zone.59  
The Sherriff’s Office in Broward and Polk counties took these practices further by 
manufacturing and distributing their own crack supply. On the seventh floor of the county 
courthouse, the Broward Sherriff’s Office used 2.2 pounds of powered cocaine obtained 
via seizure to produce twenty thousand dollars worth of street-value crack. 60  Within two 
months, the department made some 2,300 arrests by dealing its own drug. 61 In Polk 
County, the Sherriff’s Office manufactured eleven ounces of crack to compensate for the 
insufficient supply it obtained during seizures and arrest sweeps. Responding to charges 
of entrapment, Polk County spokesman Con Dougherty concluded, “These are people 
who went out on the streets to buy crack. They’re addicts.”62 A number of cases had been 
dismissed due to the possession of bogus crack, and law enforcement theory held that if 
police departments themselves made the drug, district attorneys could better prosecute 
users.  
Rhetorically, the Reagan administration fought its domestic social war to “crack 
down on the drug users—from the kid on the street to the beautiful people in Beverly 
Hills,” as Bush promised in Connecticut early in his presidential bid. But the terms of the 
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1988 Act concentrated resources on the former “high risk” user. 63 Given the reported 
extent of adolescent drug abuse, the Office of Juvenile Delinquency Prevention (one of 
the remaining vestiges of the national law enforcement program during the Nixon and 
Ford years) worked so that the federal government would “specifically designate ‘high 
risk youth’ as a primary target group” in its Anti-Drug Abuse Act.64 Reagan’s cabinet-
level drug committee also shared the Department of Justice’s priority, seeking to foster 
“the commitment of resources targeted at high-risk youth (defined as children from low-
income households, runaways, drop-outs, products of dysfunctional families, and 
juveniles in the criminal justice system) through joint public-private job opportunities and 
educational assistance programs.” 65 
Reagan comfortably signed the 1988 Act ten days after his vice president 
achieved electoral victory knowing that the direction of federal law enforcement 
programs would continue to unfold as White House officials had wished. For the Reagan 
administration and Congress, the drug trade and drug traffickers placed America “under 
siege,” and the president believed the legislation gave law enforcement officials “just the 
weapons they need to fight an effective war.” 66  
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During his presidential campaign, which had placed a critique of prison furlough 
programs and the image of black convicts front-and center, Bush looked towards 
innovative new ways to expand the nation’s carceral institutions while cutting the cost of 
imprisonment. Worried about the severe problem of prison overcrowding, Bush endorsed 
lease-purchase arrangements, whereby private firms built correctional facilities and 
leased them back to the federal government in the long term. “This approach would 
enable us to bring new institutions into operation much more quickly and would allow the 
government involved to spread out its acquisition costs over 20 or 30 years,” Bush 
hoped.67 To house new offenders entering correctional institutions without further 
straining state resources, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act proposed using civil property seized 
in forfeitures to fund prison construction.68 By the time Bush took office, the national 
crime control program had become fully self-perpetuating. 
* 
Although youth gangs first emerged as a national issue when the federal 
government established its major juvenile delinquency programs in the mid-1970s, by the 
late 1980s they had reached epic proportions. In Los Angeles, where gang warfare was 
responsible for a reported two deaths a day on average, South Central “could be the set 
for some B-picture about the world after a nuclear apocalypse—a nightmare landscape 
inhabited by marauding thugs and hard-nosed cops, a world in which innocence is 
hostage to violence and bystanders too often wind up as victims,” as Newsweek magazine 
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began its major expose on “The Drug Gangs” in March 1988.69 Crack had transformed 
“some of the country’s toughest street gangs into ghetto-based drug-trafficking 
organizations” that resorted to a new form of “urban guerrilla warfare,” and not the type 
exhibited by riot participants in the 1960s. 70 Even though the five thousand members 
who belonged to the Jamaican Posse gang accounted for sixty percent of the crack supply 
in the United States by some estimates, the media chose to focus on black American 
gangs in their coverage of the trade.71 With a reported forty to fifty thousand members, 
the Crips and the Bloods helped make Los Angeles the “street gang capital of the world.” 
The days of Molotov cocktails and “Saturday Night Specials” were of a different era; 
gang members now carried Uzis, Mac-10 machine guns, and semi-automatic rifles. 72  
Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates established the LAPD’s Community 
Resources Against Street Hoodlums (CRASH) in the late 1970s to fight the rising 
problem of gang violence in South and East Los Angeles. In practice, however, the 
CRASH units exacerbated community warfare. Just as the FBI’s COINTELPRO program 
exploited ideological rifts among black radicals in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
CRASH teams provoked disputes between rival gangs. The officers encouraged Crip sets 
to walk on the street openly armed so members could be easily arrested.73 They used 
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incarceration as a threat to reap information in exchange for law enforcement favors.74  
And they resorted to driving members to enemy neighborhoods and yelling “Crip” to 
create an opportunity for a street battle. 75 The relationship between the paramilitary 
urban gangs and the paramilitary police force was mutually reinforcing: the War on 
Drugs and post-industrial violence justified and sustained the expansion of the nation’s 
penal and juridical institutions.   
Two years after the anti-drug abuse Act of 1986 gave local departments broad 
new authority to fight the War on Drugs, the elite CRASH force had perfected the art of 
mass arrests. The series of police sweeps the force conducted reached their height in the 
spring of 1988, when one thousand officers swept through South Central in a caravan of 
patrol cars on a Friday night and made another round of sweeps the next day. More than 
fourteen hundred predominately black residents faced arrests for traffic citations, parking 
fines, curfew violations, outstanding warrants, “gang-related behaviors,” and drunk 
driving. In order to avoid further straining the county jails, the officers booked suspects in 
mobile units across the street from Memorial Coliseum. The police classified more than 
half of the suspects as gang members but filed charges against only thirty-two of the 
residents. The sweep merely established and extended criminal justice records for the 
other 1,421 detainees.76 Law enforcement authorities claimed that Operation Hammer 
had substantially reduced the gang problem, and mass arrests on random weekends 
persisted in South Central and spread to San Fernando Valley, although subsequent 
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sweeps involved a smaller force of one to two hundred officers. 77 The last major episode 
in Operation Hammer occurred one August weekend in 1989, when the CRASH force 
arrested 352 suspects in South Central after a fifty-six year old woman was injured during 
a drive-by shooting. 78 
While Lieutenant Bruce Hagerty and other officers involved in Operation 
Hammer believed their actions helped “to return to streets to the citizens,” black residents 
and mainstream civil rights organizations spoke out against the devastating impact of the 
paramilitary sweeps. 79  Community members recognized that the program promoted 
racist law enforcement practices by encouraging officers to act on the assumption that all 
black men in low-income neighborhoods in Los Angeles fit the “gang profile.” Because 
most of the residents who were rounded up, assaulted, and arrested during the Operation 
never served prison or jail time, the program seemed to have little point other than 
meeting arrest quotas and making future convictions more likely by establishing criminal 
records. 80 “Those youngsters know you can’t put them all in jail,” Charles Norman, the 
director of Los Angeles’s Community Youth Gang Services remarked of the sweeps, 
“And when they go in the jail, they come back a little meaner and a lot tougher, and the 
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problem just gets worse.” 81  Regardless of whether programs like Operation Hammer 
effectively contained the problem of violence in segregated urban communities—an issue 
that only spread in the decade after gangs and drugs emerged as major national issues—
mass arrests ensured that young residents in targeted communities would be in constant 
contact with crime control institutions.   
Although support for Operation Hammer waned in the face of critique and 
controversy, the Los Angeles police department quickly devised an approach based less 
on paramilitary practices and more on “defensible space.” Although Operation Hammer 
was the most profound expression of the use of paramilitary police force in the name of 
gang prevention, in places like Miami, Phoenix, Washington, and Chicago beginning in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, barricades, sawhorses, and concrete barriers emerged in 
black “high crime” neighborhoods in an attempt to monitor the everyday lives of 
residents.  
The Los Angeles Police Department initiated the most substantial defensible 
space program in 1990, called “Operation Cul de Sac.” The city hoped to limit gang 
members from selling drugs by putting up permanent barricades to create an “artificial 
community.” The resulting carceral environment blocked off streets from non-residents 
and provided officers the means to easily occupy a neighborhood should circumstances 
require additional security. The department erected barricades in a dozen neighborhoods, 
the largest of which stood across the street from Jefferson High School in South Central’s 
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apex. 82 Federal officials participated in the early development of the cutting-edge 
program. William Bennett, Reagan’s former Secretary of Education and President Bush’s 
Director of the Office of Drug Control Policy, visited the cite of the largest Cul de Sac 
operation to oversee its development and to meet with the principal of Jefferson High 
School.83 
The Cul de Sac measure enhanced the ability of law enforcement to monitor 
potential criminals. A black youth living in the barricaded area stated: “This just allows 
the police to do whatever they want here. We have to answer their questions and submit 
to the harassment whether or not we are in a gang. It is all legal.” 84 The heightened 
presence of patrol meant that officers could tell residents relaxing on their porches to go 
inside their homes. The barricades meant that residents were more likely to get pulled 
over and arrested in a pretext stop, and they prevented emergency vehicles from entering 
the area in the event of a serious injury. The general level of surveillance “defensible 
space” fostered in this form meant that if residents planned a gathering, they ran the risk 
of having it broken up by the police.  
In claiming that Operation Cul de Sac had brought drive-bys down by eighty-six 
percent, the police department and the federal government moved to make permanent 
barriers in communities where the drug transactions proliferated. 85 No matter that the 
program cost the LAPD thirty thousand dollars a month in overtime, and that many 
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police in neighboring communities complained that increased surveillance in South 
Central merely redirected the drug trade to places like Long Beach. And while the black 
press closely followed the Operation and harshly critiqued it in editorials and exposes 
(the Los Angeles Sentinel observed, the measure “automatically associates all teen-age 
youth in the barricaded zone with [criminal] activity”) many residents supported the 
police department in its stated effort to ensure public safety. 86  
It was in this punitive milieu that Los Angeles faced the largest incident of urban 
civil disorder in the twentieth century, when low-income residents burned, cleaned out 
businesses, and attacked civilians in April 1992. Imagine if public institutions responded 
to the request for jobs and improved schools, housing, and recreational facilities twenty 
local gang leaders demanded when they met with the Los Angeles County Board of 
Supervisors back in 1974—just after Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act.87 Thereafter, the majority of federal grants for low-income 
youth focused on juvenile detention facilities, security hardware, and social programs 
staffed by police officers rather than the vocational and educational opportunities the 
gang leaders wanted. The federal government’s resistance to these types of socio-
economic solutions from the Watts riot in 1965 through the Los Angeles uprising in 1992 
informs the question of the purpose the national crime control program and the mass 
incarceration it spawned might have served to the political and economic institutions at 
the foundation of the United States.    
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Today more than one in a hundred Americans are currently in prison or jail, an 
outcome of the development of the federal policies examined in this dissertation.88 
During the War on Poverty, black Americans comprised roughly one-third of the prison 
population. The Wars on Crime and Drugs inflated their numbers to over half of those 
incarcerated in the American prison system, which expanded fivefold from 1965 to 
1988.89 In total, two-thirds of these inmates today are African American and Latino.90 
The first twenty years of federal investment in law enforcement cultivated a particular 
type of social control, one that seems to signal that the targeted arrest of nonwhite 
Americans and the subsequent creation of new industries to support that systemic process 
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